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Written materials and oral presentations offered through the University of Kentucky College of
Law Office of Continuing Legal Education (UK/CLE) are designed to assist lawyers in maintain-
ing their professional competence. The Office of Continuing Legal Education and its volunteer -
speakers and writers are not rendering legal or other professional services by their participation in
continuing legal education activities. Attorneys and others using information obtained from UK/
CLE publications or seminars must also fully research original and current sources of authority to
properly serve their or their client's legal interests. The forms and sample documents contained in
our continuing legal education publications are intended for use only in conjunction with the
professional services and advice of licensed attorneys. All parties must cautiously consider whether -
a particular form or document is suited to specific needs. The legal research presented herein is
believed to be accurate, but is not warranted to be so. These written materials and the comments
of speakers in presentation of these materials may contain expressions of opinion which do not
necessarily reflect the views of the Office of Continuing Legal Education, the University of Ken-
tucky, the Commonwealth of Kentucky, or other governmental authorities. UK/CLE strives to
make its written materials and speaker presentations gender-neutral; however, gender-specific
references may remain where it would otherwise be awkward or unclear. It should be understood
that in such references the female includes the male, and vice-versa.
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THE NEED FOR UNIFORMITY
Infonnation technology accounts for more than one-third of the nation's economic
growth and is the most rapidly expanding component of the U.S. economy. According to
the U.S. Department of Commerce, 1 by 2006, almost half of the U.S. Workforce will be
employed by industries that are either major producers of intensive users of infonnation
technology products and services. These employees average $53;000 annual
compensation compared to $30,000 for all employees of private employers. Until now,
however, there has been no law providing clear, consistent and unifonn rules governing
the intangibles of transactions involving computer infonnation.
Few question the need for unifonn rules. Everyone who has actively studied the issue
concludes that unifonn rules are required. Those unifonn rules can either be achieved by
Unifonn State Laws where contract law has traditionally resided or by federal
preemption. Congress has a number of bills now before it that would preempt parts of
state contract law. Most states also are seeing more ad hoc bills on e-commerce.
In the early 90's a federal task force on Intellectual Property in the National Infonnation
Infrastructure (NIl) concluded:
"[the] challenge for commercial law.. .is to adapt to the reality of the NIl by
providing clear guidance as to the rights and responsibilities of those using the
NIl. Without certainty in electronic contracting, the NIl will not fulfill its
commercial potential."
The White House issued a paper on July 1, 1997 that found: "Many businesses and
consumers are still wary of conducting extensive business over the Internet
because of a lack ofa predictable legal environment governing transactions.,,2
The report notes the work of the Conference and states:
"The administration supports the prompt consideration of these [unifonn state
law] proposals, and the adoption ofunifonn legislation by all states.,,3
I U.S. Department of Commerce, "The Emerging Digital Economy II" (issued June 1999).
2 A framework for Global Electronic Commerce, http://iitf.nist.gov/eleccomm/ecomm.htm, at page 2.
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The Conference Communique for Global Business Dialogue on Electronic Commerce
(GBDe) 4 states:
"We came together today for this inaugural conference of the GBDe in order to
express our collective sense of urgency with respect to addressing electronic
commerce issues by businesses and public authorities worldwide... It is the
consensus position of the GBDe that inconsistent local, national and international
patchwork regulation and inflexible regulatory constraints will deprive consumers
of the economic benefits of an innovative electronic marketplace and would lead
to significant uncertainty to consumers. Governments, administrations,
parliaments and international organizations around the world are beginning to
question the applicability of traditional, national legislative approaches to this
new medium, which is uniquely swift and borderless. They are challenging us to
develop effective self-regulatory and market-driven· mechanisms that are not
limited to national border, to address critical policy issues... We have drawn up
proposals and criteria that will create a practical and flexible - where needed -
legal and effective market-driven framework that promotes an. open and
frictionless global marketplace. Existing barriers must be overcome. In that
process, we give precedence to effective self-regulation and technological
solutions, where possible. In special cases, where regulation may be considered
essential, any intervention of public authorities should be narrowll tailored,
internationally-oriented, transparent and aiming a level playing field."
Hal Burman, Office of Legal Adviser, Department of State, at an American Law Institute
meeting, emphasized the great importance of a consistent U.S. legal framework in order
to succeed in international negotiations:
"Our ability to extend and protect United States interests in a globalized economy
- and electronic commerce is the epitome of that globalized economy - depends
entirely on our ability to proceed from a basis of some commonality in state law.
If there is any substantial delay [in completing UeITA] that will impair our
effort... , other countries...are going to take the lead." (transcript, pp.145-6)
The need for uniformity is illustrated by the following common event: a business person
is flying somewhere over the United States using his or her laptop computer, connecting
with a database. The exact location of the airplane is unknown, as is the location of the
servers, or the holder of the database. A license is proposed. The business person
accesses the database which may be copyrighted. Among the many questions are: Is the
holder of the database the owner or authorized by the owner to tranfer the database? Has
3 id at page 5.
4 An international meeting of70 CEO's or Board members, 110 government officials and representatives of
international multilateral organizations. Principal presenters and participants included Mozelle Thompson,
FTC; Sanford Lituach, The Walt Disney Co.; Richard Brown, EDS; Steve Case, AOL; Louis Gerstner,
IBM; David House, Nortel; Lew Platt, Hewlett Packard; and Bert Roberts, MCIWorld Com.
S Conference Communique dated September 13, 1999.
http://www.gbde.orglconference/recommendations.html.
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a valid license been agree to? What are the tenns of the license? What warranties arise?
What are the applicable standards of perfonnance? Who are the parties to the contract
(license)? Have the identities of the parties been adequately established? What law
applies? What states have jurisdiction in the event of a dispute? If the database holder is
without authority, is the business person an infringer of the copyright?
Under current laws, these and many other questions are not answered clearly, consistently
and unifonnly. Thus, there might be a valid and enforceable contract (license) or tenns
of a contract in one state but not another. The chaos in a national and international
Internet is self-evident and wholly unacceptable.
The void can be filled either by Unifonn State Laws with its integration into existing
state contract law or Congress can impose unifonn rules but likely without adequate
provision to coordinate with, and integrate into, existing state contract law.
AD HOC STATE DIGITAL SIGNATURES ACTS
States have been enacting digital signature acts of various tYles and fonns to facilitate e-
commerce in their states. Presently, 47 states have done so.
But individual and disparate rules by each state, that are not unifonn, do not serve the
needs of interstate and global commerce nor facilitate the realization of the full potential
of the Infonnation Age.
FEDERAL LEGISLAnON
Congress has taken an active interest in facilitating interstate e-commerce by federal
preemption of ad hoc state statutes.
On the House side, H.R. 1714 was approved with Congressman Tom Bliley as the Patron.
And on the Senate side, S.761 was passed with Senator Abraham as the patron. The first
is entitled "Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act" and the second
"Millennium Digital Commerce Act."
Both bills would preempt state law for interstate e-commerce. Both would exclude some
transactions such as those under the revised UCC articles, family law, wills and trusts,
governmental transactions, health care decisions, court orders, etc. Much of the present
definitions and language of these bills follow UETA. Both would substantially lift the
preemption if a state enacts UETA.
These bills are presently in Conference. There is a significant likelihood that Congress
will enact some kind of preemptive bill this year. A good comparison of the two bills is
available at the NJ Law Revision Commission website. 7
6 See www.mbc.com for listings of the various state enactments.
7 http://www.lawrev.state.nj.us/fedbill.htm.
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NCCUSL E-COMMERCE UNIFORM ACTS
Over the last two decades, NCCUSL has been actively engaged in developing appropriate
uniform e-commerce rules for particular substantive transactions:
(a) UCC Article 4A for e-commerce funds transfers (wholesale wire transfers)
was promulgated in 1989 and now is enacted in all 50 states as well as being
incorporated into CHIPS (Clearing House International Payments System),
Fedwire (Federal Reserve Board) and NACHA (National Automated Clearing
House Association).
(b) Revised UCC Articles 3 and 4 promulgated in 1990 in part to modernize
check collections for electronic transactions (check truncation) which has
been enacted in all but three states.
(c) Revised UCC Article 8 promulgated in 1994 in part to modernize to
accommodate indirect electronic holding of securities which is now enacted in
47 states.
(d) Revised UCC Article 5 promulgated in 1995 in part to cover electronic Letters
of Credit which has now been enacted in 43 states.
(e) Revised UCC Article 9 promulgated in 1998 in part to accommodate
electronic filings. It already has been enacted in six states with rapid
consideration and enactment by many other states anticipated in 2000.
UETA and UCITA are further steps by NCCUSL in developing e-commerce rules
appropriate for particular transactions.
UETA
The Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (VETA) was promulgated in 1999 by
NCCUSL has a limited mission: to enable e-commerce in transactions outside of the
Uniform Commercial Code and UCITA. It will apply to UCC Articles 2 and 2A (goods)
until the project to update those Articles for e-commerce are completed and enacted by
the various states. In short, UETA applies to non-UCC transactions.
UETA simply provides that an "electronic signature" and an "electronic record" are
effective as signatures and as writings if the parties have so agreed. All substantive law
concerning the transaction remains wholly in place. The objective of UETA is to make
sure that transactions in the electronic marketplace are as enforceable as transactions
memorialized on paper and with manual signature, without changing any of the
substantive rules of law that apply. An electronic record of a transaction is the equivalent
of a paper record and an electronic signature is given the same legal effect as a manual
signature.
A-4
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The basic provisions ofVETA are:
• Section 7 simply states that "a record of signature may not be denied legal
effect or enforceability solely because it is in electronic form."
• Excluded from its scope are the revised VCC Articles, wills and trusts, and
other laws a state wishes to exclude.
• All other substantive law rules (Section 103(d)) continue to apply including
rules for posting, notice, disclosure and content rules (Section 8(c)).
• Electronic signatures and records only apply if the parties have agreed to
transaction electronically (Section 5).
• "Transferable records" (notes and documents under UCC Articles 3 and 7) are
accommodated to facilitate the current bundling of such documents for
financing of such transactions. Section 16 gives legal certainty for such
transactions.
• Sections 17, 18, and 19 provide authorization and procedures for electronic
transactions with state agencies. The sections are in brackets to indicate that
they are appropriate for states that have not othernise made provisions to
authorize their state agencies to facilitate the efficiencies of electronic
transaction between parties and governmental agencies.
See the attached summary ofVETA
VETA has been enacted already in two states: Pennsylvania and California. VETA has
been introduced as a bill in 18 other states so far in 2000. It is anticipated it will be
enacted in many of these 18 states, and others in which it may be introduced later this
year.
UCITA
The Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA) was promulgated by
NCCVSL also in 1999, but not fully styled for introduction until December. UCITA
covers:
• Software contracts and licenses
• On-line access to databases
• Contracts to distribute information over the Internet
• Contracts to create computer programs
VCITA has been introduced so far in five states: Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Oklahoma
and Virginia. It is anticipated that bills will be introduced in additional states in 2000.
UCITA has been passed by both Houses in Virginia (House: 95-2; Senate: 39 - 0) The
Governor has announced he will sign the VCITA bill.
In Maryland, the Speaker and President of the Senate are principal Patrons of the UCITA
Bills and have placed it on the priority legislative agenda. The Bar Associations of
A-5
Delaware and Washington have approved favorable reports on UCITA endorsing its
enactment.
A. WHY UCITA?
• America is in the Information Age. Information technology already accounts for
more than one-third of the U.S. economy and is, by far, its most rapidly growing
sector.
• This new information-based economy will to reach its full potential without
predictable rules of commercial law. The Uniform Commercial Code, Article 2,
governs commercial transactions in tangible goods, but there are no comparable
uniform state rules today for computer information and Internet (e-commerce)
contracting. This unfortunate state of affairs is an open invitation to confusion,
controversy and litigation that will inevitably slow economic growth.
• The Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA) addresses this
need. It lays down clear, fair rules for electronic contracting that are a major
improvement over the status quo for businesses, whether licensorsllicensees or
sellers/buyers, and for consumers.
• UCITA is about jobs, wealth creation and global leadership. It is not a set of
academic answers to legal quibbles.
• UCITA was produced in an open, thoughtful, even-handed process. The National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) spent a decade
studying and debating the issues, publishing drafts and receiving public comment
before finally approving UCITA, by a vote of 43 states to six. The Commissioners
are distinguished judges, law professors and practicing lawyers who are appointed by
and answerable to their states' Governors and legislatures. Their conclusions deserve
a strong presumption of fairness and correctness.
• UCITA is a product of compromise that, like every compromise, fully satisfies no
one, but, on balance, is very fair. Some consumer representatives want more
consumer protections; some vendors want fewer. Some corporate information
technology managers criticize UCITA as unfairly restrictive while their o\Vn lawyers
endorse it as far better than current law. NCCUSL thoughtfully balanced these and
other competing interests and produced a Uniform Act that is fair to all. As UCITA
moves to state legislatures, the same arguments pro and con that were made to
NCCUSL will be made again. It is important to recognize that these arguments have
already been heard with respect and addressed. The critical goal of uniformitv would
not be met if each of the 50 states attempted to develop a new consensus.
A-6
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UCITA is a uniform law that is urgently needed if we are to keep this country's
economic engine running. Its enactment by the states, as approved by NCCUSL, must
be given high priority.
B. UCITA THEMES
• Freedom of Contract
UCITA, like the UCC, is premised on the parties having freedom of choice. The
terms and effect of a contract are determined by agreement rather than by legislative
fiat. The exercise of contract choice opens up full opportunities for innovation and
growth. With certain limited exceptions the terms expressed by the parties in their
agreement control. If their agreement is silent, then trade usage and the parties'
course of dealing and performance are looked to, and only if the contract is both
silent and trade usage and course of performance is unhelpful, do the- "gap-filler"
provisions ofUCITA apply.
• Information and First Amendment
Rights in intellectual property are established by other law such as patent and
copyright law. UCITA specifically provides that federal preemption applies
(Section 105(a). State intellectual property law supplements UCITA and is not
displaced by UCITA (Section 114(a)). UCITA adopts a neutral position with respect
to what, ultimately, are issues of federal and international information rights policy.
However, UCITA provides a basis for case by case resolution of the myriad issues
in Section 105(b).
• Fundamental Public Policv Issues
A principal concern of consumers and other users and developers of computer
information has been that the contracts which provide for its use not contain
provisions which violate fundamental public policies. The Drafting Committee did
not want to depart from the longstanding policy that a statute premised on freedom
of contract should not be a regulatory statute, and thus was reluctant to include in
the statute a laundry list of impermissible terms. Instead, members of the Drafting
Committee worked with members of the academic community for several months to
craft a solution which would recognize the legal principle that certain terms of
certain contracts may be unenforceable because they violate a fundamental public
policy. That solution is now embodied in Section 105(b) and accompanying
comments.
A-7
C. SCOPE
• Limited to "Computer Information Transactions" (Section 103 (a))
UCITA covers "computer information transactions", Le. "an agreement...to
create, modify, transfer, or license computer information or informational rights
in computer information (102(11)). UCITA applies to contracts to license or buy
software, contracts to create computer programs, contracts for on-line access to
databases and contracts to distribute information over the Internet. UCITA does
not apply to goods such as television sets, stereo equipment, airplanes or
traditional books and publications. Goods generally remain subject to UCC
Article 2 or Article 2A. .
• Opting in and Opting Out (Section 104)
Under common law, the right ofparties to choose generally permits them to adopt
the law they may wish to apply to their transaction. However, UCITA places
some specific restrictions on opting in or out in order to safeguard the parties
(Section 104).
• Exclusions from UCITA
UCITA does not affect transactions in the core businesses of other information
industries (e.g. print, motion picture, broadcast, sound recordings) whose
commercial practices in their traditional businesses differ from those in the
computer software industry. UCITA expressly excludes:
a. Financial services transactions;
b. Motion pictures, broadcast and cable TV, other than mass-
market transactions in computer information;
c. Sound recordings, musical works, phonorecord or enhanced
sound recording;
d. Compulsory licenses (l03(d)(3));
e. Contracts of employment of an individual other than as an
independent contractor and newsgathering persons (103(d)(4);
f. A contract which does not require that the information be
furnished as computer information or in which the form of the
information as computer information is otherwise de minimis
with respect to the primary subject matter of the transaction
(103(d)(S));
g. Newspapers, magazines, books, and other print forms by the
definition of "computer information" except when transferred
in electronic form (e.g. over Internet by license), and (Section
102(11));
h. E-mail communications merely about the agreement
A- 8
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D. ASSENT: UCITA'S SAFEGUARDS AGAINST INADVERTANT ASSENT
AND SAFE HARBORS FOR CONTRACT FORl\tIATION
There are a number of concepts in VCrTA that need to be read together to fully
appreciate the safeguards incorporated to protect the parties from inadvertent contracts,
particularly in e-commerce. Some of these protections do not exist in common law.
These concepts include:
1. "Authenticate" (Section 102(6» includes "signature" but also are "with
the intent to sign a record, otherwise to execute or adopt an electronic
symbol, sound or process referring to, attached to, included in, or
logically associated or linked with, a record or term." There is no
authentication without an intent for the authentication to be a signing;
2. AlZreement bv conduct: "intentionally engages in conduct or makes
statements with reason to know that the other party or its electronic
agent mav infer from the conduct or statement that the person assents
to the record or term"; (see also Restatement, Contracts(Second» .
- there must be "intent" and also "reason to know to be proven from all
the circumstances
- the circumstances may include a "reconfirmation" as a safe harbor,
Le. an initial click on "I agree" followed by a second display asking
whether the person really intends to agree and a second click in
response thereto (Section 112(d».
3. Opportunity to Review Before conduct can be assent above, there
must be an opportunity to review the terms (Section 112(e»,
4. Later terms. after beginning performance or use, are adopted only
" .. .if the parties had reason to know that their agreement would be
represented...by a later record to be agreed on." (Section 209)
5. In a Mass-market License, the licensee is entitled to reject the contract
with later terms for any reason and obtain not only a refund but
incidental costs of return or destruction and reasonable and foreseeable
costs of restoring the licensee's system (Section 210(b»;
6. Pretransaction Disclosure (Section 211) provides a strong incentive for
disclosure of all terms before the licensee must payor gets delivery,
and lastly
A-9
7. "Attribution" to the party to be bound is r~quired. The efficacy of an
attribution procedure is determined by the circumstances including any
agreement of the parties (Section 213(c». Commercial reasonableness
of an attribution procedure is a factor in making that determination
(Section 212).
In short, a party to be bound must have an opportunity to review the terms, then assent
with an intent to authenticate or intent by conduct and with reason to know that the other
party will infer assent; (or if the opportunity to assent is after performance or use, the
party to be bound must have reason to know there are later terms and in a mass-market
transaction the party can return the item with a cost-free refund), and lastly, the claimant
has the burden of establishing attribution (Section 213(a».
E. ELECTRONIC CONTRACT (SECTIONS 212-215)
• A record or authentication may not be denied legal effect, validity or
enforceability solely on the ground that it is electronic (Section 107).· A group of
sections then set forth particular rules to be used when an electronic record or
authentication is at issue.
F. WARRANTIES (pART 4)
UCITA provides the following basic warranties which will be familiar to
practitioners in the field of licensing law: quiet enjoyment and non-infringement,
merchantability of a computer program, information content and fitness for
licensee's purpose and system integration.. It also clarifies what is an express
warranty. It sets forth the manner in which implied warranties may be disclaimed.
Implied warranties are not generally recognized and/or clear under common law.
UCITA thus sienificantly extends warranties over those under current law.
• Implied Warranty, Informational Content (Section 404)
UCITA establishes a new implied warranty which focuses on the accuracy of data
provided under a contract. The basic warranty states: " ...a merchant that, in a
special relationship of reliance with a licensee, collects, compiles, processes
provides or transmits informational content warrants to its licensee that there is no
inaccuracy in the informational content caused by the merchant's failure to perform
with reasonabie care." Note that this warranty does not guarantee that there will be
no inaccuracies; rather it gives some protection by assuring that there will be no
inaccuracies caused by a failure to use reasonable care.
Implied \Varranty, Licensee's Purpose; Svstem Integration (Section 405)
If licensor has reason to know ofany particular purpose for which the
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infonnation is required and that the licensee is relying on the licensor for expertise,
there is an implied warranty that the infonnation will be fit for that purpose unless,
from all the circumstances, it appears that licensor was to be paid for the amount of
its time or effort regardless of the suitability of the infonnation, in which case, the
implied warranty is that there is no failure to achieve the licensee's particular
purpose caused by the licensor's lack of reasonable care and workmanlike effort to
achieve that purpose.
G. TRANSFER OF INTERESTS AND RIGHTS <PART 5)
• UCITA generally pennits transfer of a contractual interest under a license. However,
transfer may be prohibited under other law (e.g. copyright law), or may not be
allowed if such a transfer would materially change the duty of the other party,
materially increase the burden or risk imposed on the other party, or materially impair
the other party's property or its likelihood or expectation of obtaining return
perfonnance.
• However, if the parties agree to a tenn prohibiting transfer, that tenn is' enforceable.
In a mass-market license it must also be conspicuous.
H. FINANCING ARRANGEMENTS (SECTIONS 507-511)
• UCITA establishes bridge rules for license financing transactions that are not
governed by UCC Article 9. The rules are similar to those for "Finance Lease"
under Article 2A.
I. REMEDIES: LIMITATIONS ON ELECTRONIC SELF-HELP (SECTION
816)
• Electronic self-help is prohibited (i) if its exercise will result in substantial harm
to the public health and safety or grave hann to the public interest (ii) unless the
license has a separately-assented-to tenn that allows a limited exercise of
electronic self-help. Upon cancellation of a license, use of electronic means to
exercise a licensor's right to repossession in NOT pennitted except as provided
in Section 816. (Note: This is a change from current common law under which
electronic self-help is more broadly permitted.)
• These provisions, when taken together with the provisions of Section 815, are so
restrictive that it is unlikely that any licensor will be able to effectively use
electronic self-help except in the most egregious cases; e.g. where a licensee is
improperly disclosing the licensor's confidential and proprietary infonnation.
Most licensors would not agree to negotiate such provisions into their standard
fonn contracts; thus it is a major benefit for licensees that UCITA effectively
excludes electronic self-help from standard fonn contracts.
A-ll
J. CONSUMER PROTECTIONS ARE PRESERVED
While many of the transactions to be covered by UCITA are commercial between
merchants, UCITA also extends consumer protections to UCITA transactions.
Section 105fc) explicitly provides:
"(c) Except as provided in Subsection (d), if this [Act] or a term of a
contract under this [Act] conflicts with a consumer protection statute [or administrative
rule], the consumer protection statute [or rule] governs."
Subsection (d) sets forth rules that enable e-commerce by allowing an electronic
record, authentication, and conspicuousness. The Official Comments clearly state that
"timing, manner and content" of disclosures are unmodified by those e-commerce
enabling rules. However, to the extent a state provides for a "writing" and does not wish
an electronic message to be authorized, a legislative note instructs the state to except such
statutory provisions.
UCITA: (1) retains existing consumer protections laws, (2) adopts consumer rules
in Article 2, and (3) adds limited additional protections appropriate for issues associated
with computer information transactions.
Many contract law rules in UCITA benefit consumers. The doctrines of
unconscionablity, good faith, and fundamental public policy provide important consumer
protections. But these rules also affect more than consumer transactions and respond to
commercial concerns as well. So do the rules in UCITA (like those in Article 2) that
disclaimer of implied warranties in a record must be conspicuous, or the rule in UCITA
that a contractual choice of forum is unenforceable if it is unreasonable and unjust, or the
rule in UCITA that assent is not effective unless there was an opportunity to review terms
prior to giving assent. All of these and other rules benefit consumers but are not typically
denominated as "consumer protection" rules. They contribute to the fact that UCITA
creates a world in which consumers ate better off than under current law.
UCITA also includes rules focused solely on consumer contracts and rules
focused on mass-market contracts, which include all consumer contracts.
Section 105(c) provides that, except for stated rules regarding electronic
commerce, if there is a conflict between UCITA and a consumer protection statute, the
consumer protection law governs. Consistent with this theme, UCITA enacts rules
preserving existing consumer law even if that result would not necessarily occur under
other state law, such as:
• Section 104: an agreement to opt into or out of UCITA cannot change a mandatory
consumer protection law that would otherwise apply
• Section 109(a): an agreed choice of law cannot alter an otherwise applicable
consumer protection rule that cannot be varied by agreement
UCITA retains consumer protection rules contained in uec Article 2 including:
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• Section 303: a contract term requiring that modifications of contract be in Miting is
not enforceable in a consumer contract unless the consumer manifests assent to the
term
• Section 704: licensee has a right to refuse tender of a copy that does not perfectly
conform to the contract
• Section 803: consequential damages for personal injury cannot be disclaimed for a
computer program contained in consumer goods
DCITA establishes various consumer protection rules focused on computer information
transactions that do not exist under current law. These include:
• Section 209: a license cannot alter teIJlls expressly agreed between the parties and, if
presented after delivery, licensee has cost-free right of return if it refuses terms
• Section 214 a consumer has a right to avoid an online contract if it acts promptly to
avoid the effect of an electronic mistake
• Section 302: safe harbor rule for changing terms in a continuing contract requires that
the licensee that is a consumer be given a right to terminate when change is made
• Section 409(b): a warranty to a consumer extends to all individual consumers in the
family or household if use should have been expected by the licensor
• Section 805: the statute of limitations for consumers cannot be reduced by agreement
• Section 104: a term changing the application of DCITA to the transaction must be
conspicuous in a mass market transaction
• Section 503: a term that prohibits transfer of a contract right must be conspicuous for
a mass market transaction.
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APPENDIX A
FACT SHEET ON
UNIFORM ELECTRONIC TRANSACTIONS ACT
(VETA) .
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A Few Facts About
UNIFORM ELECTRONIC TRANSACTIONS ACT
r,
ORIGIN: Completed by the Uniform Law Commissioners in 1999.
PURPOSE: The Unifonn Electronic Transactions Act is designed to support the use of electronic
commerce. The primary objective of this act is to establish the legal equivalence of electronic records
and signatures with paper writings and manually-signed signatures, removing barriers to electronic
commerce.
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STATE ADOPTIONS:
2000 INTRODUCTIONS: Alabama
Arizona
Colorado
Hawaii
Idaho
Indiana
Kansas
Kentucky
Maryland
California
Pennsylvania
Minnesota
Nebraska·
Ohio
Oklahoma
Rhode Island
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
West Virginia
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For any further information regarding the Unifonn Electronic Transactions Act, please contact
John McCabe or Katie Robinson at 312-915-0195.
(2/15/00)
:- http://www.nccusl.org/factsheetlUeta.htm
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APPENDIXB
SUMMARY OF
UNIFORM ELECTRONIC TRANSACTIONS ACT
(UETA) .
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UNIFORM: ELECTRONIC TRANSACTIONS ACT
-A Summary-
The Uniform Law Commissioners promulgated the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (UETA)
in 1999. It is the first comprehensive effort to prepare state law for the electronic commerce era.
Many states have already adopted legislation pertaining to such matters as digital signatures, but
VETA represents the first national effort at providing some uniform rules to govern transactions in
electronic commerce that should serve in every state. Although related to the Uniform Commercial
Code, the rules ofUETA are primarily for "electronic records and electronic signatures relating to a
transaction" that is not subject to any article of the Uniform Commercial Code, except for Articles 2
and 2A. A "transaction" means an action or set of actions occurring between two or more persons
relating to the conduct ofbusiness, commercial, or governmental affairs. Much is excluded in this
definition, including required notices, disclosures or communications by courts and governmental
agencies.
VETA applies only to transactions in which each party has agreed by some means to conduct them
by electronically. Agreement is essential. Nobody is forced to conduct to electronic transactions.
Parties to electronic transactions come under UETA, but they may also opt out. They may vary,
waive or disclaim most of the provisions ofUETA by agreement, even if it is agreed that business
will be transacted by electronic means. The rules in UETA are almost all default rules that apply only
in the event the terms of an agreement do not govern.
. Electronic commerce means, of course, persons doing business with other persons with computers
and telephone or television cable lines. The Internet is the gre.at marketplace for these kinds of
transactions; a marketplace developing almost daily in 1999 (and presumably into the foreseeable
future). The outlines and boundaries for this marketplace are still unknown and developments are not
predictable. It is not possible to predict with any certainty how new law should develop to serve that
marketplace or any other electronic marketplace that might develop in the future.
However, a few things are known about the existing electronic marketplace and there are some
assumptions about the law that governs transactions within it that can be made with reasonable
certainty in 1999, and that will continue to be reasonably certain into the future. Electronic
transactions are conducted by communicating digitized information from one person to another. That
digitized information can be communicated and stored without the use of paper, and the basic
language of electronic transactions is fully and inherently paperless. In fact, relying on paper for the
memorialization of transactions and upon manual signatures for verifying them are most likely to
impede electronic transactions, adding to their costs. And there is no benefit to any party to an
electronic transaction, with very few exceptions, in requiring that they be memorialized on paper
with signatures that are manual. The need to expand requirements in the law for writings and manual
signatures so that electronic records and electronic signatures will satisfy those requirements, is the
one thing that is reasonably certain with respect to electronic transactions.
VETA does not attempt to create a whole new system of legal rules for the electronic marketplace.
The objective ofUETA is to make sure that transactions in the electronic marketplace are as
enforceable as transactions memorialized on paper and with manual signatures, but without changing
any of the substantive rules oflaw that apply. This is a very limited objective--that an electronic
record of a transaction is the equivalent of a paper record, and that an electronic signature will be
given the same legal effect, whatever that might be, as a manual signature. The basic rules in UETA
serve this single purpose.
The basic rules are in Section 7 of UETA. The most fundamental rule in Section 7 provides that a
"record or signature may not be denied legal effect or enforceability solely because it is in electronic
form." The second most fundamental rule says that "a contract may not be denied legal effect or
enforceability solely because an electronic record was used in its formation." The third most
r http://www.nccusl.orglsummarylUetasum.htm
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fundamental rule states that any law that requires a writing wiII be satisfied by an electronic record.
And the fourth basic rule provides that any signature requirement in the law wiII be met if there is an
electronic signature.
Almost all of the other rules in UETA serve the fundamental principles set out in Section 7, and
tend to answer basic legal questions about the use of electronic records and signatures. Thus, Section
15 determines when information is legally sent or delivered in electronic form. It establishes when
electronic delivery occurs--when an electronic record capable of retention by the recipient is legally
sent and received. The traditional and statutory rules that govern mail delivery of the paper
memorializing a transaction can't be applied to electronic transactions. Electronic rules have to be
devised., and UETA provides the rule.
Another rule that supports the general validity of electronic records and signatures in transactions
is the rule on attribution in Section 9. Electronic transactions are mostly faceless transactions
between strangers. VETA states that a signature is attributable to a person if it is an act of that
person, and that act may be shown in any manner. If a security procedure is used, its efficacy in
establishing the attribution may be shown. In the faceless environment of electronic transactions, the
obvious difficulties of identification and attribution must be overcome. VETA, Section 9 gives
guidance in that endeavor.
Much has been much written about digital signatures in electronic commerce. What is a digital
signature? It is really a method of encryption that utilizes specific technology. In the faceless
environment of the electronic marketplace and particularly the Internet, such technologies are highly
'useful.
It is not wholly certain what the legal impact of these technologies should be. For that reason
UETA may not be characterized as a digital signature statute. It does facilitate the use of digital
signatures and other security procedures in rules such as the one in Section 9 on attribution. Section
10 provides some rules on errors and changes in messages. It favors the party who conforms to the
security procedure used in the specific transaction against the party who does not, in the event there
is a dispute over the content of the message.
But nothing in VETA requires the use ofa digital signature or any security procedure. It is
technologically neutral. Persons can use the most up-to-date digital signature technology, or less
sophisticated security procedures such as passwords or pin numbers. Whatever parties to transactions
use for attribution or assuring message integrity may be offered in evidence if there is a dispute.
VETA is procedural, not substantive. It does not require anybody to use electronic transactions or
to rely upon electronic records and signatures. It does not prohibit paper records and manual
signatures. Basic rules of law, like the general and statutory law of contracts, continue to apply as
they have always applied.
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There are three provisions in VETA that need special attention, and that are not directly in support
of the basic rules in Section 7. First, VETA excludes transactions subject to the Uniform Commercial
Code, except for those under Articles 2 and 2A, the Uniform Computer Information Transactions
Act, laws governing estates and trusts, and any other specific laws that a state wants to exempt from
the rules applied in VETA. Some writing and signature requirements in state law do not impact the
~nforceability of transactions, and have objectives that should not be affected by adoption of a statute
like VETA. The limitation of VETA to agreed electronic transactions will eliminate any conflict with
other writing requirements for the most part. However, there is some room for jurisdiction-specific
tailoring of VETA permitted in each state, to assure no conflict. Exclusions should be carefully and
conservatively selected. Most law relating to contracts and transactions betWeen persons will serve _
the public better if electronic records and signatures are recognized.
Second, VETA provides for "transferable records" in Section 16. Notes under Article 3 and
http://www.nccusl.orgisummarylUetasum.htm
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documents under Article 7 of the Unifonn Commercial Code are "transferable records" when in
electronic fonn. Notes and documents are negotiable instruments. The quality of negotiation relies
upon the note or document as the single, unique token of the obligations and rights embodied in the
note or document. Maintaining that quality as a unique token for electronic records is the subject of
Section 16. A transferable record exists when there is a single authoritative copy of that record
existing and unalterable in the "control" of a person. A person in "control" is a "holder" for the
purposes of transferring or negotiating that record under the Unifonn Commercial Code. Section 16
is essentially a supplement to the Unifonn Commercial Code, until its relevant articles can be fully
amended or revised to accommodate electronic instruments.
Third, VETA clearly validates contracts fonned by electronic agents. Electronic agents are
computer programs that are implemented by their principals to do business in electronic fonn. They
operate automatically, without immediate human supervision, though they are certainly not
autonomous agents. They are a kind of tool that parties use to communicate. Section 14 provides that
a person may fonn a contract by using an electronic agent. That means that the principal, which is
the person or entity which provides the program to do business, is bound by the contract that its
agent makes.
When somebody buys something on the Internet, therefore, that person will be assured that the
agreement is valid, even though the transaction is conducted automatically by a computer that solicits
orders and payment infonnation. Did anyone really think that every order on the Internet involves a
direct communication with a human being?
Three sections of UETA deal with electronic records that state governmental agencies create and
retain. Section 17 allows a state to designate one agency or officer as the authority on creation and
retention of governmental records. Section 18 allows a state to designate which agency or officer
regulates the communication of electronic records and use of electronic signatures between agencies
and other persons. Section 19 allows a state to designate an agency or officer to set standards that
promote consistency and interoperability between state agencies with respect to the use of electronic
records and signatures. All three sections are optional sections, there for the state that needs them,
but not mandatory for all states in order to implement unifonnity. These are very important
provisions, however, because they provide a state with some root law for organizing the electronic
business of the state. They should be given very serious consideration in every state.
It is not possible to cover every aspect ofUETA in a short summary. This summary highlights
some important aspects. The adoption of these rules will be a boon to electronic commerce. They
will not artificially skew any market or make any substantive law relating to contracts any different
from that governing transactions memorialized on paper. Every state should adopt them as quickly as
possible.
Founded in 1892, the National Conference ofCommissioners on Uniform State Laws is a confederation ofstate
commissioners on uniform laws. Its membership comprises more than 300 attorneys. judges, and law professors, who are
appointed by each ofthe 50 states, the District ofColumbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands, to draft uniform
and model state laws and work toward their enactment.
###
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This paper discusses contract laws and legislative proposals that will affect contracts for
access to web sites and the licensing or sale of computer information. Specifically, the paper
focuses on the Computer Information Transactions Act (DCITA), the use of contracts in the
information economy, and foreign approaches to electronic commerce. The oral presentation
will focus on samples of common mistakes made in Internet contracting. Because mistakes often
occur from lack of knowledge of consumer laws, a brief list of federal consumer statutes is
iincluded at the end of this paper.
I. REASONS FOR CONTRACTING - NEW AND OLD. While use of standard
form contracts are necessary to mass distribution of many products and typify modem
commerce, such contracts are particularly important in the online and computer information
industries. For online and information products, the purpose and reasons for contracts, standard
form or otherwise, at least include a desire by the information provider (a) to define the product
offered and (b) to control liability. 1
A. DEFINING THE PRODUCT. One of the purposes of information
contracts is to defme the information product. Assume a wire service assembles an internet data
base of news stories for use by reporters and writers at a price that justifies assembly and
maintenance of the data base. The same data base could be offered to consumers, but the price
they would be willing to pay for their non-commercial uses would not support the product. The
solution? A license at a commercial price to commercial users, and a license at a lower price to
consumer users. The data base is exactly the same under each license -- thus it is the license,
i.e., the contract, that defines the product (product #1 is access to a data base for commercial
purposes; product #2 is access to a data base for consumer purposes only). Put another way:
Consider the following contract tenn:
"A right to publicly perfonn "James Bond 1998" in Houston from June 1
through July 1."
There is no doubt that the contract tenn defines and describes the product being transferred.
While the tangible subject matter of the contract is most likely to involve delivery of a copy of the
motion picture "James Bond 1998", the product is not the copy, but the rights granted in use of
the content contained on the copy. If that point is not clear, compare the value of the contract tenn
stated above to the value ofthe product in a contract in which the contract term provides the
transferee with "exclusive rights throughout the United States" to publicly perform or display
"James Bond 1998." Yet, both contracts are satisfied by delivery of the same copy of the motion
picture. The contract, not merely the copy, is the product.2
This fact distinguishes information products from goods: a car is a Chevy or a Ford-- one doesn't
need to read a contract to determine what the essential product is. Information products are not
self-defining: typically one needs to read the license to determine what the product is.
If the product is a copyrightable work, the provider is faced with a threshold question: if
it distributes the product so as to invoke the copyright first sale doctrine, it will lose the right to
control further distribution. Thus a copyright owner who sells a copy only for use in North
America may be faced with the argument that because the copy was sold, no restrictions on
distribution apply and that copy may be redistributed in South America or elsewhere. The
B-1
answer to this problem cannot be that a copyright owner can only sells copies, i.e., can only offer
one product. Contracts always have been and will continue to be the answer:
If the proprietor of an information asset is not permined to contractually distinguish
what rights it grants or withholds, that proprietor has only one asset available for transfer and
with respect to which it can contract only one time. That rule obviously does not exist in
modern law and is not consistent with basic property or contract law. The ability to
contractually define and isolate what rights are and are not transferred is critical to
commercialization of informational assets.
[d.
This dilemma of how to create commercially viable products for both providers and
customers, is common throughout the information industries, including the software industry.
The software industry solved the dilemma with licenses, i.e., contracts:
Copyright law forbids copying a literary work without permission, except for "fair use," which permits
limited copying, as for example, copying limited portions of a book as part of a book review. Because
software must be copied in order to be useful (computers copy software in order to use it), permission to
copy must be granted in order to commercialize literary works in the form of software. In some cases, e.g.
commercial software code libraries, meaningful commercialization requires that the liteniry work be copied
many times.
Early developers who wished to commercialize their software were, therefore, faced with the challenge of
making it possible to permit people to use the software without requiring the developer to give up his
copyrights. Developers (whether they undertook to publish and distribute their own software or arranged to
have a publisher distribute it for a royalty or on some other basis) were aware that copying software is
inexpensive and easy. Reprinting an entire book may well cost more than purchasing a second copy from
the author or publisher. Not so software. Making a copy takes linle time, and is substantially less trouble
and less costly than licensing another copy. Mass market license agreements advise the licensee of the
circumstances under which copying is unauthorized, anq therefore "unfair" because unauthorized copying
violates the licensee's obligations to the licensor.
Developers were also aware (if only after talking with their lawyers) that if they did not make some effort
to iimit copying, their software might become "public domain." If this occurred, commercial potential
would be destroyed.
Developers wanted to be able to provide their creations to a mass market. To do so, developers had to
enable their customers to use the apP.lications the developers created, while assuring the developers' ability
to obtain income from their creative efforts. In other words, the developers' challenge was to find a way to
facilitate intended use of software applications without sacrificing the possibility of commercial gain. The
solution which the industry devised was licensing. The use of a contract between developer (whether
directly, or through a publisher who would undertake to distribute the software for the developer) made it
possible to tailor arrangements to particular applications, and to make changes quickly - an important
element in the rapidly developing world of technology.
In essence, licenses tell customers what developers consider "fair use" of their "literary" creations....
Harris, Michalyn, Is Article 2B Really Anti-Competitive?, 3 Cyberspace Lawyer No.8, 16 at 18
(Glasser LegalWorks, 1998) (citations omitted), author's copy available at
hnP-://'"::WW.winRro.coml~.rticl~L~J11i.-competjt.ive.htrn.
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Licensing is not limited to product delivered in a box. Use of many web sites and the
information available at or through those sites is also the subject of contract between the site and
the customer. As explained by another commentator:
Without an effective contracting method to license software and electronic information
to the mass market, the value and choice of products would have been diminished significantly,
and some companies would have had no viable products at all. Organizations as diverse as
Consumers Union, Consumer. Net, University of Califomia .at .Berkeley, Dartmouth College,
Massachusetts Institute ofTechnology, Texas Classroom Teachers Association, Public Broadcast
Service, Free Software Foundation, Robert Woods Johnson Foundation, Partnership For Food
Safety Education, National Pediatric and Family HIV Resource Center, National Institute of
Health Library, National Kidney Foundation... and Catholic Online Webmail employ standard
form contracts to provide software and information to the mass market.
Critics of mass market licensing try to paint a picture of software or information
licensing amounting to nothing more than a collection of "me too" forms in which licenses
simply mirror a copyright first sale. Nothing could be further from the truth. Today's mass
market licensing is characterized by contract variety and a variety of license terms. It is common
for mass market license to provide users with more rights than the user would have acquired had
the user simply bought a copy of the software, including reproduction, derivative works, and
distribution rights. As new products have arisen, such as multimedia software, client-server
products, and web site "products," contract variety and customer choice have also flourished via
mass market licensing.
See Gomu1kiewicz, Robert, The License Is The Product: Comments On The Promise of
Proposed Article 2B (or Something Like It) For Software And Information Licensing, 13
Berkeley Technology Journal 891 (1998)(citations omitted). See also, Gomulkiewicz and
Williamson, A BriefDefense ofMass Market Software License Agreements, 22 Rutgers
Computer & Tech. L.J. 335 (1996).
Are these contracts valid or must every provision ofa copy of information be a "first
sale." The answer is "yes," they are valid (assuming compliance is had with contract and other
applicable law) and "no," courts have not forced all distribution structures into a "first sale"
mode. See e.g., Nimmer, Raymond T., Breaking Barriers; The Relation Between Contract And
Intellectual Property Law, 13 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 827 (1998). The Federal Circuit Court of
Appeals recently held that a license of a copy of software did not give the licensee ownership of
the copy,3 i.e., a transfer is not a sale if the license terms are not consistent with rights after a
sale. See also, ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7dt Cit. 1996).
B. CONTROLLING LIABILITY. As to a second reason for contracts,
the desire to control liability, licenses allow parties to allocate risks and comply with applicable
contract laws. For example, some laws require certain contract terms to be set forth in a
"writing," or to be expressly agreed or specially disclosed -- under Article 2 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, a disclaimer of an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose must be
in a writing, and incidental and consequential damages are available to a buyer unless a contract
provides otherwise. Contracts are used by the information industries in the same way they are
used by other industries: to control liability or allocate risks such as by disclaiming warranties,
excluding certain damages, and/or limiting remedies.
B-3
Of course, one must consult applicable contract law in order to know one's liability and
to draft an enforceable contract to control it, and that law may vary with the product in question.
An example of variances in law is provided by comparing existing and proposed laws regarding
the implied warranty of non-infringement.
(i) Common Law. There is no implied warranty ofnon-infringement in the
common law. There are common law duties of reasonable care and workmanlike effort
in service contracts, but those·duties tend to inform the service, not any product that
flows from the service. There are also torts, such as negligent misrepresentation, that can
apply to one who negligently supplies inaccurate information when the requisite duty
exists and reliance is foreseeable. See e.g., Rosenstein v. Standard & Poort's Corp., 636
N.E.2d 665 (l993)(cause ofaction for negligent misrepresentation established where
company that was official source for calculating index values owed duty as matter of law
to trader to use due care in calculating the values which it knew were going to be used for
contract settlements; but exculpatory clause in contract was enforceable, so no liability
found). The ability to disclaim these duties, and the language necessary to do it, is not
uniform and is governed by the common law. Article 2 is also used, by analogy, by some
courts.
(ii) Article 2. Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code applies to sales
of goods, e.g., to the sale ofa car with patented windshield wipers. Article 2-312 inserts
into every contract for the sale of a good, a statutory warranty against infringement,
which warranty may be disclaimed completely. But the warranty may not be disclaimed
as part of a disclaimer of implied warranties. See Official Comment No.4 to Article 2-
312. The language necessary to disclaim it also does not mirror the language necessary
to disclaim an implied warranty. See Article 2-312«2) (the warranty wilt' be excluded or
modified only by specific language or by circumstances which give the buyer reason to
know that the person selling does not claim title in himselfor that he is purporting to sell
only such right or title as he or a third person may have).
(iii) Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act. DCITA, the new
uniform act for computer information transactions, was drafted to adapt laws written for
goods to the unique attributes of computer information (see below). Section 401 of
DCITA follows existing Article 2 with respect to the non-infringement warranty, but it
adds more protection for licensees who provide specifications than does existing or
proposed Article 2. As in Article 2, the DCITA warranty can be disclaimed but not as
part of a disclaimer of implied warranties.
Subsections (i) through (iii) above are intended to illustrate differences in underlying
contract laws that affect the liability of contracting parties and the varying rules for controlling
that liability. Many lawyers, particularly intellectual property lawyers, will be tempted to view
only subsection (i) as relevant to their practice, i.e, they believe that only the common law
applies.
That may be a dangerous assumption. As information and other intellectual property is
distributed increasingly like a commodity, online or offline, courts will struggle to find uniform
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law. The software industry long believed that it was governed by the common law and not
Article 2, but courts forced to deal with cases concerning software, particularly boxed software
distributed in the mass market, started to grab for the Article 2 lifeline because it afforded the
only uniform body of codified law even if that law was not written with information in mind.
UCITA will solve that problem as to matters within its scope.
II. THE UNIFORM COMPUTER INFORMATION TRANSACTIONS ACT.
The high technology and information industries are fueling the U.S. economy,4 yet no uniform
body of contract law exists for computer information. The only uniform body of contract law in
the U.S. is U.C.c. Article 2, which was written for goods. The need for a comprehensive body of
laws contemplating information instead ofgoods has been explained in other contexts:
Applying the present libel laws to cyberspace or computer networks entails rewriting
statutes that were written to manage physical, printed objects, not computer networks or services..
. . A uniform system ... is needed to cope with the impact of the information age. It is the
responsibility of the legislature to manage this technology and to change or amend the statutes as
needed.s
The need to rewrite law to reflect new economies is an old problem evidenced throughout
the history of sales law. Karl Llewellyn, the author ofArticle 2, described the need to "unhorse"
a sales law that was based on economies existing before the mercantile or industrial ages, i.e., the
need to divorce sales law from laws written for economies contemplating real estate, horses and
haystacks. See generally, Llewellyn, Karl, The First Struggle To Unhorse Sales, 52 Harvard law
Review 873 and 875 (1939). In describing the early efforts to "unhorse" sales law from
analytical tools deriving from the "village smith," Llewellyn noted that thinking in terms of
"land-law" developed in judges a rigid attitude towards words with a tremendous, power of carry-
over into non-land transactions, and that approaching a commercial (sales) document with the
eyes of a land conveyancer could lead to "pretty awful results." Id.
He also believed that all sales law could not be lumped into a single class and that sales
ofmercantile goods needed to be thought of and treated differently from sales of farms, sales
made at farms (instead of in distant markets) and horses:
If the wares are there, the descriptive words may be but a means of identifYing which bales or
barrels are under discussion, but such influence as the horse has is toward making words have
legal force: 'sound and kind' in a bill of sale for a horse means 'warranted so.' The first move
toward a law of pure commerce in wares is thus interestingly awayfrom giving meaning to such
words; for wool is not to be expected to have hidden vicious tendencies to kick. The type of
"description" of ware which is to be relied on is a description of species, which, if it proves not to
fit the barrel or the bale, unidentifies what has been apparently identified as the subject of the
dea1.6
The same subtleties can arise with respect to the differences between information and goods. A
reason Llewellyn believed mercantile sales should not be thrown into a "single intellectual bin
with cases of other and different pattern," is the same reason that licenses of information should
not be thrown into the single intellectual bin for sales of goods.7
And thus the need and rationale for the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act,
a uniform act adopted by the National Conference of Uniform Law Commissioners in July,
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1999.8 DCITA creates a different and explained intellectual bin for, cases of other or different
patterns than sales of goods, to wit, licensing of computer information.
III. UelTA PHILOSOPHY - Commercial Contract Code. Grant Gilmore
defined commercial legislation as "legislation which is designed to clarify the law about business
transactions rather than to change the habits of the business community," and noted that the
principal objects of the draftsmen ofcommercial legislation "are to be accurate and not to be
original." 9 UClTA largely takes the same approach by seeking to clarify or resolve existing
confusion and to establish "default" or "fallback" rules that will apply ifparties do not otherwise
contract. As in the UCC, some ofthe default rules cannot be changed by contract but most of
them can.
UCITA retains consumer protections found under existing commercial contract law,
preserves substantive consumer protections found under consumer protection laws, and adds new
consumer protections, but it does this in the context of a traditional commercial contract code.
Like existing Article 2, its primary purpose is to codify and facilitate commerce. This focus has
engendered much criticism from lobbyists for some consumers who desired to use UCITA as a
vehicle to promulgate a uniform consumer code. However, that is not and has' never been the
purpose of commercial contract law and ignores the numerous consumer protections laws that
exist under state and federal laws that are not disturbed by UCITA. tO
Theoretically it would be advisable to aggregate all of the 50-state and federal consumer
statutes and insert their common denominator into both UCITA and DCC Article 2 so that
uniform statutes would result and it would no longer be necessary to ascertain and comply with
the varying consumer laws of each state. However, as a political matter, that is not possible.
Lobbyists for some consumers in both the UCITA drafting project and a project to revise Article
2, routinely requested additional consumer protections-in the both statutes but never suggested or
agreed that the new, uniform protections would replace existing state consumer protections laws.
Thus, conversion of UCITA or Article 2 into a uniform consumer code would have resulted in
the loss of commercial contract codes without achieving any uniformity with respect to
consumer laws --- all varying state and federal laws would have continued additionally to exist.
Given the need for and history of commercial contract codes, such a loss cannot be justified.
With respect to default rules generally, theoretically they are supposed to reflect existing
law or industry practice, so parties who intentionally or unintentionally become subject to them
largely should not be surprised by their terms. That is often true in UCITA. For example, the
rights in information transferred by a contract are limited to the rights existing at the time of the
transfer, not later developed rights or improvements (i.e., there is no inherent right to updates).
However, in other cases the default rules do not reflect industry practices. There are
several reasons for this. Sometimes the default rules are used to reflect a policy choice regarding
which party should start with an advantage, rather than an industry practice. Parties who do not
contract around the default rules will be bound by that choice. For example, although the
software industry routinely excludes consequential damages, the default rule in UCITA for
computer programs, as in existing law common law, makes consequential damages available to
an aggrieved party. Thus the licensee retains its current advantage notwithstanding contrary
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industry practice. Another reason that the default rules might not reflect industry practices is that
the information industries are converging. Thus there are no common industry practices in some
cases because each industry has its own practice, at least as to its own products. As to converged
products, no one knows the law. UCITA resolves that by creating common default rules, even if
they mayor may not reflect a particular industry's practice.
Last, the very nature of DCITA's subject matter requires it to create law in new areas.
,for example, a government White Paper notes that the NIl "will not be used to its fullest
commercial potential if providers and consumers cannot be confident that their electronic
agreements are valid and enforceable." See Bruce A. Lehman, Intellectual Property and the
National Information Infrastructure, The Report ofthe Working Group on Intellectual Property
Rights at 54. UCITA contains electronic contracting provisions that help address these
questions.
The resolution of currently debated issues may be viewed as reflecting or not reflecting
industry practice, or as ordinary or not, depending upon one's viewpoint. For example,
opponents of "shrinkwrap" licenses who side with courts that have not enforced such licenses,II
may argue that the "mass market license" provisions are not routine because they enforce
shrinkwrap licenses under restricted conditions. However, given the validation of shrinkwrap
licenses under existing law by a majority of COurts,12 proponents of shrinkwrap licenses would
argue that UeITA's provisions are not routine because they invalidate shrinkwrap licenses unless
statutory restrictions not found in existing law on any majority or uniform basis, are met. They
would also note that UCITA accords some consumer protections to businesses and thus ignores
the existing, clear dividing line established by most other law.
Many of the most commonly asked questions about UCITA are addressed in a paper
supplied by NCCUSL. A copy is available at bnP-:l/www.n~cusl.QrglpressrellUCITAJ2A.:...tl.TM.
IV. FOREIGN APPROACHES TO ELECTRONIC COMMERCE. The
European Union is moving quickly to construct a coherent internal framework for electronic
commerce by the Year 2000:
The Commission's 1997 Communication on electronic commerce set a clear objective of creating a
European coherent legal framework by the year 2000. This proposal meets that objective. It builds upon
and completes a number of other initiatives [Note 2] that, together, will eliminate the remaining legal
obstacles [to the provision ofon-line services and electronic commerce], while ensuring that general
interest objectives are met, particularly the achievement of a high level ofconsumer protection. This
proposal will reinforce the position of the Community in the international discussions on the legal aspects
of electronic commerce which are currently underway in a number of international fora (WTO, WIPO,
UNCITRAL, OECD). The Community will thus secure a major role in international negotiations and
significantly contribute to the establishment of a global policy for electronic commerce.
[Note 2 reads as follows:] Amongst the most recent are the directives on the "regulatory transparency
mechanism", the protection of personal data, the protection ofconsumers in respect ofcontracts negotiated
at a distance; and the proposals on the legal protection ofconditional access services, electronic signatures,
copyright and related rights and electronic money.
Proposal for A European parliament And Council Directive on Certain legal Aspects Of
Electronic commerce In The Internal Market, at 3 (11/18/98) (unofficial English translation of
provisional final version; citations omitted except as noted). The European Union recognizes
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that the costs of current legal uncertainty regarding electronic commerce are real,13 and that the
existence of a legal structure is itselfa valuable asset:
Electronic commerce provides the Community with a unique opportunity to create economic growth, a
competitive European industry and new jobs. The legal framework of the internal market and the euro are
key tools for exploiting this opportunity.
. • . the Union must act in order to establish within Europe a genuine single market for electronic
commerce. This single market mustensurethat European businesses and citizens are able to receive and
supply information society services throughout the Community, irrespective of frontiers. Indeed, the legal
framework ofthe internal marketforms a major assetfor electronic commerce, and electronic commerce
forms a major assetfor the internal market . ..14
But for UCITA, the U.S. is far behind. One need only consider the impact that the EU
Directive on data protection15 has had on U.S. businesses to understand that foreign law will fill
any vacuum created by the inability of U.S. states (or the U.S.) to act, and that such foreign law
mayor may not reflect or respect U.S. values and laws.
To illustrate. Online sales are not yet heavily regulated in the U.S.. The FTC has
regulated "telemarketing sales" by requiring compliance with its Telemarketing Sales Rule. That
rule, however, does not apply to sales conducted solely online. When initially proposed, the rule
was interpreted to apply to online sales because the definition of telemarketing contained the
term "telephonic mediums." See, 60 FR 30411 (1995). On the basis of comments received
regarding the proposed rule, however, the final rule was revised to limit its application to
telephone calls only. 60 FR 30411 (1995) ("[T]he Commission acknowledges that it does not
have the necessary information available to it to support the coverage of on-line services under
the rule44." Footnote 44: "Such media remain subject to the Commission's jurisdiction under the
FTC Act. 15 U.S.C. 41 et seq. See, e.g., FTC v. Corzine, dba Chase Consulting, No. CIV-S-94-
1146-DFL JFM [E.D. Cal Dec. 1994]."
Now consider the European Council in its Directive On the Protection of Consumers In
Respect of Distance Contracts ("ECD"). Directive 97/7fEC (May 20, 1997). The directive has
recently been amended, but this author has not yet been able to obtain a copy of the amendments;
accordingly, this discussion is based on the 1997 version of the directive. The directive grants
broad protection to "consumers" involved in "distance contracts" by "means of communication at
a distance." Consumers are defined as any natural person acting for purposes outside his trade,
business or profession. "Distance Contracts" cover, with certain exceptions, contracts regarding
goods or services between a supplier and a consumer under an organized distance sales scheme,
where the supplier makes exclusive use of "means of communication at a distance" up through
the point of contracting. This latter term includes any means used to conclude a contract
between the supplier and consumer that does not involve in-person contact, including mail, fax,
telephone, radio, television, videotex (microcomputer and television screen) with keyboard, and
email.
In direct contradiction of the instantaneous nature of electronic commerce and the
interactive nature of some sites, consumers have seven working days to withdraw at will and
without penalty from any distance contract. A full refund is due, although direct return charges
can be imposed. Importantly, "unsealed audio or video recordings, records or computer
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software, CD-ROMs or CD-Is" and "books taken our of their original wrapping" are not covered
by the withdrawal and refund right. This exception reflects a recognition by the European Union
of the difference between the excepted products (such as software) and ordinary goods (toaster,
clothes, cars and other items sold online): the withdrawaVrefund right carries a risk for the
excepted products of copying or use before exercise of the withdrawal right. For goods, the EU
approach is like the FTC or state consumer protection "door-to-door" sales rules that allow a 3-
day rescission right, but only with respect to door-to-door sales where the physical presence of
the salesperson can be coercive. Such coercion does not exist for online sales: the consumer
need simply click to another site if it wants to abandon a sale.
The point of the illustration is not to de~enninewhich approach is best, but to illustrate
that, by default, the EU will set the rules for electronic commerce if the U.S. states do not set a
U.S. policy. The EU expressly recognizes that its ability to formulate rules "will reinforce the
position of the Community in the international discussions on the legal aspects of electronic
commerce which are currently underway in a number of international fora."
UCITA can serve the same function for U.S. states. It reflects traditional U.S. legal
principles as found in existing Article 2 and the common law, and goes on to adapt them to
, computer information and electronic commerce. While no group may believe that it perfectly
meets their desires, the larger question is whether the EU rules perfectly do so? For those who
prefer the traditional principles of U.S. commerce, the answer should be no and action should be
taken to adopt UCITA.
v. SELECTED U.S. CONSUMER LAWS. The following is a very brief, and
necessarily misleading, summary of some the major federal consumer laws that could affect web
sites, directly or by analogy. Many states have parallel, slightly different, or additional consumer
statutes that mayor may not be preempted by the federal statutes.
All of the Federal Reserve Board regulations are the subject of proposed amendments
that would enable and restrict the use of electronic means to comply with the regulations. See
e.g., 64 F.R. 49722 (September 14, 1999).
FTC Telemarketing Sales Rule (16 CFR § 310). This rule should not apply to web site, but the
FTC is creeping towards applying aspects of it. As to why it should not apply, see above
discussion and 60 FR 30411 (1995) ("[T]he Commission acknowledges that it does not have the
necessary information available to it to support the coverage of on-line services under the
rule44." Footnote 44: "Such media remain subject to the Commission's jurisdiction under the
FTC Act. 15 U.S.c. 41 et seq. See, e.g., FTC v. Corzine, dba Chase Consulting, No. CIV-S-94-
1146-DFL JFM [E.D. Cal Dec. 1994]"). However, the FTC has suggested interpreting this rule
as possibly applicable in several situations. See e.g., 63F.R. 24996 (May 6, 1998)(FTC
Interpretation of Rules and Guides to Electronic Media; Request for Comment. See e.g.,
discussion of e-mail solicitations).
FTC MaiVTelephone Order Rule (16 CFR §435). This is the rule that governs the date by
which products ordered by phone or mail must be shipped and what happens if there is a delay.
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Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 USC § 1681. The federal Fair Credit Reporting Act primarily
applies to persons who report credit information. Typically such persons are credit bureaus, but
any business that reports information about a consumer's credit record needs to do so in a
manner that prevents it from becoming a "consumer reporting agency" subject to the act (such
can include businesses or affiliates who share information). The act also applies to users of
credit reports. Purposes for obtaining credit reports are restricted and statutory disclosures are
required if actions are based on a report. See 15 USC § 1681h. Odd situations can invoke this
. Bct (e.g., credit card "swipe'" structures).
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 USC § 1601. This act governs debt collectors who
collect consumer debts owed to third parties. The act limits communications, prohibits
numerous forms of actions viewed as deception or harassment, and requires debt collectors to
disclose certain information about the debts being collected as well as about debtors' rights to
dispute and obtain verification of the debt. A debt collector is any person in any business whose
principal purpose is debt collection and who regularly collects or attempts to collect debts owed
another.
FTC Credit Practices Rule, 16 CFR Part 44. The FTC Credit Practices Rule prohibits sellers
and lenders from engaging in certain consumer credit practices deemed to be unfair acts or
practices. The rule prohibits inclusion ofcertain provisions in a consumer loan or sales contract,
such as a confession ofjudgment, and requires a specified notice to be given to credit cosigners.
FTC Rule: Preservation of Consumer Claims And Defenses, 16 CFR § 433. This is the
''holder in due course" rule. It essentially allows a consumer to assert defenses against a holder-
in-due-course of a consumer credit contract and requires the contract to contain a notice of the
rule.
FRB Regulation B, 12 CFR Part 202. Regulation B implements the federal Equal Credit
Opportunity Act. Federal law prohibits discrimination with respect to any aspect of a credit
transaction on the basis of race, color, reiigion, national origin, sex, marital status, or age
(provided that the applicant has the capacity to enter into a binding contract), the fact that all or
part of the applicant's income derives from any public assistance program or the fact that the
applicant has in good faith exercised any right under the Consumer Credit Protection Act or state
law. 12 CFR § 202.2(z). State laws can add additional prohibited bases such as creed and the
presence of any sensory, mental or physical handicap. Local laws can also apply (e.g., municipal
codes might prohibit credit discrimination on the basis of parental status and political ideology
etc.).
Regulation B is not just a consumer statute. It also applies to business credit in varying
degrees.
The Act applies to "creditors," which term includes any person who, in the ordinary
course ofbusiness, regularly participates in the decision whether to extend credit (which is any
right to defer the repayment of debt). 12 CFR and 1 CFR § 202.2(1) and Supp. I at § 202.2(j)#1.
Under Regulation Z and with respect to credit secured by a dwelling, "regularly" is defined
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numerically. 12 CFR § 226.2(17) Note 3. "Regularly" is not defined in Regulation B, but the
regulation is intended to cover a broader range of credit transactions than Regulation Z.
In addition to prohibiting discrimination, Regulation B requires delivery of a notice of
credit approval or rejection and a statement ofreasons for any rejection, restricts the
circumstances in which the signature ofboth spouses can be required on a debt, and contains
significant record keeping requirements.
FRB Regulation E, Electronic Fund Transfers. An electronic fund transfer (EFT) is any
transfer of funds, other than a transaction originated by check, draft, or similar paper instrument,
that is initiated through an electronic terminal, telephone or computer or magnetic tape for the
purpose of ordering, instructing, or authorizing a financial institution to debit or credit an
account. "Financial institution" is not limited to banks and other insured depository institutions,
but includes any person who, directly or indirectly, holds an account belonging to a consumer
(15 USC § 1693b(8» and any person who issues an access device and agrees with a consumer to
provide EFT services. 12 CFR § 205.2(i). An "account" is not limited to checking and savings
accounts, but includes other consumer asset accounts held by a financial institution. 12 CFR §
205.2(b). "Consumer asset account" is not defined but in recent years, the FRB has flirted with
defining it very broadly in a manner that would cover smart cards. An "access device" means
any combination of a card, code or other means ofaccess to a consumer's account that may be
used by the consumer to initiate an EFT. 12 CFR § 205.2(a)(1). All debit card transactions are
EFTs.
Under Regulation E, access devices may only be issued upon request, specified and
extensive disclosures must be given to the consumer, and transfers must be billed and
documented, and errors must be resolved, in a specified fashion. Persons such as retailers who
issue debit cards are governed by a complicated division of obligations between the retailer (the
"service provider") and the financial institution holding the consumer's account. Regulation E
imposes a limit on the liability of consumers for unauthorized EFTs, and compulsory use of
EFTs is prohibited.
FRB Regulation Z, 12 CFR Part 226. Regulation Z supplements Title I of the Consumer Credit
Protection Act, 15 USC 1601, and implements the Truth In Lending Act. It applies to any person
who is a "creditor," which is defined to include a corporation who regularly extends consumer
credit that is subject to a finance charge (term includes an interest charge) or is payable by
written agreement in more than four installments and to whom the obligation is initially payable.
"Regularly" means extending consumer credit in the preceding calendar year more than 25 times
(or more than 5 times if the credit is secured by a dwelling). See 12 CFR § 226.2(17) and Note
3. Regulation Z requires, among other things, that extensive disclosures be made before the first
extension of credit, that complying periodic statements be delivered for open-end credit, and that
certain procedures be followed to resolve billing errors or certain other complaints. Most of the
credit card provisions of Regulation Z also apply to business credit, not just consumer credit.
The regulation also limits a cardholder's liability for unauthorized uses of credit cards. Credit
advertising restrictions are also imposed. The FTC is authorized to take regulatory action for
noncompliance and class action and other damages are also available.
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FRB Regulation M, Consumer Leasing, 12 CFR Part 213. This regulation requires lessors to
provide consumers with uniform costs and other disclosures about consumer lease transactions.
Many states have similar statutes. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws is working on a state law uniform act. The federal regulation generally applies to
consumer leases ofpersonal property in which the contractual obligation does not exceed
$25,000 and has a term of more than four months. An automobile lease is the most common
type of consumer lease covered by the act.
Usury. Usury statutes restrict the amount of interest and similar charges that may be
charged on a loan or other extension ofcredit. Penalties for violation are severe and breach is
usually also a violation of Consumer Protection Acts. Usury statutes exist at the state level and
also, for federally chartered institutions such as national banks or federal thrifts, at the federal
level. There are several federal doctrines, such as the "Most Favored Lender Doctrine," that
make state usury statutes applicable to programs offered insured financial institutions. Usury
statutes apply to almost all creditors. Accordingly, any company, whether or not a financial
institution, needs to be aware of usury statutes if the company extends credit and contracts for
interest. The company needs to comply with the usury statute or locate an exemption from it.
Usury protections typically are considered to be a fundamental policy of the state" and contrary
choice of law clauses sometimes are not enforceable (the Comptroller of the Currency would say
the opposite, however).
t See e.g., Nimmer, Raymond T., Breaking Barriers; The Relation Between Contract And Intellectual Property
Law, 13 Berkeley Tech. LJ. 827,836 (1998) (information contracts typically deal with at least 3 issues: product
issues (defining the subject matter), liability issues (defining the allocation of risk), and performance issues (defining
how the transaction will be performed)).
2 Id. supra at 842.
3 DSC Communications v. Pulse Communications, -- F.3d -- (Fed. Cr. 1999) (the case involved a standard foml
software license used in the telecommunications industry). See also MAl Systems Cor. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991
F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993); Expediters int'l ofWash., Inc. v. Direct Line Cargo Mgmt Servs., Inc., 995 F. Supp. 468
(D. N.J. 1998) (licensee not an owner).
4 The U.S. high-tech industry represented a project 6.2% of the U.S. gross domestic product in 1996, up from 5.4%
in 1990. The automotive manufacturing and services percentage is 4.3; the high-tech industry (which was
conservatively defined only to include high-tech manufacturing, communications services and software and
computer-related services, and to exclude the biotechnology industry and the wholesale and retail trade of high-tech
goods), is slightly behind the private health services industry at 6.5%. The high-tech industry also creates millions
of new jobs which, because they tend to require workers with more education and technical abilities, pay 73% more
than the average private sector wage in the U.S. Additionally, the high-tech industry is the single largest exporter in
the U.S. See American Electronics Association and Nasdaq, Cybernation, The Importance ofthe high-Technology
Industry to the American Economy (1997), "Key Findings" (copy available from AEA at 1-800-284-4232).
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S U's In The Cards inc. v. Fuschetto, 535 N.W.2d 11at 14-15 (1995).
6 Id. at 887. The point here would appear to be that horses could not be characterized by species because oftheir
inherent individual differences. U appears that they traditionally did not carry any implied warranties either because
they were viewed as "detachable agrarian chattel," "articles ofnatural growth" distinguishable from wares, or
simply as horses and not wares. Llewellyn, Karl, Across Sales On Horseback, 52 Harvard Law Review 737, 740,
741 (1939).
7 Llewellyn, Jd. Note 23 at 874 (as between the law ofreal estate conveyancing and the law ofmercantile sales, the
latter should be channeled under circumstances which permit them to be perceived as mercantile cases, which
permit them to remain unconfused in their impact because they are not thrown into a single intellectual bin).
8 Examples ofother uniform acts drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
(NCCUSL) include (but are not limited to) the Uniform Trade Secrets Act and the Uniform Limited Partnership Act.
The purpose ofNCCUSL is to promote uniformity in state law on all subjects where uniformity is desirable and
practicable. To accomplish this, the commissioners participate in drafting acts and endeavor to secure their
consideration by state legislatures. National Conference OfCommissioners on Uniform State Laws, 1995-96
Reference Book at 3. NCCUSL is composed of approximately four commissioners from each state, the District of
Columbia, Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. Commissioners are appointed by state governors and tend to be
law school professors, legislators, practicing lawyers, and state code revisers. Id. Commissioners are appointed to
drafting committees and a "reporter" is chosen to draft each proposed act. The Reporter for UCITAwas Dean
Raymond T. Nimmer, Leonard Childs Professor ofLaw, University ofHouston.
Gilmore, Grant, On The Difficulties Of Codifying Commercial Law, 57 The Yale Law Journal
1341 (1948).
10 For a discussion of the treatment of consumers in the U.C.C. or Article 2B, see Miller, Fred H., Consumers And
The Code: The Search For The Proper Formula, 75 WA Univ. L. Quart. 187 (1997); Dively, Mary Jo Howard and
Cohn, Donald, Treatment ofConsumer under Proposed Uc.c. Article 2B Licenses, 16 J. Marshall J. Computer &
Info. L. 315 (1997), corrected version available from www.2Bguide.com:cfHillebrand.Gail. The Uniform
Commercial Code Drafting Process: Will Articles 2, 2B and 9 Be Fair to Consumers?, 75 Wash. U.L.Q. 69 (1997).
For a debate regarding requests made by a representative of some consumers, see Hillebrand, Gail and Towle, Holly,
32 UCC Bulletin 1-8 (September, 1997, Part One); and 33 UCC Bulletin 1-8 (October, 1997, Part Two).
II See, e.g., Wyse Technology v. Step-Saver (court used § 2-207 to hold that a shrink wrap license in
software packages delivered after a prior telephone contract did not become part of the sale contract).
12 See e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (71tt Cir. 1996); Hill vs. Gateway 2000 Inc., 105 F.3d
1147 (71tt Cir. 1997); Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 NYS2d 569 (NY AD 1998); M.A._Mortenson Co., Inc. v.
Timberline Software Corp., 1999 WL 39017 (Wash.App. 1999); Arizona Retail Sys., Inc. v. Software Link, Inc., 831
F.Supp. 759 (D. Ariz. 1993) (enforceable where no prior firm agreement because terms conditional, but not effective
where prior telephone agreement); and Caspi v. The Microsoft Network, L.L.C. et. al., Superior Court of New Jersey
Appellate Division; A-2182-97T5 (approved for publication 7/2/99) (choice offorum clause in online contract
which consumer could review entire contract and click "I Agree" or "I disagree" enforceable). For decisions not
within the information industries but which also validate that contract terms not seen at the time ofcontracting can
be enforceable, see e.g., Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 499 U.S. 585 (1991). For cases enforcing terms ofa
shrinkwrap without delving into arcane enforceability questions, see Green Book Int'l Corp. v. Inunity Corp., 2 F.
Supp. 112 (D. Mass. 1998). See also Micro Starv. Formgen, Inc., 942 F. Supp. 1312, aff'd 154 F.3d 1107 (9ltt Cir.
1998) (lower court enforced license buried in code; appellate court did not review this issue, concluding that either
the license barred the conduct or there was no license to prevent claim of infringement). Compare, e.g., Vault Corp.
v. Quaid Software, 655 F.Supp. 750, aff'd 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988) (lower court held contract was invalid
contract ofadhesion, appellate court did not review this issue).
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13 The European Union reports:
The current legal framework gives rise to significant costs for operators wishing to develop their activities
across borders. The results of a survey undertaken within the "Commercial Communications" newsletter
demonstrate the significance and specific nature of these costs.
The signifICance oflegal costs: 64% of respondents undertook a legal analysis of the regulatory
situation and notably regarding the cross-border situation. Ofthe 36% who did not, 43% had not yet done
so because they were still in pilot phases and 30% because they could not afford to undertake such an
evaluation.
Estimated legal costs to launch an Information Society service vary enormously. Several examples
demonstrate how they often amount to considerable sums: one operator responded that he is using 3-4 days
ofexternal legal advice per month, another uses 50 hours per month of both internal and external legal
advice (amounting to approximately 70,000 DM per year), another used fifty days of both in-house and
external legal advice to launch a new service and an SME indicated that it had to employ a lawyer on a full-
time basis. One of the key operators in the electronic commerce market noted that he has to rely on 8 in
house lawyers dedicating 45 hours per week and 18 outside legal advisers who on average supply 175
hours ofadvice per week. For the UK market alone, this operator estimated that a review of the regulatory
framework for his information society service cost him 60,000 ECU.
The specificity ofthe legal costs associated with electronic commerce. Of those who have
undertaken a legal analysis, no less than 40% believe that the legal uncertainty that characterized electronic
commerce was greater than for other lines of business. The cross-border dimension of the activity also
distinguishes it since 64% evaluated legal aspects other than those in their own country and 57% believed it
was essential to evaluate how the activity would be treated in other Member States. Moreover, of those who
did not make a legal assessment, only 26% denied that there was a risk and 30% would have done so if they
had had the resources to.
!d. at 8 (emphasis added).
14 Id. at Note 14, supra at 6 (emphasis added).
15 See the Directive Concerning the Protection of Individuals in Relation to the Processing of Personal Data. This
directive establishes strict rules on the collection and transfer ofdata about individuals, and creates individual rights
to obtain information in the files collected about them. It also restricts transfers ofdata from the EU to jurisdictions
without "adequate provisions for the protection of personal information."
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THE INTERNET CONTRACT:
MISTAKES & WAR STORIES
• PRESENTATION POWER-POINT SLIDES •
Timothy E. Nielander
Preston Gates & Ellis LLP
Seattle, Washington
Copyright 2000, Timothy E. Nielander
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Disclaimers & Notices
~Gopyright&PrivacyPolicy© 1998
[Company Xl All rights reserved
©Copyright 1998, [Company Xl All
Rights Reserved.
Please read our Disclaimer,
Trademarks, and Privacy Statement.
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BROADBAND ACCESS
TO THE INTERNET
John G. Hun.diey
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Broadband Access to the
Internet
Uniuersity of Kentucky
College of Law
2nd Rnnual Computer and
Technology Law Institute
John G. Hundley
High Speed Access Corp.
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Broadband Recess to the
Internet
• Issues to be couered
)- Intemet-Networlc Rrchitecture
• how does broadband work?
• choices of access
• why it matters. and effect on client·s business
• Some Regulatory Issues
• Issues not couered
)- Internet legislation and regulation per se
)- Content
)- Intellectual Property - copyright. trademark
)- Priuacy
> E-commerce/taHationljUrisdiction
C -3
The Internet-What is it?
• Definition
» Generally thought of as a "packet-switched"
copper/fiber, shared transport network that switches
and transports bits of data from one location to another.
» Features:
• "No guarantees" about order Dr timing of deliuery, integrity
of data (packet loss occurs), or security Dr priuacy (absent
additional hardware and software to secure your CP£)o
Quality of Semice (QOS) standards are common in network
agreements with major carriers.
• Seruices originate at the edge of the network in Customer
Premises Equipment (CP£). The Internet is simply a transport
medium.
• No bandwidth resemation or fiHed routing.
• Predominately a publishing medium for teHt and Images, but
uoice and uldeo streaming are rapidly euoluing.
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The Internet-What is it?
» Data is digitized and organized into "cells" or "paclcets" of
H's orO's with an identification header and Information field,
then routed ula multiple paths through the networlc before
reassembly and display.
» DIfferentiated from circuit-switched, pOlnt-to-point POTS.
» TCP/IP Protocols: most common is RIM - Rsynchronous
Transfer Mode - high speed data sWitching and transfer
protocol. RIM Is slowly di~placingFrame Relay.
.. Truly profound and unprecedented impact on SOCiety
~ For the first time in human history we haue accessible,
ineKpensiue, mass worldwide two-way interactiue
communication and information sharing capability on a real
time basis. Change is coming MUCH FRSTER than the
industrial reuolution. The Internet as most of us Icnow it is
only 6 years old.
C - 5
The Internet - History
• The Internet Originated as a 1968 DOD communications
Initiatlue. The Intent was to designed a networle capable of
withstanding a nuclear attacle.
• Computers should talle to one another across multipath
networle. and not be dependent on a central hub mainframe.
• Rduanced Research Project Rgency Networle (RRRPNETI went
online in 1969 at four sites at Unluersity of California.
• Microprocessor inuented in 1911
• Telenet - which allowed connection ula remote (host)
computers - arriued in 1912 along with other uniuersities and
. military sites.
C-6
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The Internet - History
• The "Internet" (flleta RRRPNET) spanned the globe in
1975 - the same year the Rltair 8888 (the first home PC)
was introduced.
• Rcademic USENET newsgroup channels opened up in 1978
• Compuserue created in 1979.
• IBM PC introduced in 1981 with MS-DOS standard
operating system
• In 1989, British researcher Tim Berners-Lee dreams up
the World Wide Web (WWW) for the transfer of
documents. WWW debuts in 1992.
C-7
The Internet - What is it?
• By the Numbers
.. Some 88-98 million U.S. users accessing 65 million
computing deuices are online tOday. FCC eHpect 1B users
to be online worldwide this decade.
.. 98% of those deuices are desktop/notebook PCs
.. By 2887. there will be 221 million deuices accessing the
Net. but only 41 % will be PCs. The balance will be other
appliances. in-car deuices. mobile phones/POAs. etc.
;. E-commerce: $35B this year to $388B in 2818 (1)
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The Internet-What is it?
• Dislntennediation Impacts of the Internet
:.- Marlcetlng, Sales, Rduertislng
, Email
)0 E-commerce
:.- Financial Semlces
)0 Uideo and Entertainment
> Education
> Politics
> I nfonnation Publishing
,. the Killer Rpp?
C-9
--- --------------------------------------------------,
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The Internet-What is it?
• High Speed or Broadband Access
~ generally thought of bandwidth/data throughput
equal or eHceeding 128Kbps (remember ISDN?)
• Growth of High Speed Access
~ approHimately 2.8 million today (88% cable modem)
~ 3.3 million by Decemb~r31, 2888 (41 % will haue
access to CM, only 21 % will haue access to DSL)
~ 16.6 million by December 31, 2884 (42% CM, other
DSL!wlreless)
[Yankee Group, 1/28/88)
I
-
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The Internet - Methods of
Recess
• Dial-up Modems
> Standard point to point copper -56Kbps bandwidth
limitation
> Standard I SP offering
C -11
• Aduanced Digital Set-Top BOH
~ Souped-up cable TU conuerter bOH that supports:
• "Hundreds" of digital TU channels
• Internet web browsing ula TO (not PC)
• Online Shopping
• EPG - electronic program guides
• Email
• "Local" content - weather, sports, community bulletin
boards, etc.
• Bideo on Demand [impulse pay per ulew]
• Interactiue TU aduertising (Wlnl< Communications, etc.]
• Interactiue Gaming
• Digital uideo recording (limited) ("pause" a football game]
• Can be combined with NIC and C/OSL modem for PC
• EKamples: Worldgate@, WebTU@
C -12
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• Cable Modem Recess
• Characteristics of the Cable Plant
> RF - Radio Frequency Spectrum
> Rrchitecture of the Cable Plant
> DOCSIS
• Data ouer Cable Seruice Interface
Specifications
• Deueloped by CableLabs, an industry
consortium
C -13
Cable Modem Broadband
Access
!
.I
.J
• Aduantages
,. SBB Kbps - 1BMbps
downstream, 12BKbps
up
,. Bandwidth aduantage
ouer DSL
,. Well-established cable
networks
• Disaduantages
» Somewhat more
susceptible to periodic
contention-based
slowdowns due to shared
bandwidth
» Primarily for residential
areas
, "always on" security
risks
,. 2-way seruiceoften
requires eHpensiue plant
upgrade for cable
operator
C -14
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Part 1 • Cable
Technology
• Up Stream (US)
• Subscriber to Cable
company
• 5-42 MHz
Frequency Spectrum
RF Spectrum
C8 Channel2
;7[11Hz - '-v
IF : RF (VHF &UHF), Microwave : InfraRed' VISible: Ultra X-Rays : Gamma
5-45 MHz 55-750 MHz Above 1GHz Ughl VIOlet Rays
l10a20V
Electrical
tr
• Radio Freq (Rn
,. Rboue Rudlo to InfraRed
• Down Stream (OS)
,. Cable company to
subscriber
,. 55-7SB MHzr
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Typical Cable Frequency Plan
-
""'--....... ,..----) \---....... ,..----)Y Y
-VPSTREAM~~DOWNSTREAl\I~
5·4% MHz "t"54· 'l5OJ860 l\IHz
CM Upstream Channels
5-42 MHz range
QPSK or 16 QAM
~
Analog AN ChanneIs
6 MHz spacing
-6 MHz BW
Digital AN Channels
6 MHz spacing
-6 MHz BW
54-750/860 MHz range
64 or 256 QAM
CM Downstream Channels
6 MHz spacing
-6 MHz BW
88-860 MHz range (300 - 7S0 typ.)
64 or2S6QAM -
...
In the US direction, one or more channels of US bandwidth can be allocated
anywhere in the5 - 42 MHz range that does not interfere with other US signals
that may be carried on the cable system, to transport DOCSIS CM bursts to the
CMTS. A US channel's occupied bandwidth depends on how fast data is
being sent on that channel (the "symbol rate.") This data rate parameter is one
of the many US channel parameters that are configured into the CMTS, then
continuously "advertised" by the CMTS to its CMs using the CMTS broadcast
DS UCDs.
In the DS direction, a DOCSIS DS channel is 6 MHz wide. It can be placed in
any 6 MHz slot in the DS spectrum, anywhere 88 to 860 MHz, which is in the
cable systems DS bandpass and does not interfere with other DS cable system
signals, in place ofe.g. a standard 6 MHz bandwidth analog or digital TV
signal that might otherwise be placed there. One common DS spectrum
allocation places analog TV channels at the lowest DS frequencies, then digital
TV channels, then one or more DOCSIS DS channels at the highest DS
frequencies on the system.
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Cable Signals
Typical spectrum appearance on a
spectrum analyzer wI 100KHz BW
The OOCSIS OS signal's appearance on a spectrum analyzer 9is quite
different from an analog channel's spectrum. Here, a OOCSIS OS is between
two analogs. Note how energy is distributed evenly across the OOCSIS
channel, but has strong peaks at video, sound and color carrier frequencies of
each analog channel.
The amplitude (level) ofan analog signal is defined as its peak visual carrier
leveL.the top of the high analog peak in this picture.
The level of a digital signal is defined as the total energy in its whole 6 MHz
bandwidth...a value not readily apparent in this picture. In this analyzer
display, the CMTS OS signal is actually correctly adjusted to a OOCSIS-
recommended 10 dB below the level to which an analog channel would be set
on this channel. But the plateau of the digital signal currently "appears"
another 18 dB lower on the screen. This is due to the 10 log (6 MHz / 100
kHz) = 18 dB additional correction factor associated with the analyzer's 100
kHz bandwidth setting.
A OOCSIS channel is typically referenced by the CENTER frequency of the 6
MHz channel occupies (Le. 3 MHz above the lower band edge). Contrast this
with the analog NTSC television signals, which are historically referenced by
their visual carrier frequency, which is 1.25 MHz above their lower band edge.
C - 17
HFC (Hybrid Fiber Coaxial) Technology
-
Cable
Network: -J-
• RING architecture
• Rnalog fiber RING for broadcast uldeo
• HeadendIhub to Improue reliability
• SONETISDH RING ouerlay for reliability
of aduanced serulces
C -18
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HFC (Hybrid Fiber Coaxial) Technology
Cable Network
Reliability, Increased Access Bandwidth
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• Smaller, robust
seruing areas:
~ HFe to the node
~ Rlternate feed
to the node
~ Target nodes
of SUU homes
.. Fewer amplifiers
/ / /
C -19
HFC (Hybrid Fiber Coaxial) Technology
Cable
Network:
• I ncreased bandwidth:
» Downstream "rebUilds" to 158 MHz
» Wide band amplifiers etc•••
• Two way operation:
» upstream (5-42 MHz) "Prouisioned"
and "Operational"
C -20
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HFC (Hybrid Fiber Coaxial) Technology
Cable Network ~~Ii!zem-
~1"Wf;U.
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cable
plant
System Uiew
(The good-old-days)
Your Cable Company
In the "good old" days (before Cable Modems - CMs), CATV operators
delivered TV signals ONE-way to consumer TV sets. In recent years that
became supplemented with telephone companies providing connectivity for
the consumer's internet access.
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System Uiew
Proprietary Systems with Phone upstream
(One Way· Downstream only Systems)
cable
plant
Your Cable Company
Then, to provide consumers with higher speed internet access, some
manufacturers introduced "proprietary" CM solutions consisting ofpackaged
combinations of their CMs with companion CM headend equipment. Both the
CM and cable modem headend equipment were manufactured by the same
vendor. Many such systems remain installed today.
These "proprietary" cable modem solutions provide no interoperability among
different manufacturers' CMs and cable modem headend components. In this
scenario, it is impractical to sell these CMs in retai Is stores because consumers
like can't re-use them if they relocate their residence to another cable system.
Nevertheless, the proprietary CM systems have, over the last few years,
allowed the cable operator to become a conduit for providing internet services
to consumers.
Many cable systems weren't yet capable ofupstream communications. For
these "one-way" cable systems, hybrid proprietary CM solutions were created.
These use CATV coax cable for DS communication, but telephone lines for
US communication, to provide internet access services to homes and
businesses.
C - 23
System Uiew
Proprietary Systems with 2·Way cable
cable
plant
Your Cable Company
The trend is toward two-way communication over the cable system,
eliminating the need for the telephone return path. Two-way cable systems
use the cable TV coax for both downstream (OS -- cable headend to CM) and
upstream (US - - CM back to cable headend) data transport.
Some of the proprietary cable modem system solution were capable of
working with these two-way cable systems.
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System Uiew
DOCSIS Basic System
cable
plant
Your Cable Company
In an effort to establish a CM "standard", and thereby make possible CM retail
sales direct to consumer, CableLabs and the Multimedia Cable Network
Systems (MCNS) consortium of cable operators created DOCSIS - Data Over
Cable Service Interface Specifications.
The first two CM models build to the first rou~d of DOCSIS specifications
("DOCSIS 1.0") became "CableLabs Certified" in March of 1999. The RCA
DCM105 was one of those. The first CMTS (DOCSIS-compliant cable
modem headend unit) became "CableLabs Qualified" soon thereafter.
The cable operator is now positioned to provide STANDARDIZED cable
modem internet access nationwide, using CableLabs Certified DOCSIS CMs
and CableLabs Certified DOCSIS CMTS's.
In a CableLabs DOCSIS complIant cable modem system, any vendors' CMTS
is interoperable with any vendors' CMs.
C - 25
System Uiew
Very Soon Now· Voice
over IP telephony
cable
plant
YoW" Cable Company
In the future, the DOCSIS standard may go on to provide the system
communications "core" functions that enable economical and reliable
telephone and other services to be provided over a cable TV system, in
addition to internet delivery services to homes.
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CM
• 18Rasel Ethernet
• Up to 16 PC's (with hub)
• ICP/IP Protocols
• MRC address at CM Co PC NIC
• IP address at CM Co PC
PC
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The PC's ethernet network interface card (NIC) connects to the CM via a standard (not
crossover) 10BaseT ethernet cable at the CM's RJ-45 jack.
DOCSIS specifies a compliant CM must support at least one PC. The RCA DCMI05 can
support up to 16 simultaneously connected PCs, but DOCSIS also allows the maximum
number that can actually operate in a specific DOCSIS cable system to be commanded to the
CMs to a smaller number.
The PC,like the CM, uses TCPIlP data communications protocols. TCPIIP communication
can take place between the CM or PC and any device on the Internet with which
communication is authorized by the cable operator.
Once CM automatic startup is complete and the RCA DCMI05 is m-line and operational, it
behaves like a remotely-programmable packet filter. It is remotely programmable because it
can be "talked to" by a remote device by via TCPIIP with an application level protocol such as
Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP). It is a packet filter because it filters data
traffic going CMTS to PC and PC to CMTS: not all data that appears at the CM RF connector
is passed to the PD, and not all data the appears at the eM ethernet connector is passed to the
CMTS. Aside from this filtering, an operating CM is basically an RF - to - ethernet adapter
between CMTS and PC.
Each CM has a unique MAC address that is printed m the back of the CM and hard-coded into
it. The CM also must have an IP address to communicate over the Internet to support servers
and other devices involved in its operation. It receives this IP address during lhe CM
automatic startup process.
Similarly, each PC connected to the DCMI05 CM has a unique MAC address hard-coded into
it (on its ethernet NIC) and must have an IP address to communicate over the Internet. The PC
may receive its IP address automatically during its startup, or the installer may directly enter a
pre-assigned IP address, depending upm the cable system's practices.
The CM automatically "learns" the MAC addresses of the PCs connected to it, up to the
maximum number allowed, by watching the addresses embedded in data sent to the CM by its
PCs. When the CM reboots, it forgets the MAC addresses or all PCs it had learned, and must
relearn them in subsequent activity.
DOCSIS also provides a mechanism whereby ALL a CM's ability to pass data can be disabled
by a command to the CM. If this command is sent, the CM can still be "talked to" by
authorized devices on the Internet, but communication tolfrom the PC is totally disabled.
C -27
DOCSIS
Data Over Cable Service Interface Specifications
• Industry Standard
• Focus: Internet Ouer Cable TU Systems
• Family of Documents (www.cablemodem.com)
• Parallel CableLabs Efforts:
).. DpenCable
).. PaclcetCable
• Defines "Reference Rrchltecture"
DOCSIS is a very versatile CATV industry standard. It is evolving.
"DOCSIS 1.0" is effectively complete. Product is available and being
installed in hundreds of CATV systems.
"DOCSIS 1.1" is on the horizon, and will add technology that makes possible
Quality of Service (QoS) guarantees needed fo"r newer services like DOCSIS-
based telephony over cable. Another CableLabs effort -- PacketCable -- is
merging its efforts with DOCSIS to realize this.
DOCSIS is really a family of documents. These are available from the public
area of the CableLabs cable modem website at www.cablemodem.com.
DOCSIS defines a Reference Architecture for an overall data communication
system optimized to cOonnect consumer PCs to the internet using the DOCSIS
CM and DOCSIS CMTS.
The CMTS and CM are now the industry standard fundamental building
blocks for a cable operator to implement cable modem service.
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DOCS IS Seruer types and Purpose
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The individual servers shown here represent functionality and may share the same
platform.
DOCSIS Requirements
• oHCP (Dynamic Host Configuration
Protocol):
~ prouides IP addresses for
Modems and PC's
, eKtended options and fields
(Special DoCSIS feature)
• TOO (TIme Of Day)
, system time clock:
• TFTP (Jriuial File Transfer Protocol)
, modem configuration files
,. modem configuration flies
(Special DOCS IS feature)
,. uendor c- feature specific
per user modifications by billing
system
C -30
Cisco Solution
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The Internet - Methods of Recess
• HoSL - Digital Subscriber line
• Requires oSLRM (digital subscriber line access
multipleHer) In the CO, or other feeder aggregation
points
• Prouides last mile capacity by upgrading copper phone
line that runs to building.
• Digitized transmission signal eHpands auailable
frequency.
• Variety of bit rates - RoSL, SoSL, HoSL, VoSL, etc.
• RoSL - Rsymmetrlc oSL most common consumer
application - allows for greater downstream than
upstream.
• SoSL - Single Line oSL prouides symmetric 2-way bit
rates and is the most common commercial application
C - 31
Digital Subscriber Line (cont.)
• Rdllantages • Disaduantages
» Uoice operates at 3B-3,4BB Hz, » Distance Limitations - 1B,BBB ft.,
or 2% of spectnrm. or about 3.5 miles from CO, for
» HOSL's broader range of RDSl
frequencies permits 256K-BM »"Dirty Copper" - DLCs, or Digital
MHz downstream, 64K-IM MHz Loop Carriers, must be bypassed.
upstream. » Load Coils, Bridge Taps, crosstalk-
» Uses eHisting copper bundling with T-l S, can degrade
» point-to-point functionality signal. Rttenuation is the enemy.
» Rdded Security - point to point » Prollisioning Difficulties
DSl bypasses the telco's switCh, » like cable modems, "always on"
conllerting the local loop into a can present security risks.
prillate line. » RDSl market potential inclUdes
» No shared connections, 68-75% of 178M or so access
somewhat more consistent lines.
speeds
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Comparison of Hrchitectures
-
..
Types Dedicated Access Shared Medium Access
Examples Traditional Telephone Broadband (2-way cable)
(Twisted Wire Pairs Cellular Radio
Two-way LMDS
Two-Way Satellite
-
Arrangement Group ofPoint-to-Point Bus (loopless)
Connections (loops)
Capacity Guaranteed for each Contention-based
customer Dynamically shared
...J
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The Internet - Methods of Access
• DBS - Direct Broadcast Satellite
~ C and Ku bands deployed
~ New Ka band and spot beam due 2001
~ DirecPC, Isley, Teledeslc, others
~ Geostationary u. LED-low earth orbit (Iridium)
~ 400Kbps - 2Mbps
~ eHpect eHplosiue growth of USRT technology
C-35
Direct Broadcast Satellite (cont.)
-
• Rduantages
• Wide geographic
couerage
• One-way now, broad 2-
way deployments 2004
• Oisaduantages
• Not yet reliable, rain fade
signal attenuation
• Inherent bandwidth
limitations and High
latency (signal delay)
• EKpensiue
Transceiuer/CPE
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The Internet - Methods of Recess
• LMDS - Local Multipoint Distribution Seruice (uoice and
data)
> FCC licensed spectrum in the 286Hz band and in the
38.6-48.8 6Hz band, with 1.3 6Hz bandwidth
> Used in high density areas - 5 miles "line of sight"
and "rain fade"
> EHpensiue equipment
• MMDS - Multichannel Multipoint Distribution Seruice
("wireless cable" - uideo and data).
> FCC licensed spectrum between 2.5 - 2.7 6Hz
:.. Lower frequency 0:: lower susceptibility to weather
and return path interference
:.. EHpensiue head end and CPE
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Wireless
• Microwaue - Unlicensed
~ uarious between 2.4-5.8 GHz
» line of Sight, J8 mile limit
» 2.4 GHz band is "noisy" - microwaue ouen interference,
etc.
• Laser
~ rooftop to rooftop up to 3 miles
» fat 18 to 155 Mbps, but high fade margin, eKpensiue
• Mobile Wireless - PCS/Cellular Spectrum
» emerging Wireless Rpplication Protocols - COMR, mMR, or
GSM - for Personal Display Oeuices (PORs), cell phones,
etc.
~ relatiuely low bandwidth, eKpensiue
» eKpect EKplosiue Growth
C - 38
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The Internet -Methods of Recess
• Bandwidth Equiualents (T-1 • 24 channels at 1.5 Mbps
each)
T-1 05-3 0[-3 0[-12 0[-48 OC-192
T-1 1 28 B4 336 1344 5316
05-3 1 3 12 48 192
0[-3 1 4 16 64
0[-12 1 4 16
0[-48 1 4
OC-192 1
C -39
The Internet - Methods of Recess
• Fiber
» digitized signal carried as pulses (photons) of light of uarylng
frequency (color).
» uery fast, wide bandwidth - 18Mbps (OC-192) and up
» high quality, high security, too expenslue for most applications
;. Immune to electrical Interference
» waue diulsion multiplexing extends life of "old" single mode fiber
with OC-48 or lower capacity and 38 miles or less regeneration.
» 1 strand of non-zero dispersion shifted fiber equlualent to eight (B)
OC-192s of bandWidth, with 68 mile regeneration spacing.
;. "Next Gen" long-haul fiber getting all the press - 4 hops coast to
coast (S88 mile hops)
• Qtera announced 2,588 mile hop, 18 Gigabits/second, on 3/87/88.
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The Internet Backbone
• Global Seruice Prouiders
> AlT, MCIIWorldcom-UUNet,
• New Network/Transport Prouiders
> Williams lelecomm, QWest, others
• Optical Switc hing
> challenge is to reduce the number of opto-electric
conuersions and regenerations - eliminate the electronic
data router
> become as adept manipUlating photons as electrons
> eHperts equate today's optical technology to the 1950's
electronics industry prior to the inuention of the integrated
circuit
C - 41
Conuergence of Uoice, Uideo and
Data
• Regulatory/Legacy Confilct
);> Buckets of Historical Regulation
• IP Telephony
• Destruction of Old Business Models
C -42
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Legal Issues affecting Broadband
Recess
• Classification of Cable Modem Seruice
• Cable u. DSL
• FORCED, or OPEN ACCESS
)- RlIn Corp. u. City of Portland, 43 F. Supp. 2d 1146
(USDC Or. June 3, 1999), on appeal to 9th Circuit
)- What eHactly does It mean?
)- Where is the fCC?
• Some Legislatiue Issues
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When Haley's Comet was approaching the earth's atmosphere in the early part of the 20th
century, many doomsayers predicted the end of the world. That natural phenomenon proved to
be a miscalculation and passed without event.
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In the late 1990s, the Y2K defect in computers became widely known and many
doomsayers predicted a catastrophic impact on the world economy and the very survival of the
species in view of the world's increasing reliance upon computers in this age.
As has been widely reported, the root of the Y2K problem was that programmers had
utilized two digit encoding description and had not provided for the three digits that would be
required upon the advent of the year 2000. Upon discovery of the situation, there was a
widespread disparity between the extent of the problem with respect to mainframe computers,
software, and embedded chips.
In or around 1998, the initial reports of Y2K computer failures pertained to inventory
systems and scheduling systems, primarily in the medical field and in the transportation industry.
With only two years to go before the critical date, the business world essentially was ignorant of
the potential magnitude of the situation. At that time, industry analysts correctly forecasted that
there woul~ be global catastrophes unless the situation was promptly and adequately addressed.
During the ensuing 24 months, the private and public sectors responded in an astonishing
way to address the situation. In the private sector, essentially every corporate business
implemented Y2K assessment and remedial programs. These reactionary measures were
embraced by the computer industry for two reasons. First, the computer industry, by its very
nature, is on the cutting edge of technological developments and is analytical in nature. This
problem-solving bent was suited well to address the Y2K issue. Secondly, the Y2K problem was
a golden opportunity for the computer industry and software vendors to market upgrades to their
existing systems and enjoy the profits derived therefrom.
Within that two-year span, massive effort was implemented to review nearly every
business' computer systems to determine Y2K exposure. Hundreds upon thousands of
computers were found to be defective, and it was widely believed that there would be an
onslaught of litigation.
©2000,1. MARK GRUNDY. Au.. RIGHTS RESERVED.
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The rapid pace in technological developments resulted in widespread business solution
approaches to the situation - rather than fighting the matters in the courts. The software vendors
and computer manufacturers frequently would simply discount their services and products in
return for the opportunity to upgrade computer systems and cure Y2K defects. ...I
The result of the Y2K "panic" is that nearly every business in the United States has in
some way or another upgraded or modernized their computer systems, which are integral to
nearly every facet of today's business world. It is anticipated that productivity has been advanced
by nearly a decade as a result of this phenomenon.
-II. THE Y2K ACT
Sixteen or more states enacted specialized Y2K legislation to address the anticipated
onslaught of litigation. Similarly, the United States Congress passed the Y2K Act in order to
provide a cooling off period for Y2K disputes to avoid what was viewed· as a possible
unmanagable disruption of the court system.
In the end, a few hundred Y2K related lawsuits have been filed throughout the country.
However, the vast majority of the disputes have been resolved by computer upgrade or fixes.
Those lawsuits which were instituted are subject to the federal Y2K Act, which contains
the following provisions:
~ Lender's may not foreclose on residential mortgages where the failure to pay is
related to a Y2K glitch.
Plaintiffs are severely curtailed in their ability to obtain punitive damages, unless
they can prove by clear and convincing evidence intentional wrongful conduct,
and the net worth of the defendant has threshold limits which could range from
$250,000 to $500,000. In addition, plaintiffs cannot obtain punitive damages
from a governmental entity.
The most significant portion of the statute is the pre-litigation notice, which
provides that when damages are sought in litigation (as opposed to purely
injunctive relief) the claimant must send notice via certified mail to the designated
agents of the defendant. The notice must give specified and detailed information
about the material defect, a cause to harm, the loss actually suffered, what remedy
that it sought, the basis for the remedy, and who may negotiate a resolution of the
dispute with the defendant.
The defendant has thirty days to respond and advise how it intends to remedy the
loss, and as to whether it is willing to participate in arbitration or mediation
outside the court system. The parties have sixty days to do so unless the parties
agree to a longer time period.
02000. J. MARK GRUNDY. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
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The plaintiff may file suit only if the defendant fails to respond in thirty days, or if
the plaintiff is seeking purely injunctive relief.
There are heightened pleading requirements in which all complaints must set
forth, in particularity, the specific information about the nature and the amount of
each element of damage claimed, giving the factual basis for those damages
claimed, and specific information about how the defects manifested themselves,
and how the factual defects are material to the plaintiff s business.
The plaintiff has a duty to mitigate the damages it seeks by heeding the
defendant's Y2K readiness disclosure, or other disclosures which the plaintiff
reasonably should have known about, unless the plaintiff was intentionally
defrauded by the defendant.
There are contractual damage limitations in accordance with the terms of the
contracts between the parties.
In tort actions under the Y2K Act, a plaintiff cannot recover damages for
economic loss (such as loss of profits), business interruption (unless the damages
are provided for in the contract), or unless the Y2K failure caused damage to
tangible personal property or real property.
There are severe restrictions on the bringing of class actions under for Y2K
defects, which prevent the filing of numerous low-damage class actions in the
federal courts.
The government's ability to impose civil penalties on small businesses in
situations such as banking or security systems or public health, safety
environmental situations in which the problem was caused by Y2K failures, may
be suspended for a time period.
There are a number of Y2K cases being actively litigated in the court systems today
pursuant to the guidelines. However, nothing of the magnitude as originally anticipated by many
analysts. In January of 2000, the United States Government declared that its Y2K compliance
efforts were successful and it reported that no catastrophe had occurred.
III. BUSINESS I LEGAL DISPUTES
The recent widespread software upgrades and purchase of new systems - which are a
result of the old systems being non-Y2K compliant - have given rise to numerous business and
legal disputes. Those disputes involve numerous issues which are not specifically Y2K related.
Such issues relate to matters that arise in:
©2000, J. MARK GRUNDY. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
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general software disputes;
remediation of various computer bugs;
allocation of royalties;
ownership of codes and software products;
choice of law and choice of venue issues;
noncompete and nondisclosure issues;
injunctive remedies;
measure of damages;
.. representations and warranties;
company and individual liabilities; and
marketing and licensing arrangements
D -4
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TITLE 15 USC
CHAPTER 92
Sections 6601·6617
Y2KACT
6601. Findings and purposes
(a) Findings
The Congress finds the following:
(l)(A) Many information technology systems, devices, and programs are not capable of recognizing certain dates
in 1999 and after December 31, 1999, and will read dates in the year 2000 and thereafter as if those dates represent
the year 1900 or thereafter or will fail to process dates after December 31, 1999.
(B) If not corrected, the problem described in subparagraph (A) and resulting failures could incapacitate systems
that are essential to the functioning of markets, commerce, consumer products, utilities, Government, and safety
and defense systems, in the United States and throughout the world.
(2) It is in the national interest that producers and users of technology products concentrate their attention and
resources in the time remaining before January 1, 2000, on assessing, fixing, testing, and developing contingency
plans to address any and all outstanding year 2000 computer date- change problems, so as to minimize possible
disruptions associated with computer failures.
(3)(A) Because year 2000 computer date-change problems may affect virtually all businesses and other users of
technology products to some degree, there is a substantial likelihood that actual or potential year 2000 failures will
prompt a significant volume of litigation, much of it insubstantial.
(B) The litigation described in subparagraph (A) would have a range of undesirable effects, including the
following:
(i) It would threaten to waste technical and financial resources that are better devoted to curing year 2000
computer date-change problems and ensuring that systems remain or become operational.
(ii) It could threaten the network of valued and trusted business and customer relationships that are important to
the effective functioning of the national economy. .
(iii) It would strain the Nation's legal system, causing particular problems for the small businesses and individuals
who already find that system inaccessible because of its complexity and expense.
(iv) The delays, expense, uncertainties, loss of control, adverse publicity, and animosities that frequently
accompany litigation of business disputes could exacerbate the difficulties associated with the date change and work
against the successful resolution of those difficulties.
(4) It is appropriate for the Congress to enact legislation to assure that the year 2000 problems described in this
section do not unnecessarily disrupt interstate commerce or create unnecessary caseloads in Federal courts and to
provide initiatives to help businesses prepare and be in a position to withstand the potentially devastating economic
impact of such problems.
(5) Resorting to the legal system for resolution of year 2000 problems described in this section is not feasible for
many businesses and individuals who already find the legal system inaccessible, particularly small businesses and
individuals who already find the legal system inaccessible, because of its complexity and expense.
(6) Concern about the potential for liability--in particular, concern about the substantial litigation expense
associated with defending against even the most insubstantiallawsuits--is prompting many persons and businesses
with technical expertise to avoid projects aimed at curing year 2000 computer date- change problems.
(7) A proliferation of frivolous lawsuits relating to year 2000 computer date-change problems by opportunistic
parties may further limit access to courts by straining the resources of the legal system and depriving deserving
parties of their legitimate rights to relief.
(8) Congress encourages businesses to approach their disputes relating to year 2000 computer date-change
problems responsibly, and to avoid unnecessary, time-consuming, and costly litigation about Y2K failures,
particularly those that are not material. Congress supports good faith negotiations between parties when there is
such a dispute, and, if necessary, urges the parties to enter into voluntary, nonbinding mediation rather than
litigation.
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(b) Purposes
Based upon the power of the Congress under Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the Constitution of the United States,
the purposes of this chapter are--
(1) to establish uniform legal standards that give all businesses and users of technology products reasonable
incentives to solve year 2000 computer date- change problems before they develop;
(2) to encourage continued remediation and testing efforts to solve such problems by providers. suppliers,
customers, and other contracting partners;
(3) to encourage private and public parties alike to resolve disputes relating to year 2000 computer date-change
problems by alternative dispute mechanisms in order to avoid costly and time-consuming litigation, to initiate those
mechanisms as early as possible, and to encourage the prompt identification and correction of such problems; and
(4) to lessen the burdens on interstate commerce by discouraging insubstantial lawsuits while preserving the ability ..
of individuals and businesses that have suffered real injury to obtain complete relief.
6602. Dermitions
In this chapter:
(1) Y2K action
The term "Y2K action"--
(A) means a civil action commenced in any Federal or State court, or an agency board of contract appeal
proceeding, in which the plaintiffs alleged harm or injury arises from or is related to an actual or potential Y2K
failure, or a claim or defense arises from or is related to an actual or potential Y2K failure;
(B) includes a civil action commenced in any Federal or State court by a government entity when acting in a
commercial or contracting capacity; but
(C) does not include an action brought by a government entity acting in a regulatory, supervisory, or enforcement
capacity.
(2) Y2K failure
The term "Y2K failure" means failure by any device or system (including any computer system and any microchip
or integrated circuit embedded in another device or product), or any software, firmware, or other set or collection of
processing instructions to process, to calculate, to compare, to sequence, to display, to store, to transmit, or to
receive year-2ooo date-related data, including failures--
(A) to deal with or account for transitions or comparisons from, into, and between the years 1999 and 2000
accurately;
(B) to recognize or accurately to process any specific date in 1999, 2000, or 2001; or
(C) accurately to account for the year 2000's status as a leap year, including recognition and processing of the
correct date on February 29,2000.
(3) Government entity
The term "government entity" means an agency, instrumentality, or other entity of Federal, State, or local
government (including multijurisdictional agencies, instrumentalities, and entities).
(4) Material defect
The term "material defect" means a defect in any item, whether tangible or intangible, or in the provision of a
service, that substantially prevents the item or service from operating or functioning as designed or according to its
specifications. The term "material defect" does not include a defect that--
(A) has an insignificant or de minimis effect on the operation or functioning of an item or computer program;
(B) affects only a component of an item or program that, as a whole, substantially operates or functions as
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designed; or
(C) has an insignificant or de minimis effect on the efficacy of the service provided.
(5) Personal injury
The term "personal injury" means physical injury to a natural person, including--
(A) death as a result of a physical injury; and
(B) mental suffering, emotional distress, or similar injuries suffered by that person in connection with a physical
injury.
(6) State
The term "State" means any State of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico, the Northern Mariana Islands, the United States Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, and any other
territory or possession of the United States, and any political subdivision thereof.
(7) Contract
The term "contract" means a contract, tariff, license, or warranty.
(8) Alternative dispute resolution
The term "alternative dispute resolution" means any process or proceeding,
other than adjudication by a court or in an administrative proceeding, to assist in the resolution of issues in
controversy, through processes such as early neutral evaluation, mediation, minitrial, and arbitration.
6603. Application of chapter
(a) General rule
This chapter applies to any Y2K action brought after January 1, 1999, for a Y2K failure occurring before January
1,2003, or for a potential Y2K failure that could occur or has allegedly caused harm or injury before January I.
2003, including any appeal, remand, stay, or other judicial, administrative, or alternative dispute resolution
proceeding in such an action.
(b) No new cause of action created
Nothing in this chapter creates a new cause of action, and, except as otherwise explicitly provided in this chapter.
nothing in this chapter expands any liability otherwise imposed or limits any defense otherwise available under
Federal or State law.
(c) Claims for personal injury or wrongful death excluded
This chapter does not apply to a claim for personal injury or for wrongful death.
(d) Warranty and contract preservation
(1) In general
Subject to paragraph (2), in any Y2K action any written contractual term, including a limitation or an exclusion of
liability, or a disclaimer of warranty, shall be strictly enforced unless the enforcement of that term would manifestly
and directly contravene applicable State law embodied in any statute in effect on January I, 1999, specifically
addressing that term.
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(2) Interpretation of contract
In any Y2K action in which a contract to which paragraph (1) applies is silent as to a particular issue, the
interpretation of the contract as to that issue shall be determined by applicable law in effect at the time the contract
was executed.
(3) Unconscionability
Nothing in paragraph (1) shall prevent enforcement of State law doctrines of unconscionability, including
adhesion, recognized as of January I, 1999, in controlling judicial precedent by the courts of the State whose law
applies to the Y2K action.
(e) Preemption of State law
This chapter supersedes State law to the extent that it establishes a rule of law applicable to a Y2K action that is
inconsistent with State law, but nothing in this chapter implicates, alters, or diminishes the ability of a State to
defend itself against any claim on the basis of sovereign immunity.
(f) Application with year 2000 information and readiness disclosure act
Nothing in this chapter supersedes any provision of the Year 2000 Information and Readiness Disclosure Act.
(g) Application to actions brought by a government entity
(1) In general
To the extent provided in this subsection, this chapter shall apply to an action brought by a government entity
described in section 6602(1 )(C) of this title.
(2) Definitions
In this subsection:
(A) Defendant
(i) In general
The term "defendant" includes a State or local government.
(ii) State
The term "State" means each of the several States of the United States, the District of Columbia, the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, and the Commonwealth of the
Northern Mariana Islands.
(iii) Local government
The term "local government" means--
(I) any county, city, town, township, parish, village, or other general purpose political subdivision of a State; and
(II) any combination of political subdivisions described in subclause (I) recognized by the Secretary of Housing
and Urban Development.
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(B) Y2K upset
The teon "Y2K upset"--
(i) means an exceptional temporary noncompliance with applicable federally enforceable measurement,
monitoring, or reporting requirements directly related to a Y2K failure that are beyond the reasonable control of the
defendant charged with compliance; and
(ii) does not include--
(I) noncompliance with applicable federally enforceable measurement, monitoring, or reporting requirements that
constitutes or would create an imminent threat to public health, safety, or the environment;
(II) noncompliance with applicable federally enforceable measurement, monitoring, or reporting requirements
that provide for the safety and soundness of the banking or monetary system, or for the integrity of the national
securities markets, including the protection of depositors and investors;
(III) noncompliance with applicable federally enforceable measurement, monitoring, or reporting requirements to
the extent caused by operational error or negligence;
(IV) lack of reasonable preventative maintenance;
(V) lack of preparedness for a Y2K failure; or
(VI) noncompliance with the underlying federally enforceable requirements to which the applicable federally
enforceable measurement, monitoring, or reporting requirement relates.
(3) Conditions necessary for a demonstration of a Y2K upset
A defendant who wishes to establish the affirmative defense of Y2K upset shall demonstrate, through properly
signed, contemporaneous operating logs, or other relevant evidence that--
(A) the defendant previously made a reasonable good faith effort to anticipate, prevent, and effectively remediate
a potential Y2K failure;
(B) a Y2K upset occurred as a result of a Y2K failure or other emergency directly related to a Y2K failure;
(C) noncompliance with the applicable federally enforceable measurement, monitoring, or reporting requirement
was unavoidable in the face of an emergency directly related to a Y2K failure and was necessary to prevent the
disruption of critical functions or services that could result in harm to life or property;
(0) upon identification of noncompliance the defendant invoking the defense began immediate actions to correct
any violation of federally enforceable measurement, monitoring, or reporting requirements; and
(E) the defendant submitted notice to the appropriate Federal regulatory authority of a Y2K upset within 72 hours
from the time that the defendant became aware of the upset.
(4) Grant of a Y2K upset defense
Subject to the other provisions of this subsection, the Y2K upset defense shall be a complete defense to the
imposition of a penalty in any action brought as a result of noncompliance with federally enforceable measurement,
monitoring, or reporting requirements for any defendant who establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that
the conditions set forth in paragraph (3) are met.
(5) Length of Y2K upset
The maximum allowable length of the Y2K upset shall be not more than 15 days beginning on the date of the upset
unless specific relief by the appropriate regulatory authority is granted.
(6) Fraudulent invocation of Y2K upset defense
Fraudulent use of the Y2K upset defense provided for in this subsection shall be subject to the sanctions provided
in section 1001 of Title 18.
(7) Expiration of defense
The Y2K upset defense may not be asserted for a Y2K upset occurring after June 30, 2000.
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(8) Preservation of authority
Nothing in this subsection shall affect the authority of a government entity to seek injunctive relief or require a
defendant to correct a violation of a federally enforceable measurement, monitoring, or reporting requirement.
(h) Consumer protection from Y2K failures
(1) In general
No person who transacts business on matters directly or indirectly affecting residential mortgages shall cause or
permit a foreclosure on any such mortgage against a consumer as a result of an actual Y2K failure that results in an
inability to accurately or timely process any mortgage payment transaction.
(2) Notice
A consumer who is affected by an inability described in paragraph (1) shall notify the servicer for the mortgage, in
writing and within 7 business days from the time that the consumer becomes aware of the Y2K failure and the
consumer's inability to accurately or timely fulfill his or her obligation to pay, of such failure and inability and shall
provide to the servicer any available documentation with respect to the failure.
(3) Actions may resume after grace period
Notwithstanding paragraph (1), an action prohibited under paragraph (1) may
be resumed, if the consumer's mortgage obligation has not been paid and the servicer of the mortgage has not
expressly and in writing granted the consumer an extension of time dUring which to pay the consumer's mortgage
obligation, but only after the later of--
(A) four weeks after January 1,2000; or
(B) four weeks after notification is made as required under paragraph (2), except that any notification made on or
after March 15, 2000, shall not be effective for purposes of this subsection.
(4) Applicability
This subsection does not apply to transactions upon which a default has occurred before December 15, 1999, or
with respect to which an imminent default was foreseeable before December 15, 1999.
(5) Enforcement of obligations merely tolled
This subsection delays but does not prevent the enforcement of financial obligations, and does not otherwise affect
or extinguish the obligation to pay.
(6) Definition
In this subsection--
(A) The term "consumer" means a natural person.
(B) The term "residential mortgage" has the meaning given the term "federally related mortgage loan" under
section 3 of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974 ( 12 U.S.c. 2602).
(C) The term "servicer" means the person, including any successor, responsible for receiving any scheduled
periodic payments from a consumer pursuant to the terms of a residential mortgage, including amounts for any
escrow account, and for making the payments of principal and interest and such other payments with respect to the
amounts received from the borrower as may be required pursuant to the terms of the mortgage. Such term includes
the person, including any successor, who makes or holds a loan if such person also services the loan.
(i) Applicability to securities litigation
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In any Y2K action in which the underlying claim arises under the securities laws (as defined in section 3(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ( 15 U.S.C. 78c(a», the provisions of this chapter, other than section 6612(b) of
this title, shall not apply.
6604. Punitive damages limitations
(a) In general
In any Y2K action in which punitive damages are permitted by applicable law, the defendant shall not be liable for
punitive damages unless the plaintiff proves by clear and convincing evidence that the applicable standard for
awarding damages has been met.
(b) Caps on punitive damages
(1) In general
Subject to the evidentiary standard established by subsection (a), punitive damages permitted under applicable law
against a defendant described in paragraph (2) in a Y2K action may not exceed the lesser of--
(A) three times the amount awarded for compensatory damages; or
(B) $250,000.
(2) Defendant described
A defendant described in this paragraph is a defendant--
(A) who--
(i) is sued in his or her capacity as an individual; and
(ii) whose net worth does not exceed $500,000; or
(B) that is an unincorporated business, a partnership, corporation, association, or organization, with fewer than 50
full-time employees.
(3) No cap if injury specifically intended
Paragraph (1) does not apply if the plaintiff establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant acted
with specific intent to injure the plaintiff.
(c) Government entities
Punitive damages in a Y2K action may not be awarded against a government entity.
6605. Proportionate liability
(a) In general
Except in a Y2K action that is a contract action, and except as provided in subsections (b) through (g), a person
against whom a final judgment is entered in a Y2K action shall be liable solely for the portion of the judgment that
corresponds to the relative and proportionate responsibility of that person. In determining the percentage of
responsibility of any defendant, the trier of fact shall determine that percentage as a percentage of the total fault of
all persons, including the plaintiff, who caused or contributed to the total loss incurred by the plaintiff.
(b) Proportionate liability
(1) Determination of responsibility
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In any Y2K action that is not a contract action, the court shall instruct the jury to answer special interrogatories. or,
if there is no jury, the court shall make findings with respect to each defendant. including defendants who have
entered into settlements with the plaintiff or plaintiffs, concerning--
(A) the percentage of responsibility. if any. of each defendant. measured as a percentage of the total fault of all
persons who caused or contributed to the loss incurred by the plaintiff; and
(B) if alleged by the plaintiff. whether the defendant (other than a defendant who has entered into a settlement
agreement with the plaintiff)--
(i) acted with specific intent to injure the plaintiff; or
(ii) knowingly committed fraud.
(2) Contents of special interrogatories or findings
The responses to interrogatories or findings under paragraph (1) shall specify the total amount of damages that the
plaintiff is entitled to recover and the percentage of responsibility of each defendant found to have caused or
contributed to the loss incurred by the plaintiff. .J
(3) Factors for consideration
In determining the percentage of responsibility under this subsection. the trier of fact shall consider--
(A) the nature of the conduct of each person found to have caused or contributed to the loss incurred by the
plaintiff; and .
(B) the nature and extent of the causal relationship between the conduct of each such person and the damages
incurred by the plaintiff.
(c) Joint liability for specific intent or fraud
(1) In general
Notwithstanding subsection (a), the liability of a defendant in a Y2K action that is not a contract action is joint
and several if the trier of fact specifically determines that the defendant--
(A) acted with specific intent to injure the plaintiff; or
(B) knowingly committed fraud.
(2) Fraud; recklessness--
(A) Knowing commission of fraud described
For purposes of subsection (b)(1)(B)(ii) and paragraph (1)(B) of this subsection, a defendant knowingly
committed fraud if the defendant--
(i) made an untrue statement of a material fact, with actual knowledge that the statement was false;
(ii) omitted a fact necessary to make the statement not be misleading, with actual knowledge that, as a result of
the omission, the statement was false; and
(iii) knew that the plaintiff was reasonably likely to rely on the false statement.
(B) Recklessness
For purposes of subsection (b)(1)(B) and paragraph (1) of this subsection, reckless conduct by the defendant does
not constitute either a specific intent to injure. or the knowing commission of fraud. by the defendant.
(3) Right to contribution not affected
Nothing in this section affects the right, under any other law, of a defendant to contribution with respect to another
defendant found under subsection (b)(1 )(B), or determined under paragraph (1 )(B) of this subsection, to have acted
with specific intent to injure the plaintiff or to have knowingly committed fraud.
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(d) Special rules
(1) Uncollectible share
(A) In general
Notwithstanding subsection (a), if, upon motion made not later than 6 months after a final judgment is entered in
any Y2K action that is not a contract action, the court determines that all or part of the share of the judgment against
a defendant for compensatory damages is not collectible against that defendant, then each other defendant in the
action is liable for the uncollectible share as follows:
(i) Percentage of net worth
The other defendants are jointly and severally liable for the uncollectible share if the plaintiff establishes that--
(I) the plaintiff is an individual whose recoverable damages under the final judgment are equal to more than 10
percent of the net worth of the plaintiff; and
(II) the net worth of the plaintiff is less than $200,000.
(ii) Other plaintiffs
For a plaintiff not described in clause (i), each of the other defendants is liable for the uncollectible share in
proportion to the percentage of responsibility of that defendant.
(iii) For a plaintiff not described in clause (i), in addition to the share identified in clause (ii), the defendant is
liable for an additional portion of the uncollectible share in an amount equal to 50 percent of the amount determined
under clause (ii) if the plaintiff demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant acted with
reckless disregard for the likelihood that its acts would cause injury of the sort suffered by the plaintiff.
(B) Overall limit
The total payments required under subparagraph (A) from all defendants may not exceed the amount of the
uncollectible share.
(C) Subject to contribution
A defendant against whom judgment is not collectible is subject to contribution and to any continuing liability to
the plaintiff on the judgment.
(D) Suits by consumers
(i) Notwithstanding subparagraph (A), the other defendants are jointly and severally liable for the uncollectible
share if--
(I) the plaintiff is a consumer whose suit alleges or arises out of a defect in a consumer product; and
(II) the plaintiff is suing as an individual and not as part of a class action.
(ii) In this subparagraph:
(I) The term "class action" means--
(aa) a single lawsuit in which: (1) damages are sought on behalf of more than 10 persons or prospective class
members; or (2) one or more named parties seek to recover damages on a representative basis on behalf of
themselves and other unnamed parties similarly situated; or
(bb) any group of lawsuits filed in or pending in the same court in which: (I) damages are sought on behalf of
more than 10 persons; and (2) the lawsuits are joined, consolidated, or otherwise proceed as a single action for any
purpose.
(II) The term "consumer" means an individual who acquires a consumer product for purposes other than resale.
(ill) The term "consumer product" means any personal property or service which is normally used for personal,
family, or household purposes.
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(2) Special right of contribution
To the extent that a defendant is required to make an additional payment under paragraph (1), that defendant may
recover contribution--
(A) from the defendant originally liable to make the payment;
(B) from any other defendant that is jointly and severally liable;
(C) from any other defendant held proportionately liable who is liable to make the same payment and has paid less
than that other defendant's proportionate share of that payment; or
(0) from any other person responsible for the conduct giving rise to the payment that would have been liable to
make the same payment.
(3) Nondisclosure to jury
The standard for allocation of damages under subsection (a) and subsection (b)(l), and the procedure for
reallocation of uncollectible shares under paragraph (I) of this subsection, shall not be disclosed to members of the
jury.
(e) Settlement discharge
(1) In general
A defendant who settles a Y2K action that is not a contract action at any time before final verdict or judgment shall
be discharged from all claims for contribution brought by other persons. Upon entry of the settlement by the court,
the court shall enter an order constituting the final discharge of all obligations to the plaintiff of the settling
defendant arising out of the action. The order shall bar all future claims for contribution arising out of the action--
(A) by any person against the settling defendant; and
(B) by the settling defendant against any person other than a person whose liability has been extinguished by the
settlement of the settling defendant.
(2) Reduction
If a defendant enters into a settlement with the plaintiff before the final verdict or judgment, the verdict or
judgment shall be reduced by the greater of--
(A) an amount that corresponds to the percentage of responsibility of that defendant; or
(B) the amount paid to the plaintiff by that defendant.
(f) General right of contribution
(l) In general
A defendant who is jointly and severally liable for damages in any Y2K action that is not a contract action may
recover contribution from any other person who, if joined in the original action, would have been liable for the same
damages. A claim for contribution shall be determined based on the percentage of responsibility of the claimant and
of each person against whom a claim for contribution is made.
(2) Statute of limitations for contribution
An action for contribution in connection with a Y2K action that is not a contract action shall be brought not later
than 6 months after the entry of a final, nonappealable judgment in the Y2K action, except that an action for
contribution brought by a defendant who was required to make an additional payment under subsection (d)(l) may
be brought not later than 6 months after the date on which such payment was made.
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(g) More protective State law not preempted
Nothing in this section preempts or supersedes any provision of State law that--
(1) limits the liability of a defendant in a Y2K action to a lesser amount than the amount determined under this
section; or
(2) otherwise affords a greater degree of protection from joint or several liability than is afforded by this section.
6606. Prelitigation notice
(a) In general
Before commencing a Y2K action, except an action that seeks only injunctive relief, a prospective plaintiff in a
Y2K action shall send a written notice by certified mail (with either return receipt requested or other means of
verification that the notice was sent) to each prospective defendant in that action. The notice shall provide specific
and detailed information about--
(1) the manifestations of any material defect alleged to have caused harm or loss;
(2) the harm or loss allegedly suffered by the prospective plaintiff;
(3) how the prospective plaintiff would like the prospective defendant to remedy the problem;
(4) the basis upon which the prospective plaintiff seeks that remedy; and
(5) the name, title, address, and telephone number of any individual who has authority to negotiate a resolution of
the dispute on behalf of the prospective plaintiff.
(b) Person to whom notice to be sent
The notice required by subsection (a) shall be sent--
(1) to the registered agent of the prospective defendant for service of legal process;
(2) if the prospective defendant does not have a registered agent, then to the chief executive officer if the
prospective defendant is a corporation, to the managing partner if the prospective defendant is a partnership, to the
proprietor if the prospective defendant is a sole proprietorship, or to a similarly-situated person if the prospective
defendant is any other enterprise; or
(3) if the prospective defendant has designated a person to receive prelitigation notices on a Year 2000 Internet
Website (as defined in section 3(7) of the Year 2000 Information and Readiness Disclosure Act), to the designated
person, if the prospective plaintiff has reasonable access to the Internet.
(c) Response to notice
(1) In general
Within 30 days after receipt of the notice specified in subsection (a), each prospective defendant shall send by
certified mail with return receipt requested to each prospective plaintiff a written statement acknowledging receipt
of the notice, and describing the actions it has taken or will take to address the problem identified by the prospective
plaintiff.
(2) Willingness to engage in ADR
The written statement shall state whether the prospective defendant is willing to engage in alternative dispute
resolution.
(3) Inadmissibility
A written statement required by this subsection is not admissible in evidence, under Rule 408 of the Federal Rules
of Evidence or any analogous rule of evidence in any State, in any proceeding to prove liability for, or the invalidity
of, a claim or its amount, or otherwise as evidence of conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations.
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(4) Presumptive time of receipt
For purposes of paragraph (1), a notice under subsection (a) is presumed to be received 7 days after it was sent.
(5) Priority
A prospective defendant receiving more than one notice under this section may give priority to notices with respect
to a product or service that involves a health or safety related Y2K failure.
(d) Failure to respond
If a prospective defendant--
(1) fails to respond to a notice provided pursuant to subsection (a) within the 30 days specified in subsection
(c)(1); or
(2) does not describe the action, if any, the prospective defendant has taken, or will take, to address the problem
identified by the prospective plaintiff, the prospective plaintiff may immediately commence a legal action against
that prospective defendant
(e) Remediation period
(1) In general
If the prospective defendant responds and proposes remedial action it will take, or offers to engage in alternative
dispute resolution, then the prospective plaintiff shall allow the prospective defendant an additional 60 days from
the end of the 30-day notice period to complete the proposed remedial action or alternative dispute resolution before
commencing a legal action against that prospective defendant.
(2) Extension by agreement
The prospective plaintiff and prospective defendant may change the length of the 60-day remediation period by
written agreement.
(3) Multiple extensions not allowed
Except as provided in paragraph (2), a defendant in a Y2K action is entitled to no more than one 30-day period and
one 60-day remediation period under paragraph (1).
(4) Statutes of limitation, etc., tolled
Any applicable statute of limitations or doctrine of laches in a Y2K action to which paragraph (I) applies shall be
tolled during the notice and remediation period under that paragraph.
(f) Failure to provide notice
-
If a defendant determines that a plaintiff has filed a Y2K action without providing the notice specified in subsection .,J
(a) or without awaiting the expiration of the appropriate waiting period specified in subsection (c), the defendant
may treat the plaintiffs complaint as such a notice by so informing the court and the plaintiff in its initial response
to the plaintiff. If any defendant elects to treat the complaint as such a notice--
(1) the court shall stay all discovery and all other proceedings in the action for the appropriate period after filing of .,J
the complaint; and
(2) the time for filing answers and all other pleadings shall be tolled during the appropriate period.
(g) Effect of contractual or statutory waiting periods
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In cases in which a contract, or a statute enacted before January I, 1999, requires notice of nonperformance and
provides for a period of delay prior to the initiation of suit for breach or repudiation of contract, the period of delay
provided by contract or the statute is controlling over the waiting period specified in subsections (c) and (d).
(h) State law controls alternative methods
Nothing in this section supersedes or otherwise preempts any State law or rule of civil procedure with respect to the
use of alternative dispute resolution for Y2K actions.
(i) Provisional remedies unaffected
Nothing in this section interferes with the right of a litigant to provisional remedies otherwise available under Rule
65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or any State rule of civil procedure providing extraordinary or
provisional remedies in any civil action in which the underlying complaint seeks both injunctive and monetary
relief.
U) Special rule for class actions
For the purpose of applying this section to a Y2K action that is maintained as a class action in Federal or State
court, the requirements of the preceding subsections of this section apply only to named plaintiffs in the class
action.
6607. Pleading requirements
(a) Application with Rules of Civil Procedure
This section applies exclusively to Y2K actions and, except to the extent that this section requires additional
information to be contained in or attached to pleadings, nothing in this section is intended to amend or otherwise
supersede applicable rules of Federal or State civil procedure.
(b) Nature and amount of damages
In all Y2K actions in which damages are requested, there shall be filed with the complaint a statement of specific
information as to the nature and amount of each element of damages and the factual basis for the damages
calculation.
(c) Material defects
In any Y2K action in which the plaintiff alleges that there is a material defect in a product or service, there shall be
filed with the complaint a statement of specific information regarding the manifestations of the material defects and
the facts supporting a conclusion that the defects are material.
(d) Required state of mind
In any Y2K action in which a claim is asserted on which the plaintiff may prevail only on proof that the defendant
acted with a particular state of mind, there shall be filed with the complaint, with respect to each element of that
claim, a statement of the facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of
mind.
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6608. Duty to mitigate
(a) In general
Damages awarded in any Y2K action shall exclude compensation for damages the plaintiff could reasonably have
avoided in light of any disclosure or other information of which the plaintiff was, or reasonably should have been,
aware, including information made available by the defendant to purchasers or users of the defendant's product or
services concerning means of remedying or avoiding the Y2K failure involved in the action.
(b) Preservation of existing law
The duty imposed by this section is in addition to any duty to mitigate imposed by State law.
(c) Exception for intentional fraud
Subsection (a) does not apply to damages suffered by reason of the plaintiffs justifiable reliance upon an
affirmative material misrepresentation by the defendant, made by the defendant with actual knowledge of its falsity,
concerning the potential for Y2K failure of the device or system used or sold by the defendant that experienced the
Y2K failure alleged to have caused the plaintiffs harm.
6609. Application of existing impossibility or commercial impracticability doctrines
In any Y2K action for breach or repudiation of contract, the applicability of the doctrines of impossibility and
commercial impracticability shall be determined by the law in existence on January I, 1999. Nothing in this chapter
shall be construed as limiting or impairing a party's right to assert defenses based upon such doctrines.
6610. Damages limitation by contract
In any Y2K action for breach or repudiation of contract, no party may claim, or be awarded, any category of
damages unless such damages are allowed--
(1) by the express terms of the contract; or
(2) if the contract is silent on such damages, by operation of State law at the time the contract was effective or by
operation of Federal law.
6611. Damages in tort claims
(a) In general
...
'1
-
A party to a Y2K action making a tort claim, other than a claim of intentional tort arising independent of a contract, ....Ji
may not recover damages for economic loss unless--
(1) the recovery of such losses is provided for in a contract to which the party seeking to recover such losses is a
party; or
(2) such losses result directly from damage to tangible personal or real property caused by the Y2K failure
involved in the action (other than damage to property that is the subject of the contract between the parties to the
Y2K action or, in the event there is no contract between the parties, other than damage caused only to the property
that experienced the Y2K failure), and such damages are permitted under applicable Federal or State law. -
(b) Economic loss
•For purposes of this section only, and except as otherwise specifically provided in a valid and enforceable written
contract between the plaintiff and the defendant in a Y2K action, the term "economic loss" means amounts awarded
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to compensate an injured party for any loss, and includes amounts awarded for damages such as--
(l) lost profits or sales;
(2) business interruption;
(3) losses indirectly suffered as a result of the defendant's wrongful act or omission;
(4) losses that arise because of the claims of third parties;
(5) losses that must be pled as special damages; and
(6) consequential damages (as defined in the Uniform Commercial Code or analogous State commercial law).
(c) Certain other actions
A person liable for damages, whether by settlement or judgment, in a civil action to which this chapter does not
apply because of section 6603(c) of this title whose liability, in whole or in part, is the result of a Y2K failure may,
notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, pursue any remedy otherwise available under Federal or State
law against the person responsible for that Y2K failure to the extent of recovering the amount of those damages.
6612. State of mind; bystander liability; control
(a) Defendant's state of mind
In a Y2K action other than a claim for breach or repudiation of contract, and in which the defendant's actual or
constructive awareness of an actual or potential Y2K failure is an element of the claim, the defendant is not liable
unless the plaintiff establishes that element of the claim by the standard of evidence under applicable State law in
effect on the day before January 1, 1999.
(b) Limitation on bystander liability for Y2K failures
(l) In general
With respect to any Y2K action for money damages in which-'-
(A) the defendant is not the manufacturer, seller, or distributor of a product, or the provider of a service, that
suffers or causes the Y2K failure at issue;
(B) the plaintiff is not in substantial privity with the defendant; and
(C) the defendant's actual or constructive awareness of an actual or potential Y2K failure is an element of the
claim under applicable law, the defendant shan not be liable unless the plaintiff, in addition to establishing all other
requisite elements of the claim, proves, by the standard of evidence under applicable State law in effect on the day
before January 1, 1999, that the defendant actually knew, or recklessly disregarded a known and substantial risk,
that such failure would occur.
(2) Substantial privity
For purposes of paragraph (l)(B), a plaintiff and a defendant are in substantial privity when, in a Y2K action
arising out of the performance of professional services, the plaintiff and the defendant either have contractual
relations with one another or the plaintiff is a person who, prior to the defendant's performance of such services,
was specifically identified to and acknowledged by the defendant as a person for whose special benefit the services
were being performed.
(3) Certain claims excluded
For purposes of paragraph (l)(C), claims in which the defendant's actual or constructive awareness of an actual or
potential Y2K failure is an element of the claim under applicable law do not include claims for negligence but do
include claims such as fraud, constructive fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, negligent misrepresentation, and
interference with contract or economic advantage.
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(c) Control not determinative of liability
The fact that a Y2K failure occurred in an entity, facility, system, product, or component that was sold, leased,
rented, or otherwise within the control of the party against whom a claim is asserted in a Y2K action shall not
constitute the sole basis for recovery of damages in that action. A claim in a Y2K action for breach or repudiation
of contract for such a failure is governed by the terms of the contract.
(d) Protections of the Year 2000 Information and Readiness Disclosure Act apply
The protections for the exchanges of information provided by section 4 of the Year 2000 Information and
Readiness Disclosure Act (public Law 105-271)shall apply to any Y2K action.
6613. Appointment of special masters or magistrate judges for Y2K actions
Any district court of the United States in which a Y2K action is pending may appoint a special master or a
magistrate judge to hear the matter and to make findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Rule 53
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
6614. Y2K actions as class actions
(a) Material defect requirement
A Y2K action involving a claim that a product or service is defective may be maintained as a class action in Federal
or State court as to that claim only if--
(1) it satisfies all other prerequisites established by applicable Federal or State law, including applicable rules of
civil procedure; and
(2) the court finds that the defect in a product or service as alleged would be a material defect for the majority of
the members of the class.
(b) Notification
In any Y2K action that is maintained as a class action, the court, in addition to any other notice required by
applicable Federal or State law, shall direct notice of the action to each member of the class, which shall include--
(l) a concise and clear description of the nature of the action;
(2) the jurisdiction where the case is pending; and
(3) the fee arrangements with class counsel, including the hourly fee being charged, or, if it is a contingency fee,
the percentage of the final award which will be paid, including an estimate of the total amount that would be paid if
the requested damages were to be granted.
(c) Forum for Y2K class actions
(l) Jurisdiction
Except as provided in paragraph (2), the district courts of the United States shall have original jurisdiction of any
Y2K action that is brought as a class action.
(2) Exceptions
The district courts of the United States shall not have original jurisdiction over a Y2K action brought as a class
action if--
(A)(i) a substantial majority of the members of the proposed plaintiff class are citizens of a single State;
(ii) the primary defendants are citizens of that State; and
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(iii) the claims asserted will be governed primarily by the laws of that State;
(B) the primary defendants are States, State officials, or other governmental entities against whom the district
courts of the United States may be foreclosed from ordering relief;
(C) the plaintiff class does not seek an award of punitive damages, and the amount in controversy is less than the
sum of $10,000,000 (exclusive of interest and costs), computed on the basis of all claims to be determined in the
action; or
(D) there are less than 100 members of the proposed plaintiff class.
A party urging that any exception described in subparagraph (A), (B), (C), or (D) applies to an action shall bear the
full burden of demonstrating the applicability of the exception
(3) Procedure if requirements not met
(A) Dismissal or remand
A United States district court shall dismiss, or, if after removal, strike the class allegations and remand, any Y2K
action brought or removed under this subsection as a class action if-
(i) the action is subject to the jurisdiction of the court solely under this subsection; and
(ii) the court determines the action may not proceed as a class action based on a failure to satisfy the conditions of
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
(B) Amendment; removal
Nothing in paragraph (A) shall prohibit plaintiffs from filing an amended class action in Federal or State court. A
defendant shall have the right to remove such an amended class action to a United States district court under this
subsection.
(C) Period of limitations tolled
Upon dismissal or remand, the period of limitations for any claim that was asserted in an action on behalf of any
named or unnamed member of any proposed class shall be deemed tolled to the full extent provided under Federal
law.
(D) Dismissal without prejudice
The dismissal of a Y2K action under subparagraph (A) shall be without prejudice.
(d) Effect on Rules of Civil Procedure
Except as otherwise provided in this section, nothing in this section supersedes any rule of Federal or State civil
procedure applicable to class actions.
6615. Applicability of State law
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to affect the applicability of any State law that provides stricter limits on
damages and liabilities, affording greater protection to defendants in Y2K actions, than are provided in this chapter.
6616. Admissible evidence ultimate issue in State courts
Any party to a Y2K action in a State court in a State that has not adopted a rule of evidence substantially similar to
Rule 704 of the Federal Rules of Evidence may introduce in such action evidence that would be admissible if Rule
704 applied in that jurisdiction.
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6617. Suspension of penalties for certain year 2000 failures by small business concerns
(a) Definitions. In this section-
(l) the term "agency" means any executive agency, as defined in section 105 of title 5, United States Code, that has
the authority to impose civil penalties on small business concerns;
(2) the term "first-time violation" means a violation by a small business concern of a federally enforceable rule or
regulation (other than a Federal rule or regulation that relates to the safety and soundness of the banking or
monetary system or for the integrity of the National Securities markets, including protection of depositors and
investors) caused by a Y2K failure if that Federal rule or regulation had not been violated by that small business
concern within the preceding 3 years; and
(3) the term "small business concern" has the same meaning as a defendant described in section 5(b)(2)(B) [15
USCS Section 6604(b)(2)(B)].
(b) Establishment of liaisons. Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act [enacted July 20,
1999], each agency shall-
(l) establish a point of contact within the agency to act as a liaison between the agency and small business concerns
with respect to problems arising out of Y2K failures and compliance with Federal rules or regulations; and
(2) publish the name and phone number of the point of contact for the agency in the Federal Register.
(c) General rule. Subject to subsections (d) and (e), no agency shall impose any civil money penalty on a small
business concern for a first-time violation.
(d) Standards for waiver. An agency shall provide a waiver of civil money penalties for a first-time violationk,
provided that a small business concern demonstrates, and the agency determines, that -
(l) the small business concern previously made a reasonable good faith effort to anticipate, prevent, and effectively
remediate a potential Y2K failure;
(2) a first-time violation occurred as a result of the Y2K failure of the small business cocnern or other entity, which
significantly affected the small business concern's ability to comply with a Federal rule or regulation;
(3) the first-time violation was unavoidable in the face of a Y2K failure or occurred as a result of efforts to prevent
the disruption of critical functions or services that cold result in harm to life or property;
(4) upon identification of a first-time violation, the small business concern initiated reasonable and prompt measures
to correct the violation; and
(5) the small business concern submitted notice to the appropriate agency of the first-time violation within a
reasonable time not to exceed 5 business days from the time that the small business concern became aware that the
first-time violation had occurred.
(e) Exceptions. An agency may impose civil money penalties authorized under Federal law on a small business
concern for a first-time violation if-
(l) the small business concern's failure to comply with Federal rules or regulations resulted in actual harm, or
constitutes or creates an imminent threat to public health, safety, or the environment; or
(2) the small business concern fails to correct the violation not later than 1 month after initial notification to the
agency.
(f) Expiration. This section shall not apply to first-time violations caused by a Y2K failure occurring after
December 31, 2000.
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GEOverview
"This company, like every company in the world
today, is in the midst of the biggest, most
transformational revolution in the past century,
brought on by the internet."
"It will change everything for us, in our dealings
with each other, our suppliers, and above all our
customers."
- Jack Welch, 1999
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Audit Staff ~
• Deploy teams to high
priority businesses to
help carry out 8·1 actiolls
Global BMC
• Assist in customer & benchmarking
interviews
• Validate opportunities & threats in concert
with businesses & Corporate Internet
Initiatives Team
Corporate Internet Initiatives Team,
(CIG, CR&D, Corp Mktg) ~
• Share internal & external best practices (EC strategy, organization)
• Identity greatest threats & greatest opportullities, inclUding cross-business ones
• Establish common standards (infrastructure, applications, security)
• Help businesses prepare for 8·1'5
... Existing Business EC Teams (Mkgt, IT, aD) t
• Continue CWC development (push from level 1 to level 4)
• Evaluate broader internel opportunities & threats
• Deline action plans & implement
~
r:::
~
W
a..
o
'-m::
IJan 1999 I
@t-~~~~~ 6<:-:~~
<S6 ~. (9?-~ '?~ i9~~(J\0.,
~~~~
o tS>t-'?~. ~Yq...~
~~~
® Definition • 3602 View
SMG Service
....
• Collects key information about
customers
• Enables personalization
• Centralizes information - enabling
the "Single Face of GEAIJ
• Focuses on the relationship
A 3602 View of the Customer is a collection of processes and
technology that ...
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You should not have to understand our organization to do business with us
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Level 4
Level 3
Level 2
Level 1
Differentiable
Services
("Sticky")
Complex
Transactions &
Services
Simple
Transactions &
Services
Brochureware
EC Playing Field
EXAMPLES
• Personalization (e.g., account history, pricing,
open orders)
• Customized Interface
• Remote Monitoring &Diagnostics (online VMI)
• Customers Dashboards
• Product/Service Configurators
• Real-Time Collaborative Design
• Interactive/Smart Troubteshooting
• Online Interactive Training Materials
• Detailed Product Information
(e.g., specifications, pricing, availability)
• Online Order Track and Pay
• Simple Troubleshooting (static guides)
• Company Information
• Basic Product Information
• Annual Report
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Customer Metrics
E-Commerce Metrics
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Return on Relationship: This is defined as the actual return on investment from a particular
business relationship, where a relationship is defined as all transactions conducted by an
individual online customer.
Repeat Customer: How many customers conduct online transactions more than once. This
measures the penetration within an account.
Abandonment Rate: How many customers being a transaction and then abandon it. This will
demonstrate potential problem spots with our system or potential customer hesitation points.
Conversion Rates (Surfer-to-Shopper-to-Buyer): This measurement will show how
successful we are in capturing online business.
Online Customer Base:. How many customers have registered with the site?
Financial
Revenue: How much Revenue has been generated online?
Average Order Revenue: How much is the average order?
Cost Savings: How much savings can be directly attributed to online information or services?
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® E-Commerce Metrics
Web Metrics
Search Engine Rank: Where does our site rank when searching select search engines
with pertinent keywords?
Unique Visitors/Month: How many visitors come to our site each month?
Clickstreams: What are the most popular paths through the site?
Most/Least Popular Content: What pages on the site are most visited? Least visited?
Links-IN: How many other sites are linking to our site?
Performance Metrics
Load Time: How long does it take for our homepage to load?
Transaction Times: How long do select transactions take?
System Errors: How often do our servers create an error that a customer views?
Customer Satisfaction: This is a qualitative measurement that can be made using
customer surveys.
® Beating Aggregators
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Industry Firsts
• "On-Line" Color Matching
• E-Commerce functionality
• "Micro-Lots"
• "Xpress" Services @ Premium Prices
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Internet Color Matching
Order Entry Process
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Color Matching Process
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ColorXpress Website
•• .:.-. JlIIIi:£j _..-:" I
.,. - - .~. ...... -
rI :_'_'_ . ...:.-
"~~~~~;;t:n.-.'~:
------- ~-:-::- ...
. •. ,.n Q~ ..::.~
"':::;)j ~-::::_--- -:'< ~""~I ~=r~';;'~:::1 ,~;:::'* =~.:.=::."'=--==--=.... i ....
:;:. ~;-;~:;;.~~~ ~ .
.- ~""._~-. '.-/
:=.. ~4~-;:.?~!:~··
._.r- ~-"~~~~ ....~
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3
I Raising The Bar & Chang.!!!g The Game on The Competition I
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Polymerland.com
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''','hat's New
Custom~r lnfo
Welcome to Polymerland. The only resin source you will
ever need.
Service innovation has mllde Po1ymerland the global leader in thermoplastic resin
distribution featuring quelity products from the leading suppliers of engineering
resins, commodities, custom compounds, and specialty compounds.
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~ NEW! ::::- ....;;. NEW! ::::-
-.,,..r--. Customer Shipment Tracking! -.),.,r--
. ;, cStnp'M'eNY: tRA6~~.·
. ,.' ORDER INQUIRY/ENTRY.
--Technlc::J1 Assistance
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Order InquirylEntry Quick Lopn:
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Our site was last UpcJaMd FebllJ8ty 22. 1999. For details on what has
changed, check out the What's New section!
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® www.l!0lymerland.com
What worked vs. What didn't
• Moving qUickly L...:.:.:...I ~ • Waiting for perfection., vs.
• Training your people vs. • Not selling the value
• Show the value to your customers vs. • Not telling anyone
t'1
• Reward your Commercial team vs. • Not engaging the entire business
t-'
• Deliver true value • Delivering "Brochureware"0 vs.
• Ask your customer's what they want vs. • Thinking you already know
Summary of Results
• 2 - 3 million dollars a week
• Decrease of 1000 calls per week
• Customer satisfaction/loyalty
• Business excitement!
• Business growth
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Draft - Proprietary & Confidential
GEA - Customer Web Center
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(518199)
CustomerNet
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• Introduced in 1996 with 6 customers ... over 1800+ active today
• Average 1000+ orders per week
• $500MM GSB in 1998
• Current CapabiUty
- Ordering, availability, pricing, front room tools, check invoicing, etc.
I Ahead of competition ... plan to stay there I
@ GEA Customer webDC~;;;;;ry&Coofklential CustomerNet
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Welcome to GEA~
CustDmerNet
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The categorized and scrollable menu at left is your key to moving anywhere in the
I Cus10rnelNet site quickly alld easily. Move your pointer to the menu at lefl8nd click your
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~. AvailabilityJPlice:
. -- Purchase HistorY
-- Co·op Adv'Statw
-- Price Hot Sheet, .
".. Speew :proaU1U
Sfari Oider
-- Top30 Fo:rm
-- BW1k Fom;,
-- O.:istomi2led Fonn .
-- Formwith note,
Ord.erReview
- Vi!WlPriiit Orden
- Edit Orders
hmtiCt!LGokUiJ
Proof.fDeliwi'y
-- All Invoices .
-. Kttvwn Invoice N-
-- Kttvwn P.O. 1$
-- KtIQWl\ MS fI
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126-02861 : Kelley Appliances :::1
MAP Schedule updated to _lude MAP Bulletin99·2 issued on 04JOfim9 NEW!
You haw new Prke Hot Sheets is.ued on 02/1'199 NEW!
YOli hDe Bukorden Awilahle
News abOlit AVB
Sypel'lededlOh.olete JmrentolJ' Lilt
Monthly Customer Smvey
Showcase Closeou1 Specials
Ifthis is your fIrSt visit to our O1stoms7Net site. please go to O1stomtl7Nst FQafu711.5 for an
CM1View on using the ORA OlstomerMlt. If you have not been on CustomerNet for a while,
you may see a special NEW! prompt on the home page. Click this prompt to
read about chartges end. enhancements since your last visit.
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@ Draft - Proprietary & ConfidentialGEA Customer Web Center CustomerNet
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• GE Appliances
Growth Planning
• Account Targets
• Floor Planning
Tools
• Pricing Programs
• Store
Merchandising
• Promotion
Planning
• Product Accesories
• Extended SelVi&8
Plans
In-Store Services
• Quid< Spec Design
Center
• Custom Brochure
• Sale9 Training
• Siore
Merchandising
• POS.com
!;@j Oan~ -----..
Back Room
Order Service
• Order
• Shipment Tracking
• InventOlY
Management.com
Welcome back. Brian}
After-Sale
Service Support
• SelVlce Protection Plus
o Contract
Submission
o Contract
Management
• Parts and SelVlce
o Palts Ordering and
Tracking
o SeNlce Scheduling
and Status
Reporting
• My GE Six Sigma
Oashboard
• My GE Operational
Measurements
o Mile
o Turns
• SIC Penetration
o V""
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i" - r- ff·iToc.. ~\;~~i '~o";e'
• Direction we need to go ...
• Easy to find information
• Integrated, easy access ...
- myPage (personalized)
- Specials
- Products, Parts, Services
• Phase 1 planned for 3099
...:::.1
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® GEA Customer WebDrC~~~;~ary & Confidential
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GEAppliances
Builder.com
• New tool to enhance
builder appliance sales
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YOUR
KITCHEN
YOUR
CHO-ICE
Welcorne Home to Style enlllnAGvetiDn
GE and 'fOur builder il'l'/te yOll to Vist our 'o'irtual flWIieflce
showroom--a place where you ClIn:
• Oe\ lin nside tlolllllihe Illtest llppll8nce styles,
convenience leaCures and OE innoVllllons.
• M8te your Of: ElPPliance selections now!
• Visit the henlctr/e Design Cefller ..
In~11iP. ¥nil" finrll!ll th!! inillfrrolltinn IInll nP.",rI tn ffIot,o:lnn v,.;r ...
• Educate new home
buyer on what's new in
appliances
• Allows home buyer to
pre-select their specific
appliance upgrades &
options
• Decorating tips for the
entire house
ILate August 1999 Rollout I
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~ Draft. Proprietary & Confidential (518/99)~ GEA Customer Web Center Leveraging the Internet
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• Complete tool for the builder --
plann;ng, accounting, and project
management
• eCommerce connection to suppliers
& distributors - from purchasing
through delivery logistics
• Creates efficiencies throughout the
supply chain
Move from 20/0 of builders' world
to integrated business partner ...
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I Create industry standard eCommerce tool I
® GEA Customer webDC~~O;;;'Y&COnfidential Summarl..
• Internet world is a reality ... Business-ta-Business
eCommerce will lead
~ • Foremost priority far GE
......
00
• Several GEA initiatives launched and in development
• Current partners are key to internet success
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® GE Appliances Draft - Proprietary & Confidential
• Target the right customer
trl
• Own the customer's total experienceI
....
\0
• Streamline business processes that impact the
customer
• Provide a 3600 view of the customer relationship
• Let customers help themselves
• Help customers do their jobs
• Deliver personalized service
Customer.com
@ GE Appliances Draft - Proprietary &Confidential
• Do not waste our time
1:'1
I
• Remember who we areN0
• Make it easy for us to order
• Make sure your service delights us
• Customize your products and services for me
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@ GE Appliances Draft - Proprietary & Confidential eCommerce
Internet penetration and access continues to grow ...
t"%j
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... but online transactions will be relatively small.
- Forrester Research
Current Distribution critical to success
® GE Appliances Draft - Proprietary & Confidential Customer Web Center
Web Web Mention Selling
Presence Presentation Appliances Anything
Nationals ~ rJ• Sears Offers appl iances, Yes
parts & contract
-
• Home Depot rJ Company Info rJ No.-tT:! ('CS
I ...G)
N a: AggregatorsN
riJ rit• Value America Offers all, under major appJ. Yes
• Appliance order.com riJ Offers all major appliances fii Yes
• CompareNet 'ii Offers comparisons of rit No
major appliances with
links to purchase
Builders
• Zaring Homes rJ Offers home models, loan No
(J) info, & community info
,Q., fI::t: • CENTEX Homes Offers building and No
related fj nancial services
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@ GEA • Customer web'C;;;;& ConfldendaJ Nationals
"1llQO s..... Roo bud< and Co. Salistadion Gua,a~\••d O'J"ur m..n• .,badc.
pte.se view eu. PllY~t:! policy."d tim tn' c:ofllditiollS.
.··Gim,,'
'''bUI sr....... ~!~:til
t".tf\r\Nt-..~'V/b.., ~..u: )!:h~~ a'i
!r..~ .Inri rnoO:r..:\
• Selling On-line
• Appliance repair
• Weekly specials
• Partsraccessories
Sears
1
-Call. visitor ec1XLlll1'~ppliances -··~:;Mis-s'--···~_c,
11U Week's Specials
The largest appliance site online! --- ..... -;~ . .:.-._-~.-
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Craftsman Tools
Ovel 3500 lools online
with projecls and lips
PartsDirec1
Over 4 million parts online
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® GEA _Customer we~ra~;~;~& Conlklentlal Aggregators
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C;andOpefiing!
• Start shopping with ,:, ~~
our Appliance finder ~,~; >
• LODking for something specific?
I ,III
• Read about us in the
Auslin Aml'rtr"n'.SIIleS1I411
• Retail price comparisons
• What features would you like?
• Simple/Easy to usell
1- Find olher A"pliallm - dill
~ I~~~ Trifagy .'ornmoraA:QIII, Inc. AtiRigIn R.~.rv.d - T!"m~ of Ung.
~iinc.ordtr,com "'0 Tr~091 tCommora..com ... lr_l1Iar~~cI TrbJy tCommtrce.com, Inc.
-----------<.....~~.".......a. •••_ ... __ ...~..s............................ __~ --
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This week'~ SlJeti8ls:
Whirlpool
GE Remgerator Dishwasher
~ ~. . ~
b'fset'ecting
eatures
Special Fp.lIlures
low Energy r
Noise Reduction r
Heavy Duty Food Disposer r
: Reset I
Physical Futures
Color Ir-N-o-P-ref-,-er-e-nc-e-3
Conlrol Type INo PreferenceB
Dasic Features
S1and31d C1cles r
Upper Ratk Adjuslable r
China/Crys1al r
Ht-Temp Wash Option r
Indicator Ugh1' r
Slemware Holder r
Dishwashers Show an
Brand l~oPrefel8nceiJ
,"
Maytag
Washer
I~
1JaH!fI!
applillnuOrder
$459.00
You Save:
$100,00 (16%)
Montgomery Ward
~
Best Buy
~H:j ~j:;
•+MW
;. '!
;"'l!t'l
I]J~~:,:~
Iii
Circuit City
$'399.%
lfd'AHf'il
applianceOrder applianceOnJer
$899.00 $399.00
You Save: You Saw:
$UIl95 (10%) $4093 (9%)
Sears
.~,n "'l-~J
GE Range
... -
•.au i
applianceOrder
$492.00
You Save:
$57.00 (10%)
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Ee MODELS THAT WORK... AND THAT DON'T WORK
WORK DON'T WORK JURY STILL OUT
-Bricks' N Click
-Buttons & Banners -Subscription fees (may(BN.com; GAP; Sears) work now for AOL but will
they hold up?)
-Target Marketing via
-SPAM- unsolicited poorly -Wizards
Internet to selected interest targeted email
groups.
-Auctions/reverse Auctions
-Copy Cats-No brand -Big N Bulky.com(Priceline, e-bay; GE-Bid) awareness (Appliances, furniture, cars,
large CE)
Brand, Brand, Brand
-ANY poorly executed -Grocery. Delivery(Sony, Disney, CNBC) offering (Toys R Us) (Webvan)
-poor delivery
-poor quality
-poor security
-Meeting unmet needs
-"Communities" iVillage
....effectively for Women(Drugstore.com,
ImproveNet, B&N-out-of-
print search; Realtor.com)
-Amazon.com.
High traffic w/ thin margins
Critical path not clear
-Streamliming life's
"necessities"
(Service.com,
Housestore.com)
E - 25
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E-COMMERCE BUSINESS MODELS
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Brochure Transactional Data Wiring
Ware Hosting Wizards 1-2-1 Aggregator Auction Communities and Use
Explana- Explanatory Explanatory Interactive On-line Pulls Enables Assembles a Collects and
tion/At- material on plus--refers sites or sale of together a user to bid variety of organizes
tributes line; like users to capabilities-- productsl variety of online for contents and data forservices offerings products
brochures in fulfillment 'teaching, w/great in a or lines for internal
stores, but sources directing, margins) product! services groups of and/or
better providing a service users external use
"better way" area or for
a user Data Types:
group demographic,
psychographic.
financial
B2B Public GEA.com GE's GE's Buildet GE's Everyone
company Polymerland Custome e-Bid
sites r-Net
B2C • Public ImproveNet GE's Mixing Amazon Brandwise E-Bay • iVillage Doubleclick
company Realtor.com Spoon Webvan ValueAmericc: Priceline • AOLsites (Coke, Ask Jeeves Sears CompareNetRaytheon) Xoom.com • MSNBC
• Institutions GE Svc.Net
• "Dinosaurs" How2.com
(Haverhill) MapQuest
Revenue • Cost Center • Indirect • Advertising -OM -Trans. fee -Trans. fee • Subscrip- • Rent or sell
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INTERNET USER AGREEMENTS AND OTHER
CONTRACTUAL ISSUES RELATING TO THE INTERNET
I. INTRODUCTION
The 1990's saw a logarithmic explosion of the number of people and businesses using the
Internet and particularly the World Wide Web. Accurately assessing the number of people with
Internet access is difficult. Published estimates indicate that the actual number of people with
Internet access went from four million in 1994 to 112 million in 1998. The number will double to
200 million by the end of 2000. By comparison it took more than fifty years for normal telephone
access to achieve the level of saturation the Internet has achieved in less than a decade.
This tremendous rise in usage has created a commensurate growth in the number of
companies that commercially provide Internet access. These companies range from giants such as
America Online, with a nationwide system of access, to local Internet service providers (ISP's) that
might only serve a single locality. The ISP may just provide access, or it may provide a full range
of services, including e-mail, web page hosting and design, and providing of on-line content. The
ISP may provide service to consumers with a computer at home for family use, or to businesses that
have hundreds of users and a need for continuous high speed access.
The agreement between the ISP and the Internet user must clearly define this relationship.
For a consumer seeking only limited access for personal use through a telephone modem, there may
in fact be no negotiation of the agreement, as the consumer typically accepts the standard "form"
agreement. For businesses seeking a broader range of services, there will be issues on the table for
discussion. In either case, the parties should understand what the issues are and what the contract
says.
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II. MEANS OF ACCESSING THE INTERNET
Internet Access Providers (lAPs)
An lAP is a company focused on providing access via servers directly connected to the
Internet. lAPs typically provide no on-line content or resources, and merely act as a gateway.
Examples are NetCom., PSINet and Sprintlink.
Internet Service Providers (lSPs)
ISP's offer the gateway typical of an lAP, but offer other services such as web site hosting,
web site design, e-mail and domain name registration. Access is typically provided by leased
telecommunication lines. The difference between lAPs and ISPs has become somewhat blurred and
it is not uncommon to see the terms used interchangeably.
-
j
On-Line Service Providers (OSPs) ..J
OSPs provide the client with technologies, including software, that enable the client to use
the Internet and typically provide content and other resources. Examples are American Online,
CompuServe and Prodigy. Again, there is some blurring of the distinctions between categories as
ISP's will typically have a web page with some level of content.
-III. TYPES OF ACCESS
Modem Access
A telephone modem with speeds in the 28 kbps to 56 kbps is the typical low end linking
method to connect to an ISP/IAP. The problem is the inherent limitation of the modem which
impacts on response time and the ability to download materials.
F-2
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Gateways and Designated Lines
Gateways are devices which relay infonnation between networks using routers connected to
the Internet. Gateways use either a Point to Point Protocol (PPP) or Service Line Internet Protocol
(SLIP). Dedicated links allow a computer network to access the Internet via a telephone line used
solely for that purpose.
ISDN
Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN) provides a high speed transmission across a
switched network and eliminates the conversion of the signal to an analog signal as with a modem.
Tl
T I lines are dedicated point to point connections running from the user's site to the
communications center of the ISP. Access is approximately 100 times faster than a 14.4 kbps
modem and significantly faster than an ISDN line. Tl lines can be divided into as many as 24
channels, each ofwhich is four times faster than a 14.4. kbps modem.
Cable Modems
Cable modems permit wider bandwidth access by use of a hybrid coaxial/fiber optic cable
construction, with access typically through a cable TV Network.
ADSL
Asymmetric Digital Subscriber Line (ADSL) offers wide-band connection over standard
phone lines. Speed is comparable to Tllines on uploads but is markedly slower on downloads.
Wireless Access
Wireless access is accomplished either by satellite delivery or use of a wireless phone
network.
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Free Access
This is a variation of consumer oriented modem access that provides access in return for
either (or both) the ability to market the user's demographic infonnation or for the providing of
advertising to the user. This would only be viable for personal or small business use.
IV. IMPORTANT CONTRACT PROVISIONS
A. Intended Use of Service.
Contracts should specify whether this is a consumer-oriented agreement for a single ..ii
user and his family or alternatively is a commercial or business user that will be accessing Internet
services for multiple users and multiple locations through its own server. A typical consumer user
provision will include the following:
User acknowledges that the services are intended for personal use
only. In order to keep phone lines available for other users who are
actively using their accounts, provider has a 20 minute idle timeout
policy. Further, provider may logout any user who has been on line
for more than four (4) hours continuously, even with activity. User
agrees not to utilize any software device or other automatic methods
to allow the account to stay logged on while not in active use.
For a consumer-oriented account the provider may also restrict the size of e-mail contained in a
mailbox at anyone time, the use of simultaneous log ons at multiple locations, and the use of
multiple log ons from one location through a router. Obviously, this type of provision would not ...
appear in an agreement for business usage.
B. Restricted Activities.
As part of the tenns and conditions of use, the service provider will often set out in
detail prohibited activities. These would include some or all of the following:
F-4
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6. Sending of unsolicited bulk e-mail;
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1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
Interference with the use of the Internet by other authorized users;
Sending ofe-mail using a log on name other than that assigned by the
service provider;
Publishing, posting or distributing defamatory, infringing or obscene
material;
Making fraudulent offers;
Hacking;
Attempting to intercept e-mail;
Sending files containing software or other protected intellectual
property unless the user owns or controls the rights thereto;
Mail bombing or news bombing. Mail bombing is the sending of 10
or more similar messages to the same e-mail address. News bombing
constitutes sending more than 10MB of data to a news group.
Planting viruses or other corrupted data files;
Violating export laws or other software technical information export
controls;
Installation of auto responders, cancel boxes or other automated
routines that generate excessive amounts of traffic;
Disruption of discussion groups;
Engaging in commercial e-mail activities;
General prohibitions against engaging in activities that violate United
States and international laws, rules or regulations.
claims arising out of the user's Internet activities. A typical provision would include:
r
r
r
r
c. Indemnification Agreements.
The service provider should require indemnification from the user for damages or
F-5
User agrees to indemnify the miter, its affiliates and assigns from and
against any and all liabilities, expenses (including reasonable attorney
fees) and damages arising out of claims based upon user's use (or the
use by one who gains access to the services through user's account)
of services, including any claim of libel, defamation, violation of
right to privacy or publicity, loss of service by the subscribers or
infringement of any intellectual property or other proprietary rights.
Note: An indemnification agreement is only as good as the financial solvency of the indemnifier.
The provider will wish to take other affirmative steps to insulate itself from liability to third
parties as a result of user's activities.
D. Limitations on Liability.
Service provider should include a broadly worded disclaimer of liability. This should
limit special or consequential damages and disclaim all warranties except .those specifically
provided.
E. ECPA Notice.
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act (18 U.S.C. §251O et seq.) requires notice
if the electronic mail and other communications systems provided do not offer the same level of
privacy as is afforded to regular mail by the United States Postal Service. This requirement is
independent of other privacy policies. The service provider will typically give this notice.
F. Choice of Law.
The agreement should set out what jurisdiction's laws cover the interpretation of the
contract and where the disputes will be resolved. A typical provision would be:
Terms and conditions of this agreement are governed by the laws of
the Commonwealth of Kentucky without regard to its conflict law.
User hereby consents to the exclusive jurisdiction of any of the courts
located in Fayette County, Kentucky for all disputes arising out of or
relating to the use of the services. User specifically consents to the
exercise of this personal jurisdiction in these courts and waives the
rights to removal or consent to removal.
F-6
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G. Software Sub-Licenses.
The Internet service provider will provide to the user software to facilitate utilization
r
r
r
of service. This may include a browser software such as Netscape Communicator® or Internet
Explorer®, along with other dial up networking software to allow connection to be established. As
part of the user agreement, the tenns and conditions of this sub-license should be set out in detail.
For business uses, the user will wish to see the license as part of its due diligence. If any warranty
is provided for this software, that warranty should designate who the responsible party is, whether
r it is the ISP or the author ofthe software. If a technical service representative is available, the hours
,.. of availability should be addressed.
,
agreement, the reasons for such tennination and post-tennination rights.
r
,.
I
H. Tennination Rights.
The contract should set out in detail the provisions for either party to tenninate the
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1. Other Policies and Amending the Agreement.
The basic agreement should contain a provision incorporating by reference other
policies which may be periodically posted by the ISP. Typically these policies shall be accepted by
the user and the non-accepting user shall have the right to tenninate the arrangement. The types of
policies which might be posted by a service provider would be electronic mail use policies and
privacy policies. A typical provision would state:
Provider may revise and/or modify this agreement and any posted
policies at any time or in any manner. Any revision and/or
modification will be effective thirty (30) days after provider posts
notice to members on its web site (http://www.PROVIDER.net)
and/or on its members pages or bye-mail or in various publications
and mailings to it members.
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J. Alternative Dispute Resolution.
As stated above, the agreement should contain a jurisdictional choice and venue
selection clause. A service provider may wish to consider reference to alternative dispute methods
such as arbitration or mediation. Binding arbitration is increasingly attractive as a method to avoid
exposure to class action lawsuits. Most alternative dispute resolution forums do not provide a
mechanism for class actions suits.
V. ENFORCEABILITY OF CLICK WRAP AGREEMENTS.
Of significant concern in drafting an Internet user agreement is the proper mechanism to
-insure that its provisions will be enforceable. As this is a computer agreement and will be "signed"
on-line, the provider needs some degree of certainty as to whether its "click wrap agreement" will ..
be enforceable. At least three decisions have indicated that a click wrap agreement will be enforced.
These include Hotmail Corp. v. vans Money Pie. Inc., 47 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1020 (N.D. Ca. 1998). In that
case the judge granted the plaintiffs request for a preliminary injunction against a user that had
violated the plaintiff's terms ofservice agreement and a click wrap agreement. In Storm Impact. Inc.
v. Software of the Month Club, 13 F.Supp. 2d 782 (N.D. Ill. 1998) the court held that the express
provisions of rights contained in the terms of the service agreement displayed on the screen were
valid and enforceable. Finally, in America On-Line. Inc.. v. LCGM. Inc., 46 F.Supp.2d 444 (E.D. ...
Va. 1998) a Virginia court ruled in favor of the America On-Line, finding that the defendant had
breached the terms of the service agreement with AOL.
F-8
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The enactment of statutes such as the Uniform Electronic Transaction Act (VETA) and the
Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (DCITA), along with other digital signature laws
enhance the continued viability of the "shrink wrap" or "click wrap" concept.
Asa drafter, a "shrink wrap" or "click wrap" agreement should contain the following
r elements:
r
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1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
The license should give the user notice at the time that the transaction
is subject to such an agreement;
The notice should be clearly visible;
The detailed license terms must be disclosed to the user prior to or
shortly after the start of the service;
The user should be offered a refund ifhe decides to reject the terms;
The user's acceptance of the terms should involve a specific action
such as clicking a box or typing "yes" before submitting to continue
the transaction;
r
r
r
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6. Ifthe agreement includes terms which are uncommon in industry, or
are likely to cause smprise, such terms should be highlighted.
VI. OTHER DRAFTING CONSIDERATIONS
Depending on the nature of the service provided, other considerations may come into play
in the development of the Internet user agreement. The service provider may provide a minimum
level of web hosting for the users. If so, the terms and conditions of this web page hosting should
be delineated along with any design functions or responsibilities. If the service provider assists the
user in creating a web page, there needs to be clearly expressed delineation of who will own the
resulting intellectual property and who will be responsible for content issues.
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The service provider is in a position to gather a great deal of infonnation concerning the user. .i
The service provider should set out its policies with respect to the use of, or a potential transfer of
this infonnation. Whatever policy the ISP has with respect to use of infonnation, the ISP should
allow the user some degree over that use. This can be accomplished with either an "opt-in" or "opt-
out" approach. The distinction is whether the user has to take an affinnative action to protect his
..
privacy ("opt-out") or an affnmative action to allow utilization of infonnation about him and his
account ("opt-in").
VII. LEGAL ISSUES FOR SERVICE PROVIDERS - CONTRIBUTORY AND VICARIOUS
LIABILITY
The Internet is a medium which allows for easy posting and transfer of copyrighted material
or material containing trademarks or other intellectual property. Such transfer, however, may
infiinge the rights of the intellectual property owner. As the actual infringer may be hard to track
down and without the deep pockets of the ISP, the"ISP is often the target of any action by the
proprietary rights owner. This is done through theories of either direct, contributory, or vicarious
-liability. In Marobie-FL. Inc. v. National Assoc. of Fire Equipment Distributors, 983 F.Supp. 1167
(N.D. Ill. 1997), the plaintiff sought damages on a direct liability theory against the ISP because the .,j
material was stored on the ISP's hard drive. The Court found that the defendant was similar to the
owner ofa copy machine and that the defendant only provided the means to copy and did not itself
perform any of the infringing activities, therefore it was not directly liable for the infringement of
the copyrighted work. Under a theory of contributory infringement, it is necessary to establish
whether the access provider should have known that the user was infringing the plaintiffs copyrights
j
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after having received notice from the plaintiffs. See Religious Technology Center v. NetCom On-
Line Communications Services. Inc., 907 F.Supp. 1361 (N.D. Calif. 1995). In that case the court
held that the plaintiffs had raised a genuine issue of fact as to whether the access provider should
have known that the infringement was occurring after having received notice from the plaintiffs.
Vicarious liability requires that the service provider has the right and ability to controlling
r
r
infringer's act and receives a direct financial benefit from the infringement. Unlike contributory
infringement, knowledge of infringing nature of activity is not an element necessary to prove
vicarious liability. Software trade groups such as the Software Publishers Associations have
1. The ISP has no actual knowledge of the infiingement;
To some extent the issues ofcontributory and vicarious liability for on-line service providers
provided guidelines for ISP's to keep them on the side of the angels with respect to infiingement.
These provisions provide a safe harbor for ISP's if the following conditions are met:
The ISP is not aware of facts or circumstances that would make the
infiingement apparent;
The ISP receives no financial benefit from the infringement; and
2.
3.
These codes are often criticized as being too expansive in defining the potential liability of an ISP.
have been resolved by recent revisions to the Copyright Act. See 17 U.S.C. §512. 1
r
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4. The ISP responds expeditiously upon necessary notice.
r
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r
r
1Due to a drafting error there are two provisions in Title 17 of the United States labeled §512. Reference here
is to the second §512.
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VIII. PRIVACY CONSIDERATIONS
The use of the Internet raises substantial issues of personal privacy. These have been
addressed in passing above and are impacted by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act
("ECPA") and the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act ("COPPA") (15 U.S.c. §6501 et seq).
Additionally, the industry has attempted some degree of self-regulation with respect to personal
privacy and selling personal privacy infoIlI1ation. Certain sites such as the BBB Online
(www.BBBonline.org) or TrustE (www.truste.org) provide certification of a site's particular privacy
practices and sample or model policy. For an on-line service provider, the privacy issue is both a ...ii
legal issue and a marketing issue as Internet users become more concerned with their personal
-pnvacy.
./
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APPENDIX
Sample Internet Service Provider Agreement
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DISCLAIMER: THIS IS A SAMPLE
FORM AGREEMENT FOR DISCUSSION
PURPOSES AND IS NOT INTENDED
AS A DEFINITIVE FORM:
SAMPLE: INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDER AGREEMENT
TIllS INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDER AGREEMENT (the "Agreement") is entered into
as of -', 1999, by and between LOCAL COMPANY, INC., a Kentucky corporation
("Company"), and ("Client").
WHEREAS, Client desires to obtain Internet access through Company's network established
by Company with BIG PHONE COMPANY;
NOW, THEREFORE, the parties agree as follows:
1. Services and Responsibilities of Company. Company agrees to provide the
"Services" described on Exhibit A.
2. Term ofAgreement. The Agreement shall commence on the date of installation and
continue in effect for a period of __ (~ years unless terminated sooner as provided herein. At
the end of the term the Agreement shall automatically renew for an additional period of__L)
years.
3. Compensation. For Company's provision of the services set forth herein, Client
promises to pay to Company the monthly fees ("Fees") as set forth on Exhibit A attached hereto.
The monthly fees shall be due and payable on or before the _ day of each month following the
month during which the services were provided. All payments not made to Company by such date
shall thereafter bear interest at __% per month. After the initial term of this Agreement, Company
may adjust the rates and charges upon sixty (60) days notice to Client. Client agrees to pay Company
its then prevailing rates for time and materials for service provided by Company (or third party) to
identifY or correct any failure caused by facilities or equipment not furnished by Company or to
repair damage or interruption caused by equipment.
4. Use of Services. Client agrees to maintain access to service as confidential and
privileged information, and to use the services in accordance with all applicable laws and
regulations. Client agrees that he will not use the services to publish, post, distribute or disseminate
another person's proprietary information, including trademarks or copyrighted information without
the express authorization of the rights holder.
5. Warranty. Company will endeavor to provide the Service on a 24-hour-a-day, 7-day-
per-week basis. Company does not warrant that the Service will be provided without interruption.
In the case ofa service intenuption caused by Company, Company shall refund to Client in the form
ofa credit Company's service charge for the period during which the service was interrupted if credit
is granted by Company's upstream provider of service. Such credit will not be given for Service
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interruption caused by Client, or by activities or facilities furnished by Client or third parties, or by
any occurrence beyond the control of Company. Company MAKES THIS WARRANTY IN LIEU
OF ALL OTHER WARRANTIES, EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR
A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
6. Limitation ofLiability. With respect to claims arising out of provision of the service
set out in this Agreement, Company's liability, whether in contract, tort or otherwise, shall be limited
to direct damages which shall not exceed the total charges to Client for the services for the initial
term of this Agreement. In the case of service interruption, Company's liability shall be limited to
a prorated credit for the charges applicable for the period of interruption. Under no circumstances
shall Company be liable for incidental, consequential or special damages, notwithstanding their
foreseeability or disclosure by Client to Company, including, but not limited to, damages arising
from delay, loss of data, profits, or goodwill. Company shall bear no liability for use of equipment
or services provided under the Agreement in connection with life support systems or devices.
Company may from time-to-time provide advice, make recommendations or supply other analysis
related to the system, equipment and services described in this Agreement, and while Company shall
use reasonable efforts in this regard, Client acknowledges and agrees that this limitation of liability
shall apply to provision of such advice, recommendations and analysis.
7. Responsibility for Telecommunications Charges. The Service is intended to be
connected to the public switched telephone network. Client is solely responsible for selection,
implementation and maintenance of security featUres for defense against unauthorized long distance
calling. Client is solely responsible for payment of long distance, toll and other telecommunications
charges and any other charges incurred through use of the Service.
8. Hazardous Substances. Except as disclosed to and acknowledged in writing by
Company, Client certifies that it is not aware of the presence of any asbestos or other hazardous
substance (as defined by any federal, state or local law or regulation) at any location where Company
is to perform services under this Agreement. If during such performance Company employees or
agents encounter any such substance, Client agrees to take all necessary steps, at its own expense,
to remove or contain the asbestos or other hazardous substance and to test the premises to ensure that
exposure does not exceed the least exposure limit for the protection of workers. Company may
suspend performance under this Agreement until the removal or containment has been completed
and approved by the appropriate governmental agency and Company. Performance obligations under
this Agreement shall be extended for the delay caused by said cleanup or removal. Client's failure
to remove or contain hazardous substances shall entitle Company to terminate this Agreement
without further liability. If Company so terminates, Client shall pay Company the fees due under
this Agreement for the balance of what would have been due for the remaining term of the
Agreement.
9. Compliance With Law. The specifications and requirements of the Service, its price
and installation are based on compliance with applicable laws, regulations and ordinances in effect
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on the date the price is quoted to Client. Client agrees to pay any additional costs incurred by
Company after the date of this Agreement resulting from changes in laws.
10. Delayed Perfonnance. Ifperfonnance under this Agreement is interfered with by acts
of God, war, riot, embargo, acts of the Government in its sovereign capacity, labor difficulties,
unavailability of equipment or parts from vendors, changes requested by Client, or any other
circumstances beyond the reasonable control and without the fault of the party affected, such party,
upon giving prompt notice to the other party, shall be excused from such performance on a day-to-
day basis to the extent of such interference (and the other party shall likewise be excused from its
perfonnance), provided that the party so affected shall use reasonable efforts to remove such causes
ofnonperformance and both parties shall proceed whenever such causes are removed or cease.
11. Default. Ifeither party fails to perform any material obligation under this Agreement
or violates any material term or condition of this Agreement, and such failure or violation is not
cured within five (5) days following receipt of a default notice from the other party, then the other
party shall have the right to terminate this Agreement upon written notice to the defaulting party.
12. Insolvency. Either party may terminate this Agreement by notice, in writing, if the
other party admits insolvency, makes an assignment for the benefit of creditors, or has a trustee or
receiver appointed over all or any substantial part of its assets.
13. Authorization and Enforceability. The execution, delivery and performance of this
Agreement by Client has been duly authorized by Client and, if a corporation, its directors and
officers, and this Agreement has been duly executed and delivered by Client and is enforceable in
accordance with its terms.
14. Indemnification and Limitation of Liability. Client shall indemnify and hold
Company and its employees and agents harmless from and against any claims, demands, costs, loss,
damage, liability, obligations, fines, penalties or expense, including without limitation reasonable
attorneys' fees, in connection with or arising out of the Services performed for Client by Company
pursuant to and within the scope of this Agreement, and such indemnification shall include without
limitation, claims of third parties for copyright or trademark infringement or for violations of any
federal, state or local laws, rules or regulations governing or affecting the Services. The provisions
of this Section shall apply if loss or damage, irrespective of cause or origin, results directly or
indirectly to persons or property, from performance or non-performance of the Services, or from
negligence, active or otherwise, by Company, its agents, servants, assigns or employees. The
obligations of Client under this Section shall survive the termination of this Agreement.
15. Miscellaneous.
a. Notices. Any and all notices, demands or other communications given by any
of the parties hereunder shall be in writing and shall be validly given or made ifgiven by personal
delivery, facsimile, or ifdeposited in the United States mail, certified or registered, postage prepaid,
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return receipt requested. If such notice, demand or other communication be given by personal
delivery or facsimile, service shall be conclusively deemed made at the time of such personal service
or facsimile transmission if received. Any notice, demand or other communication given by mail
shall conclusively be deemed given seventy-two (72) hours following its deposit in the United States
mail addressed to the party to whom such notice, demand or other communication is to be given as
hereinafter set forth:
To Company: LOCAL COMPANY, INC. To Client:
b. Relationship ofParties. Nothing contained in this Agreement shall be deemed
or construed to create a partnership, fiduciary relationship, joint tenancy, joint venture or co-
ownership by or between the parties herein.
c. Time of the Essence. Time shall be of the essence in the performance of all
of the obligations of the parties under this Agreement.
d. Successors and Assigns. All of the terms and provisions contained herein
shall inure to the benefit of and shall be binding upon the parties hereto and their respective heirs,
executors, administrators, personal representatives, successors and assigns.
e. A~~licable Law and Severability. This Agreement shall, in all respects, be
governed by the laws of the State of Kentucky.
16. ECPA Notice. In accordance with the Electronic Communication Privacy Act,
Company hereby provides notice that use of electronic mail pursuant to this Agreement is not as
secure as the use of the United States Postal Service, First Class Mail.
17. Venue. The parties agree that venue for any claim, action, suit or proceeding arising
under pursuant to this Agreement shall be with the United States District Court for the Eastern
District ofKentucky or the Fayette County, Kentucky Circuit or District Courts. The parties submit
to jurisdiction before these courts and agree that service of process may be obtained pursuant to the
provisions of the Kentucky long-arm statute.
18. Attorney's Fees. In the event an action is brought to enforce or interpret this
Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover its reasonable attorneys' fees and
expenses incurred in connection with the action.
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IN WIlNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have duly executed this Agreement as of the day and
year fIrst above written.
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COl\1PANY: LOCAL COl\1PANY, INC.
By: _
Title: _
Phone:, _
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CLIENT: _
By:, _
Title:, _
Phone:, _
Services Provided:
EXHIBIT A
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BUSINESS METHOD PATENTS
Jack E. Toliver
IntelProp, LC
Lexington, Kentucky
William L Montague, Jr.
Stoll, Keenon & Park, LLP
Lexington, Kentucky
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1. What is a Patentable Business Method
, Amazon, the on-line bookstore, recently obtained a patent for linking web pages. This
announcement on Bloomberg News, February 28, triggered a point and a half jump in Amazon's
stock price. [See Endnote]. Such e-commerce patents have been incubating in the patent office
and are now beginning to emerge in record numbers. Nearly 1400 e-commerce patents issued in
the first half of 1999. This compares to 648 that issued for all of 1997. The Patent Office has
hired 500 new examiners for its Internet and Software Section to handle the backlog. The ticking
sound you hear may be a patent "time bomb" set to go off in the market which is vital to your
commercial enterprise.
Is the U.S. patent system sanctioning an unprecedented expansion in conceptual
ownership? Many would agree that it is. If you believe that there has been a paradigm shift in
knowledge based commerce, you should expect the patent system to respond to this challenge by
protecting the new knowledge based developments. This may require strategic defensive
planning to protect your investment. Get your computer engineers to begin "thinking" patent
protection as soon as they come up with a workable solution to a software problem. Then become
a user of your own business method. Don't just patent it. If it's the lifeblood of your commercial
enterprise, put it into practice...at Internet speed. Offense, it is said, is often the best defense. That
is true here. Think defensively, if you do, you will at least have a defense to a patent infringement
suit. Under a recent amendment to the patent law, a prior user, his customers, or a successor in
the business, may continue using a patented business method by others if it was in use more than
a year before the filing date of the patent (Intellectual Property and Communications Reform Act
of 1999, PL 106-113, 11/29,99). Also, the recent amendments alleviate the "time bomb" effect.
Patent applications will be laid open to public inspection within 18 months after the filing date.
The problem of an application pending in secret for many years in the Patent Office and then
"exploding" in the market just as the investments of others are beginning to bear fruit will be
curtailed. This coupled with the "prior user" defense should alleviate many of the perceived
problems created by this paradigm shift in the patent law toward the granting of patents on
knowledge based inventions, so called business method patents.
G(a) - 1
So, how do you recognize a potential business method worth patenting? Is it a mere
algorithm? Can an abstract idea, an algebraic formula with no concrete, and practical application
become a business method patent? The questions suggest the answer.
The Patent Act harkens back to the Constitution.1 The core principle, whether a process
is tangible or intangible, is whether it produces a tangible, useful result. Useful has a special
meaning. The intellectual activity can't end in an abstraction. An algorithm expressed as a
thought process is not useful. Until it has been reduced to practice in the solution of a real world
problem, it remains an unpatentable expression. Let's examine the holding in State Street Banli
to see how the law applies to an accounting program for a financial institution.
1 Article 1, Section 8, The Congress shall have the power...To promote the progress of science
and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their
respective writings and discoveries. (Emphasis added).
2State Street Bank and Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc. 149 F.3d 1368, 1375, (Fed.
Cir. 1998) 47 US PQ2d 1596, 1604
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1.1 The Holdin2 in State Street Bank
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) didn't exist when the 1952 Act
came into effect, but its predecessor, the Customs Court of Patent Appeals (CCPA) had allowed
electronic patents in computer technology. The computer's brain, its CPU, had to do something
useful and concrete in the external world. The computer as a "machine" was statutory subject
matter under Section 101. The case law had not reached the question of whether software alone
was statutory subject matter. It was protected under the copyright law. So the Patent Office took
a narrow view of software being statutory subject matter guided by the CCPA. Section 101 spells
out what subject matter may be patented3• Business method patents were barred, until the CAFC
provided a clarification in State Street.
Signature Financial obtained U.S. Patent 5,193,056 in March 1993. State Street and
r Signature were competitors in offering mutual fund partnerships. State Street brought a
declaratory judgment action against Signature in 1996 alleging that the patent was invalid for
r failing to claim statutory subject matter under Section 101. State Street had entered into an oral
license agreement with Signature which left State Street free to challenge Signature's patent. A
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
written license agreement would typically bar such a challenge. State Street alleged that the
patent was drawn to nonstatutory subject matter by attempting to claim an unpatentable
mathematic algorithm. The Patent Office had allowed the claims "disguised" as a machine. It
looked like a hardware patent carrying out a useful external result, namely data processing of
share price information in mutual fund partnerships. The Massachusetts District Court found the
core issue on the motion for summary judgment by State Street to be as follows:
335 USC 101 is broad and general in nature, "Any ...process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any... .improvement thereof..... may be patented. And Section 100 (b)
further expands "process" to include "art or method, and... a new use of a known process,
machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or material." If the claims of the patent pursuant to
Section 112, second paragraph, fall into anyone of the named categories, the invention is allowed
to proceed through the further analysis required for patentablity under Section 102 novelty. Even
though the claims may pass muster under Section 102, they still have to be "nonobvious" under
Section 103 to become a patent.
G(a) - 3
"Whether computer software that essentially performs mathematical
accounting functions and is configured to run on a general purpose...
computer is patentable under Section 101 ...."
The Court noted that this question had vexed theorist and practitioners since computers
had entered the marketplace some thirty years ago.4 The case reached the CAFC 5 in 1998. In an
opinion by Judge Rich, it reversed the lower Court's holding on non statutory subject matter for a
business method:
"Today, we hold that the transformation of data, representing discreet
dollar amounts, by a machine through a series of mathematical
calculations into a final share price, constitutes a practical application
of a mathematical algorithm, formula, or calculation, because it
produces a 'useful, concrete and tangible result'-a final share price
momentarily fixed for recording and reporting purposes and even
accepted and relied upon by regulatory authorities and in subsequent trades.,,6
The CAFC recognized that the judicial exception which had been engrafted upon Section
101 as the Business Method exception was dead, and dispatched it with a succinct sentence:
"We take this opportunity to lay this ill-conceived exception to rest.',7
While this decision seemingly opens the floodgates for patenting mere mathematical
algorithms as methods of doing business, the Court made it abundantly clear that by merely
lowering the first hurdle, statutory subject matter under Section 101, it was not lowering the
successive hurdles required to be cleared before an invention would be considered patentable. It
would still have to pass the second, third, and fourth hurdles to patentability, namely that the
4 John A. Burtis Towards A Rational Jurisprudence of Computer-Related Patentability in Light of
In Alappat. 79 Minn. L. Rev. 1129 (1995) "It is into this judicial quagmire that the court must
dive." CCH 1996'1[47450, p. 68,729.
547 USPQ 2d 1596 (Fed Cir 1998)
6Id 1601
7Id 1602
G(a) - 4
...
-
-
r
i
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
t
r
r
claims omit no element required for a complete and workable disclosure under Section 1128 that
it be novel under Section 102, and not obvious under Section 103. This last hurdle [Section 103]
tripped up AT & T in the most recent business method case to reach the CAFe.
1.2 The Holdine in AT&T Corporation v Excel Communications Inc.9
The claims of the AT&T patent were pure method of doing business claims denied
protection under Section 101 by the District Court as not directed to statutory subject
matter. It was clear from the written description of the '184 patent that AT&T was
claiming a process that "applies Boolean algebra to [subscribers and call recipients],
(PICs) to determine the value of the PIC indicator, and applies that value through
switching and recording mechanisms to create a signal useful for billing purposes."w
After reversing the lower Court's holding of nonstatutory subject matter, on
remand, the District Courtll looked at a similar billing exchange for telephone subscribers
within a local Family Network offered by MCI to its subscribers. The AT & T method
claims were found to be infringed by Excel's national billing network. However, the
claims would also "read on" MCl's local Family Network. It was in public use more than
r a year before the filing of the AT &T patent. As such it was a bar to claims held invalid for
obviousness under Section 103.
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
8 The "omitted element" prong of Section 112's written description requirement is interpreted to
prevent the investor from broadening a claim by omitting an element previously indicated as an
essential element. Sec, e.g. DeWitt, Does supreme Court Precedent Sink Submarine Patents? 38
IDEA 601 (1998).
9172 F.3d 1352, [1353-54],50 USPQ 2d 1447 (Fed Cir 1999)
III ID at 1358
1152 US PQ 2d1865
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2. Effective Prosecution of a Business Method Patent
It may come as no surprise that the most recent Edition of the Patent Examining
Guidelines eliminates the paragraph, which read:
"Though seemingly within the category of process or method,
a method of doing business can be rejected as not being
within the statutory classes, see Hotel Security Checking v Lorraine
Company 160 F. 467(200 Cir. 1908) and In Wait, 24 USPQ
88,22 CCPA 822 (1932, 1934)."
Rather the newer Edition of the manual now reads:
"Office personnel have had difficulty in properly treating
claims directed to methods of doing business. Claims
should not be categorized as methods of doing business.
Instead, such claims should be treated like any other process claims."
In State Street, the CAFC endorsed this change:
"We agree that this is precisely the manner in which
this type of claim should be treated."
Business method patents are to be treated no differently than any other process
patents if the claims are directed to "a useful, concrete, and tangible result." In the case of
Signature's patent, it was a final share of price momentarily fixed for recording and
reporting purposes and even accepted and relied upon by regulatory authorities.
Although these were "machine" claims, they were in "means plus function" form,
expressed as a series of steps on a flow chart12 similar in result to the AT &T method
12Section 112,116" An element in a c1aim...may be expressed as a means or step [flow chart] for
performing a specified function...and ...construed to cover the corresponding structure, material,
or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof," Figure 1 of the '056 patent in State
Street is illustrative of a flow chart type of disclosure necessary to support a "means plus
function" claim in a business method patent.
G(a) - 6
i
....
-
...
;r claims which read, in part, as follows:
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
!
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
Claim 1. "A method for use in a telecommunications systems ...
COmprlsiog the steps of: generating a messag~for an
----------
interchange call between "0 o-riginating subscriber,
and including in said message record, a primary
interchange carrier (PIC) indicator having a value
which is a function of whether or not the interchange
carrier associated with the terminating subscriber is a
predetermined one of said interexchange carriers."
Although these claims successfully cleared the "hurdles" of Sections 101 (statutory
subject matter), 112 (distinctly claiming the subject matter), 102 (novelty), on remand, the
District Court found the claims invalid for obviousness under Section 103 as a matter of
law.
3. Conclusion
We come back to the question of whether the.patent system is challenging the
legitimacy of our knowledge based economy by issuing proprietary exclusionary rights to
those who seek to patent business methods and whether this reflects an unhealthy
paradigm shift in the patent law? Judging from the U. S. economic surge compared to the
rest of the world one might say that the incentive to protect knowledge based inventions
was stimulating growth and attracting capital formation and investment. Amazon's stock
price jumped on the announcement by Bloomberg News it was obtaining a web patent. The
signs appear favorable for those who seek patent protection for business method
inventions.
G(a) -7
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Chairman of Amazon Urges Reduction of Patent Terms, New York Times, By Matt Richtel, March 11, 2000: This title
was followed by a sub-caption. "Bezos Suggests 3 to 5 years, Instead of 20". Tim O'Reilly, CEO of O'Reilly &
Associates, publisher of computer books, who ad\1oca~~~nsourcing, or free access t'J .omp"lcr "vUl~e code and
software, wrote to Mr. Bezos complaining about Amazon's business m".hod 1''';0:;,<5. In response, Mr. Bezos posted a
letter on Amazon's web page suggesting shorter terms, pnd implying that Amazon would not vigorously enforce its own
"One Click" and "Web Linking" patents. This is being discounted as a public relations stunt. Amazon may have an
"image" problem after its One Click patent suit precluded barnesandnoble.com from using single mouse click ordering
(since avoided by two clicks). Patent terms can be "dedicated" to the public at any time by the owner. Also, technology
often becomes obsolete in other fields, besides software. When it does, the solution is not to change the term of all
patents, simply let the market "obsolete" the patent. The owner can merely let it lapse by skipping the maintenance fee
when due at the fourth, eighth or twelfth years after issue.
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STATE STREET BANK & TRUST CO., Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
SIGNATURE FINANCIAL GROUP, INC. Defendant-Appellant.
No. 96-1327.
United States Court of Appeals,
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Page 1
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
July 23, 1998.
Bank brought action against assignee of patent for computerized accounting system used to manage mutual fund
investment structure, seeking declaratory judgment that patent was invalid and unenforceable. The United States
District Court for the District of Massachusetts, Patti B. Saris, J., 927 F.Supp. 502, granted summary judgment for
bank, and assignee appealed. The Court of Appeals, Rich, Circuit Judge, held that: (1) patent was directed to machine,
not process; (2) invention was not unpatentable under mathematical algorithm exception to patentability; and (3) there
is no "business method" exception to patentability.
Reversed and remanded.
[1] FEDERAL COURTS ~766
170Bk766
On appeal, Court of Appeals is not bound to give deference to the district court's grant of summary judgment, but must
make an independent determination that the standards for summary judgment have been met.
[2] PATENTS ~324.5
291k324.5
Court of Appeals reviews patent claim construction de novo including any allegedly fact-based questions relating to
claim construction.
[3] PATENTS ~324.5
291k324.5
Court of Appeals reviews statutory construction de novo.
[4] PATENTS ~101(8)
291kI01(8)
"Machine" claims having means-plus-function clauses may only be reasonably viewed as process claims if there is no
supporting structure in the written description that corresponds to the claimed "means" elements.
[5] PATENTS ~101(11)
291kI01(11)
Patent claiming data processing system for managing a financial services configuration of a portfolio established as a
partnership, which machine was made up of, at the very least, specific structures disclosed in written description and
corresponding to means-plus-function elements recited in claim, was directed to machine, not process. 35 U.S.C.A. §
101.
[6] PATENTS~3
291k3
It is improper to read limitations into statute generally setting forth patentable subject matter where the legislative
history indicates that Congress clearly did not intend such limitations. 35 U.S.C.A. § 101.
[7] PATENTS~6
Copr. © West 2000 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
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291k6
Unpatentable mathematical algorithms are identifiable by showing they are merely abstract ideas constituting
disembodied concepts or truths that are not "useful"; to be patentable an algorithm must be applied in a "useful" way.
35 U.S.C.A. § 101.
[8] PATENTS~6
291k6
Transformation of data, representing discrete dollar amounts, by a machine through a series of mathematical
calculations into a final share price, for purpose of managing mutual fund investment structure, was practical
application of a mathematical algorithm, formula, or calculation, because it produced useful, concrete and tangible
result, and claimed machine thus was not unpatentable under mathematical algorithm exception to patentability. 35
U.S.C.A. § 101.
[9] PATENTS~6
291k6
Dispositive inquiry in determining patentability of invention notwithstanding its inclusion of mathematical algorithm is
whether the claim as a whole is directed to statutory subject matter; it is irrelevant that a claim may contain, as part of
the whole, subject matter which would not be patentable by itself, and claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory
does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula, computer program or digital computer.
35 U.S.C.A. § 101.
[10] PATENTS ~101(1)
291klOl(l)
The question of whether a patent claim encompasses statutory subject matter should not focus on which of the four
categories of subject matter a claim is directed to, namely, process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter,
but rather on the essential characteristics of the subject matter, in particular, its practical utility. 35 U.S.C.A. § 101.
[11] PATENTS ~7.14
291k7.14
Business methods are subject to same legal requirements for patentability as applied to any other process or method,
and thus there is no "business method" exception to patentability. 35 U.S.C.A. § 101.
*1369 William L. Patton, Ropes & Gray, Boston, Massachusetts, argued for plaintiff-appellee. With him on the brief
were James L. Sigel and James S. DeGraw. Also on the brief was Maurice E. Gauthier, Samuels, Gauthier, Stevens &
Reppert.
Steven L. Friedman, Dilworth, Paxson, Kalish & Kauffman LLP, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, argued for defendant-
appellant. With him on the brief were Steven J. Henry, Wolf, Greenfield & Sacks, P.e., Boston, Massachusetts; and
Philip G. Koenig, Pittas IIKoenig, Winchester, Massachusetts.
William T. Ellis, Foley & Lardner, Washington, D.C., for amicus curiae Information Technology Industry Council.
With him on the brief were Harold C. Wegner, Richard L. *1370 Schwaab, and Mary Michelle Kile. Of counsel was
John F. Cooney, Venable, Baetjer, Howard & Civiletti, LLP.
Robert C. Scheinfeld, Baker & Botts, L.L.P., New York, New York, for amicus curiae Mastercard International
Service. With him on the brief was Lawrence T. Kass. Of counsel on the brief for amicus curiae VISA International
Service Association were Laurie S. Hane, Donald S. Chisum, and Alan L. Durham, Morrison & Foerster LLP, Palo
Alto, California.
Before RICH, PLAGER, and BRYSON, Circuit Judges.
RICH, Circuit Judge.
Signature Financial Group, Inc. (Signature) appeals from the decision of the United States District Court for the
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District of Massachusetts granting a motion for summary judgment in favor of State Street Bank & Trust Co. (State
Street), finding U.S. Patent No. 5,193,056 (the '056 patent) invalid on the ground that the claimed subject matter is not
encompassed by 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). See State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 927
F.Supp. 502, 38 USPQ2d 1530 (D.Mass.1996). We reverse and remand because we conclude that the patent claims are
directed to statutory subject matter.
BACKGROUND
Signature is the assignee of the '056 patent which is entitled "Data Processing System for Hub and Spoke Financial
Services Configuration." The' 056 patent issued to Signature on 9 March 1993, naming R. Todd Boos as the inventor.
The '056 patent is generally directed to a data processing system (the system) for implementing an investment structure
which was developed for use in Signature's business as an administrator and accounting agent for mutual funds. In
essence, the system, identified by the proprietary name Hub and Spoke (R), facilitates a structure whereby mutual funds
(Spokes) pool their assets in an investment portfolIo (Hub) organized as a partnership. This investment configuration
provides the administrator of a mutual fund with the advantageous combination of economies of scale in administering
investments coupled with the tax advantages of a partnership.
State Street and Signature are both in the business of acting as custodians and accounting agents for multi-tiered
partnership fund financial services. State Street negotiated with Signature for a license to use its patented data
processing system described and claimed in the '056 patent. When negotiations broke down, State Street brought a
declaratory judgment action asserting invalidity, unenforceability, and noninfringement in Massachusetts district court,
and then filed a motion for partial summary judgment of patent invalidity for failure to claim statutory subject matter
under § 101. The motion was granted and this appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
[1][2][3] On appeal, we are not bound to give deference to the district court's grant of summary judgment, but must
make an independent determination that the standards for summary judgment have been met. Vas-Cath, Inc. v.
Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1560, 19 USPQ2d 1111, 1114 (Fed.Cir.1991). Summary judgment is properly granted
where there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The substantive issue at hand, whether the '056 patent is invalid for failure to claim statutory
subject matter under § 101, is a matter of both claim construction and statutory construction. "[W]e review claim
construction de novo including any allegedly fact-based questions relating to claim construction." Cybor Corp. v. FAS
Techs., 138 F.3d 1448, 1451,46 USPQ2d 1169, 1174 (Fed.Cir.1998) (in banc). We also review statutory construction
de novo. See Romero v. United States, 38 F.3d 1204, 1207 (Fed.Cir.1994). We hold that declaratory judgment
plaintiff State Street was not entitled to the grant of summary judgment of invalidity of the '056 patent under § 101 as a
matter of law, because the patent claims are directed to statutory subject matter.
The following facts pertinent to the statutory subject matter issue are either undisputed or represent the version alleged
by the nonmovant. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, *1371 Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202
(1986). The patented invention relates generally to a system that allows an administrator to monitor and record the
financial information flow and make all calculations necessary for maintaining a partner fund financial services
configuration. As previously mentioned, a partner fund financial services configuration essentially allows several
mutual funds, or "Spokes," to pool their investment funds into a single portfolio, or "Hub," allowing for consolidation
of, inter alia, the costs of administering the fund combined with the tax advantages of a partnership. In particular, this
system provides means for a daily allocation of assets for two or more Spokes that are invested in the same Hub. The
system determines the percentage share that each Spoke maintains in the Hub, while taking into consideration daily
changes both in the value of the Hub's investment securities and in the concomitant amount of each Spoke's assets.
In determining daily changes, the system also allows for the allocation among the Spokes of the Hub's daily income,
expenses, and net realized and unrealized gain or loss, calculating each day's total investments based on the concept of
a book capital account. This enables the determination of a true asset value of each Spoke and accurate calculation of
allocation ratios between or among the Spokes. The system additionally tracks all the relevant data determined on a
daily basis for the Hub and each Spoke, so that aggregate year end income, expenses, and capital gain or loss can be
Copr. © West 2000 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
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determined for accounting and for tax purposes for the Hub and, as a result, for each publicly traded Spoke.
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It is essential that these calculations are quickly and accurately performed. In large part this is required because each
Spoke sells shares to the public and the price of those shares is substantially based on the Spoke's percentage interest in
the portfolio. In some instances, a mutual fund administrator is required to calculate the value of the shares to the
nearest penny within as little as an hour and a half after the market closes. Given the complexity of the calculations, a
computer or equivalent device is a virtual necessity to perform the task.
The '056 patent application was filed 11 March 1991. It initially contained six "machine" claims, which incorporated
means-plus-function clauses, and six method claims. According to Signature, during prosecution the examiner
contemplated a § 101 rejection for failure to claim statutory subject matter. However, upon cancellation of the six
method claims, the examiner issued a notice of allowance for the remaining present six claims on appeal. Only claim I
is an independent claim. .
[4] The district court began its analysis by construing the claims to be directed to a process, with each "means" clause
merely representing a step in that process. However, "machine" claims having "means" clauses may only be reasonably
viewed as process claims if there is no supporting structure in the written description that corresponds to the claimed
"means" elements. See In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1540-41,31 USPQ2d 1545, 1554 (Fed.Cir.1994) (in banc). This
is not the case now before us.
[5] When independent claim 1 is properly construed in accordance with § 112, IJ[ 6, it is directed to a machine, as
demonstrated below, where representative claim 1 is set forth, the subject matter in brackets stating the structure the
written description discloses as corresponding to the respective "means" recited in the claims.
1. A data processing system for managing a financial services configuration of a portfolio established as a
partnership, each partner being one of a plurality of funds, comprising:
(a) computer processor means [a personal computer including a CPU] for processing data;
(b) storage means [a data disk] for storing data on a storage medium;
(c) first means [an arithmetic logic circuit configured to prepare the data disk to magnetically store selected data] for
initializing the storage medium;
(d) second means [an arithmetic logic circuit configured to retrieve information from a specific file, calculate
incremental increases or decreases based on specific input, allocate the results on a percentage basis, and store the
output in a *1372 separate file] for processing data regarding assets in the portfolio and each of the funds from a
previous day and data regarding increases or decreases in each of the funds, [sic, funds'] assets and for allocating the
percentage share that each fund holds in the portfolio;
(e) third means [an arithmetic logic circuit configured to retrieve information from a specific file, calculate
incremental increases and decreases based on specific input, allocate the results on a percentage basis and store the
output in a separate file] for processing data regarding daily incremental income, expenses, and net realized gain or
loss for the portfolio and for allocating such data among each fund;
(f) fourth means [an arithmetic logic circuit configured to retrieve information from a specific file, calculate
incremental increases and decreases based on specific input, allocate the results on a percentage basis and store the
output in a separate file] for processing data regarding daily net unrealized gain or loss for the portfolio and for
allocating such data among each fund; and
(g) fifth means [an arithmetic logic circuit configured to retrieve information from specific files, calculate that
information on an aggregate basis and store the output in a separate file] for processing data regarding aggregate year-
end income, expenses, and capital gain or loss for the portfolio and each of the funds.
Each claim component, recited as a "means" plus its function, is to be read, of course, pursuant to § 112, I)[ 6, as
inclusive of the "equivalents" of the structures disclosed in the written description portion of the specification. Thus,
claim 1, properly construed, claims a machine, namely, a data processing system for managing a financial services
configuration of a portfolio established as a partnership, which machine is made up of, at the very least, the specific
structures disclosed in the written description and corresponding to the means-plus-function elements (a)-(g) recited in
the claim. A "machine" is proper statutory subject matter under § 101. We note that, for the purposes of a § 101
analysis, it is of little relevance whether claim 1 is directed to a "machine" or a "process," as long as it falls within at
least one of the four enumerated categories of patentable subject matter, "machine" and "process" being such
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categories.
This does not end our analysis, however, because the court concluded that the claimed subject matter fell into one of
two alternative judicially- created exceptions to statutory subject matter. [FNl] The court refers to the first exception
as the "mathematical algorithm" exception and the second exception as the "business method" exception. Section 101
reads:
FNI. Indeed, although we do not make this detennination here, the judicially created exceptions, Le., abstract ideas, laws of
nature, etc., should be applicable to all categories of statutory subject matter, as our own precedent suggests. See Alappat, 33
F.3d at 1542,31 USPQ2d at 1556; see also In re Johnston, 502 F.2d 765, 183 USPQ 172 (CCPA 1974) (Rich, J., dissenting).
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any
new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this
title.
The plain and unambiguous meaning of § 101 is that any invention falling within one of the four stated categories of
statutory subject matter may be patented, provided it meets the other requirements for patentability set forth in Title 35,
i.e., those found in §§ 102, 103, and 112, l)[ 2. [FN2]
FN2. As explained in In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 960, 201 USPQ 352, 360 (CCPA 1979) (emphases and footnote omitted):
The first door which must be opened on the difficult path to patentability is § 101 .... The person approaching that door is an
inventor, whether his invention is patentable or not .... Being an inventor or having an invention, however, is no guarantee of
opening even the first door. What kind of an invention or discovery is it? In dealing with the question of kind, as distinguished
from the qualitative conditions which make the invention patentable, § 101 is broad and general; its language is: "any * * *
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any * * * improvement thereof." Section IOO(b) further expands
"process" to include "art or method, and * * * a new use of a known process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or
material." If the invention, as the inventor defines it in his claims (pursuant to § 112, second paragraph), falls into anyone of
the named categories, he is allowed to pass through to the second door, which is § 102; "novelty and loss of right to patent" is
the sign on it. Notwithstanding the words "new and useful" in § 101, the invention is not examined under that statute for
novelty because that is not the statutory scheme of things or the long-established administrative practice.
*1373 [6] The repetitive use of the expansive term "any" in § 101 shows Congress's intent not to place any restrictions
on the subject matter for which a patent may be obtained beyond those specifically recited in § 101. Indeed, the
Supreme Court has acknowledged that Congress intended § 101 to extend to "anything under the sun that is made by
man." Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309, 100 S.Ct. 2204, 65 L.Ed.2d 144 (1980); see also Diamond v.
Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182, 101 S.Ct. 1048,67 L.Ed.2d 155 (1981). [FN3] Thus, it is improper to read limitations into §
101 on the subject matter that may be patented where the legislative history indicates that Congress clearly did not
intend such limitations. See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308, 100 S.Ct. 2204 ("We have also cautioned that courts 'should
not read into the patent laws limitations and conditions which the legislature has not expressed.' " (citations omitted»).
FN3. The Committee Reports accompanying the 1952 Act infonn us that Congress intended statutory subject matter to
"include anything under the sun that is made by man." S.Rep. No. 82-1979 at 5 (1952); H.R.Rep. No. 82-1923 at 6 (1952).
The "Mathematical Algorithm" Exception
The Supreme Court has identified three categories of subject matter that are unpatentable, namely "laws of nature,
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas." Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185, 101 S.Ct. 1048. Of particular relevance to this case,
the Court has held that mathematical algorithms are not patentable subject matter to the extent that they are merely
abstract ideas. See Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 101 S.Ct. 1048, passim; Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 98 S.Ct. 2522, 57
L.Ed.2d 451 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63,93 S.Ct. 253, 34 L.Ed.2d 273 (1972). In Diehr, the Court
explained that certain types of mathematical subject matter, standing alone, represent nothing more than abstract ideas
until reduced to some type of practical application, i.e., "a useful, concrete and tangible result." Alappat, 33 F.3d at
1544,31 USPQ2d at 1557. [FN4]
FN4. This has come to be known as the mathematical algorithm exception. This designation has led to some confusion,
Copr. © West 2000 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
G(a) - 17
FOR EDUCATIONAL USE ONLY
149 F.3d 1368
(Cite as: 149 F.3d 1368, *1373)
Page 6
especially given the Freeman- Walter-Abele analysis. By keeping in mind that the mathematical algorithm is unpatentable
only to the extent that it represents an abstract idea, this confusion may be ameliorated.
[7] Unpatentable mathematical algorithms are identifiable by showing they are merely abstract ideas constituting
disembodied concepts or truths that are not "useful." From a practical standpoint, this means that to be patentable an
algorithm must be applied in a "useful" way. In Alappat, we held that data, transformed by a machine through a series
of mathematical calculations to produce a smooth waveform display on a rasterizer monitor, constituted a practical
application of an abstract idea (a mathematical algorithm, formula, or calculation), because it produced "a useful,
concrete and tangible result"--the smooth waveform.
Similarly, in Arrhythmia Research Technology Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 22 USPQ2d 1033
(Fed.Cir.1992), we held that the transformation of electrocardiograph signals from a patient's heartbeat by a machine
through a series of mathematical calculations constituted a practical application of an abstract idea (a mathematical
algorithm, formula, or calculation), because it corresponded to a useful, concrete or tangible thing--the condition of a
patient's heart.
[8] Today, we hold that the transformation of data, representing discrete dollar amounts, by a machine through a series
of mathematical calculations into a final share price, constitutes a practical application of a mathematical algorithm,
formula, or calculation, because it produces "a useful, concrete and tangible result"--afinal share price momentarily
fixed for recording and reporting purposes and even accepted and relied upon by regulatory authorities and in
subsequent trades.
The district court erred by applying the Freeman-Walter-Abele test to determine whether the claimed subject matter
was an unpatentable abstract idea. The Freeman-Waiter-Abele test was designed by the Court *1374 of Customs and
Patent Appeals, and subsequently adopted by this court, to extract and identify unpatentable mathematical algorithms in
the aftermath of Benson and Flook. See In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237, 197 USPQ 464 (CCPA 1978) as modified by
In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758, 205 USPQ 397 (CCPA 1980). The test has been thus articulated:
First, the claim is analyzed to determine whether a mathematical algorithm is directly or indirectly recited. Next, if a
mathematical algorithm is found, the claim as a whole is further analyzed to determine whether the algorithm is
"applied in any manner to physical elements or process steps," and, if it is, it "passes muster under § 101."
In re Pardo, 684 F.2d 912, 915, 214 USPQ 673, 675-76 (CCPA 1982) (citing In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902,214 USPQ
682 (CCPA 1982». [FN5]
FN5. The test has been the source of much confusion. In In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902,214 USPQ 682 (CCPA 1982), the CCPA
upheld claims applying "a mathematical formula within the context of a process which encompasses significantly more than
the algorithm alone." Id. at 909. Thus, the CCPA apparently inserted an additional consideration--the significance of additions
to the algorithm. The CCPA appeared to abandon the application of the test in In re Taner, 681 F.2d 787, 214 USPQ 678
(CCPA 1982), only to subsequently "clarify" that the Freeman-Walter-Abele test was simply not the exclusive test for detecting
unpatentable subject matter. In re Meyer, 688 F.2d 789, 796, 215 USPQ 193, 199 (CCPA 1982).
[9] After Diehr and Chakrabarty, the Freeman-Walter-Abele test has little, if any, applicability to determining the
presence of statutory subject matter. As we pointed out in Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1543,31 USPQ2d at 1557, application
of the test could be misleading, because a process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter employing a law of
nature, natural phenomenon, or abstract idea is patentable subject matter even though a law of nature, natural
phenomenon, or abstract idea would not, by itself, be entitled to such protection. [FN6] The test determines the
presence of, for example, an algorithm. Under Benson, this may have been a sufficient indicium of nonstatutory
subject matter. However, after Diehr and Alappat, the mere fact that a claimed invention involves inputting numbers,
calculating numbers, outputting numbers, and storing numbers, in and of itself, would not render it nonstatutory subject
matter, unless, of course, its operation does not produce a "useful, concrete and tangible result." Alappat, 33 F.3d at
1544,31 USPQ2d at 1557. [FN7] After all, as we have repeatedly stated,
FN6. See e.g. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 590, 98 S.Ct. 2522, 57 L.Ed.2d 451 (1978) ("[A] process is not unpatentable
simply because it contains a law of nature or a mathematical algorithm."); Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333
U.S. 127, 130,68 S.Ct. 440, 92 L.Ed. 588 (1948) ("He who discovers a hitherto unknown phenomenon of nature has no claim
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to a monopoly of it which the law recognizes. If there is to be invention from such a discovery, it must come from the
ap,plication of the law to a new and useful end."); Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86,94,59 S.Ct.
427,83 L.Ed. 506 (1939) ("While a scientific truth, or the mathematical expression of it, is not a patentable invention, a novel
and useful structure created with the aid of knowledge of scientific truth may be.").
[W]hen a claim containing a mathematical formula implements or applies that formula in a structure or process which, when
considered as a whole, is performing a function which the patent laws were designed to protect (e.g., transforming or reducing
an article to a different state or thing), then the claim satisfies the requirements of § 101.
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 192, lot S.Ct. 1048; see also In re Iwahashi, 888 F.2d 1370, 1375, 12 USPQ2d 1908, 1911 (Fed.Cir.l989);
Taner, 681 F.2d at 789,214 USPQ at 680. The dispositive inquiry is whether the claim as a whole is directed to statutory
subject matter. It is irrelevant that a claim may contain, as part of the whole, subject matter which would not be patentable by
itself. "A claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a
mathematical formula, computer program or digital computer." Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187, 101 S.Ct. 1048.
FN7. As the Supreme Court expressly stated in Diehr, its own holdings in Benson and Flook "stand for no more than these
long-established principles" that abstract ideas and natural phenomena are not patentable. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185, 101 S.Ct.
1048 (citing Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309, 100 S.Ct. 2204 and Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 130,68 S.Ct. 440.).
every step-by-step process, be it electronic or chemical or mechanical, involves an algorithm in the broad sense of the
term. Since § 101 expressly includes processes as a category of inventions which may be patented and § 100(b)
further defines the word "process" as meaning "process, art or *1375 method, and includes ~ new use of a known
process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or material," it follows that it is no ground for holding a claim
is directed to nonstatutory subject matter to say it includes or is directed to an algorithm. This is why the proscription
against patenting has been limited to mathematical algorithms....
In re Iwahashi, 888 F.2d 1370, 1374, 12 USPQ2d 1908, 1911 (Fed.Cir.1989) (emphasis in the original). [FN8]
FN8. In In re Pardo, 684 F.2d 912 (CCPA 1982), the CCPA narrowly limited "mathematical algorithm" to the execution of
formulas with given data. In the same year, in In re Meyer, 688 F.2d 789, 215 USPQ 193 (CCPA 1982), the CCPA interpreted
the same term to include any mental process that can be represented by a mathematical algorithm. This is also the position
taken by the PTO in its Examination Guidelines, 61 Fed.Reg. 7478, 7483 (1996).
[10] The question of whether a claim encompasses statutory subject matter should not focus on which of the four
categories of subject matter a claim is directed to [FN9]--process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter--but
rather on the essential characteristics of the subject matter, in particular, its practical utility. Section 101 specifies that
statutory subject matter must also satisfy the other "conditions and requirements" of Title 35, including novelty,
nonobviousness, and adequacy of disclosure and notice. See In re Warmerdam, 33 F.3d 1354, 1359,31 USPQ2d 1754,
1757-58 (Fed.Cir.1994). For purpose of our analysis, as noted above, claim 1 is directed to a machine programmed
with the Hub and Spoke software and admittedly produces a "useful, concrete, and tangible result." Alappat, 33 F.3d at
1544,31 USPQ2d at 1557. This renders it statutory subject matter, even if the useful result is expressed in numbers,
such as price, profit, percentage, cost, or loss.
FN9. Of course, the subject matter must fall into at least one category of statutory subject matter.
The Business Method Exception
[11] As an alternative ground for invalidating the '056 patent under § 101, the court relied on the judicially-created, so-
called "business method" exception to statutory subject matter. We take this opportunity to lay this ill-conceived
exception to rest. Since its inception, the "business method" exception has merely represented the application of some
general, but no longer applicable legal principle, perhaps arising out of the "requirement for invention"--which was
eliminated by § 103. Since the 1952 Patent Act, business methods have been, and should have been, subject to the
same legal requirements for patentability as applied to any other process or method. [FNlO]
FN 10. As Judge Newman has previously stated,
[The business method exception] is ... an unwarranted encumbrance to the definition of statutory subject matter in section 101,
that [should] be discarded as error-prone, redundant, and obsolete. It merits retirement from the glossary of section 101 .... All
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of the "doing business" cases could have been decided using the clearer concepts of Title 35. Patentability does not tum on
whether the claimed method does "business" instead of something else, but on whether the method, viewed as a whole, meets
the requirements of patentability as set forth in Sections 102, 103, and 112 of the Patent Act.
In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290, 298, 30 USPQ2d 1455, 1462 (Fed.Cir.l994) (Newman, J., dissenting).
The business method exception has never been invoked by this court, or the CCPA, to deem an invention unpatentable.
[FN11] Application of this particular exception has always been preceded by a ruling based on some clearer concept of
Title 35 or, more commonly, application of the abstract idea exception based on finding a mathematical algorithm.
Illustrative is the CCPA's analysis in In re Howard, 55 C.C.P.A. 1121, 394 F.2d 869, 157 USPQ 615 (CCPA 1968),
wherein the court affirmed the Board of Appeals' rejection of the claims for lack of novelty and found it unnecessary to
reach the Board's section 101 ground that a method of doing business is "inherently unpatentable." Id. at 872, 55
C.C.P.A. 1121,394 F.2d 869, 157 USPQ at 617. [FN12]
FNll. See Rinaldo Del Gallo, III, Are "Methods of Doing Business" Finally out of Business as a Statutory Rejection?, 38
IDEA 403, 435 (1998).
FN12. See also Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219, 96 S.Ct. 1393,47 L.Ed.2d 692 (1976) (the Supreme Court declined to discuss
the section 101 argument concerning the computerized financial record-keeping system, in view of the Court's holding of patent
invalidity under section 103); In re Chatfield, 545 F.2d 152, 157, 191 USPQ 730, 735 (CCPA 1976); Ex parte Murray, 9
USPQ2d 1819, 1820 (Bd.Pat.App & Interf. 1988) ("[T]he claimed accounting method [requires] no more than the entering,
sorting, debiting and totaling of expenditures as necessary preliminary steps to issuing an expense analysis statement ....")
states grounds of obviousness or lack of novelty, not of non-statutory subject matter.
*1376 Similarly, In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290, 30 USPQ2d 1455 (Fed.Cir.1994), while making reference to the
business method exception, turned on the fact that the claims implicitly recited an abstract idea in the form of a
mathematical algorithm and there was no "transformation or conversion of subject matter representative of or
constituting physical activity or objects." 22 F.3d at 294,30 USPQ2d at 1459 (emphasis omitted). [FN13]
FN13. Any historical distinctions between a method of "doing" business and the means of carrying it out blur in the complexity
of modem business systems. See Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis v. Merrill Lynch, 564 F.Supp. 1358, 218 USPQ 212
(D.DeI.1983), (holding a computerized system of cash management was held to be statutory subject matter.)
State Street argues that we acknowledged the validity of the business method exception in Alappat when we discussed
Maucorps and Meyer:
Maucorps dealt with a business methodology for deciding how salesmen should best handle respective customers and
Meyer involved a "system" for aiding a neurologist in diagnosing patients. Clearly, neither of the alleged
"inventions" in those cases falls within any § 101 category.
Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1541, 31 USPQ2d at 1555. However, closer scrutiny of these cases reveals that the claimed
inventions in both Maucorps and Meyer were rejected as abstract ideas under the mathematical algorithm exception,
not the business method exception. See In re Maucorps, 609 F.2d 481, 484, 203 USPQ 812, 816 (CCPA 1979); In re
Meyer, 688 F.2d 789, 796, 215 USPQ 193, 199 (CCPA 1982). [FNI4]
FN14. Moreover, these cases were subject to the Benson era Freeman- Walter-Abele test--in other words, analysis as it existed
before Diehr and Alappat.
Even the case frequently cited as establishing the business method exception to statutory subject matter, Hotel Security
Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co., 160 F. 467 (2d Cir.1908), did not rely on the exception to strike the patent. [FN15] In
that case, the patent was found invalid for lack of novelty and "invention," not because it was improper subject matter
for a patent. The court stated "the fundamental principle of the system is as old as the art of bookkeeping, Le., charging
the goods of the employer to the agent who takes them." Id. at 469. "If at the time of [the patent] application, there
had been no system of bookkeeping of any kind in restaurants, we. would be confronted with the question whether a
new and useful system of cash registering and account checking is such an art as is patentable under the statute." Id. at
472.
Copr. © West 2000 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
G(a) - 20
...
J
...
-
-
r
r
FOR EDUCATIONAL USE ONLY
149 F.3d 1368
(Cite as: 149 F.3d 1368, *1376)
Page 9
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
FN15. See also Loew's Drive-in Theatres v. Park-in Theatres, 174 F.2d 547, 552 (1st Cir.1949) (holding that the means for
carrying out the system of transacting business lacked "an exercise of the faculty of invention"); In re Patton, 29 C.C.P.A. 982,
127 F.2d 324,327-28 (CCPA 1942) (finding claims invalid as failing to define patentable subject matter over the references of
record.); Berardini v. Tocci, 190 F. 329, 332 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.1911); In re Wait, 22 C.C.P.A. 822, 73 F.2d 982,983 (CCPA
1934) ("[S]urely these are, and always have been, essential steps in all dealings of this nature, and even conceding, without
holding, that some methods of doing business might present patentable novelty, we think such novelty is lacking here."); In re
Howard, 55 C.C.P.A. 1121,394 F.2d 869, 157 USPQ 615, 617 (CCPA 1968) ("[W]e therefore affirm the decision ofthe Board
of Appeals on the ground that the claims do not define a novel process [so we find it] unnecessary to consider the issue of
whether a method of doing business is inherently unpatentable."). Although a clearer statement was made in In re Patton, 29
C.C.P.A. 982, 127 F.2d 324, 327, 53 USPQ 376, 379 (CCPA 1942) that a system for transacting business, separate from the
means for carrying out the system, is not patentable subject matter, the jurisprudence does not require the creation of a distinct
business class of unpatentable subject matter.
This case is no exception. The district court announced the precepts of the business method exception as set forth in
several treatises, but noted as its primary reason for finding the patent invalid under the business method exception as
follows:
If Signature's invention were patentable, any financial institution desirous of implementing a multi-tiered funding
complex modelled (sic) on a Hub and Spoke configuration would be required to seek Signature's permission before
embarking on *1377 such a project. This is so because the '056 Patent is claimed [sic] sufficiently broadly to
foreclose virtually any computer- implemented accounting method necessary to manage this type of financial
structure.
927 F.Supp. 502, 516, 38 USPQ2d 1530, 1542 (emphasis added). Whether the patent's claims are too broad to be
patentable is not to be judged under § 101, but rather under §§ 102, 103 and 112. Assuming the above statement to be
correct, it has nothing to do with whether what is claimed is statutory subject matter.
In view of this background, it comes as no surprise that in the most recent edition of the Manual of Patent Examining
Procedures (MPEP) (1996), a paragraph of § 706.03(a) was deleted. In past editions it read:
Though seemingly within the category of process or method, a method of doing business can be rejected as not being
within the statutory classes. See Hotel Security Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co., 160 F. 467 (2nd Cir.1908) and In re
Wait, 24 USPQ 88, 22 C.C.P.A. 822,73 F.2d 982 (1934).
MPEP § 706.03(a) (1994). This acknowledgment is buttressed ·by the U.S. Patent and Trademark 1996 Examination
Guidelines for Computer Related Inventions which now read:
Office personnel have had difficulty in properly treating claims directed to methods of doing business. Claims should
not be categorized as methods of doing business. Instead such claims should be treated like any other process claims.
Examination Guidelines, 61 Fed.Reg. 7478, 7479 (1996). We agree that this is precisely the manner in which this type
of claim should be treated. Whether the claims are directed to subject matter within § 101 should not turn on whether
the claimed subject matter does "business" instead of something else.
CONCLUSION
The appealed decision is reversed and the case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
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Reversed and remanded.
Holder of patent relating to method of indicating telephone call recipient's primary interexchange carrier (PIC) as data
field in standard message record brought infringement action against competitor. The United States District Court for
the District of Delaware, Sue L. Robinson, J., 1998 WL 175878, granted summary judgment for competitor, and patent
holder appealed. The Court of Appeals, Plager, Circuit Judge, held that patent's method claims were within scope of
patentable subject matter.
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[1] PATENTS ~314(5)
29Ik314(5)
Whether asserted patent claims are invalid for failure to claim statutory subject matter is a question of law which Court
of Appeals reviews without deference. 35 U.S.C.A. § 101.
[2] FEDERAL COURTS ~754.1
170Bk754.1
In matters of statutory interpretation, it is appellate court's responsibility independently to determine what the law is.
[3] PATENTS ~7.14
291k7.14
Patent claim reciting method of indicating telephone call recipient's primary interexchange carrier (PIC) as data field in
standard message record was "process" claim, under patent statute's definition of patentable subject matter. 35
U.S.C.A. § 101.
See publication Words and Phrases for other judicial constructions and definitions.
[4] PATENTS~6
291k6
A mathematical formula alone, sometimes referred to as a mathematical algorithm, viewed in the abstract, is considered
unpatentable subject matter. 35 U.S.C.A. § 101.
[5] PATENTS~6
291k6
Because patent statute includes processes as a category of patentable subject matter, the judicially-defined proscription
against patenting of a mathematical algorithm, to the extent such a proscription exists, is narrowly limited to
mathematical algorithms in the abstract. 35 U.S.C.A. § 101.
[6] PATENTS~5
291k5
Whether stated implicitly or explicitly, scope of patent statute's definition of patentable subject matter is the same
regardless ofthe form, machine, or process in which a particular claim is drafted. 35 U.S.C.A. § 101.
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[7] PATENTS ~7.14
291k7.14
Patent claiming process for indicating telephone call recipient's primary interexchange carrier (PIC) as data field in
standard message record, which employed subscribers' and call recipients' PICs as data, applied Boolean algebra to
those data to determine value of PIC indicator, and applied that value through switching and recording mechanisms to
create signal useful for billing purposes, was within scope of patentable subject matter, as process applied Boolean
principle to produce useful, concrete, tangible result without preempting other uses of the mathematical principle. 35
U.S.C.A. § 101.
[8] PATENTS~6
291k6
Patent claims containing mathematical algorithms need not involve physical transformation or conversion of subject
matter from one state into another to be deemed patentable subject matter. 35 U.S.C.A. § 101.
PATENTS ~328(2)
291k328(2)
5,333,184. Cited.
*1353 Constantine L. Trela, Jr., Sidley & Austin, of Chicago, Illinois, argued for plaintiff-appellant. With him on the
brief was Joseph S. Miller. Of counsel on the brief were Albert E. Fey, Thomas L. Secrest, and Steven C. Cherney, Fish
& Neave, of New York, New York; and Laura A. Kaster and Christopher P. Godziela, AT&T Corp., of Liberty
Corner, New Jersey.
Donald R. Dunner, Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, L.L.P., of Washington, DC, argued for
defendants-appellees. With him on the brief were J. Michael Jakes and Howard A. Kwon. Of counsel on the brief were
Mike McKool, Jr., Eric W. Buether, and Monte M. Bond, McKool Smith, P.C., of Dallas, Texas.
Before PLAGER, CLEVENGER, and RADER, Circuit Judges.
PLAGER, Circuit Judge.
This case asks us once again to examine the scope of section 1 of the Patent Act, 35 U.S.c. § 101 (1994). The United
States District Court for the District of Delaware granted summary judgment to Excel Communications, Inc., Excel
Communications Marketing, Inc., and Excel Telecommunications, Inc. (collectively "Excel"), holding U.S. Patent No.
5,333,184 (the '184 patent) invalid under § 101 for failure to claim statutory subject matter. See AT&T Corp. v. Excel
Communications, Inc., No. CIV.A.96-434-SLR, 1998 WL 175878, at *7 (D.Del. Mar. 27, 1998). AT&T Corp.
("AT&T"), owner of the '184 patent, appeals. Because we find that the claimed subject matter is properly within the
statutory scope of § 101, we reverse the district court's judgment of invalidity on this ground and remand the case for
further proceedings.
BACKGROUND
A.
The '184 patent, entitled "Call Message Recording for Telephone Systems," issued on July 26, 1994. It describes a
message record for long-distance telephone calls that is enhanced by adding a primary interexchange carrier ("PIC")
indicator. The addition of the indicator aids long-distance carriers in providing differential billing treatment for
subscribers, depending upon whether a subscriber calls someone with the same or a different long-distance carrier.
The invention claimed in the '184 patent is designed to operate in a telecommunications system with multiple long-
distance service providers. The system contains local exchange carriers ("LECs") and long-distance service
(interexchange) carriers ("IXCs"). The LECs provide local telephone service and access to IXCs. Each customer has
an LEC for local service and selects an IXC, such as AT & T or Excel, to be its primary long-distance service
(interexchange) carrier or PIC. IXCs may own their own facilities, as does AT&T. Others, like Excel, called "resellers"
or "resale carriers," contract with facility-owners to route their subscribers' calls through the facility- owners' switches
and transmission lines. Some IXCs, including MCI and U.S. Sprint, have a mix of their own lines and leased lines.
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*1354 The system thus involves a three-step process when a caller makes a direct-dialed (l+) long-distance telephone
call: (1) after the call is transmitted over the LEC's network to a switch, and the LEC identifies the caller's PIC, the
LEC automatically routes the call to the facilities used by the caller's PIC; (2) the PIC's facilities carry the call to the
LEC serving the call recipient; and (3) the call recipient's LEC delivers the call over its local network to the recipient's
telephone.
When a caller makes a direct-dialed long-distance telephone call, a switch (which may be a switch in the
interexchange network) monitors and records data related to the call, generating an "automatic message account"
("AMA") message record. This contemporaneous message record contains fields of information such as the originating
and terminating telephone numbers, and the length of time of the call. These message records are then transmitted from
the switch to a message accumulation system for processing and billing.
Because the message records are stored in electronic format, they can be transmitted from one computer system to
another and reformatted to ease processing of the information. Thus the carrier's AMA message subsequently is
translated into the industry-standard "exchange message interface," forwarded to a rating system, and ultimately
forwarded to a billing system in which the data resides until processed to generate, typically, "hard copy" bills which
are mailed to subscribers.
B.
The invention of the '184 patent calls for the addition of a data field into a standard message record to indicate whether
a call involves a particular PIC (the "PIC indicator"). This PIC indicator can exist in several forms, such as a code
which identifies the call recipient's PIC, a flag which shows that the recipient's PIC is or is not a particular IXC, or a
flag that identifies the recipient's and the caller's PICs as the same IXC. The PIC indicator therefore enables IXCs to
provide differential billing for calls on the basis of the identified PIC.
The application that issued as the '184 patent was filed in 1992. The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office ("PTa")
initially rejected, for reasons unrelated to § 101, all forty-one of the originally filed claims. Following amendment, the
claims were issued in 1994 in their present form. The '184 patent contains six independent claims, five method claims
and one apparatus claim, and additional dependent claims. The PTa granted the '184 patent without questioning
whether the claims were directed to statutory subject matter under § 101.
AT&T in 1996 asserted ten of the method claims against Excel in this infringement suit. The independent claims at
issue (claims 1, 12, 18, and 40) include the step of "generating a message record for an interexchange call between an
originating subscriber and a terminating subscriber," and the step of adding a PIC indicator to the message record.
Independent claim 1, for example, adds a PIC indicator whose value depends upon the call recipient's PIC:
A method for use in a telecommunications system in which interexchange calls initiated by each subscriber are
automatically routed over the facilities of a particular one of a plurality of interexchange carriers associated with that
subscriber, said method comprising the steps of:
generating a message record for an interexchange call between an originating subscriber and a terminating subscriber,
and .
including, in said message record, a primary interexchange carrier (PIC) indicator having a value which is a function
of whether or not the interexchange carrier associated with said terminating subscriber is a predetermined one of said
interexchange carriers. .
(Emphasis added.) Independent claims 12 and 40 add a PIC indicator that shows if a *1355 recipient's PIC is the same
as the IXC over which that particular call is being made. Independent claim 18 adds a PIC indicator designed to show
if the caller and the recipient subscribe to the same IXC. The dependent claims at issue add the steps of accessing an
IXC's subscriber database (claims 4, 13, and 19) and billing individual calls as a function of the value of the PIC
indicator (claims 6, 15, and 21).
The district court concluded that the method claims of the '184 patent implicitly recite a mathematical algorithm. See
AT&T, 1998 WL 175878, at * 6. The court was of the view that the only physical step in the claims involves data-
gathering for the algorithm. See id. Though the court recognized that the claims require the use of switches and
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computers, it nevertheless concluded that use of such facilities to perform a non-substantive change in the data's format
could not serve to convert non-patentable subject matter into patentable subject matter. See id. at *6-7. Thus the trial
court, on summary judgment, held all of the method claims at issue invalid for failure to qualify as statutory subject
matter. See id. at *7.
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Summary judgment is appropriate if there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). We review without deference a trial court's grant of summary
judgment, with all justifiable factual inferences drawn in favor of the party opposing the motion. See Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255,106 S.Ct. 2505·,91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
[1][2] The issue on appeal, whether the asserted claims of the '184 patent are invalid for failure to claim statutory
subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101, is a question of law which we review without deference. See Arrhythmia
Research Technology v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 1055-56, 22 USPQ2d 1033, 1035 (Fed.Cir.1992). In
matters of statutory interpretation, it is this court's responsibility independently to determine what the law is. See
Hodges v. Secretary of the Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 9 F.3d 958, 960 (Fed.Cir.1993).
B.
Our analysis of whether a claim is directed to statutory subject matter begins with the language of 35 U.S.C. § 101,
which reads:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any
new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this
title.
The Supreme Court has construed § 101 broadly, noting that Congress intended statutory subject matter to "include
anything under the sun that is made by man." See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309, 100 S.Ct. 2204, 65
L.Ed.2d 144 (1980) (quoting S.Rep. No. 82-1979, at 5 (1952); H.R.Rep. No. 82-1923, at 6 (1952»; see also Diamond
v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182, 101 S.Ct. 1048,67 L.Ed.2d 155 (1981). Despite this seemingly limitless expanse, the
Court has specifically identified three categories of unpatentable subject matter: "laws of nature, natural phenomena,
and abstract ideas." See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185, 101 S.Ct. 1048.
[3] In this case, the method claims at issue fall within the "process" [FNl] category of the four enumerated categories
of patentable subject matter in § 101. The district court held that the claims at issue, though otherwise within the terms
of § 101, implicitly recite a mathematical algorithm, see AT&T, 1998 WL 175878, at *6, and thus fall within the
judicially created *1356 "mathematical algorithm" exception to statutory subject matter.
FNI. "Process" is defined in 35 U.S.C. § lOO(b) to encompass: "[a] process, art or method, and includes a new use of a known
process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or material."
[4] A mathematical formula alone, sometimes referred to as a mathematical algorithm, viewed in the abstract, is
considered unpatentable subject matter. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 101 S.Ct. 1048,67 L.Ed.2d 155 (1981);
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 98 S.Ct. 2522, 57 L.Ed.2d 451 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 93 S.Ct.
253, 34 L.Ed.2d 273 (1972). Courts have used the terms "mathematical algorithm," "mathematical formula," and
"mathematical equation," to describe types of nonstatutory mathematical subject matter without explaining whether the
terms are interchangeable or different. Even assuming the words connote the same concept, there is considerable
question as to exactly what the concept encompasses. See, e.g., Diehr, 450 U.S. at 186 n. 9, 101 S.Ct. 1048 ("The term
'algorithm' is subject to a variety of definitions .. , [Petitioner's] definition is significantly broader than the definition this
Court employed in Benson and Flook."); accord In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290, 293 n. 5, 30 USPQ2d 1455, 1457 n. 5
(Fed.Cir.1994).
[5] This court recently pointed out that any step-by-step process, be it electronic, chemical, or mechanical, involves an
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"algorithm" in the broad sense of the term. See State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d
1368, 1374-75,47 USPQ2d 1596, 1602 (Fed.Cir.1998), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 119 S.Ct. 851, 142 L.Ed.2d 704
(1999). Because § 101 includes processes as a category of patentable subject matter, the judicially-defined
proscription against patenting of a "mathematical algorithm," to the extent such a proscription still exists, is narrowly
limited to mathematical algorithms in the abstract. See id.; see also Benson, 409 U.S. at 65,93 S.Ct. 253 (describing a
mathematical algorithm as a "procedure for solving a given type of mathematical problem").
Since the process of manipulation of numbers is a fundamental part of computer technology, we have had to reexamine
the rules that govern the patentability of such technology. The sea-changes in both law and technology stand as a
testament to the ability of law to adapt to new and innovative concepts, while remaining true to basic principles. In an
earlier era, the PTO published guidelines essentially rejecting the notion that computer programs were patentable.
[FN2] As the technology progressed, our predecessor court disagreed, and, overturning some of the earlier limiting
principles regarding § 101, announced more expansive principles formulated with computer technology in mind. [FN3]
In our recent decision in State Street, this court discarded the so-called "business method" exception and reassessed the
"mathematical algorithm" exception, see 149 F.3d at 1373-77, 47 USPQ2d at 1600-04, both judicially-created
"exceptions" to the statutory categories of § 101. As this brief review suggests, this court (and its predecessor) has
struggled to make our understanding of the scope of § 101 responsive to the needs of the modem world.
FN2. See, e.g., 33 Fed.Reg. 15581, 15609-10 (1968).
FN3. See In re Tarczy-Hornoch, 55 C.C.P.A. 1441,397 F.2d 856, 158 USPQ 141 (CCPA 1968) (overruling the "function of a
machine" doctrine); see also In re Bernhart, 57 C.C.P.A. 737, 417 F.2d 1395, 163 USPQ 611 (CCPA 1969) (discussing
patentability of a programmed computer); In re Musgrave, 57 C.C.P.A. 1352,431 F.2d 882, 167 USPQ 280 (CCPA 1970)
(analyzing process claims encompassing computer programs). For a more detailed review of this history, with extensive
citation to the secondary literature, see Justice Stevens's dissent in Diehr, 450 U.S. at 193, 101 S.Ct. 1048.
The Supreme Court has supported and enhanced this effort. In Diehr, the Court expressly limited its two earlier
decisions in Flook and Benson by emphasizing that these cases did no more than confirm the "long-established
principle" that laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are excluded from patent protection. 450 U.S. at
185, 101 S.Ct. 1048. The Diehr *1357 Court explicitly distinguished Diehr's process by pointing out that "the
respondents here do not seek to patent a mathematical formula. Instead, they seek patent protection for a process of
curing synthetic rubber." Id. at 187, 101 S.Ct. 1048. The Court then explained that although the process used a well-
known mathematical equation, the applicants did not "pre-empt the use of that equation." Id. Thus, even though a
mathematical algorithm is not patentable in isolation, a process that applies an equation to a new and useful end "is at
the very least not barred at the threshold by § 101." Id. at 188, 101 S.Ct. 1048. In this regard, it is particularly worthy
of note that the argument for the opposite result, that "the term 'algorithm' ... is synonymous with the term 'computer
program,' " id. at 219, 101 S.Ct. 1048 (Stevens, J., dissenting), and thus computer- based programs as a general
proposition should not be patentable, was made forcefully in dissent by Justice Stevens; his view, however, was
rejected by the Diehr majority.
As previously noted, we most recently addressed the "mathematical algorithm" exception in State Street. See 149 F.3d
at 1373-75, 47 USPQ2d at 1600- 02. In State Street, this court, following the Supreme Court's guidance in Diehr,
concluded that "[u]npatentable mathematical algorithms are identifiable by showing they are merely abstract ideas
constituting disembodied concepts or truths that are not 'useful.' ... [T]o be patentable an algorithm must be applied in
a 'useful' way." Id. at 1373,47 USPQ2d at 1601. In that case, the claimed data processing system for implementing a
financial management structure satisfied the § 101 inquiry because it constituted a "practical application of a
mathematical algorithm, ... [by] produc[ing] 'a useful, concrete and tangible result.''' Id. at 1373,47 USPQ2d at 1601.
The State Street formulation, that a mathematical algorithm may be an integral part of patentable subject matter such
as a machine or process if the claimed invention as a whole is applied in a "useful" manner, follows the approach taken
by this court en banc in In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 31 USPQ2d 1545 (Fed.Cir.1994). In Alappat, we set out our
understanding of the Supreme Court's limitations on the patentability of mathematical subject matter and concluded
that:
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[The Court] never intended to create an overly broad, fourth category of [mathematical] subject matter excluded from
§ 101. Rather, at the core of the Court's analysis ... lies an attempt by the Court to explain a rather straightforward
concept, namely, that certain types of mathematical subject matter, standing alone, represent nothing more than
abstract ideas until reduced to some type of practical application, and thus that subject matter is not, in and of itself,
entitled to patent protection.
Id. at 1543, 31 USPQ2d at 1556-57 (emphasis added). Thus, the Alappat inquiry simply requires an examination of
the contested claims to see if the claimed subject matter as a whole is a disembodied mathematical concept representing
nothing more than a "law of nature" or an "abstract idea," or if the mathematical concept has been reduced to some
practical application rendering it "usefuL" Id. at 1544, 31 USPQ2d at 1557. In Alappat, we held that more than an
abstract idea was claimed because the claimed invention as a whole was directed toward forming a specific machine
that produced the useful, concrete, and tangible result of a smooth waveform display. See id. at 1544,31 USPQ2d at
1557.
[6] In both Alappat and State Street, the claim was for a machine that achieved certain results. In the case before us,
because Excel does not own or operate the facilities over which its calls are placed, AT&T did not charge Excel with
infringement of its apparatus claims, but limited its infringement charge to the specified method or process claims.
Whether stated implicitly or explicitly, we consider the scope of § 101 to be the same regardless of the form--machine
or process--in which a particular claim is drafted. See, e.g., In *1358 re Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1581, 31 USPQ2d at 1589
(Rader, J., concurring) ("Judge Rich, with whom I fully concur, reads Alappat's application as claiming a machine. In
fact, whether the invention is a process or a machine is irrelevant. The language of the Patent Act itself, as well as
Supreme Court rulings, clarifies that Alappat's invention fits comfortably within 35 U.S.C. § 101 whether viewed as a
process or a machine."); State Street, 149 F.3d at 1372,47 USPQ2d at 1600 ("[F]or the purposes of a § 101 analysis, it
is of little relevance whether claim 1 is directed to a 'machine' or a 'process,'...."). Furthermore, the Supreme Court's
decisions in Diehr, Benson, and Flook, all of which involved method (i.e., process) claims, have provided and
supported the principles which we apply to both machine--and process-type claims. Thus, we are comfortable in
applying our reasoning in Alappat and State Street to the method claims at issue in this case.
C.
[7] In light of this review of the current understanding of the "mathematical algorithm" exception, we turn now to the
arguments of the parties in support of and in opposition to the trial court's judgment. We note that, at the time the trial
court made its decision, that court did not have the benefit of this court's explication in State Street of the mathematical
algorithm issue.
As previously explained, AT&Ts claimed process employs subscribers' and call recipients' PICs as data, applies
Boolean algebra to those data to determine the value of the PIC indicator, and applies that value through switching and
recording mechanisms to create a signal useful for billing purposes. In State Street, we held that the processing system
there was patentable subject matter because the system takes data representing discrete dollar amounts through a series
of mathematical calculations to determine a final share price--a useful, concrete, and tangible result. See 149 F.3d at
1373,47 USPQ2d at 1601.
In this case, Excel argues, correctly, that the PIC indicator value is derived using a simple mathematical principle (p
and q). But that is not determinative because AT&T does not claim the Boolean principle as such or attempt to
forestall its use in any other application. It is clear from the written description of the '184 patent that AT&T is only
claiming a process that uses the Boolean principle in order to determine the value of the PIC indicator. The PIC
indicator represents information about the call recipient's PIC, a useful, non-abstract result that facilitates differential
billing of long- distance calls made by an IXC's subscriber. Because the claimed process applies the Boolean principle
to produce a useful, concrete, tangible result without pre-empting other uses of the mathematical principle, on its face
the claimed process comfortably falls within the scope of § 101. See Arrhythmia Research Technology, Inc. v.
Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 1060,22 USPQ2d 1033, 1039 (Fed.Cir.1992) ("That the product is numerical is not a
criterion of whether the claim is directed to statutory subject matter.").
[8] Excel argues that method claims containing mathematical algorithms are patentable subject matter only if there is a
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"physical transformation" or conversion of subject matter from one state into another. The physical transformation
language appears in Diehr, see 450 U.S. at 184, 101 S.Ct. 1048 ("That respondents' claims involve the transformation
of an article, in this case raw, uncured synthetic rubber, into a different state or thing cannot be disputed."), and has
been echoed by this court in Schrader, 22 F.3d at 294,30 USPQ2d at 1458 ("Therefore, we do not find in the claim any
kind of data transformation.").
The notion of "physical transformation" can be misunderstood. In the first place, it is not an invariable requirement,
but merely one example of how a mathematical algorithm may bring about a useful application. As the Supreme Court
itself noted, "*1359 when [a claimed invention] is performing a function which the patent laws were designed to protect
(e.g., transforming or reducing an article to a different state or thing), then the claim satisfies the requirements of §
101." Diehr, 450 U.S. at 192, 101 S.Ct. 1048 (emphasis added). The "e.g." signal denotes an example, not an
exclusive requirement.
This understanding of transformation is consistent with our earlier decision in Arrhythmia, 958 F.2d 1053, 22 USPQ2d
1033 (Fed.Cir.1992). Arrhythmia's process claims included various mathematical formulae to analyze
electrocardiograph signals to determine a specified heart activity. See id. at 1059, 22 USPQ2d at 1037-38. The
Arrhythmia court reasoned that the method claims qualified as statutory subject matter by noting that the steps
transformed physical, electrical signals from one form into another form--a number representing a signal related to the
patient's heart activity, a non- abstract output. See id., 958 F.2d at 1059, 22 USPQ2d at 1038~ The finding that the
claimed process "transformed" data from one "form" to another simply confirmed that Arrhythmia's method claims
satisfied § 101 because the mathematical algorithm included within the process was applied to produce a number which
had specific meaning--a useful, concrete, tangible result--not a mathematical abstraction. See id. at 1060, 22 USPQ2d
at 1039.
Excel also contends that because the process claims at issue lack physical limitations set forth in the patent, the claims
are not patentable subject matter. This argument reflects a misunderstanding of our case law. The cases cited by Excel
for this proposition involved machine claims written in means- plus-function language. See, e.g., State Street, 149 F.3d
at 1371,47 USPQ2d at 1599; Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1541, 31 USPQ2d at 1554-55. Apparatus claims written in this
manner require supporting structure in the written description that corresponds to the claimed "means" elements. See
35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 6 (1994). Since the claims at issue in this case are directed to a process in the first instance, a
structural inquiry is unnecessary.
The argument that physical limitations are necessary may also stem from the second part of the Freeman-Walter-Abele
test, [FN4] an earlier test which has been used to identify claims thought to involve unpatentable mathematical
algorithms. That second part was said to inquire "whether the claim is directed to a mathematical algorithm that is not
applied to or limited by physical elements." Arrhythmia, 958 F.2d at 1058, 22 USPQ2d at 1037. Although our en banc
Alappat decision called this test "not an improper analysis," we then pointed out that "the ultimate issue always has
been whether the claim as a whole is drawn to statutory subject matter." 33 F.3d at 1543 n. 21, 31 USPQ2d at 1557 n.
21. Furthermore, our recent State Street decision questioned the continuing viability of the Freeman-Walter- Abele test,
noting that, "[a]fter Diehr and Chakrabarty, the Freeman-Walter-Abele test has little, if any, applicability to
determining the presence of statutory subject matter." 149 F.3d at 1374,47 USPQ2d at 1601. Whatever may be left of
the earlier test, if anything, this type of physical limitations analysis seems of little value because "after Diehr and
Alappat, the mere fact that a claimed invention involves inputting numbers, calculating numbers, outputting numbers,
and storing numbers, in and of itself, would not render it nonstatutory subject matter, unless, of course, its operation
does not produce a 'useful, concrete and tangible result.''' Id. at 1374,47 USPQ2d at 1602 (quoting Alappat, 33 F.3d
at 1544, 31 USPQ2d at 1557).
FN4. See In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237, 197 USPQ 464 (CCPA 1978), as modified by In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758, 205 USPQ
397(CCPA 1980), and In re Abele, 648 F.2d 902, 214 USPQ 682 (CCPA 1982).
Because we focus on the inquiry deemed "the ultimate issue" by Alappat, rather than on the physical limitations
inquiry of *1360 the Freeman-Walter-Abele test, we find the cases cited by Excel in support of its position to be
inapposite. For example, in In re Grams, the court applied the Freeman-Walter-Abele test and concluded that the only
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physical step in the claimed process involved data-gathering for the algorithm; thus, the claims were held to be
directed to unpatentable subject matter. See 888 F.2d 835,839, 12 USPQ2d 1824, 1829 (Fed.Cir.1989). In contrast,
our inquiry here focuses on whether the mathematical algorithm is applied in a practical manner to produce a useful
result. In re Grams is unhelpful because the panel in that case did not ascertain if the end result of the claimed process
was useful, concrete, and tangible.
Similarly, the court in In re Schrader relied upon the Freeman- Walter-Abele test for its analysis of the method claim
involved. The court found neither a physical transformation nor any physical step in the claimed process aside from the
entering of data into a record. See 22 F.3d at 294,30 USPQ2d at 1458. The Schrader court likened the data-recording
step to that of data-gathering and held that the claim was properly rejected as failing to define patentable subject matter.
See id. at 294, 296, 30 USPQ2d at 1458-59. The focus of the court in Schrader was not on whether the mathematical
algorithm was applied in a practical manner since it ended its inquiry before looking to see if a useful, concrete,
tangible result ensued. Thus, in light of our recent understanding of the issue, the Schrader court's analysis is as
unhelpful as that of In re Grams.
Finally, the decision in In re Warmerdam, 33 F.3d 1354, 31 USPQ2d 1754 (Fed.Cir.1994) is not to the contrary.
There the court recognized the difficulty in knowing exactly what a mathematical algorithm is, "which makes rather
dicey the determination of whether the claim as a whole is no more than that." Id. at 1359, 31 USPQ2d at 1758.
Warmerdam's claims 1-4 encompassed a method for controlling the motion of objects and machines to avoid collision
with other moving or fixed objects by generating bubble hierarchies through the use of a particular mathematical
procedure. See id. at 1356,31 USPQ2d at 1755-56. The court found that the claimed process did nothing more than
manipulate basic mathematical constructs and concluded that "taking several abstract ideas and manipulating them
together adds nothing to the basic equation"; hence, the court held that the claims were properly rejected under § 101.
Id. at 1360, 31 USPQ2d at 1759. Whether one agrees with the court's conclusion on the facts, the holding of the case is
a straightforward application of the basic principle that mere laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are
not within the categories of inventions or discoveries that may be patented under § 101.
D.
In his dissent in Diehr, Justice Stevens noted two concerns regarding the § 101 issue, and to which, in his view, federal
judges have a duty to respond:
First, the cases considering the patentability of program-related inventions do not establish rules that enable a
conscientious patent lawyer to determine with afair degree of accuracy which, if any, program-related inventions will
be patentable. Second, the inclusion of the ambiguous concept of an "algorithm" within the "law of nature" category
of unpatentable subject matter has given rise to the concern that almost any process might be so described and
therefore held unpatentable.
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 219, 101 S.Ct. 1048 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Despite the almost twenty years since Justice Stevens wrote, these concerns remain important. His solution was to
declare all computer-based programming unpatentable. That has not been the course the law has taken. Rather, it is
now clear that computer-based programming constitutes patentable subject matter so long as the basic requirements of
§ 101 are met. Justice Stevens's concerns can be addressed within that framework.
*1361 His first concern, that the rules are not sufficiently clear to enable reasonable prediction of outcomes, should be
less of a concern today in light of the refocusing of the § 101 issue that Alappat and State Street have provided. His
second concern, that the ambiguous concept of "algorithm" could be used to make any process unpatentable, can be
laid to rest once the focus is understood to be not on whether there is a mathematical algorithm at work, but on whether
the algorithm-containing invention, as a whole, produces a tangible, useful, result.
In light of the above, and consistent with the clearer understanding that our more recent cases have provided, we
conclude that the district court did not apply the proper analysis to the method claims at issue. Furthermore, had the
court applied the proper analysis to the stated claims, the court would have concluded that all the claims asserted fall
comfortably within the broad scope of patentable subject matter under § 101. Accordingly, we hold as a matter of law
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that Excel was not entitled to the grant of summary judgment of invalidity of the '184 patent under § 101.
Since the case must be returned to the trial court for further proceedings, and to avoid any possible misunderstandings
as to the scope of our decision, we note that the ultimate validity of these claims depends upon their satisfying the other
requirements for patentability such as those set forth in 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103, and 112. Thus, on remand, those
questions, as well as any others the parties may properly raise, remain for disposition.
CONCLUSION
The district court's summary judgment of invalidity is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED & REMANDED.
END OF DOCUMENT
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I. Introduction.
Until lately, litigation over business method patents has been virtually unknown. Inventors
have been reluctant to seek -- and the Patent & Trademark Office has been reluctant to grant --
patents for methods of doing business. That reluctance has been due in part to the vaguely held
"business method" exception to what kinds of inventions constitute patentable subject matter under
Section 101 of the Patent Act. In addition, prior to the recent advent ofthe Internet and e-commerce,
"novel" and "non-obvious" business methods were somewhat hard to come by.
Two circumstances over the last several years, however, have conspired to change all of that.
First, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which has jurisdiction over all
patent appeals, formally laid to rest the "ill-conceived" business method exception in its 1998
decision in State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc. I Second, the Internet
Age for business arrived, and scores ofnovel business methods began springing up all over the place.
As a result, Internet entrepreneurs began filing business method patent applications at a prodigious
rate, and the Patent and Trademark Office began granting patents based on those applications. Now,
it is quite clear to all concerned that novel business methods, and particularly novel Internet business
methods, are "inventions" for which patent protection should be sought and vigorously enforced.
As the State Street court noted in its opinion, patentable subject matter under section 101 extends
to "'anything under the sun that is made by man.",2
1149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 851 (1999).
2Id. at 1373 (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309, 65 L. Ed. 2d 144, 100 S.
Ct. 2204 (1980».
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Because business over the Internet began to take off in the mid- to late-1990's, that is when ...J
many Internet businesses - such as Amazon.com and Priceline.com - began filing patents
applications on their new ways to do business over the Internet. With the several-year examination
period that is typical for all patent applications, those early Internet patent applications have only
recently begun to issue. Combined with the fact that patent applications are kept confidential by the
Patent and Trademark Office during the examination period, that fact has resulted in several
companies doing business on the Internet suddenly being hit with infringement actions during the
past year. For instance, Bamesandnoble.com has been sued by its online bookseller rival J
Amazon.com for infringement of Amazon's patent on "one-click ordering" over the Internet.
Likewise, Microsoft has been made the target of an infringement action by Priceline.com, which
claims that Microsoft's Expedia travel site infringes Priceline's "reverse auction" patent. Finally,
in what may the most interesting situation of them all, online advertiser L90, Inc., was served with
i
J
a potentiallydevastating patent infringement lawsuit by its competitor, DoubleClick, Inc.,just before
it was planning to go public. In short, the beginnings of what may turn out to be a flood of litigation J
between Internet competitors has now begun.
j
© William L. Montague, Jr., 2000
G(b) - 2
r
Priceline.com, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., et ale
U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut (New Haven)
Filed October 13, 1999
Case No. 99-CV-1991
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A. PARTIES.
Plaintiff: Priceline.com Inc.
r Defendants: Microsoft Corp.Expedia, Inc.
r, B. ATTORNEYS.
Patent No.: 5,794,207
Application Date: September 4, 1996
Issue date: August 11, 1998
Abstract:
The present invention is a method and apparatus for effectuating bilateral buyer-
driven commerce. The present invention allows prospective buyers of goods and
services to communicate a binding purchase offer globally to potential sellers, for
sellers conveniently to search for relevant buyer purchase offers, and for sellers
potentially to bind a buyer to a contract based on the buyer's purchase offer. In a
preferred embodiment, the apparatus of the present invention includes a controller
which receives binding purchase offers from prospective buyers. The controller
makes purchase offers available globally to potential sellers. Potential sellers then
have the option to accept a purchase offer and thus bind the corresponding buyer to
a contract. The method and apparatus of the present invention have applications on
Pennie & Edmonds
Day, Berry & Howard
Cummings & Lockwood
Cravath, Swaine & Moore
Plaintiff:
Defendants:
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the Internet as well as conventional communications systems such as voice
telephony.
Claims:
1. A method for using a computer to facilitate a transaction between a buyer and at
least one of sellers, comprising:
inputting into the computer a conditional purchase offer which includes an offer
price;
inputting into the computer a payment identifier specifying a credit card account, the
payment identifier being associated with the conditional purchase offer;
outputting the conditional purchase offer to the plurality of sellers after receiving the
payment identifier;
inputting into the computer an acceptance from a seller, the acceptance being
responsive to the conditional purchase offer; and
providing a payment to the seller by using the payment identifier.
2. The method of claim 1, in which the step of inputting into the computer an
acceptance comprises:
inputting into the computer an acceptance from each member of a set of sellers, the
set of sellers comprising at least one seller, each acceptance being responsive to the
conditional purchase offer;
and further comprising:
selecting one received acceptance, thereby determining a selected seller of the set of
sellers;
and in which the step of providing a payment comprises:
providing a payment to the selected seller by using the payment identifier.
3. The method of claim 2, in which the step of selecting one received acceptance
comprises:
determining a first received acceptance, thereby determining a first seller of the set
of sellers;
and in which the step of providing a payment comprises:
providing a payment to the first seller by using the payment identifier.
4. The method of claim 1, further comprising:
determining if a predetermined amount is available in the credit card account.
5. The method of claim 1, in which the step of providing a payment comprises:
transferring payment from the buyer to the selected seller.
6. The method of claim 1, in which the step of providing a payment comprises:
transmitting the payment identifier to the selected seller.
© William L. Montague, Jr., 2000
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7. The method of claim 1, further comprising:
outputting to the buyer a request for an authorization to use the payment identifier
to provide payment it an acceptance is received; and
inputting into the computer the authorization from the buyer in response to the
request.
8. The method of claim 1, in which the step of inputting into the computer an
acceptance comprises:
inputting into the computer an acceptance from each of a set of sellers.
9. The method of claim 1 in which the conditional purchase offer includes an
expiration date and is non-revocable prior to the expiration date.
10. The method of claim 1, further comprising:
determining an active period during which the conditional purchase offer is active;
and in which the step of inputting into the computer an acceptance is performed
during the active period.
11. The method of claim 1, further comprising:
inputting into the computer a revocation of the conditional purchase offer after the
step of receiving an acceptance; and in which the step of providing a payment
comprises:
providing a payment of a predetermined amount to the seller.
12. An apparatus for facilitating a transaction between a buyer and at least one of a
plurality of sellers, comprising:
a storage device; and
a processor connected to the storage device,
the storage device storing
a program for controlling the processor; and
the processor operative with the program to receive a conditional purchase offer
which includes an offer price;
receive a payment identifier specifying a credit card account, the payment identifier
being associated with the conditional purchase offer;
make the conditional purchase offer available to the plurality ofsellers after receiving
the payment identifier;
receive an acceptance from a seller, the acceptance being responsive to the
conditional purchase offer; and
provide payment to the seller by using the payment identifier.
13. The apparatus of claim 12, in which the processor is further operative with the
program to:
receive an acceptance from each member of a set of sellers, the set of sellers
© William L. Montague, Jr., 2000
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comprising at least one seller, each acceptance being responsive to the conditional
purchase offer;
select one received acceptance, thereby determining a selected seller of the set of
sellers; and
provide a payment to the selected seller by using the payment identifier.
14. The apparatus of claim 13, in which the processor is further operative with the
program to:
determine a first acceptance received, thereby determining a first seller of the set of
sellers; and
provide a payment to the first seller by using the payment identifier.
15. The apparatus of claim 12, in which the processor is further operative with the
program to:
determine if a predetermined amount is available in the credit card account.
16. The apparatus of claim 21, in which the processor is further operative with the
program to:
transfer payment from the buyer to the seller.
17. The apparatus of claim 12, in which the processor is further operative with the
program to:
transmit the payment identifier to the seller.
18. The apparatus of claim 12, in which the processor is further operative with the
program to: .
output to the buyer a request for an authorization to use the payment identifier to
provide payment if an acceptance is received; and
receive the authorization from the buyer in response to the request.
19. The apparatus of claim 12, in which the processor is further operative with the
program to:
receive an acceptance from each of a set of sellers.
20. The apparatus of claim 12, in which the conditional purchase offer includes an
expiration date and is non-revocable prior to the expiration date.
21. The apparatus of claim 12, in which the processor is further operative with the
program to:
determine an active period during which the conditional purchase offer is active; and
receive an acceptance during the active period.
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22. The apparatus of claim 12, in which the processor is further operative with the
program to:
receive a revocation of the conditional purchase offer after receiving an acceptance;
and
provide a payment of a predetermined amount to the seller.
23. A method for using a computer to facilitate a transaction between a buyer and at
least one of a plurality of sellers, comprising:
inputting into the computer a conditional purchase offer which includes an offer
price;
inputting into the computer a payment identifier specifying a financial account, the
payment identifier being associated with the conditional purchase offer;
outputting to the buyer a request for authorization to use the payment identifier to
provide a payment it an acceptance is received;
inputting into the computer authorization from the buyer in response to the
request;
outputting the conditional purchase offer to the plurality ofsellers after receiving the
payment identifier; .
inputting into the computer an acceptance from a seller, the acceptance being
responsive to the conditional purchase offer; and
providing the payment to the seller by using the payment identifier.
24. The method of claim 23, in which the step of inputting into the computer an
acceptance comprises:
inputting into the computer an acceptance from each member of a set of sellers, the
set of sellers comprising at least one seller, each acceptance being responsive to the
conditional purchase offer;
and further comprising;
selecting one received acceptance, thereby determining a selected seller of the set of
sellers;
and in which the step of providing a payment comprises:
providing a payment to the selected seller by using the payment identifier.
25. The method of claim 24, in which the step of selecting an acceptance received
comprises:
determining a first acceptance received, thereby determining a first seller of the at
least one seller;
and in which the step of providing a payment comprises:
providing a payment to the first seller by using the payment identifier.
26. The method of claim 23, in which the financial account is a credit card account.
© William L. Montague, Jr., 2000
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27. The method of claim 26, further comprising:
determining if a predetermined amount is available in the credit card account.
28. The method of claim 23, farther comprising:
transferring payment from the buyer to the seller.
29. The method of claim 23 in which the step of providing a payment comprises:
transmitting the payment identifier to the seller.
30. The method of claim 23, in which the step of inputting into the computer an
acceptance comprises:
inputting into the computer an acceptance from each of a set of sellers.
31. The method of claim 23, in which the conditional purchase offer includes an
expiration date and is non-revocable prior to the expiration date.
32. The method of claim 23, further comprising:
determining an active period during which the conditional purchase offer is active;
and in which the step of inputting into the computer an acceptance is performed
during the active period.
33. The method of claim 23, further comprising:
inputting into the computer a revocation of the conditional purchase offer after the
step of receiving an acceptance; and in which the step of providing a payment
comprises:
providing a payment of a predetermined amount to the seller.
34. An apparatus for facilitating a transaction between a buyer and at least one of a
plurality of sellers, comprising:
a storage device; and
a processor connected to the storage device,
the storage device storing
a program for controlling the processor; and
the processor operative with the program to
receive a conditional purchase offer which includes an offer price;
receive a payment identifier specifying a financial account, the payment identifier
being associated with the conditional purchase offer;
output to the buyer a request for an authorization to use the payment identifier to
provide a payment if an acceptance is received;
receive the authorization from the buyer in response to the request;
transmit the conditional purchase otter to the plurality of sellers after receiving the
payment identifier;
receive an acceptance from a seller, the acceptance being responsive to the
© William L. Montague, Jr., 2000
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transmitted conditional purchase offer; and
provide the payment to the seller by using the payment identifier.
35. The apparatus of claim 34, in which the processor is further operative with the
program to:
receive an acceptance from each member of a set of sellers, the set of sellers
comprising at least one seller, each acceptance being responsive to the conditional
purchase offer;
select one received acceptance, thereby determining a selected seller of the set of
sellers; and
provide a payment to the selected seller by using the payment identifier.
36. The apparatus of claim 35, in which the processor is further operative with the
program to:
determine a first acceptance received, thereby determining a first seller of the set of
sellers; and
provide a payment to the first seller by using the payment identifier.
37. The apparatus ofclaim 34, in which the financial account is a credit card account.
38. The apparatus of claim 37, in which the processor is further operative with the
program to:
determine if a predetermined amount is available in the financial account.
39. The apparatus of claim 34, in which the processor is further operative with the
program to:
transfer payment from the buyer to the seller.
40. The apparatus of claim 34, in which the processor is further operative with the
program to:
transmit the payment identifier to the seller.
41. The apparatus of claim 34, in which the processor is further operative with the
program to:
receive an acceptance from each of a set of sellers.
42. The apparatus of claim 34, in which the conditional purchase offer includes an
expiration date and is non-revocable prior to the expiration date.
43. The apparatus of claim 34, in which the processor is further operative with the
program to:
determine an active period during which the conditional purchase offer is active; and
© William L. Montague, Jr., 2000
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receive an acceptance during the active period.
44. The apparatus of claim 34, in which the processor is further operative with the
program to:
receive a revocation of the conditional purchase offer after receiving an acceptance;
and
provide a payment of a predetermined amount to the seller.
Ill. Rosengard v. Land's End, Inc., et ale
U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York
Filed October 18, 1999
Case No. 99-CV-10614
A. PARTIES.
Plaintiff: Andrea L. Rosengard
Defendants: Public Technologies Multimedia, Inc.
J.e. Penney Company, Inc.
Land's End, Inc.
MatteI, Inc.
Broderbund Software, Inc.
Hearst Corporation
Federated Department Stores, Inc.
B. ATTORNEYS.
Plaintiff: Fish & Neave
Defendants: Morrison & Foerster, LLP
c. PATENT.
Patent No.: 5,930,769
Application Date: October 7, 1996
Issue date: July 27, 1999
Abstract:
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The present invention provides a method ofmanual fashion shopping and method for
electronic fashion shopping by a customer using a programmed computer, CD-ROM,
television, Internet or other electronic medium such as video. The method comprises
receiving personal information from the customer; selecting a body type and fashion
category based on the personal information; selecting fashions from a plurality of
clothes items based on the body type and fashion category; outputting a plurality of
fashion data based on the selected fashions; and receiving selection information from
the customer.
Claims:
1. A method of fashion shopping by a customer comprising the steps of:
receiving personal information from the customer;
selecting a body type and fashion category based on the personal information;
selecting fashions from a plurality of clothes items based on the body type and
fashion category;
outputting a plurality of fashion data based on the selected fashions;
receiving selection information from the customer; and
processing order information to place an order for the selected fashions.
2. A method as in claim 1 wherein the personal information includes a digitized
image of the customer's face.
3. A method as in claim 1 wherein the personal information includes an electronic
commerce identifier for billing purposes.
4. A method as in claim 1 wherein the fashion category provided is selected from the
group consisting of petite, short, average, and tall.
5. A method as in claim 1 wherein said clothes items are a clothes category selected
from the group consisting of day suits, evening suits, dresses, robes, coats, active
sports, sportswear, casual wear, and at home wear.
6. A method as in claim 1 wherein said fashion data comprises providing available
colors, manufacturer's prices, styles, and sizes.
7. A method as in claim 1 further comprising the step of determining on availability
of selected fashions.
r © William L. Montague, Jr., 2000
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8. A method as in claim 1wherein the method further comprises the step of receiving
an order from the customer.
9. A method as in claim 1 further comprising the step of outputting a personal code
number to identify the customer.
10. A method as in claim 1 wherein body type is a stature selected from the group
consisting of full-bust/slight hip, normal, without a waistline, and slight bust/fuller
hip.
11. A method as in claim 1 wherein the fashion category is selected from the group
consisting of slim, athletic, stout, and portly stout.
12. A method as in claim 1 wherein the fashion category is selected from the group
consisting of infant, toddler, children, pre-teen, and teen.
13. A method as in claim 1 wherein the fashions and fashion data are contained in a
database.
14. A method as in claim 1 wherein the fashion data includes a garment description.
15. A method as in claim 1wherein the fashion data includes accessory style number,
accessory description, and accessory cost.
16. A method as in claim 1 further comprising the step of updating the selected
fashions based on said received selection information.
17. A method as in claim 1 wherein the personal information includes the
measurements of bust, hips, waist, arm length, height, and center front.
18. A method as in claim 17 wherein the measurements further comprise inseam,
center length, and center depth.
19. A method as in claim 1 wherein the personal information includes a plurality of
body measurements and a digitized picture of the customer's face.
20. A method as in claim 19 wherein the outputting the plurality of fashion data
includes outputting a computerized simulated body type image corresponding to the
© William L. Montague. Jr., 2000
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customer's body measurements and the digitized picture of the customer's face.
21. A method as in claim 1 further comprising the step of determining size and fit of
a selected fashion.
22. A method as in claim 21 wherein determining the size and fit comprises the steps
ofdisplaying a closest size for the selected fashion and indicating where adjustments
are necessary.
23. A method as in claim 21 further comprising determining an amount the selected
fashion needs to be altered.
24. A method of electronic fashion shopping by a customer using an electronic
medium comprising the steps of:
receiving a personal code number to access a database of fashions;
accessing a personal information record based on the inputted personal code number;
outputting a body type and body type data based on the personal information record;
receiving a clothes item to shop from the customer;
receiving selection information from the customer; and
outputting an order for the clothes item, an invoice for the customer and an inventory
record of all items ordered by the customer.
25. A method as in claim 24 wherein receiving selection information from the
customer is a step selected from the group consisting ofplacing an order, see another
fashion, start again and see size and fit information.
26. A method as in claim 24 wherein the personal information record includes a
digitized image of the customer's face.
27. A method as in claim 24 wherein the personal information record includes
electronic commerce information for business purposes.
28. A method as in claim 24 wherein the clothes item is a clothing category selected
from the group consisting of day suits, evening suits, dresses, robes, coats, active
sports, sportswear, casual wear, and at-home wear.
29. A method as in claim 24 wherein the body type data is associated with data
relating to which styles to wear and which styles to avoid.
r © William L. Montague, Jr., 2000
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30. A method as in claim 24 wherein the body type is a stature selected from the
group consisting of full-bust/slight hip, normal, without a waistline, and slight
bust/fuller hip.
31. A method as in claim 24 wherein the fashion data comprises providing available
colors, manufacturer's prices, styles, and sizes.
32. A method as in claim 24 wherein the method further comprises the step of
receiving an order from the customer.
33. A method as in claim 24 wherein the fashion data includes a garment description.
34. A method as in claim 24 further comprising the step of updating the selected
fashions based on the received selection information.
35. A method as in claim 24 wherein the personal information -record contains a
plurality of body measurements for the customer.
36. A method as in claim 35 wherein the body measurements include bust, hips,
waist, arm length, height, and center front.
37. A method as in claim 24 further including the step of determining a fashion
category based on the personal information record.
38. A method as in claim 37 wherein the fashion category is selected from the group
consisting of petite, short, average, and tall.
39. A method as in claim 37 wherein the fashion category is selected from the group
consisting of slim, athletic, stout, and portly stout.
40. A method as in claim 37 wherein the fashion category is selected from the group
consisting of infant, toddler, children, pre-teen, and teen.
41. A method as in claim 24 further comprising the step of determining size and fit
of a selected fashion.
42. A method as in claim 41 wherein determining the size and fit comprises the steps
ofdisplaying a closest size for the selected fashion and indicating where adjustments
© William L. Montague, Jr., 2000
G(b) - 14
4J
J
J,~~.-,
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
rr
J
r
r
r
r
~.
r
t
r
~.
r
-i
r,
IV.
are necessary.
43. A method as in claim 41 further comprising determining the amount the selected
fashion needs to be altered.
44. A method as in claim 41 further comprising the step of determining an
availability of selected fashions.
45. A method for assisting in clothing shopping comprising:
receiving personal information from a person including a plurality of body
measurements;
providing a database of clothing items, including multidimensional models of fit for
the clothing items;
receiving a clothing type from the person;
selecting a clothing item of the clothing type from the database, the clothing item fit
model of the selected clothing item, corresponding to the body type as determined by
the received body measurements; and
outputting data relating to the result of modeling the person in the selected clothes .
item based on the personal information and the selected clothing item fit model.
Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, et ale
United States District Court for the West District of Washington (Seattle)
Filed October 21, 1999
Case No. 99-CV-1695
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A. PARTIES.
Plaintiff: Amazon.com, Inc.
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Defendants:
B. ATTORNEYS.
Plaintiff:
Barnesandnoble.com, Inc.
Perkins Coie
McCutchen Doyle Brown & Enersen
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Defendants: Foster Pepper & Shefelman
Pennie & Edmonds
C. PATENT.
Patent No.: 5,960,411
Application Date: September 12, 1997
Issue date: September 28, 1999
Abstract:
A method and system for placing an order to purchase an item via the Internet. The
order is placed by a purchaser at a client system and received by a server system. The
server system receives purchaser information including identification of the
purchaser, payment information, and shipment information from the client system.
The server system then assigns a client identifier to the client system and associates
the assigned client identifier with the received purchaser information. The server
system sends to the client system the assigned client identifier and an HTML
document identifying the item and including an order button. The client system
receives and stores the assigned client identifier and receives and displays the HTML
document. In response to the selection of the order button, the client system sends to
the server system a request to purchase the identified item. The server system
receives the request and combines the purchaser information associated with the
client identifier of the client system to generate an order to purchase the item in
accordance with the billing and shipment information whereby the purchaser effects
the ordering of the product by selection of the order button.
Claims:
1. A method of placing an order for an item comprising:
under control of a client system,
displaying information identifying the item; and
in response to only a single action being performed, sending a request to order the
item along with an identifier of a purchaser of the item to a server system;
under control of a single-action ordering component of the server system,
receiving the request;
retrieving additional information previously stored for the purchaser identified by the
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identifier in the received request; and
generating an order to purchase the requested item for the purchaser identified by the
identifier in the received request using the retrieved additional information; and
fulfilling the generated order to complete purchase of the item
whereby the item is ordered without using a shopping cart ordering model.
2. The method of claim 1 wherein the displaying of information includes displaying
information indicating the single action.
3. The method of claim 1 wherein the single action is clicking a button.
4. The method of claim 1 wherein the single action is speaking of a sound.
5. The method of claim 1 wherein a user of the client system does not need to
explicitly identify themselves when placing an order.
6. A client system for ordering an item comprising:
an identifier that identifies a customer;
a display component for displaying information identifying the item;
a single-action ordering component that in response to performance of only a single
action, sends a request to a server system to order the identified item, the request
including the identifier so that the server system can locate additional information
needed to complete the order and so that the server system can fulfill the generated
order to complete purchase of the item; and
a shopping cart ordering component that in response to performance of an add-to-
shopping-cart action, sends a request to the server system to add the item to a
shopping cart.
7. The client system of claim 6 wherein the display component is a browser.
8. The client system of claim 6 wherein the predefined action is the clicking of a
mouse button.
9. A server system for generating an order comprising:
a shopping cart ordering component; and
a single-action ordering component including:
a data storage medium storing information for a plurality of users;
a receiving component for receiving requests to order an item, a request including an
indication of one of the plurality of users, the request being sent in response to only
a single action being performed; and
© William L. Montague. Jr.• 2000
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an order placement component that retrieves from the data storage medium
information for the indicated user and that uses the retrieved information to place an
order for the indicated user for the item; and
an order fulfillment component that completes a purchase of the item in accordance
with the order placed by the single-action ordering component.
10. The server system of claim 9 wherein the request is sent by a client system in
response to a single action being performed.
11. A method for ordering an item using a client system, the method comprising:
displaying information identifying the item and displaying an indication of a single
action that is to be performed to order the identified item; and
in response to only the indicated single action being performed, sending to a server
system a request to order the identified item
whereby the item is ordered independently of a shopping cart model and the order is
fulfilled to complete a purchase of the item.
12. The method of claim 11 wherein the server system uses an identifier sent along
with the request to identify additional information needed to generate an order for the
item.
13. The method ofclaim 12 wherein the identifier identifies the client system and the
server system provides the identifier to the client system.
14. The method of claim 11 wherein the client system and server system
communicate via the Internet.
15. The method of claim 11 wherein the displaying includes displaying an HTML
document provided by the server system.
16. The method of claim 11 including sending from the server system to the client
system a confirmation that the order was generated.
17. The method of claim 11 wherein the single action is clicking a mouse button
when a cursor is positioned over a predefined area of the displayed information.
18. The method of claim 11 wherein the single action is a sound generated by a user.
19. The method of claim 11 wherein the single action is selection using a television
© William L. Montague. Jr.. 2000
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remote control.
20. The method of claim 11 wherein the single action is depressing of a key on a key
pad.
21. The method of claim 11 wherein the single action is selecting using a pointing
device.
22. The method of claim 11 wherein the single action is selection of a displayed
indication.
23. The method of claim 11 wherein the displaying includes displaying partial
information supplied by the server system as to the identity of a user of the client
system.
24. The method of claim 11 wherein the displaying includes displaying partial
shipping information supplied by the server system.
25. The method of claim 11 wherein the displaying includes displaying partial
payment information supplied by the server system.
26. The method of claim 11 wherein the displaying includes displaying a moniker
identifying a shipping address for the customer.
DoubleClick, Inc. v. L90, Inc.
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia (Norfolk)
Filed November 12, 1999
Case No. 99-CV-1914
A. PARTIES.
,.
I
Plaintiff:
Defendant:
DoubleClick Inc.
L90, Inc.
r
r
© William L. Montague. Jr.. 2000
G(b) - 19
Claims:
G(b) - 20
© William L. Montague, Jr., 2000
Patent No.: 5,933,811
1
]
J
j
]
Jr:,f
J'......,;
]
J
J,.... ,,'.
]
J
]
1-
J.
J
]
J
]
]
Kaufman & Canoles
Howrey & Simon
Morrison & Foerster
Willcox & Savage
Plaintiff:
Defendants:
Application Date: August 20, 1996
Abstract: The present invention is a system and method for delivering
customized electronic advertisements in an interactive communication system. The
customized advertisements are selected based on consumer profiles and are then
integrated with offerings maintained by different content providers. The preferred
interactive communication system interconnects multiple consumer computers,
multiple content provider computers and multiple Internet provider computers with
an advertisement provider computer. Whenever a consumer directs one of the
consumer computers to access an offering existing in one of the content provider
computers, an advertising request is sent to the advertisement provider computer.
Upon receiving the advertising request, the advertising provider computer generates
a custom advertisement based on the consumer's profile. The custom advertisement
is then combined with the offering from the content provider computer and displayed
to the consumer. The advertisement provider computer also credits a consumer
account, a content provider account and an internet provider account each time a
consumer views a custom advertisement. Furthermore, the advertisement provider
computer tracks consumer responses to the customized advertisements.
Issue date: August 3, 1999
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1. An advertisement provider computer for customizing advertisements to be
transferred via the internet, comprising:
a registration module executable at an advertisement provider computer, said
registration module configured to allow a consumer to register consumer
demographic information, and configured to allow a content provider to register
content provider information;
an advertising module executable at said advertisement provider computer, said
advertising module configured to select an advertisement based on said consumer
demographic information and configured to transfer said advertisement to said
consumer; and
an accounting database, wherein said advertisement providercomputer is configured
to access said accounting database to bill an advertiser and credit said content
provider when said advertisement is transferred to said consumer.
2. The advertisement provider computer according to claim 1, wherein said
registration module is further configured to create an advertisement request and to
transfer said advertisement request to said content provider.
3. The advertisement provider computer according to claim 2, where said
advertisement request comprises an advertisement provider computer identifier and
a content provider script.
4. The advertisement provider computer according to claim 2, wherein said
registration module is further configured to assign a consumer identification code to
said consumer, and configured to tra~sfer a consumer identification code to said
consumer.
5. The advertisement provider computer according to claim 4, wherein said
advertising module is further configured to accept said advertisement request and
said consumer identification code from said consumer.
6. The advertisement provider computer according to claim 1, wherein said content
provider information comprises content provider demographic information, and
wherein said advertisement is selected based on both said consumer demographic
information and said content provider demographic information.
7. The advertisement provider computer according to claim 1, further comprising:
a registration database configured to store registration information; and
an advertisement database configured to store advertisement information.
r © William L. Montague, Jr., 2000
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8. The advertisement provider computer according to claim 1, wherein said
advertisement provider computer is further configured to access said accounting
database to credit said consumer when said advertisement is transferred.
9. The advertisement provider computer according to claim 1, wherein the
advertising module is further configured to track consumer activities.
10. The advertisement provider computer according to claim 9, wherein said
consumer activities relate to said advertisement, and wherein said accounting
database is further configured to update billing information based on said consumer
activities.
11. The advertisement provider computer according to claim 1, wherein said
advertisement provider computer is associated with a website which is comprised of
a plurality of computers.
12. A method of providing a customized advertisement, comprising:
registering a consumer and consumer demographic data at an advertisement provider
computer;
registering a content provider and content provider data at said advertisement
provider computer;
receiving a request for an advertisement at said advertisement provider computer;
accessing with said advertisement provider computer, a database of advertisements
which associates an advertisement with one or more advertisers;
selecting with said advertisement provider computer, at least one of said
advertisements from said database of advertisements based on said consumer
demographic data;
transferring said selected advertisement from said advertisement provider computer
to said consumer through the internet;
providing a bill from said advertisement provider computer to the associated
advertiser, said bill based on said selected advertisement; and
providing a credit from said advertisement provider computer to said content
provider, said credit based on said selected advertisement.
13. The method according to claim 12, wherein said request identifies at least said
advertisement computer, said content provider, and said consumer.
14. The method according to claim 12, wherein said content provider data comprises
content provider demographic data, and wherein said selection of at least one
advertisement is based on both said consumer demographic data and said content
© William L. Montague, Jr., 2000
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provider demographic data.
15. The method according to claim 12, further comprising providing a consumer
credit from said advertisement provider computer to said consumer, said consumer
credit based on said selected advertisement.
16. The method according to claim 12, further comprising tracking activities of said
consumer.
17. The method according to claim 16, further comprising updating one of said bill,
said credit, and said consumer credit, based on said activities.
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Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., et al
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Amazon.com Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com Inc.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
\VESTERN DISTRICT OF \VASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE
AMAZON.COM, INC.,
Plaintiff,
Y.
BARNESANDNOBLE.COM, INC., and
BARNESANDNOBLE.COM, LLC,
Defendants.
No. C99-1695P
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION
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On October 21, 1999, Plaintiff Amazon. com filed a complaint in this Court alleging patent
infiingement by Defendants Bamesandnoble.com Inc. and Bamesandnoble.com LLC (hereinafter
referred to collectively as "Bamesandnoble.com"). The patent in question is United States Patent No.
5,960,411 (the '411 patent), which was issued on September 28, 1999. The '411 patent describes a
~v1ethod and System for Placing a Purchase Order Via a Communications Network and includes 26
claims.
The '411 patent, in essence, describes a method and system in which a consumer can complete a
pun.:hase order for an item via the Internet using only a single action (such as a single click ofa
computer mouse button) once information identifying the item is displayed to the consumer. This
method and system is only applicable in situations where a retailer already has in its files various
information about the purchaser (such as the purchaser's address and credit card number) and where
the purchaser's client system (e.g., a personal computer) has been provided with an identifier that
enables the retailer's server system to identify the purchaser.
Amazon.com alleges that Defendants' "Express Lane" ordering feature infiinges various claims of the
'41 I patent. Concurrently with its complaint, Amazon.com filed a motion for a preliminary injunction
to enjoin Bamesandnoble.com from infringing the '411 patent. Amazon.com properly noted a hearing
on the motion for a preliminary injunction in accordance with the local rules of this Court for
:--':ovember 12, 1999. After the Court denied Defendants' motion to reschedule the hearing to January
of 2000, the parties fully briefed their arguments and conducted expedited discovery, including a
number of depositions. An evidentiary hearing on Plaintiffs motion began on November 16, 1999,
and was conducted over five days.
Amazon.com presented live testimony at the hearing from the following witnesses: Mr. Henry
\1anbeck, an attorney and former Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks; Mr. Jeffrey Bezos, the
chairman and chief executive officer of Amazon.com; and Mr. Geoffrey Mulligan, who was
G(b) - 27
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Background
Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a), the Court's findings offacts and conclusions oflaw are set forth
below.
1. Plaintiff Amazon.com, Inc. ("Amazon.com") is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of
business at Seattle, Washington. Through its website, www.amazon.com. the company enables
customers to find and purchase books, music, videos, consumer electronics, games, toys, gift~,
electronic greeting cards, and other items over the World Wide Web. (Ex. 11, Bezos Dec!. §3).
Defendants raised a number ofdefenses in their pleadings and during the hearing. In support of their
position that Amazon.com is not likely to succeed at a trial on the merits, Defendants placed
particular emphasis on arguments that the '411 patent is invalid on obviousness and anticipation
grounds and that the Express Lane feature does not infringe any claims in the '411 patent. To a lesser
extent, Defendants also suggested that the '411 patent is unenforceable. In addition, Defendants
argued that Amazon.com could not demonstrate irreparable harm, that the balance ofhardships did
not tip in Amazon.com's favor, and that the public interest would not be served by issuance ofa
preliminary injunction.
The Preliminary Injunction is effective at 12:01 a.m. P.S.T. on Saturday, December 4, 1999, and upon
Amazon.com's filing an undertaking in the sum or $10,000,000, and shall remain in effect during the
pendency of this action. Defendants may, however, continue to offer an Express Lane feature if the
feature is modified in a manner that is consistent with this Order to avoid infringement of the '411
patent.
On November 22, 1999, following the testimony ofall witnesses and the submission of evidence, the
parties presented proposed findings of fact and conclusions oflaw to the Court. The Court heard
closing arguments on November 23, 1999. Based on the papers, pleadings, testimony, evidence, and
arguments presented by the parties, the Court finds that Plaintiff has demonstrated: (1) a reasonable
likelihood of success on the merits at trial; (2) it will suffer irreparable harm if the preliminary
injunction is not granted; (3) the balance ofhardships tips in its favor; and (4) the preliminary
injunction sought is in the public interest. Although Defendants have raised a number ofdefenses
concerning the validity of the patent and infringement of the patent, Plaintiffhas shown that the
defenses asserted by Defendant lack substantial merit. Therefore, the Court hereby GRANTS
Plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction.
presented as an expert on electronic commerce ("e-commerce"). Barnesandnoble.com presented live
testimony at the hearing from the following witnesses: Dr. John Lockwood, an assistant professor of
. computer science at Washington University in S1. Louis and the developer ofa program called \Veb
Basket; Mr. Alexander Trevor, a technology consultant and a former employee of CompuServe, Inc.;
Mr. Gary King, the chiefinfonnation officer for Barnesandnoble.com; and Mr. Jonathan Bulkeley,
the chief executive officer of Barnesandnoble.com In addition, the parties jointly submitted
deposition designations from the following individuals: Mr. Shel Kaphan, who is listed as an inventor
of the '411 patent; Dr. Eric Johnson, a professor at the Columbia School of Business who was
presented as an expert on e-commerce issues; Mr. Martin Adelman, a professor at the George
Washington University School of Law; and Mr. Donald Carli, the founder and principal ofNima
Hunter, Inc., which provides services related to e-commerce.
Amazon.com Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com Inc.
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2. Defendant Barnesandnoble.com L~C is a Delaware limited liability company with its principal
place of business at New York, New York. Barnesandnoble.com LLC operates a website through
\vhich it distributes books, software, music, and other items. (Ex. 36 at 6).
3. Defendant Barnesandnoble.com Inc. is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business
at New York, New York. Barnesandnoble.com Inc. is a holding company whose sole asset is a 20%
share in Barnesandnoble.com LLC, and whose business is acting as sole manager of
Bamesandnoble.com LLC. Barnesandnoble.com Inc. controls all major business decisions of
Barnesandnoble.com LLC. Collectively, these two defendants are referred to herein as
"Bamesandnoble.com." (Ex. 36).
4. Sometime before May 1997, Amazon.com CEO Jeffrey Bezos conceived ofan idea to enable
Amazon.com customers to purchase items with a single-click of a computer mouse button. (Tr. at
123:4-22, 124: 1-12 (Bezos». This idea was commercially implemented by Amazon.com in
September of 1997. (Tr. at 125:9-13 (Bezos».
5. On September 28, 1999, United States Patent No. 5,960,411 (the "'411 patent"), entitled "Method
and System for Placing a Purchase Order Via a Communications Network," was issued. (Complaint,
Ex. A). The filing date for the '411 patent is September 21, 1997. (ld.). The patent was assigned to
and is owned by Amazon.com.
6. The evidence indicates that before granting the patent, the examiner assigned to the patent searched
the data base of patents available at the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), and obtained a search of
private databases through the PTO's Science and Technology Information Center ("STIC").
Additionally, the examiner commissioned a third-party search firm to perform a search for potential
non-patent prior art. (Tr. at 62:20-25 (Manbeck); Ex. 13, Manbeck Decl. at ~~8, 9). The examiner
:l\so conferred with more senior examiners and counsel to insure that the patent involved patentable
subject matter. (Tr. at 60:16-63:14; 65:2-10; 72:20-73:9 (Manbeck); Ex. 13, Manbeck Dec!. at ~1O).
The evidence from the patent's file history and the testimony of former Commissioner Manbeck
indicates that the patent was thoroughly examined by the PTO before issuance. (Tr. at 73: 10-13
(~tanbeck); Ex. 13, Manbeck Decl. at ~11).
Prior Art
7. Plaintiffs expert Geoffrey Mulligan testified that except for single-action ordering and the
implementation of single-action ordering without a shopping cart model, everything in the
independent claims of the '411 patent (claims 1,6,9, and II) is in prior art. (Tr. at 180:14-181:3).
8. In support of their arguments that the single-action ordering element of the '411 patent is invalid on
ob\"iousness and anticipation grounds, Defendants offered evidence concerning several prior art
references. This evidence of prior art falls into two general categories: systems for ordering tangible
items online (such as groceries or computer equipment) and electronic document delivery systems. In
the fanner category were Dr. John Lockwood's Web Basket system, the Netscape Merchant System
dt.:scribed in the "Creating a Virtual Store" reference, and the "Oliver's Market" web pages. In the
laner category were the CompuServe financial information service represented by Mr. Alexander
Trevor's testimony regarding the "Trend" feature, and U.S. Patent No. 5,708,780 (the '780 patent). It
is undisputed that these prior art references were not before the PTO when the '411 patent was
G(b) - 29
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Setscape Merchant System
II. The Court finds that Web Basket requires a multiple-step ordering process from the time that an
item to be purchased is displayed. (See Tr. at 275:7-276:5). These multiple steps are inconsistent with
the single-action requirements of the '411 patent.
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Web Basket
13. Defendants also presented as a prior art reference an excerpt from a book entitled "Creating the
Virtual Store" that was copyrighted in 1996. (Ex. A-63; Ex. 27). Defendants focused on the following
language from this reference: "Merchants also can provide shoppers with an instant buy button for
some or all items, enabling them to skip check out review. This provides added appeal for customers
who already know the single item they want to purchase during their shopping excursion." (Ex. 27 at
7; Tr. at 309:23-310: 18; 312:3-20 (Lockwood». Defendants argue that the Netscape Merchant
System reference anticipates each of the independent claims of the '411 patent and that this reference,
either alone or in combination with other prior art references, renders the claims of the '411 patent
ob\·ious.
9. Defendants presented evidence regarding an on-line ordering system called "\Veb Basket" that was
deYeloped in and around August 1996 by Defendants' expert Dr. John Lockwood. (Tr. at 214:23-
216:2; 218:13-229:18 (Lockwood); Ex. A-56, Lockwood Decl. ~9). Defendants argue that Web
Basket anticipates at least claims 6-8 of the '411 patent and that this reference, either alone or in
combination with other prior art references, renders the claims of the '411 patent obvious.
12. On cross-examination, Dr. Lockwood admitted that it "could have" been simpler for a person
purchasing from Web Basket to purchase items using only one click ofa computer mouse, but he
admitted that he never considered making single-action ordering an available option to users. (Tr. at
277: 19-23 (Lockwood».
I 5. Read in context, the few lines relied on by Defendants appear to describe only the elimination of
the checkout review step, leaving at least two other required steps to complete a purchase. (Tr. at
317: 10-18 (Lockwood); see also Ex. 27 at 7). Thus, apart from the words "instant buy," there is no
indication that the Netscape system implements a single-action ordering component as required by,
10. \Veb Basket requires users to accumulate items into a virtual shopping basket and to check these
items out when they are finished shopping. (Tr. at 175:6-17; 176:7-179:13 (Mulligan); Ex. 12,
Mulligan Supp. Decl. at ~29). Web Basket also requires several confirmation steps for even
preregistered users to complete their purchases. (Ex. 12, Mulligan Supp. Decl. at ~~18-22; Ex. A-56,
Lockwood Deck ml41-44).
I ..L The balance of the Netscape article describes a multi-step shopping cart ordering model that
r~quires both checkout and checkout review steps, (Ex. 27). A first step is required to put an item in
the user's cart. Information identifying the item is then stored on the user's computer. A second
"check-out" step is required to send that information to the merchant's computer. A third step of
ch~ckout review must occur after the transfer of the list of purchased items to the merchant's
computer during the check-out step. The standard Netscape shopping cart therefore would appear to
require a minimum ofthree steps by the user. (Tr. at 324: 12-327: 18 (Lockwood».
Amazon.com Inc. v. Bamesandnoble.com Inc.
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claims 6 and 9 of the '411 patent or a single action as required by claims 1 and 11 of the '411 patent.
Moreover, Defendants' expert acknowledged that he did not know how the Netscape instant buy
feature worked. (Tr. at 312:3-20; 350:7-12 (Lockwood».
Oliver's ~/arket
16. Defendants presented pages from a website entitled "Oliver's Market The Ordering System." (Ex.
A-1.06). This web site may be accessed at www.sonic.netJ-raptor/current/how20rdr.htmi. Defendants
contend that the Oliver's Market system anticipates all of the independent claims of the '411 patent
and that this reference, either alone or in combination with other prior art references, renders the
claims ofthe '411 patent obvious.
17. Though the Oliver's Market reference begins with the sentence: "A single crick on its picture is all
it takes to order an item," the ordering system described by the reference is a multi-step shopping cart
model. (Ex. A-106).
IS. The "single click" referred to in the first sentence is the click required to add an item to the user's
shopping cart and does not complete the ordering process. After a single action is taken to select an
item. the method described by this reference explicitly requires the user to take further actions to
complete a purchase order, including: (1) specifying whether items will be picked up or delivered; (2)
specifying the time that pickup or delivery is desired; and (3) indicating that the user is done
shopping, which would appear to be the checkout procedure required by a standard shopping cart
model. These additional actions axe inconsistent with the single-action requirements of independent
claims 1,6,9, and 11.
'780 patent
19. Defendants also presented testimony by Dr. Lockwood in support of their argument that U.S.
Patc:nt No. 5,708,780 (the '780 patent) anticipates or renders obvious claims ofthe '411 patent. The
'7S0 Patent lists a filing date of June 7, 1995 and an issue date ofJanuary 13, 1998. (Ex. A-67). The
title of the '780 patent is "Internet Server Access Control and Monitoring System." The description of
the '780 patent is directed towards a service for controlling access to web documents within a
particular domain. Defendants argue that the '780 patent anticipates claims 1 ant 11 of the '411 patent.
20. In the '780 patent's preferred embodiment, a user browses the web conventionally. (Ex. A-67 at
Col. 3. 11 21-22). A content server provides web documents to the user and determines when the user
:,ct:ks access to "controlled" content, i.e., web pages for which the user needs authorization to browse.
(!d. 3t Col. 3, 11 22-25; Fig. 2A).
21. The '780 patent does not explicitly show generating an order for an item. The record regarding
whether and how the system ofthe '780 patent generates an order for an item consists entirely of Dr.
Lockwood's testimony. Dr. Lockwood's testimony on this point is confusing and the witness appeared
not to understand how the system described would function. Dr. Lockwood testified that generating
an order takes place when the server system opens a file on its disk drive to read a controlled page.
(Tr. at 305: 1-19). Dr. Lockwood also testified that the user places an order by selecting a link to a
controlled page. (Tr. at 302:5-303:5).
22. The testimony ofDr. Lockwood regarding this patent, as well as the '780 patent itself, describe a
system in which controlled pages are simply returned to the user's browser when an authorized
G(b) - 31
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request is received by the content server. (See Ex. A-67, fig. 3; Tr. at 309:2-16).
Barnesandnoble. com 's Shopping Cart and Express Lane
26. To order a chart from CompuServe, the user must first log in to the CompuServe service with his
or her user ID and password, then select the Trend application dialogue box. Once that box appears,
the user at a minimum must first (1) type in a stock ticker tape .symbol and then (2) click on the chart
button which becomes active once the user has typed the first letter of the ticker tape symbol. (Tr. at
377:25-378:18; 388:4-14 (Trevor». The Court finds that this method involves two actions, not one.
In addition, CompuServe does not begin processing any surcharge to the user's account until the
user's computer performs an additional step of sending back a confirmation to CompuServe that the
requested chart image was in fact accessed. (Tr. at 384:5-14 (Trevor».
24. Defendants presented evidence that CompuServe offered a service called "Trend" beginning in
the mid-1990s whereby CompuServe subscribers could obtain stock charts for an additional"
surcharge. Defendants presented screen shots from the current system and the testimony of a former
CompuServe employee that the current screen shots were substantially the same as those provided to
CompuServe subscribers in the mid 1990s. (Tr. at 369:12-20 (Trevor». Defendants argue that the
Trend System anticipates claim 11 of the '411 patent and renders obvious various claims of the
patent.
23. It appears that if billing is to take place at all in the '780 Patent system it would take place based
on the logged transactions. (Tr. 306:9-15). In this regard, the '780 Patent system shows no more than
a method for tracking what documents the users of an on-line information service like LEXIS or
WESTLAW would request and then billing them based on these requests.
25. The CompuServe system was not a world wide web application. (Tr. at 380:21-381:7 (Trevor».
Instead, after a user logged in, a persistent connection was established between the user's computer
and CompuServe which lasted until the user logged off. (Tr. at 368:24-369:8; 380:25-381:16
(Trevor». CompuServe, therefore, did not solve the problem ofidentifying users.
28. Bamesandnoble.com offers customers two purchasing options. One is called Shopping Cart and
the other is called Express Lane. (Ex. 9, Mulligan Decl. at ~~7, 8.i, Ex. H). The two methods are
27. There are key differences between each of the prior art references cited by Defendants and the
method and system described in the claims of the '411 patent. The Court finds that none ofthe prior
an references offered by Defendants anticipate the claims of the '411 patent. On the question of
obviousness, the Court finds that the differences between the prior art references submitted by
Defendants and the '411 patent claims are significant. Moreover, there is insufficient evidence in the
re~ord regarding a teaching, suggestion, or motivation in the prior art that would lead one ofordinary
skill in the art of e-commerce to combine the references. The Court finds particularly telling Dr.
Lockwood's admission that it never occurred to him to modify his \Veb basket program to enable
single-action ordering, despite his testimony that such a modification would be easy to implement.
This admission serves to negate Dr. Lockwood's conclusory statements that prior art references teach
to one of ordinary skill in the art the invention ofthe '411 patent. (Tr. at 319:5-320:22 (Lockwood».
Amazon.com Inc. v. Bamesandnoble.com Inc.
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separate and cannot be combined. (Tr. at 429:6-10 (King); Ex 9, Mulligan Decl. at Ex. I (noting
"Express lane and the Shopping Cart are two different ways to place your order. You can't combine
them."». The Barnesandnoble.com Shopping Cart option includes the steps of a standard shopping
can model, including adding items to a virtual shopping cart and "checking out" to complete the
purchase. (Ex. 9, Mulligan Decl. at ~14j).
29. Barnesandnoble.com's Express Lane allows customers who have registered for the feature to
purchase items by simply clicking on the Express Lane button shown on the detail or product page
that describes and identifies the book or other item to be purchased. (Ex. 9, Mulligan Decl. at Ex.
R).The text beneath the Express Lane button invites the user to "Buy it now with just click!" (Id.).
30. Throughout its web site, Bamesandnoble.com consistently describes Express Lane as a one-click
ordering method. (Tr. at 463: 15-464: 10 (Bulkeley». In its May 1999 prospectus,
Barnesandnoble.com consistently described Express Lane as making one-click ordering possible.
(See, e.g., Ex. 36 at 6, 44, 47). In its November 1999 10-Q Report to shareholders,
Barnesandnoble.com describes Express Lane as a one-click ordering system. (Ex. 39 at 13). It does
not appear that Barnesandnoble.com has ever described the Express Lane ordering process as
requiring more than one action, other than in the course ofthis litigation. (Tr. 471: 1-4 (Bulkeley».
3 I. Barnesandnoble.com began using the Express Lane feature in May of 1998, describing the feature
in a press release as "Express Lane (SM) One Click Ordering" and noting that "[n]ow, visitors can
click one button to order books, software and magazines." (Ex. 37).
32. Clicking on the shopping cart icon on the top of every Bamesandnoble.com page will not show
the items that the user has purchased using the Express Lane. (Tr. at 430: 14-17 (King».
33. The strong similarities between the Amazon.com l~click feature and the Express Lane feature
subsequently adopted by Bamesandnoble.com suggest that Bamesandnoble.com copied
Amazon.com's feature. (Ex. 10, Johnson Decl., ~13).
Direct Evidence ofNonobviousness
34. Amazon.com has provided direct evidence ofnonobviousness. Jeff Bezos, Amazon.com's founder
and an inventor on the '411 patent, testified that because "many customers were tentative and
somewhat fearful ofon-line purchasing, conventional wisdom was that they had to be slowly and
. incrementally led to the point ofpurchase. In addition, consumers were not acclimated to rely without
contirmation on stored personal information for correct shipping and billing." (Ex. 11 Bezos Decl.
-:9).
35. Professor Eric Johnson of Columbia Business School testified in his declaration that
"Amazon.com's I-Click® purchasing was a major innovation in on-line retailing that allows for
purchasing without disrupting the consumer's shopping experience; and by eliminating additional
confirmation requirements, recasts the default in a way that both maximizes the likelihood that
consumers will complete their purchases and minimizes consumer anxiety over real or perceived
issues of internet security." (Ex. 10, Johnson Decl. ~12).
36. Moreover, despite their experience with prior art shopping cart models of on-line purchasing,
both sides' technical experts acknowledged that they had never conceived of the invention. Mr.
Mulligan testified that ordering with one click was "a huge leap from what was done in the past." (Tr.
G(b) - 33
G(b) - 34
Objective Factors
Page is ot 1.1.
Irreparable Harm
40. Amazon.com's single-action ordering is used by millions of customers, indicating the commercial
success of the feature. (Ex. 11, Bezos Dec!. ~14). Barnesandnoble.com's Express Lane also accounts
t~)r :l significant portion of its sales. (Ex. 28). Further evidence of commercial success of single-action
ordering is suggested by the fact that Bamesandnoble.com promoted its Express Lane feature in a
press release after it was announced (Ex. 37) and in its prospectus (Ex. 36 at 6, 44, and 47). Indeed,
Bamesandnoble.com described Express Lane as one of its "major enhancements" to its on-line
business. (ld. at 6).
39. Barnesandnoble.com presented evidence that a number of other e-commerce retailers have
offered single-action ordering to customers. (Tr. at 453: 11-456: 15 (Bulkeley».
38. In the on-line industry in general and at Bamesandnoble.com in particular, over halfof the
shopping carts started by customers are abandoned before checkout. (Tr. at 418: 9-11 (King». In an
attempt to alleviate the problem ofabandoned shopping carts, Bamesandnoble.com attempts to make
the checkout process as simple and easy as possible. (Tr. at 473:24- -474:5 (Bulkeley); Tr. at 419:24-
410:8 (King». The single-action ordering invention of the '411 patent solves the problem by
eliminating the checkout process entirely.
37. plaintiffs single-action ordering method addressed an unsolved need that had been long-felt (at
least in the relatively short period of time that e-commerce has existed), namely streamlining the on-
line ordering process to reduce the high percentage oforders that are begun but never completed, i.e..
abandoned shopping carts. The problem of on-line consumers starting but abandoning shopping carts
was acknowledged by both parties and their experts (Ex. 10, Johnson Dec. ~8; Ex. 11, Bezos Dec!.
~:S: Tr. at 473:14-474:5; (Bulkeley); Tr. at 418:1-420:12 (King».
at 190:25). Mr. Mulligan testified further that: "I've been working in electronic commerce for years
now. And I've never thought of the idea of being able to tum a shopping cart or take the idea of
clicking on an item and suddenly having the item ship-having the complete process done." (Tr. at
199:3-7). Mr. Mulligan also testified that he believed it was "a huge leap of faith for the website and
the consumer to implement something like this." (Tr. at 199: 12-14). Additionally, as noted above, Dr.
Lock\vood testified that he never thought ofmodifying \Veb Basket to provide single-action ordering.
(Tr. at 277:19-23).
41. Industry analysts and the popular press also found Amazon.com's single-action ordering process
to be innovative. Patricia Seybold, an e-commerce observer and consultant, described Amazon.com's
I-C1ick~ purchasing as "legendary." (Ex. 11, Bezos Dec!. ~14; Ex. A). Joseph Grallivan in The New
}"ork Post described Amazon.com's l-Click® purchasing as a "seductive innovation." (Ex. 11, Bezos
Decl. ~14; Ex. B). InJoWor/d indicated: "Net retailers are starting to realize that potential customers
often don't make it as far as the virtual checkout line - - they fill their on-line shopping carts with
products, then simply abandon them ... Faced with these problems, it's no surprise that retailers have
hl.:l.:n eyeing Amazon.com's I-click purchases with envy for some time now." (Ex. 11, Bezos Dec!.
-;I·n
41. The harm that would be suffered by Amazon.com due to Bamesandnoble.com's infringement
during the pendency ofthis case would be irreparable. The invention described in the '411 patent is of
Amazon.com Inc. v. Bamesandnoble.com Inc.
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significant commercial value, as evidenced, among other things, by the large number of customers
who make use of single-action ordering available on the websites of both Amazon.com and
Barnesandnoble.com, and by the large number ofother e-commerce retailers whom
Barnesandnoble.com claims have adopted single-action ordering. (Ex. 11, Bezos Decl.1[14; Ex. 28;
Tr. at 453: 11-456: 15 (Bulkeley».
43. The harm Amazon.com would suffer ifdenied the benefit ofusing its invention to distinguish
itself from its competitor Barnesandnoble.com could not easily be measured in dollars. (Tr. at
474:19-475:19 (Bulkeley».
44. Amazon.com has pursued a strategy of innovating to distinguish its shopping experience from the
competition, and it has made substantial investments to build customer relationships and broaden its
customer base during the current growth phase of electronic commerce. (Tr. at 107:22-109: 1 (Bezos);
Ex. 10, Johnson Decl. 1[7).
45. Customers become loyal to sites with which they become familiar. Considerations such as ease of
use and the availability of time-saving features are significant factors in determining the relative
success of on-line enterprises. (Ex. 10, Johnson Decl.1[4; Tr. at 122:4-11; 419:25 & 420:1-12).
Creating easy-to~use and easy-to-Iearn consumer interfaces is a key aspect of e-colnmerce
competition. Amazon.com's commercial success depends in part on its efforts to reduce its customers'
time and effort in using its site. (Ex. 10, Johnson Decl.1[7, see a/so Ex. 37, at 41).
46. One ofAmazon.com's investments to improve its customers' experience and attract new
customers was to develop single-action ordering. (Tr. at 123:4-124:6 (Bezos». The feature has been
popular with Amazon.com customers and the one-step ordering innovation has been praised in the
industry. (Tr. at 125:9-126:6 (Bezos); Ex. 11, Bezos Decl. at 1[14, Exs. A, B).
47. A number ofother e-commerce retailers, including 'Defendants, subsequently adopted systems
that are essentially identical to the features ofAmazon.com's single-action ordering process. With
respect to Barnesandnoble.com, the Court finds that its later adoption of a single-action ordering
system, Express Lane, eliminated a key point ofdifferentiation between its website and
Amazon.com's.
48. The harm to Amazon.com would be compounded ifBarnesandnoble.com's infringement were
permitted to continue during the 1999 holiday shopping season (Ex. 10, Johnson Decl.1[16; Ex. 11,
Bezos Decl. 1[20). There is no dispute that holiday seasons have historically been ,key periods for e-
commerce customer acquisition and that they can have a significant effect on the long-term prospects
of e-commerce businesses. (See Tr. at 474:9-18 (Bulkeley». In 1998, for example, Amazon.com
increased its customer base nearly 20% in just the last six weeks of the year, adding over a million
new customer accounts in this time period. (Ex. 11, Bezos Decl. at 1[20). This year appears likely to
be an even more significant season for customer acquisition. (Ex. 10 Johnson Decl. at mJI6-17; Ex.
11. Bezos Decl. at 1[20; Tr: at 108:3-16). Industry estimates for the amount that will be spentby
consumers online in November and December of this year range from 56 to 12 billion - - 2 to 3 times
tht: amount spent during the same period in 1998. (Ex. 10; Johnson Decl. at 1[16, Exs. C, D)
49. As many as 10 million new users are expected to make their first on-line purchases during the
1999 holiday season. (Ex. 10; Johnson Decl.1[16). Millions of these new customers are likely to be
shopping at Amazon.com and Barnesandnoble.com for the first time. Long-term success in e-
commerce depends on establishing positive relationships with these new on-line buyers now, to
G(b) - 35
II. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
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5. The statutory presumption ofvalidity, 35 U.S.C. §282, applies to all patents and is meant "to
contribute stability to the grant ofpatent rights." Magnivision, Inc. v. Bonneau Co., 115 F.3d 956,958
(Fed. Cir. 1997). This presumption operates at every stage of the litigation, including in a motion for
preliminary injunction against an alleged infringer. See Canon Computer Systems, Inc. v. Nu-kote
Int'I, Inc., 134 F.3d 1085, 1088 (Fed. Cir. 1998). A defendant may overcome this presumption,
however, ifhe raises a "substantial question" concerning the validity of a patent and if the party
seeking the injunction fails to show that this defense lacks "substantial merit." See New England
Braiding Co. v. A. w: Chesterton Co., 970 F.2d 878, 883 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (noting that "[w]hile it is
not the patentee's burden to prove validity, the patentee must show that the alleged infringer's defense
lacks substantial merit"). Defendants raise a number of questions regarding the '411 patent's validity,
which the Court discusses below.
Validity
4. "[T]o obtain a preliminary injunction, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. §283, a party must establish a right
thereto in light of four factors: (1) reasonable likelihood ofsuccess on the merits; (2) irreparable
harm; (3) the balance ofhardships tipping in its favor; and (4) the impact of the injunction on the
public interest." Hybritech, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 849 F.2d 1446, 1451 (Fed Cir. 1988).
Preliminary Injunction Standard
3. On September 28, 1999, United States Patent No. 5,960,411 (the "'411 patent"), entitled "Method
and System for Placing a Purchase Order Via a Communications Network," was duly and legally
issued. The patent was assigned to and is owned by Amazon.com.
preserve the ability to compete effectively for future sales, which by some estimates will reach $78
billion by the year 2003. (Ex. 10, Johnson Decl., Ex. C; Tr: at 474:9-18).
A. Likelihood ofSuccess on the Merits
2. Venue is proper in this District pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§139I(b) and 1400(b) because Defendants
reside here (28 U.S.C. §1391(c».
1. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over Amazon.com's claim for patent infringement
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1338(a). Defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction in this
District because they have purposefully availed themselves of the privileges of conducting business in
the State ofWashington.
50. If Bamesandnoble.com were able to continue to offer Express Lane as currently configured
during the 1999 holiday season and for the pendency of this action, Amazon.com would not be able
to distinguish itself from a key competitor by offering single-action ordering and would likely lose
market share and customers to Bamesandnoble.com. The Court finds that this loss would not be
easily compensable in damages. Exclusive rights to the patented invention are important to
Amazon.com's ability to differentiate the customer experience available at its site from that of
competitor sites such as Bamesandnoble.com.
Anticipation
Amazon.com Inc. v. Bamesandnoble.com Inc.
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6. Anticipation is a question of fact, see Atlas Powder Co. v. Ireco Inc., 190 F.3d 1342, 1346 (Fed.
Cir. 1999), and is a defense only if "all of the same elements are found in exactly the same situation
and united in the same way ... in a single prior art reference." Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Computervision
Co/p., 732 F.2d 888, 894 (Fed. Cir. 1984). Although anticipation is a factual inquiry, the Court
reiterates its findings and the applicable law here for ease ofreference.
7. The Court finds that Web Basket does not anticipate any claim of the '411 patent. Each claim of the
'411 patnet requires either "a single-action ordering component" [claims 1-10] or "a single action that
. is to be performed to order the identified item" [claims 11-26]. The Web Basket ordering process
requires that the user perform at least five actions to complete the order. Web Basket, therefore, does
not include "a single-action ordering component" or "a single action that is to be performed to order
the identified them."
8. In addition, claims 1-5 and 11-26 require that "the item is ordered without using a shopping.cart
ordering model" [claims 1-5] or "the item is ordered independently of a shopping cart model" [claims
11-26]. Because Web Basket is itself a shopping cart model, it lacks these required elements as well.
9. The description ofthe Netscape Instant Buy option presented by Defendants consisted of a total of
four lines. Defendants' expert Dr. Lockwood was unable to supply any additional information
regarding the feature described by this reference and ultimately admitted that he did not know how
the feature worked. (Tr. at 312:3-20; 350:7-12). The Netscape reference therefore does not teach the
invention to one ofordinary skill in the art (e.g., Dr. Lockwood) as is required ofan anticipatory
reference.
10. Moreover, when read in context, the reference appears to describe a shopping cart model with an
option to skip one ofthe required checkout steps. Thus viewed in the best light for Defendants, the
Netscape reference fails to anticipate any of the claims -of the '411 for the same reasons as Web
Basket: it does not include a single-action ordering component. Moreover, it does not appear to be
independent of a shopping cart model, as required by claims 1 and 11.
11. Similarly, the Oliver's Market reference, when read as a whole, plainly discloses a multi-step
shopping cart model. It, therefore, also lacks the same elements that are missing from Web Basket
and Netscape: a single-action ordering component that is independent of a shopping cart model.
12. The '780 patent entitled "Internet Server Access Control and Monitoring System" also fails to
anticipate any claim ofthe '411 patent. As discussed above, the system described in the '780 patent
controls access to certain web pages. Even assuming that a web page is an "item" to be ordered as that
term is used in the claims of the '411 patent, the access control system described in the '780 patent is
not an ordering system.
13. Each claim of the '411 patent requires that the server system generate an order for the item
requested by the customer. The requirement is described in slightly different terms in each of the
independent claims but the import is the same: "generat[e] an order to purchase the requested
item" (claim 1); "Locate additional information needed'to compete the order and so that the server
system can fulfill the generated order" (claim 6); "uses the retrieved information to place an order for
the indicated user for the item" (claim 9); "whereby the item is ordered independently of a shopping
cart model and the order is fulfilled to complete a purchase of the item" (claim 11).
G(b) - 37
Obviousness
G(b) - 38
I7. In the CompuServe Trend system, to receive a chart the user has to type in the ticker symbol
identifying the stock for which they want to order a chart. The system does not, therefore, identify an
item that a user could order with a single action. Thus, CompuServe does not anticipate claims 1-8 or
11-26. .
t'age 11 ot 22.
14. The system described by the '780 patent merely delivers the requested web page to authorized
users as would any other web server. The fact that the user may later be billed based on a log of pages
that he or she has visited does not tum the standard delivery of web pages requested by a client into
an order generation and fulfillment system as required by the claims of the '411 patent.
18. As described above with respect to the '780 patent, claims 6-10 of the '411 patent require a
shopping cart ordering component in addition to the single-action ordering component. There is no
evidence that the CompuServe Trend service -included a shopping cart component. It therefore does
not, as Defendants acknowledge, anticipate claims 6-10.
16. Finally, the CompuServe Trend service does not anticipate any claim of the '411 patent. Each
claim ofthe '411 patent (except 9 and 10) requires (with slightly different language) displaying
information identifying the item to be ordered and a single action to be taken to order the item:
"displaying information identifying the item; and in response to only a single action being performed,
sending a request to order the item" (claim 1); "a display component for displaying information
identifying the item; a single action ordering component that in response to performance ofonly a
single action, sends a request to a server system to order the identified item" (claim 6); "displaying
information identifying the item and displaying an indication of a single action that is to be performed
to order the identified item" (claim 11).
15. In addition, claims 6-10 of the '411 patent require a shopping cart ordering component in addition
to the single action ordering component. The '780 patent does not disclose a shopping cart ordering
component. That it appears impossible to "order" web pages using a shopping cart model suggests
that web pages are not items to be ordered within the meaning of the claims '411 patent. In any case,
the access control system of the '780 patent lacks the other claim elements, i.e., order generating
step/component and the shopping cart ordering component required by the claims of the '411 and,
therefore, does not anticipate them.
19. "Included within the presumption ofvalidity mandated by 35 U.S.C. §282 is a presumption of
nonobviousness which the patent challenger must overcome by proving facts with clear and
convincing evidence. The presumption remains intact even upon proof of prior art not cited by the
Patent and Trademark Office (PTa), though such art, ifmore relevant than that cited, may enable the
challenger to sustain its burden." Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Computervision Corp., 732 F.2d 888, 894
(Fed. Cir. 1984) (citations omitted).
20. The issue of obviousness is a mixed question of fact and law. The ultimate question is one oflaw,
but it is based on several factual inquiries, including: (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) the
differences between the prior art and the claims; (3) the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art; and
(4) applicable secondary considerations. See Weatherchem Corp. v. J.L. Clark, Inc., 163 F.3d 1326,
1332 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
Amazon.com Inc. v. Bamesandnoble.com Inc.
22. In any event, whether it.would be, at the present time, an "obvious" or "trivial" modification of
the Web Basket system to include the "single action" feature of the '411 patent is legally irrelevant.
The law is clear that the time period for any obviousness determination is "at the time the invention
was made." 35 U.S.C. §103(a). See also. In re Dembiczak, 175 F.3d 994, 998-99 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
23. "[O]bjective indicia 'may often be the most probative and cogent evidence ofnonobviousness in
the record.'" Gambro Lundia AB v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.• 110 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(quoting Stratoflex. Inc. v. Aeroquip. Corp.. 713 F.2d 1530, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1983»; see also, Arkie
Lures Inc. v. Gene Larew Tackle. Inc.• 119 F.3d 953, 957 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("Indeed, evidence of
secondary considerations may often be the most probative and cogent evidence in the record. It may
often establish that an invention appearing to have been obvious in light of the prior art was not.").
21. Defendants' evidence relating to invalidity of claims of the '411 patent on the ground of
obviousness consists largely ofDr. Lockwood's statements that he could modify his Web Basket
system to actually be a single-action ordering system, and that doing so would be an "obvious" or
"trivial" modification of the Web Basket system. (Tr. at 229; Ex. A-56, Lockwood Deck ~51) Dr.
Lockwood, however, testified (as did Mr. Mulligan), that it had never occurred to him to do this. (Tr.
at 277:19-23 (Lockwood); Tr. at 199:2-15 (Mulligan». Mr. Mulligan further produced credible
testimony why one skilled in the art would not, at the time the invention was made, have considered
this modification. (Tr. at 190:21-191 :2; 199:2-15).
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24. "Such secondary considerations as commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, [and]
failures of others" are relevant as evidence ofobviousness. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1,
17-18,86 S.Ct. 684, 15 L.Ed.2d 545 (1966). See also. Arlie Lures Inc., 119 F.3d at 957
(Considerations of commercial success, licensing activities, and copying may be "highly probative of
the issue of nonobviousness.").
25. Copying ofthe invention by Bamesandnoble.com and others is additional evidence of
nonobviousness. "It gives the tribute ofits praise to the prior art; it gives the [invention] the tribute of
its imitation, as others have done." Diamond Rubber Co. v. Consolidated Rubber Tire Co.• 220 U.S.
428,441,31 S.Ct. 444, 55 L.Ed. 527 (1911).
26. The adoption ofsingle-action ordering by other e-commerce retailers following Amazon.com's
introduction ofthe feature, coupled with the need to solve the problem ofabandoned shopping carts
bye-commerce customers, is additional evidence ofnonobviousness. See Hayes Microcomputer
Prod. Inc. v. Ven-tel. Inc., 982 F.2d 1527, 1540 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ("[T]he commercial success of the
invention, the failure ofothers to solve the problem addressed by the patented invention, and the fact
that the [invention] has become the industry standard is compelling objective evidence of the
nonobviousness of the claimed invention.").
27. In light of its consideration of the factors and evidence related to the question of obviousness, the
Court finds Bamesandnoble.com is unlikely to succeed in showing by clear and convincing evidence
that the claims of the '411 patent were obvious. Bamesandnoble.com's reliance on the simplicity of
the invention is unavailing. "Defining the problem in terms of its solution reveal improper hindsight
in the selection ofthe prior art relevant to obviousness." Monarch Knitting Machinery Corp. v. Sulzer
Jlorat GMBH, 139 F.3d 877,881 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
Enforceability
G(b) - 39
Claim Construction
Page 140122
G(b) - 40
33. The term "shopping cart model" is described in the Background of the Invention section of the
'411 patent beginning at column 2 line 17: "The selection ofvarious items is generally based on the
32. Claims must be read in view ofthe specification ofwhich they are a part. See Markman v.
Westview Instruments. Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Words defined in the specification
should be given the same meaning in the claims. McGill. Inc. v. John Zink Co., 736 F.2d 666, 674
(Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1037, 105 S.Ct. 514, 83 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984), overruled on
other grounds. MarA.man, 52 F.3d at 967. See also Standard Oil Co. v. American Cyanamid Co., 774
F.2d 448, 452 (Fed.Cir. 1985) (the specification is the primary basis for construing claims).
For ease ofreference, the Court includes its entire infringement analysis in the Conclusions ofLaw
section, even though it presents mixed questions oflaw and fact.
31. The parties do not dispute the meaning ofmost of the terms in the patent claims including: "client
system"; "sever system"; and "method for ordering." (See Tr. at 434:1-435:13 (King». The parties
disagree, however, as to the meaning ofthe terms "shopping cart model," "fulfillment," "single
action," and "single-action ordering component."
30. Defendants have also argued that Plaintiffhas not demonstrated that the "Express Lane" feature
infringes any claims of the '411 patent. "[A]nalysis ofpatent infringement involves two steps: (1)
claim construction to determine what the claims cover, i.e., their scope, followed by (2) determination
ofwhether the properly construed claims encompass the accused structure." Cole v. Kimberly-Clark
Corp. 102 F.3d 524, 528 (Fed. Cir. 1997). The former is a question of law; the latter is a question of
fact. See Voice Techs. Group v. VMS Sys. Inc., 164 F.3d 605, 612 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
Infringement Analysis
29. In any event, the Court finds that Defendants' regarding unenforceability lack substantial merit.
The testimony of Mr. Mulligan, a member of the IETF, that the IETF Draft is less relevant to the '411
patent than cited references including one in a publication entitled "Dr. Dobbs Journal" that itself
references the IETF Draft, is unopposed and dispositive. (Tr. at 174: 13-25 (Mulligan» A "patentee
need not cite an otherwise material reference to the PTa if that reference is merely cumulative or is
less material than other references already before the examiner." Barter Int'l. Inc. v. McGaw. Inc.,
149 F.3d 1321, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
Amazon.com Inc. v. .barnesandnoble.com Inc.
28. In their initial opposition to Plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction, Defendant argued that
. the '411 patent was unenforceable due to alleged inequitable conduct on the part of the one of the
inventors, Shel Kaphan. Specifically, Defendants alleged that Mr. Kaphan's failure to cit to the PTa
an Internet Engineering Task Force draft entitled "State Management Mechanism" ("IETF Draft"), in
which he is acknowledged as a contributor by the authors, constituted inequitable conduct.
Defendants deposed Mr. Kaphan and submitted brief excerpts from his deposition to the Court. None
of those excerpts related to his knowledge ofthe IETF Draft or any intent to deceive the patent office.
The Court assumes that Defendants have abandoned their inequitable conduct claim, at least for the
purposes of their opposition to the preliminary injunction motion. Indeed, Defendants presented no
arguments based on unenforceability in their closing argument or in their proposed findings of fact
and conclusions of law.
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'shopping cart' model. When the purchaser selects an item from the electronic catalog, the server
computer system metaphorically adds that item to a shopping cart. When the purchaser is done
selecting items, then all the items in the shopping cart are 'checked out' (i.e. ordered) when the
purchaser provides billing and shipping infonnation." As described at column 2 lines 34 through 43,
in some cases the billing and shipping infonnation may be prestored by the merchant and need only
be onfinned to complete the checkout process.
34. The definition of shopping cart model in the background section of the '411 patent is consistent
with that provided by Amazon.com's e-commerce experts Dr. Johnson and Mr. Mulligan. (See Ex.
10, Johnson Decl. at '14; Ex. 12, Mulligan Decl. at '7; Tr. at 167:19-168:9 (Mulligan».
35. Dr. Lockwood defined a shopping cart model more broadly in a manner that could potentially
include any method ofbuying on-line. (Tr. at 279:5-282:4). In general, the Court found Dr.
Lockwood's description ofthe tenn "shopping cart model" to be confusing and inconsistent.
Barnesandnoble.com's ChiefInfonnation Officer, Mr. King, gave a similarly broad definition Df
shopping cart model. (Tr. at 428: 1-21). According to its own expert Dr. Lockwood, under
Defendants' definition of shopping cart model, claims 1 and 11 would appear to be internally
inconsistent. (See Tr. at 284:22-285:22). Similarly, Mr. King testified that with Bamesandnoble.com's
definition of shopping cart model, claims 1 and 11 would not cover the single-action purchasing
method described in the '411 patent. (Tr. at 428:1-21). .
36. A claim interpretation that excludes the preferred embodiment is "rarely, if ever, correct."
Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996). "When claims are
amenable to more than one construction, they should when reasonably possible be interpreted so as to
preserve their validity." Modine Mfg. Co. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 75 F.3d 1545, 1557 (Fed. Cir.
1996). The Court, therefore, rejects the definition of "shopping cart model" propounded by
Defendants.
37. The Court adopts instead a definition which is consistent with the patent specification preserves
the validity of the claims, and allows the claims to be read on the preferred embodiment described in
the patent specification. In construing the claims, the Court, therefore, takes the term "shopping cart
model" to mean a method for on-line ordering in which a user selects and accumulate items to be
purchased while browsing a merchant's site and then must proceed to one or more checkout or
confinnation steps in order to complete the purchase. (Ex. 12, Mulligan Supp.Decl. m15-6).
38. The second point ofdisagreement is the meaning ofthe terms "fulfill" and "order fulfillment
component" in claims 6 and 9, and in particular whether "fulfill" or "fulfillment" refer to computer or
physical processes. Though the patent specification does not explicitly define the phrase, order
"filling" and "fulfillment" is discussed at length at column 8 and figure 7 in the context of
Amazon.com's order consolidation algorithm. That discussion and the entire specification describe
only computer processes and an order is defined to be filled "when all its items are currently in
inventory (i.e. available) and can be shipped." In addition, Amazon.com's expert Mr. Mulligan
testified that an "order fulfillment component" ofa "server system" as required by claim 9 is "the
software that takes the information provided by the database of the user infonnation and the inventory
database and combines those into a shipment order ... and then notifies that the order is ready for
shipment." (Tr. at 165:7-12).
39. Mr. Mulligan's above definition of "order fulfillment component" as a computer program is
consistent with the out of court statements by Bamesandnoble.com's Chief Infonnation Officer, Mr. ..
G(b) - 41
G(b) - 42
Page 10 ot 1.1.
44. In its opening papers, Amazon.com provided a declaration from its expert Mr. Mulligan .
explaining in detail where every element ofclaims 1,2,3,5,6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17,21,
22,23,24 is present in Barnesandnoble.com's Express Lane ordering system. (Ex. 9, Mulligan Decl.).
Mr. Mulligan described his analysis with respect to independent claims 9 and 11 in his testimony
before the Court. (Tr. at 161 :2-169:4). . .
43. The parties dispute what mouse clicks "count" in determining whether the single-action
requirement of the '411 patent claims is satisfied. The Court finds that clicks "count" after both
information identifying the item and a description ofthe single action the user must take to complete
a purchase order for that item are displayed to the user.
Comparison ofthe '411 Patent Claims to Defendants' Express Lane Feature·
40. Similarly, the Court finds that the term "fulfill" as used in claim 6 in the phrase, "so that the
server system can fulfill the generated order," refers to processes performed by the order fulfillment
component of (or order fulfillment application running on) the server system and does not include the
physical steps ofhandling or packing tangible items.
King, regarding Barnesandnoble.com's "fulfillment application" in a recent interview with an industry
trade press. (See Ex. 8). During cross-examination Mr. King testified that "fulfillment application"
was a commonly used term in the industry to refer to computer programs associated with the
fulfillIl)ent process. (Tr. at 432:25-433:8). The Court therefore finds that "order fulfillment
component" as used in claim 9 refers to order fulfillment application software described by Mr.
Mulligan and Mr. King.
42. The term "single action" is not defined by patent specification. However, the patent specification
provides that "once the description ofan item is displayed, the purchaser need only take a single
action to place the order to purchase that item." (Ex. A-I at col. 3, II. 64-66). The specification also
provides that "a single action may be preceded by multiple physical movements of the purchaser (e.g.,
moving a mouse so that a mouse pointer is over a button)." (Ex. A-I at col. 10, II. 2-4). In addition,
the specification indicates "[i]n general, the purchaser need only be aware ofthe item or items to be
ordered by the single action and ofthe single action needed to place the order." (Ex. A-I at col. 4, II.
14-17 (emphasis added». As a result, the term "single action" as used in the '411 patent appears to
refer to one action (such as clicking a mouse button) that a user takes to purchase an item once the
following information is displayed to the user: (I) a description ofthe item and (2) a description of
the single action the user must take to complete a purchase order for that item. -
41. The third point ofdisagreement concerns the terms "single action" and "single-action ordering
component" as used in claims I, 6, 9, and II.
45. In their pre-hearing briefing, Defendants only disputed Mr. Mulligan's analysis with respect to the
meaning of fulfillment in claims 6 and 9 and the meaning of "shopping cart model" in claims 1 and
II. (Ex. A-16, King Decl. W8-12). Mr. King acknowledged that Barnesandnoble.com's Express Lane
included every element ofclaim 11 except the last, which requires that the item is ordered
independently ofa shopping cart model. (Tr. at 434:1-435:13).
46. Because the Court adopts the patent specification's description ofthe term "shopping cart model,"
which is consistent with Mr. Mulligan's testimony, the Court finds that Barnesandnoble.com infrin2es
claims 1,2,3,5, II, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17,21,22,23,24.
Amazon.com Inc. v. Barnesandnobie.com inc.
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47. The Court has also found that the tenns "fulfill" and "order fulfillment component" in claims 6
and 9 do not include the retailer's acts ofphysically locating, packaging, and shipping a tangible item
after a purchase order is completed. The Court, therefore, finds that Bamesandnoble.com also
infringes claims 6-10 ofthe '411 patent.
48. At the hearing on this motion, Defendants argued that Bamesandnoble.com's Express Lane option
was not a "single-action ordering component" as required by claims 1,3,5,6, 7,8,9, 10, because a
user of Express Lane must take more than one action from the first time that some infonnation
regarding an item is displayed. The Court finds this argument unavailing. Except in court,
Bamesandnoble.com everywhere has described its Express Lane option as "one-click ordering,"
including on its web site and its communications with shareholders and prospective shareholders
filed with the Securities Exchange Commission. (Tr. at 464:3-8; Tr. at 464:24 467:22 (Bulkeley); Ex.
36 at 6, 44, 47). Moreover, the Court agrees with the testimony ofMr. Mulligan that browsing a site
is not ordering and that one does not begin the ordering process until one is past the home page and is
presented with an opportunity to order an item. (Tr. at 185:3-8; Tr. at 191:7-15). This occurs for the
first time at the product or detail page on the Bamesandnoble.com site. (Id. and 9, Mulligan Decl.,
Ex., R). From there, as noted on Bamesandnoble.com's own web page, ordering with the Express
Lane option requires only a single click. (Id.).
49. Mr. King testified that he was provided with a copy ofthe '411 patent by Bamesandnoble.com's
outside counsel in early October, 1999. (Tr. at 417:9-19). It was the first time that Mr. King had ever-
received a patent from Bamesandnoble.com's outside counsel. (Tr. at 417:20-22). "Where, as here, a
potential infringer has actual notice ofanother's patent rights, he has an affinnative duty to exercise
due care to determine whether or not he is infringing." Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-
Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1389 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
Summary
50. Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiffhas demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of
success on the merits at trial.
B. Irreparable Harm
51. The Court finds that Plaintiffhas made a strong showing that the '411 patent is valid and that·· .
Defendants' Express Lane feature infringes the patent. Plaintiff is therefore entitled to a presUmption
of irreparable harm. See, e.g:, Smith Int'l, Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co., 718 F.2d 1573, 1581 (Fed. Cir.
1983) (holding "where validity and continuing infringement have been clearly established: ...
immediate irreparable harm is presumed"). While Defendants have raised a number ofdefenses
regarding validity, noninfringement, and enforceability, the Court finds that Plaintiffhas established
that these defenses lack substantial merit.
52. In light ofPlaintifrs strong showing ofvalidity and infringement, Defendants can rebut the
presumption of irreparable harm only in limited circumstances not applicable here, such as that (1)
the allegedly infringing activities have ended or will soon end; (2) the movant has engaged in a
pattern ofgranting licenses; or (3) the movant unduly delayed in bringing suit. See Polymer Techs.,
Inc. v. Bridwell, 103 F.3d 970,974 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Absent these facts or Defendants' "proffer of .
similar evidence," the Federal Circuit has indicated that "infringement of a valid patent inherently
causes irreparable harm." Id. at 975.
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54. Defendants also suggest that Amazon.com engaged in undue delay by not paying its Issue Fee for
the '411 patent until six weeks after receiving the Notice ofAllowability for the patent. Defendants
cite no authority which indicates that this type of delay is either undue or even relevant. Moreover, as
fonner PTO Commissioner Harry Manbeck testified, taking six weeks between the Notice of
Allowability and payment of the Issue Fee is not unusual, and is probably shorter than average period.
(Ex. 13, Manbeck Dec. ~17).
57. Amazon.com has presented the testimony ofits founder and chainnan, JeffBezos, and ofan e-
commerce expert, Dr. Eric Johnson, explaining the significance ofsingle-action ordering and of
reducing "friction" in customer experiences ofshopping on-line. They provided both opinion and
empirical evidence that reducing the number of steps a customer must take to make a purchase
increases the likelihood that the customer will complete that purchase. (See Ex. 10, Johnson Dec!.
~1 0; Ex. 11, Bezos Dec!. 'tI8) A single-action ordering method is valuable because it reduces the steps
that an on-line customer must take when making a purchase. The evidence adduced from
Page 1801'22
53. Defendants attempt to invoke the category, ofundue delay, arguing that Amazon.com should have
filed their suit immediately upon issuance of the patent. However, Amazon.com filed this action 22
days after its patent was issued. The Court is unaware ofany authority indicating that filing a motion
for a preliminary injunction less than a month after a patent is issued constitutes an undue delay.
Instead, cases citing undue delay as a factor to be considered on a motion for preliminary injunction
address delays ofmonths or years, not days. See Mentor Graphics Corp. v. Quickturn Design
Systems, Inc., 999 F.Supp. 1388 (D. Or. 1997) (delay ofmore than one year between the filing of
patent infringement action and the filing ofa motion for a preliminary injunction did not bar the
patentee from obtaining a preliminary injunction), affd 150 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Rubbermaid
Commercial Prods., Inc. v. Contico Int'l., Inc., 836 F.Supp. 1247 (W.D. Va. 1993) (eight months no
bar); Motorola, Inc. v. Alexander Mfg. Co., 786 F.Supp. 808 (N.D. Iowa 1991) (three months no bar);
SMI Indus. Canada Ltd. v. Caelter Indus., Inc., 586 F.Supp. 808 (N.D.N.Y. 1984) (six months no
bar).
56. All of the following factors here weigh in favor ofa finding of irreparable harm: the parties are
direct competitors trying to influence the same group ofcustomers; Amazon.com spent significant
time and effort on market development; Defendants' continuing infringement is likely to undermine
Amazon.com's market position; and Defendants' unchecked infringement will encourage others to
infringe. See Mills, supra; see also Atlas Powder Co.~ 773 F.2d at 1233 ("Ifmonetary reliefwere the
sole relief afforded by the patent statute then ... infringers could become compulsory licensees for as
long as the litigation lasts."). These sorts ofindirect effects are the reason the statute includes
injunctive remedies. See Hybritech, 849 F.2d at 1457 ("The patent statute provides injunctive relief to
preserve the legal interests of the parties against future infringement which may have market effects
never fully compensable in money."). .
55. Beyond the presumption of irreparable harm, there is additional evidence ofirreparable harm in
the record. Irreparable harm can also be shown by demonstrating that damages are an inadequate
remedy. The Federal Circuit uses a variety of factors to detennine whether irreparable harm exists.
See Mills, "The Developing Standard for Irreparable Harm in Preliminary Injunctions to Prevent
Patent Infringement," 81 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc'y 51,65-66 (Jan. 1999) (listing factors); see
also Jacobson v. Cox Paving Co., 19 U.S.P.Q.2d 1641; 1653 (D. Ariz. 1991) (listing factors and
noting that courts have issued injunctions after finding only a few), afJ'd, 949 F.2d 404 (Fed. Cir.
1991 ).
Amazon.com Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com Inc.
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Bamesandnoble.com regarding the problem ofabandoned shopping carts (an "industry standard" 65%
of them are never checked out) and the popularity ofits single-action Express Lane feature
corroborate the commercial value of the '411 patent. (See Ex. 28; Tr. at 418: 1-11; 420:9-421: 18
(King); 473:14-474:5 Bulkeley».
58. Amazon.com's witnesses also described how and why the upcoming holiday season will be
critical to the online retailing industry. (Ex. 10, Johnson Decl. "16-17; Ex. 11, Bezos Decl. '20).
They presented evidence that invaluable customer loyalty and goodwill will be irreparably lost to
Defendants if they are allowed to continue to infringe, particularly in the next two critical months for
e-commerce retailing. As the Federal Circuit has explained, "Competitors change the marketplace.
Years after infringement has begun, it may be impossible to restore a patentee's ... exclusive position
by an award ofdamages and a permanent injunction." Polymer Tecit. 103 F.3d at 975-76. Again, the
testimony from Barnesandnoble.com corroborates Amazon.com's claim that the 1999 holiday season
will be extremely important commercially to on-line retailers. (See Tr. at 474:9-18 (Bulkeley».
59. Defendants argue that Amazon.com is not entitled to an injunction because its injuries can be
compensated in money damages. The cases they cite all hinge on a finding, not applicable here, that
the patentee was not entitled to a presumption of irreparable harm because it had not made a clear
showing ofvalidity and infringement. See Nutrition 21 v. Thome Research. Inc.• 930 F.2d 867, 871
(Fed. Cir. 1991); Eli Lilly & Co. v. American Cyanamid Co.• 896 F.Supp 851, 860 (S.D. Ind. 1995).
Where the presumption ofirreparable harm applies, that plaintiff's injuries are fully compensable
cannot alone justify a finding that defendants rebutted the presumption ofirreparable harm. Polymer
Techs., 103 F.3d at 975-76.
60. Here, Amazon.com has presented ample evidence that the harm it asks the Court to prevent - -
losing the opportunity to distinguish itself and build customer loyalty at a critical time - - cannot be
reduced to a simple formula. See Hybritech, 849 F.2d at 1456-57 ("It is well-settled that .. the nature
of the patent grant weighs against holding that monetary damages will always suffice to make the
patentee whole."). There is no easy way to determine the value of the relationships and loyalties that
millions of customers establish with Internet retailers over the next several months.
61. Neither side is able to offer any formula that is readily available for determining what damages
might be.
62. Amazon.com's patent entitles it to the exclusive right to offer its single-action ordering invention,
and to reap the value that feature adds to its site. Defendants' use of the Express Lane feature, as
currently configured, would deny Amazon.com ofthe benefit of its patent. .
Bamesandnoble.com has failed to demonstrate that the value of the use of the patent can be
calculated in dollars.
63. Amazon.com is presumptively and actually suffering irreparable injury because ofDefendants'
infringement. The Court concludes that only a preliminary injunction will prevent that harm.
C Balance OfHardships
64. The balance ofhardships between the parties also favors granting Amazon.com's motion for
preliminary injunction. The Court must weigh the threatened injury to the patent holder if injunctive
relief is not granted against the injury to the accused infringer if the preliminary injunction is granted.
G(b) - 45
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69. Mr. King testified that it would be possible to remove the Express Lane feature from the
Barnesandnoble.com site and that he has already met with his developers to discuss it. (Tr. at 435: 14-
19).
68. As Dr. Johnson points out, on-line retailers have great freedom with which they can create their
0\\-11 unique consumer experiences. (Ex. 10, Johnson Decl. , 15). As noted above,
Bamesandnoble.com could modify Express Lane to employ any non-infringing ordering system,
including any that requires two or more actions. MoreOver, in addition to "Express Lane,"
Bamesandnoble.com offers a multi-step "shopping cart" ordering system, so it does not need single-
action ordering to keep its site running. Many other on-line retailers operate their businesses using
multi-step ordering, and Bamesandnoble.com can as well. (See Ex. 11, Bezos Decl. at '21).
67. Aside from the need to take steps to modify its Express Lane feature, Defendants' only testimony
or evidence of any harm it will suffer if it is enjoined from infringing the '411 patent is that calls to its
customer service phone lines will increase because ofthe change to its users' experience. (Tr: at
458: 15-19). Bamesandnoble's concerns about customer service calls or possible temporary
interruptions in its website operation would not tip the balance in favor of an infringing defendant.
See PPG Indus., Inc. v. Guardian Indus. Corp., 75 F.3d 1558, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (it was less
burdensome on infringer to suffer "a temporary interruption" in the infringer's production and sale of
its product where patentee would suffer significant harm from denial ofpreliminary injunction).
66. The harm to Amazon.com is more extensive. Without this injunction, Amazon. com will lose the
primary value ofthe l-Click® option: its role in distinguishing the Amazon.com site from the site of
a key competitor. (See Ex. 10, Johnson Dec. ml8-12).
See H.vbritech Inc.. 849 F.2d at 1457. Here, the balance ofhardships tips in Amazon.com's favor. Any
harm suffered by Bamesandnoble.com would result directly from its misappropriation of
Amazon.com's patented purchasing method. The balance ofhardships does not favor a defendant
where the defendant "took a calculated risk that it might infringe [plaintiff's] patents." Smith In!'l. Inc.
v. Hughes Tool Co.. 718 F.2d 1573, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
65. Moreover, the evidence indicates that Bamesandnoble.com can modify its "Express Lane" feature
with relative ease to avoid infringement of the '411 patent. For instance, infringement can be avoided
by simply requiring users to take an additional action to confirm orders placed by using Express Lane.
(Tr. at 530:8-13).
71. The public is served by innovation on the Internet and in electronic commerce, particularly now
while it is still developing rapidly. Competition to provide unique, effective and enjoyable consumer
experiences will lead to innovation and diversity in on-line commerce. (Ex. 11, Bezos Decl. '22). On
the other hand, innovation will be discouraged if competitors are permitted a free ride on each other's
70. Finally, the question ofwhether the balance ofhardships tips in Amazon. com's favor is
necessarily related to its showing ofa likelihood of success on the merits. "Because the court must
balance the hardships, at least in part in light of its estimate ofwhat is likely to happen at trial, it must
consider the movant's showing oflikelihood ofsuccess." Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Grip-Pak, Inc.,
906 F.2d 679, 683 (Fed. Cir. 1990). Amazon.com's strong showing oflikelihood of success further
tips the balance ofhardships in its favor.
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patented inventions. Protection of intellectual property rights in innovations will foster greater
competition and innovation. (Ex. 11, Bezos Decl. ~22; Ex. 10, Johnson Dec!. ~15).
72. Granting Amazon.com's preliminary injunction will serve the public interest. The public has a
strong interest in the enforcement of intellectual property rights. The purpose of the patent system is
to reward inventors and provide incentives for further innovation by preventing others from
exploiting their work. See E.l du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Polaroid Graphics Imaging, Inc., 706
F.Supp. 1135, 1146 (D.Del. 1989), affd 887 F.2d 1095 (Fed. Cir. 1989). Encouraging Amazon.com
to continue to innovate - - and forcing competitors to come up with their own new ideas - -
unquestionably best serves the public interest.
73. Defendants' argument that the injunction would not serve the public interest presupposes that the
'41 1 patent is invalid and not infringed. Amazon. com has established that Defendants' defenses lack
substantial merit. The Amazon.com inventors are therefore entitled "to reap the benefits of their
labor" and "prevent others from practicing what they have invented." E.!. du Pont de Nemours. & Co.,
706 r .Supp. at 1146. This is particularly true in a rapidly developing industry where the window of
opportunity to reap the benefits is likely to be short-lived, given the fertile climate for e-commerce
inventions.
E. Other Arguments
74. Defendants have also offered a variety ofother arguments against issuance ofthe preliminary
injunction. They have suggested, for instance, that: (1) Amazon.com should have warned potential
infringers that a patent application was pending for the '411 patent prior to its issuance; (2)
Amazon.com somehow inequitably timed the issue date ofthe patent to fall near the 1999 holiday
season; and (3) Defendants' due process rights would be abrogated if they only had a few weeks to
prepare for a hearing on Amazon.com's motion for a preliminary injunction. Defendants have cited no
relevant case law to the Court in support of these arguments, and the Court finds these arguments
unpersuasive.
IV. CONCLUSION
Therefore, the Court hereby ORDERS that Defendants Barnesandnoble.com LLC and
Bamesandnoble.com Inc., their officers, agents, servants, employees and attorneys and those in active
concert or participation with them or Defendants ARE HEREBY RESTRAINED AND ENJOINED
from continuing to infringe United States Patent No. 5,960,411, including by continuing to make or
use \\'ithin the United States Defendants' Express Lane feature as currently configured or any other
single-action ordering system that employs the methods or systems ofthe '411 patent, or by inducing
others to make or use within the United States Defendants' Express Lane feature as currently
configured or any other single-action ordering system that employs the methods or system of the '411
patent. Defendants may continue to offer an Express Lane feature if the feature is modified to avoid
infringement of the '411 patent in a manner that is consistent with the fmdings offact and conclusions
of law set forth above.
The above Preliminary Injunction is effective at 12:01 a.m. P.S.T. on Saturday, December 4, 1999,
and upon Amazon.com's filing an undertaking in the sum of$10,000,000, and shall remain in effect
during the pendency ofthis action.
The clerk is directed to provide copies of this order to all counsel of record.
G(b) - 47
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Dated: December 1, 1999.
/s/
Marsha J. Pechman
U.S. District Judge
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ON-LINE PRIVACY: IS THERE ANY? SHOULD THERE BE ANY?
BALANCING THE INTERESTS OF CONSUMERS AND BUSINESS.
Information has been gathered by businesses about consumers for as long as there have been
businesses and consumers. Some of the more popular retail outlets have become successful based
on their ability to identify and use appropriately a customer's name and preferences. No doubt
everyone reading this article has had the experience of ordering an item from a specialty catalog,
and then, in the following weeks, being deluged by catalogs, magazines and other solicitations for
similar or related products and services.
Even the government is guilty of making money from private information. In the past,
practically all states sold personal infonrtation gathered as a part of the motor vehicle licensing
process, even if the information was otherwise not publicly available. Privacy ofDriver's License
Data Upheld, Los ANGELES TIMES, January 13,2000. States such as New York, Florida, Wisconsin
and others earned tens of millions of dollars selling such information to marketing companies. In
1994, Congress passed the Driver's Privacy Protection Act to force all states to refrain from
releasing certain DMV information, unless the motorist consented to the transfer of such
information. In 1998, the 4th Circuit Court of Appeals, which has the reputation' of favoring states'
rights, struck down the statute as unconstitutional. Recently, however, in a 9-0 ruling, the U.S.
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the statute.
Your bank has also likely sold your name and address in the past, and possibly some
information about your income level, to marketing companies and other businesses. New
regulations proposed by the Federal Reserve and the Treasury Department permit bank customers to
opt out of having certain non-public information sold or shared with telemarketers or other third
parties. Barring Banks From Giving Away Your Personal Data, APBnews.com, February 4,2000.
So, to answer the first question posted above, ''Is There Any?", the answer up to now may well be
"Not Much!"
So What's Different About the Internet?
Americans are becoming increasingly sensitive to privacy issues, and this is likely due to
several reasons. First, in the past while consumers may have known or sensed that information was
being gathered about them, consumer perception, to the extent it existed, was that the information
gathering process was proceeding at a slow and dysfunctional pace. With the Internet, the ability to
quickly and efficiently gather, organize and transmit data is nothing less than miraculous. While in
the past the manual gathering and matching of names, addresses and preferences might take a
retailer months or years, now that information can be gathered, sorted and transferred almost
instantaneously.
Concern over data privacy is exemplified by the complaints recently lodged against
DoubleClick, Inc., the world's largest banner ad server. The Washington based Electronic Privacy
Information Center ("EPIC") recently filed a request with the Federal Trade Commission to look
into the data collection practices of DoubleClick, Inc. In November 1999, DoubleClick merged
with Abacus Direct Corp., a marketing research company that apparently maintains a data base of
names, addresses and other marketing information for approximately 90% of American households.
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The FTC required Geocities to adopt a privacy policy that disclosed the following:
So What Parameters Exist for The On-Line Gathering
And Use of Personal Data?
Last but not least, tiring of being bombarded with solicitations, Americans are looking for
opportunities to throw a few stumbling blocks in the pathway of telemarketers.
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what infonnation is being collected;*
As of April of 1998, the Geocities web site was one of the 10 most frequently visited sites.
The Geocities site was a virtual neighborhood featuring web sites of its members divided into topics
of interest and including web sites of interest to children, such as the "Enchanted Forest." The
Geocities site did not have a comprehensive privacy statement but instead had short privacy
statements scattered throughout the site that discussed the infonnation being gathered For example,
one statement on the site indicated that if certain optional infonnation were provided, it would not
be shared with anyone without the provider's pennission. In addition, on some of the pages that
targeted children, Geocities would collect infonnation as a part of allowing participation in contests
or other activities. Geocities was apparently providing user infonnation (including infonnation
gathered from children) to third parties without a user's pennission. Because Geocities was not
complying with its own privacy statements and further because the site was targeting children and
then transferring to third parties the infonnation gathered from children, the FTC asserted
jurisdiction. In the Matter of Geocities, Complaint, www.ftc.gov/os/1999/9902/9823015.cmp.htm
and In the Matter ofGeocities, Decision and Order, www.ftc.gov/os/1999/9902/9823015d&o.htm.
EPIC claims that, prior to the announcement of the merger, DoubleClick had represented that the
infonnation it collected, i. e., clickstream data from visitors to web sites that featured DoubleClick
ads would be anonymous. Beginning in June 1999, DoubleClick apparently revised its privacy
policy to say that DoubleClick might combine personally identifiable data with clickstrea.m data.
Privacy Group Seeks FTC Investigation of Net Marketer's Information Collection Practices,
Electronic Commerce & Law, February 16,2000, Vol. 5, No.7, p. 157.
Second, Americans are becoming more sensitized to the privacy issue as a result of the
media coverage received by the European Union in connection with its strong stance on privacy and
its negotiations with the U.S. on privacy issues. Along the same lines, the widespread use of the
Internet by children has caused many American consumers who might not otherwise be interested
to focus on the issue.
While there are several industry specific laws and regulations governing privacy, and laws
and regulations governing children's privacy have been recently adopted, there is no broad reaching
law or regulation in effect that governs privacy. Currently, the Federal Trade Commission asserts
jurisdiction over on-line privacy through its enforcement power to regulate "deceptive acts and
practices" under the FTC Act. 15 U.S.C. § 45. Under the FTC Act, there is currently no private
right of action for consumers who have suffered a breach of privacy. The Federal Trade
Commission first exercised its enforcement power under the FTC Act in the Geocities matter.
In addition, the FTC required that Geocities' privacy notice be placed in a prominent
location and that the following notice be placed at locations in the site where any personal
identifying information would be collected: NOTICE: We collect personal information on the
site. To learn· more about how we use your information, click here.
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its intended use;
third parties to whom it would be disclosed;
the consumer's ability to obtain access or to directly access the information and the
means by which the consumer may do so;
the consumer's ability to remove directly or to have the information removed from
the web site database and the means by which the consumer may do so; and
the procedures to delete personal identifying information from the web site's
database and any limitations related to such deletion. In re Matter of Geocities,
Decision and Order.
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With respect to information gathered from children, the Geocities' site was required to
comply with certain requirements that correspond with the requirements of the now in effect
Children's Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998. In addition, Geocities was required to contact
parties to which it had transferred personally identifying information and request that the use of
certain information be discontinued. Further, the FTC has required the following notice to appear on
the Geocities website for five years after the date of the FTC Order: NOTICE: Click here for
important information about safe surfmg from the Federal Trade Commission.
The FTC has publicly conceded that it cannot force a web site to display a privacy
statement. Prepared Statement of the Federal Trade Commission, "Consumer Privacy on the
World Wide Web": Hearings before the Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade and
Consumer Protection of the House Committee, lOSth Congo N. 23 (1998) (statements of Robert M.
Pitosfsky, Chairman of the FTC). However, the position of the FTC was made clear in the
Geocities matter that if a business does have a privacy policy, it is required to follow it. Consistent
with the FTC's position in Geocities, it also investigated and entered into a consent order with
Liberty Financial Companies concerning web site privacy issues. See In re Liberty Fin. Cos.,
www.ftc.gov/os!1999/990S/lbtyord.htm.
Should a Web Site Have a Privacy Policy?
In determining whether to adopt a privacy statement, a business must weigh risks associated
with having a privacy policy against the distinct advantages of having a privacy policy. One clear
advantage of having a privacy policy is a marketing advantage. Consumers who are sensitized to
the issue will allocate a measure of credibility to a site that has a policy and may discredit a site that
has no privacy policy. Second, the FTC has not yet recommended that Congress adopt broad
legislation to govern privacy, with the expectation that businesses on the web will act responsibly
and engage in self regulation. Clearly, from a business perspective, self regulation is preferable to
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government regulation, and the unwillingness of a significant number of e-businesses to adopt
privacy policies will likely spawn federal legislation on the subject. Third, the U.S. and the
European Union will eventually agree on a safe harbor approach to enable U.S. companies to access
European data under the E.U. privacy directive, and one component of the safe harbor requirements
will be the adoption of and adherence to a privacy policy.
What Now?
Now that an e-cornmerce business has decided to adopt a privacy policy, what is the next
step? There are several options to getting started, including working with one of the recognized seal
programs or drafting a policy of its own based upon the business' practices, on the criteria laid out
in the Geocities order and other FTC guidelines and, if applicable, the B.U. Privacy Directive.
Seal Programs.
One action the private sector has taken to encourage self-regulation and to fend off federal
legislation is the creation of seal programs. Currently, the most widely-used seal program is
TRUSTe, an independent non-profit organization founded by the CommerceNet Consortium and
Electronic Frontier Foundation and launched on June 10, 1997. Self Regulation and Privacy
Online: A Report to Congress, Federal Trade Commission, July 1999, www.ftc.gov/os/1999/9907/
privacy99.pdf. By working with TRUSTe and meeting its requirements, a business may display the
TRUSTe seal of approval. TRUSTe requires the completion of a detailed questionnaire, the
adoption of a privacy policy that provides notice, disclosure, choice and consent, the adoption of
certain data security measures and compliance with TRUSTe's standards. (See www.truste.org).
TRUSTe is allowed certain oversight and audit powers with respect to companies that bear its seal
and provides a complaint resolution procedure. TRUSTe is also permitted to engage in "seeding,"
which involves tracking the way that the site treats' certain personal information. As of January
2000, TRUSTe had 1,000 members, which included 15 of the top 20 sites and 1/2 of the top 100
sites. TRUSTe Approves lOOOth Web Site, TRUSTe Press Release, January 12, 2000,
www.truste.orglabout/l000.html.
The other most prominent seal program is BBBOnline, which is sponsored by the Better
Business Bureau. BBBOnline operates in much the same way as TRUSTe. BBBOnline has 250
sites as members. See www.bbbonlines.org. In addition there are a few industry specific seal
programs such as CPA WebTrust, created by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
and the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants and ESRB Privacy Online, developed by the
Entertainment Software Rating Board.
The advantages to approaching privacy through a seal program are that the seal programs
are becoming well known by consumers and lend the site some credibility. In addition, the
programs mandate that serious attention be given to the privacy process and facilitate in the
development of the privacy statement and maintenance program, which decreases the chance that a
business will fail to comply with its own policy.
On the downside, if a business does not comply in some manner with its privacy policy or
does comply but has a complaint, it is forced not only to deal with the complaining consumer, but
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may be required to engage in a mandatory dispute resolution process under the control of the
relevant seal program. In addition, the business is subject to surprise audits and the seeding
activities of the seal program. Finally, a seal program may refer a case of noncompliance to the
FTC for its review.
Fair Information Practice Principles
While the FTC's current position appears to be that it cannot force companies to adopt a
privacy policy and can only require that companies adhere to their privacy policy, the FTC has
clearly endorsed certain fair information practices (see Self Regulation and Privacy Online: A
Report to Congress, Federal Trade Commission, July 1999, www.ftc.
gov\os\1999\9907\privacy99.pQD, and Privacy Online: A Report to Congress, Federal Trade
Commission, June 1998, www.ftc.gove\reports\privacy3\toc.htm. To the extent federal legislation is
proposed by the FTC, it is safe to assume that these fair information practices will become an
integral part of the legislation. As is typical of the FTC, the approach currently taken by that agency
is one centered on disclosure.
There are five core principles of privacy protection endorsed by the FTC: (1)
notice/awareness; (2) choice/consent; (3) access/participation; (4) integrity/security; and (5)
enforcement/redress. These principles were first developed by government agencies in the United
States, Canada and Europe in the early 1970's and were articulated in the report of the 1973 United
States Department of Health, Education and Welfare entitled Records, Computer and the Rights of
Citizens. The principles apparently also served as a resource for the European Union when it
developed its privacy directive. These core principles of privacy protection were intended to be
used as safeguards for the protection ofprivacy whether or not information was gathered online.
Notice/Awareness: Notice is the most fundamental of the five privacy principles. Notice is
necessary for a consumer to make an informed decision about whether to disclose personal
information. Specifically, the FTC believes that the following notice is essential:
• Identification of the entity collecting the data;
• Identification of any potential recipients of the data;
• The nature of the data collected and the means by which it is collected if not
obvious (passively, by means of electronic monitoring, or actively, by asking
consumer to provide the information);
• Whether the provision of the requested data is voluntary or required, and the
consequences of a refusal to provide the requested information;
• The steps taken by the data collector to ensure the confidentiality, integrity and
quality of the data.
The notice must be clear and conspicuous, posted in a prominent location on the web site,
and readily accessible from the home page and any web page where information is collected from
the consumer.
Choice/Consent: This principle requires that consumers be provided a choice with respect
to secondary uses of consumer information, including secondary uses by the web site provider.
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AccesslParticipation: The FTC believes that access is essential to ensure that the data is
accurate and complete. The access must be relatively simple and inexpensive and allow the
correction of errors and/or the registration of objections with respect to a consumer's data.
Integrity/Security: Companies must take appropriate steps, from a managerial and
technical perspective, to protect against the loss, unauthorized access, misuse, destruction or
disclosure ofconsumer data.
EnforcementlRedress: The FTC believes that without an enforcement mechanism, the
other principles are not effective. The FTC recommends that enforcement and redress be provided
either through self-regulation enforcement or through legislation and government regulation.
Privacy Online: A Report to Congress, June 1998.
European Union Privacy Directive
In October of 1998, the European Union Privacy Directive took effect. The Directive
prevented E.U companies from transferring any personal information to cOmpanies in other
countries where such countries did not provide adequate privacy protection. Due to its disjointed
approach to privacy, the United States is considered one of the countries that did not provide
adequate privacy protection. Since the adoption of the Directive, representatives of the European
Union and the United States have been negotiating to establish a safe harbor with which US.
companies can comply to enable them to receive European data. The U.S. and European Union
have apparently reached a tentative agreement, expected to be fmally announced in March of 2000.
Diplomats: European Union Likely to Approve Data Privacy Agreement with U.S. Next Month,
Electronic Commerce & Law, Vol. 5, No.9, March 1,2000.
Although the latest draft of the international safe harbor privacy principles has not yet been
released by the US. Department of Commerce, it is likely to require that companies desiring to
benefit from the safe harbor adhere to the following principles that the B.U. believes are necessary
to ensure adequate privacy protection:
Notice: A company must inform individuals about the purposes for
which it collects and uses information, how to contact the company
with any inquiries or complaints, the types of parties to which the
company discloses its information, the choices and means the
company offers individuals for limiting use and disclosure, and when
the company is using or disclosing information for a purpose other
than that for which it was originally collected or for which it was
processed by the transferring company. The notice must be provided
in clear and conspicuous language when individuals are first asked to
provide personal information to the company or as soon as is
practical, but in any event before the company uses or discloses the
information.
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Choice: The company must offer individuals the opportunity to
choose whether and how personal information they provide is used
or disclosed to third parties, where such use or disclosure is
incompatible with the purposes for which it was originally collected
or subsequently authorized by the individual. For sensitive
information (i.e., personal information specifying medical or health
conditions, racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or
philosophical beliefs, trade union membership or information
relating to the sex life of the individual), individuals must be given an
affirmative or explicit choice (opt in) if the information is to be used
or disclosed in a manner other than as authorized by the individual.
Individuals must be provided with clear and conspicuous, readily
available common and affordable mechanisms to exercise choice.
Onward Transfer: The company may only disclose personal
information to third parties consistent with the principles of notice
and choice. Where a company has not provided choice (because a
use is not incompatible with the purpose for which the data was
originally collected or which was subsequently authorized by the
individual), and the company wishes to transfer the data to a third
party, it may do so if it first either ascertains that the third party
subscribes to the directive principles, is subject to the directive or
another adequacy rmding, or enters into a written agreement with
such party requiring the third party to provide at least the same level
of privacy protection as is required by the directive.
Security: Companies creating, maintaining, using or disseminating
personal information must take reasonable precautions to protect
such information from loss, misuse, unauthorized access, disclosure,
alteration or destruction.
Data Integrity: Consistent with the directive principles, a company
may not process personal information in a way that is incompatible
with the purposes for which it has been collected or subsequently
authorized. To the extent necessary for other purposes, the company
should take reasonable steps to ensure that the data is reliable for its
intended use, and is accurate, complete and current.
Access: Individuals must have access to personal information about
them that a company holds and must be able to correct, amend or
delete that information where it is inaccurate, except when the
burden of expense of providing access would be disproportionate to
the risk of the individual's privacy in question, or where the rights of
persons other than the individual would be violated.
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Enforcement: Effective privacy protection must include
mechanisms for assuring compliance with the principles, recourse for
individuals affected by noncompliance with the principles, and
consequences for the company when the principles are not followed.
November 15, 1999, Draft International Safe Harbor Privacy
Principles Issued by the U.S. Department of Commerce,
www.ita.doc.gov/td/ecom/principles1199.htm. [As edited by author
to shorten text.]
A serious point of contention in the negotiations between the European Union and the
United States in relation to the privacy directive safe harbor was what enforcement mechanism
would be used against companies that violated the privacy principles. Based on reports discussing
the recent agreement between the US. and E.U, companies will be able to satisfy the enforcement
component of the safe harbor by: (1) subjecting themselves to the authority of a data protection
commissioner in one of the 15 E.U member countries; (2) showing that the company is already
covered by US. privacy laws, such as those that regulate credit card applications; (3) signing up
with a self-regulatory privacy organization in the United States, such as BBBOnline, that is
monitored by the Federal Trade Commission; or (4) agreeing to refer privacy related disputes with
individuals to a panel of European data protection authorities for resolution. Diplomats: European
Union Likely to Approve Data Privacy Agreement With U.s. Next Month, Electronic Commerce and
Law, VoL 5, No.9, p. 206.
Children's On-line Privacy Protection Act 1998
On October 21, 1998, President Clinton signed into law the Children's Online Privacy
Protection Act of 1998, which imposes privacy obligations on commercial web sites that are
directed to children under 13 or sites that have knowingly collected personal information from
children under 13. 15 US.c. § 6501 et seq. The Act requires that web site operators: (1) provide
parents notice of the web site's information practices; (2) obtain prior verifiable parental consent
for the collection, use and disclosure of personal information from children; (3) upon request,
provide a parent with the ability to review the personal information collected from a child; (4)
provide a parent with the opportunity to prevent the further use of personal information that has
already been collected, or the future collection of personal information from the child; (5) limit
collection of personal information from a child's online participation in a game, prize offering or
another activity to information that is reasonably necessary for the activity; and (6) establish and
retain reasonable procedures to protect the confidentiality, security and integrity of the information
collected (Self-Regulation and Privacy On Line: A Report to Congress, Federal Trade Commission,
July 1999). One helpful provision in the statute is a safe harbor for companies that subscribe to self-
regulation programs approved by the FTC. Regulations for the statute are at 16 C.F.R. 312, and
were issued October 20, 1999. Compliance with this statute is a challenging task and should cause
companies that do not target children to take precautions to better ensure that children under 12 do
not provide information through the company's web site.
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Industry Specific Statutes and Regulations.
There are other industry-specific statutes that relate to privacy including the following: Fair
Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.c. § 1681 et. seq. (governing consumer credit reports); Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et. seq. (governing electronic mail and
voice mail communications); Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 47 U.S.c. §551
(governing cable television subscriber information); Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, 12
U.S.C. § 3401 et. seq. (governing individual bank records); Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988,
18 U.S.c. § 2710 (governing video rental records); Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of
1974, 20 U.S.c. § 1232g (governing student records); Communications Act of 1934, as amended
by the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 222 (governing information relating to the use
of telecommunication services); Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (governing data collected by
the federal government); 1999 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (S.900, enacted November 12, 1999)
(relating to, among other issues, restrictions on the disclosure of personally identifiable financial
information acquired by institutions); Electronic Funds Transfer Act, 15 U.S.c. § 1693-1693r
(relating to accounts with electronic funds transfer features); Health Insurance Reportability and
Accountability Act of 1996, 29 U.S.C. § 1181; 42 C.F.R. 9482.24 (1998); 42 U.S.c. § 290dd-3
(1994) and recently announced proposed regulations offering privacy protection for health
information (64 Fed. Reg. 59918 (1999) (proposed November 3, 1999».
Privacy Hurtles
The implementation of a privacy program can be a daunting task. Among other practical
issues in implementing a program, one basic hurdle to clear is to identify all of the uses that a
company makes of information it gathers on its site and the ways in which it gathers that
information. Because web sites are constantly evolving, making these identifications is like
shooting at a moving target. Companies need to also'keep in mind that third parties who advertise
on or link to their site may independently gather information about visitors to the site.
Implementing an opt in/opt out option can be more difficult than it might first appear. A
company must have the technology and resources in place to support an opt in/opt out approach and
further have the ability to document and record choices made by web site visitors.
In addition, the question is still open as to what access a web site operator should give a
party to information gathered. Access to basic personal information such as name, age, address,
etc., is one thing. Access to information gathered through clickstream monitoring and cookies is
another.
One way to address the ability to use gathered data for secondary uses is to acquire the
consent of a user. The question is still open, however, as to whether putting a consent obligation in
a non-click wrap user agreement or a privacy policy clears the way for the web site operator to use
such information in the consented manner.
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Conclusion
The privacy programs currently in place are many and varied, ranging from no privacy
policy to extremely complex and detailed privacy policies. The resolution of the safe harbor
requirements of the E.U. directive will require companies that wish to accept data from their
European counterparts to address privacy issues. For the rest of the World Wide Web, who are not
otherwise regulated by industry specific laws and regulations, the goals should be to adopt a privacy
policy that is as simple as it can be in light of the company's practices and then to follow such
policy religiously until such time as federal laws or regulations are adopted that mandate a particular
approach to privacy. For companies that want to be aggressive with respect to the use and collection
of data, such companies must be prepared to devote significant time and resources to develop a
policy that reflects its practices and to carefully monitor its practices.
To answer the second question posed in the title of this article, "Should there be any
[privacy on-line]?, the reality of the situation is that e-commerce will be greatly facilitated if there
are some basic privacy standards in place and e-commerce expansion is an event that greatly
benefits both businesses and consumers.
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CYBERSPACE JURISDICTION
As the Christmas recently past demonstrated, electronic commerce ("E-Commerce") over
the Internet has become a huge business. Although conventional commerce still dwarfs it, E-
Commerce already amounts to billions of dollars annually. Moreover, the dollar volume is
growing rapidly, not just in transactions between businesses and consumers (B to C transactions)
but, perhaps more important, in transactions among businesses (B to B transactions).
With the rise in volume of E-Commerce, can litigation be far behind? Of course, not.
After all, this is America.
Already, there exists over 100 reported cases involving cyberspace jurisdictional issues.
The attached Case List of Cases Finding No Personal Jurisdiction and Cases Finding Personal
Jurisdiction contain their citations. The attached Articles List discusses many of these cases and
the legal concepts underlying them. This paper examines a number of these cases with an eye
toward exposing the logic of some of the judicial decisions, developing some fundamentals of
cyberspace jurisdiction and suggesting some protective actions being haled into unanticipated
and/or unwelcome forums.
In Morantz v. Hang & Shine Ultrasonics, Inc., 79 F.Supp.2d 537 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 20,
1999), the court succinctly summarized the current situation noted that the exponential growth of
the Internet, the arrival of the World Wide Web as a business medium and the "jurisdiction-
confounding" nature of cyberspace spawned new strains of jurisdictional analysis. The court
also noted the three-category continuum for analyzing web site jurisdiction. The first category is
the passive web site that merely posts information. At the other extreme are highly interactive
sites over which business is conducted. The latter usually involve a high volume of deliberate
exchanges of information through the web site, including formation of contracts. In the middle
category jurisdiction depends on the level of commercial information exchange that takes place
on the web site.
In Morantz, the site was not highly interactive. Contracts and sales were not
consummated through the web site. Order forms for a promotional video could be printed out
but not sent over the Internet. Also a link was provided which allowed a user to send an e-mail
directly to the defendant's site. The court concluded that these web site features were not
interactive enough to justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction and declined to exercise it.
Instead, the court transferred plaintiffs trademark infringement action to the Western District of
New York.
To place this case, the others discussed in this paper and the 100 plus cases on the
attached Case Lists in proper perspective, it is helpful to briefly review the existing jurisprudence
on personal jurisdiction. In doing so, recall that until the arrival of the Internet, a territory that
defies all boundaries, personal jurisdiction tracked somewhat closely geographical and territorial
boundaries, and, indeed, was rooted in them and defined by them.
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JURISDICTIONAL FUNDAMENTALS
Personal jurisdiction concerns a court's power to decide a matter in controversy before it,
and the court's authority over the subject matter and the parties involved in such controversy. In
federal courts, issues about personal jurisdiction may be raised at any time. Indeed, a judgment
rendered by a court without proper personal jurisdiction will not be enforced when properly
challenged.
Personal jurisdiction is of two types: "general jurisdiction" extends to all cases and
controversies that may be brought before the court within the bounds of legal rights and
remedies; "specific jurisdiction" covers only a specified case or class of cases. More limited in
nature than general jurisdiction, specific jurisdiction requires less proof to establish. Thus far,
most U.S. cases concerning personal jurisdiction over Internet activities have rested on specific
jurisdiction.
Traditionally, the courts have considered various facts in determining whether
jurisdiction, general or specific, exists. Absent a Federal statute expressly conferring jurisdiction
over a given matter on a specific court, federal courts apply the law of the state where the action
is brought and use a two-step analysis to determine if proper personal jurisdiction exists. In such
an analysis, the court first determines if jurisdiction is proper under the State's long-arm statute.
If it is, the court next determines if the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant
comports with due process under the U.S. Constitution. World-Wide Volkswagen Con>. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 289-90 (1980).
Long-arm statutes are of two types: Those that limit a court's exercise of jurisdiction in
one or more ways; and those that permit the exercise of personal jurisdiction to the full extent
permitted by the U.S. Constitution. In states where the statute permits full exercise, the court's
analysis really consists of a single step evaluation of whether personal jurisdiction is proper
under the due process clause of the U.S. Constitution.
In now familiar language, International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945),
states due process mandates that the defendant have "minimum contacts such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice'''.
Id. at 316. Later, World-Wide Volkswagen Con>. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980), held the
defendant's minimum contacts must be "conduct and connection with the forum State ... such
that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court." Id. at 297. Due process does not
require that the defendant have ever been physically present in the forum. Due process does
require that the defendant's contacts be more than merely "random," fortuitous" or "attenuated"
ones. Burger King Con>. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985).
Under Hansen v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), to establish general jurisdiction over a
defendant, constitutional due process requires a showing that the defendant's contacts· were
"substantial" or "continuous and systematic"; in short, that the defendant "purposely avail[ed] of
the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and
protection of its laws." Id. at 253. However, for specific jurisdiction, Supreme Court decisions
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require only that the defendant's efforts are directed toward the forum state. So long as a
commercial actor's efforts are "purposefully directed" toward residents of another state,
"jurisdiction may not be avoided merely because the defendant did not physically enter the
forum state." Burger King Corp., supra, at 476.
What do these land mark cases tell us about jurisdiction over E-Commerce on the
Internet? In truth, these cases supply the language of and framework for analysis, but their
principles are only indirectly related to the results that the courts reach. An understanding of the
function of the Internet, a willingness and ability to explain it to the court and the creativity to
concoct a persuasive solution on the facts are important additional requirements for reaching
correct decisions. What emerges is a realization that the case results are somewhat diverse, the
principles of analysis are still under development and consistent results have been (relatively)
slow to develop. Unfortunately, the situation makes it difficult for lawyers for Internet
merchants to advise their clients how to do business on the Internet and avoid the jurisdictional
reach of a host of states. To address this concern, this paper includes cases where Internet
jurisdiction was found absent and uses them to propose conduct to avoid Internet jurisdictional
snares.
APPLYING JURISDICTIONAL FUNDAMENTALS
TO ONLINE CONTACTS
As noted, 100 or more cases exist which apply the jurisdictional fundamentals in
litigation involving online contacts. In approximately 60 of the cases on the attached Case List,
the Court found no personal jurisdiction. In another 40, the Court found personal jurisdiction.
The pages which follow examine some of the cases to expose the logic of the decisions and to
develop some fundamentals of cyberspace jurisdiction. Then, I suggest some protective actions
that persons doing business using the Internet might take to avoid successful assertions of
jurisdiction.
Cases Finding No Jurisdiction
One of the earliest and most widely cited cases in which a court found a web site did not
provide the necessary minimum contacts is Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F.Supp.2d
295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), affd, 126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997). Bensusan operated "The Blue Note"
jazz club in New York City. King operated "The Blue Note" club in Columbia, Missouri.
Bensusan held a federally registered mark "The Blue Note" to promote his club and ticket sales.
King put up a web site that advertised his Columbia Blue Note with a telephone number and
ticket purchasing information. Bensusan claimed that King's web site constituted trademark
infringement. At issue was whether King's web site evidenced an intent to sell merchandise in
New York justifying personal jurisdiction over him.
Granting King's Motion to Dismiss For Lack of Personal Jurisdiction, the Court refused
to view King's web site as "purposeful availment, " because a New York resident would have to
take several affirmative steps to access and utilize the web site. Further, the New York resident
would actually have to go Missouri to pick up tickets he purchased because King did not mail
tickets to his Columbia, Missouri club to purchasers. The Court rejected Bensusan's claim that
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King should have foreseen that the web site would be viewed in New York. There were no facts
indicating that King encouraged any New Yorkers to access his site. In response to Bensusan's
argument that King should have foreseen that his web site would be viewed in New York, the
Court held that "mere forseeability of an in-state consequence" was not an adequate basis to
assert personal jurisdiction over King. Moreover, the Bensusan court analogized creating a web
site to "placing a product in the stream of commerce," in that its effects " may be felt nationwide
- - or even worldwide - - but, without more, it is not an act purposefully directed toward to forum
state." 937 F. Supp.2d at 301. In short, King's web site in simply did not rise to the level of
doing business in New York. The Second Circuit affirmed the District Court, relying on the
language of the New York Long Arm statute and avoiding the due process issue. The District
Court in Bensusan was one of the first to pay close attention to the facts, analyze them and
conclude that the online contacts did not support personal jurisdiction.
In Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 1997), the 9th Circuit
concluded that a web site or other electronic contact, alone, was not "purposeful availment" of
the benefits of the forum state. Cybersell, Inc., an Arizona corporate plaintiff ("Cybersell
Arizona"), sued a Florida corporation (Cybersell Florida) in an Arizona court for alleged
trademark infringement through a web site. Cybersell Florida had no contacts" with Arizona. It
did not attempt to market in Arizona. It did not sell any products or services in Arizona. It did
not solicit business in Arizona. It did not receive any telephone calls from Arizona. Even so,
"Cybersell Arizona claimed that its assertion of jurisdiction met due process requirements in that
Cybersell Florida "should be amenable to suit in Arizona because cyberspace is without borders
and a web site is necessarily intended for use on a worldwide basis." Unpersuaded, the Court
recognized that anyone could access a web site, but that fact did not compel a conclusion that the
web site alone was an attempt to target anyone in any specific forum. Here, Cybersell Florida
did not intentionally aim its conduct at Arizona knowing it would cause harm there. The 9th
Circuit recognized that some cases found a web site" to be sufficient contact for the assertion of
jurisdiction, but noted there was usually "something more" to show that the defendant
purposefully directed substantial activity to the forum state. In Cybersell there were no other
contacts between the Florida defendant and the State of Arizona. In short, it was simply a
passive web site. Cybersell Florida did not undertake any actions that qualify as purposeful
activity invoking the benefits and protections ofArizona.
The cases finding no jurisdiction include ones in which the court declined to uphold
personal jurisdiction based on the mere existence of a web site without anything more. Indeed,
according to Morantz, supra, it is now at least somewhat settled that "a mere presence on the
World Wide Web does not support the minimum contacts necessary to subject a corporation to
personal jurisdiction on a worldwide basis." Morantz, supra, 39 F.Supp.2d at 539-540. See
Harbuck v. Aramco, Inc., 1999 WL 999431 (E.D.Pa., Oct 21, 1999) (NO.CIV. A. 99-1971);
Molnlycke Health Care AB v. Dumex Medical Surgical Products, Ltd., 64 F.Supp.2d 448
(E.D.Pa., Sep 07, 1999) (NO. CIV. A. 99-1725); Edberg v. Neogen Corp., 17 F.Supp.2d 104
(D.Conn., Aug 04, 1998) (NO. 3:98CV00717 (GLG))". A number of other cases finding no
jurisdiction appear on the attached Case List: Cases Finding No Personal Jurisdiction.
As the Cybersell court had stated: "[S]o far as we are aware, no court has ever held that
an internet advertisement alone is sufficient to subject the advertiser to jurisdiction in the
1-4
I'·"f'):
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
/
r
r
r
r
r
r
plaintiffs home state ...." Cybersell, supra, 130 F.3d at 418. However, as the Morantz court
observed, the jurisdictional jurisprudence of the Internet contains at least two cases which
unfortunately find very minimal contacts are sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction. Inset
Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F.Supp 161 (D. Conn. 1996), holds that maintaining a
web site and telephone number is sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction in every state.
Heroes, Inc. v. Heroes Found., 958 F.Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1996) found where a web site that
explicitly solicited donations and provided a toll free number subject to the jurisdiction of the
court. Fortunately, these misguided cases have been widely criticized in other opinions and have
seldom been followed, but you can expect to see them when a plaintiff is scrambling to find
minimum contacts.
Cases Finding Jurisdiction
Another early and widely cited Internet jurisdiction case, CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson,
89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996) occurred close to home. CompuServe, headquartered in Columbus,
Ohio, was an early "information utility." Patterson, a Texas resident, developed software
attractive to CompuServe and its customers. In 1991, CompuServe and Patterson agreed to make
Patterson's shareware available to all CompuServe subscribers. Their agreement was negotiated
and consummated bye-mail. Thereafter, Patterson transmitted (from Texas) to CompuServe (in
Ohio) 32 master software files which CompuServe placed on its server for access by its
subscribers. A couple of years later, CompuServe began to market and sell software similar to
Patterson's. Upon learning of CompuServe's actions, Patterson e-mailed CompuServe that its
efforts constituted an infringement on his common law trademark rights. CompuServe changed
the name of its software. However, Patterson continued to complain and threaten suit.
(Unsurprisingly, Patterson was a lawyer.) His continued complaints and demands for
compensation caused CompuServe to seek a declaratory judgment in Ohio Federal Court.
Patterson moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The trial court granted his motion,
but the 6th Circuit reversed.
In CompuServe, the 6th Circuit noted the crucial federal constitutional inquiry was
whether, given the facts of the case, the non-resident defendant had sufficient contacts with the
forum state that the District Court's exercise of jurisdiction would comport with "traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice. [citations omitted]" The 6th Circuit employs three
criteria to make this determination:
"First, the defendant must purposefully avail himself the privilege
of acting in the forum state or causing a consequence in the forum
state. Second, the cause of action must arise from the defendant's
activities there. Finally, the acts of the defendant or consequences
caused by the defendant, must have a substantial enough connection
with the forum to make the exercise of jurisdiction over the
defendant reasonable. Id. at 1262.
The 6th Circuit concluded that Patterson had knowingly made an effort to market his products
through CompuServe. Accordingly, the 6th Circuit believed it reasonable to subject Patterson to
suit in Ohio, the state which is home to the computer network service he chose to employ.
1-5
Discussing each of the three criteria, the court found that, by his actions, Patterson took
steps that created a connection with Ohio. He subscribed to CompuServe. He entered into the
shareware registration agreement when he loaded his software on to the CompuServe system for
others to use or purchase. He repeatedly sent his computer software electronically to
CompuServe. He advertised that software on CompuServe. Finally, he initiated the events that
lead to the filing of the suit by making demands of CompuServe by both electronic and regular
mail. The 6th Circuit found these contacts with Ohio "substantial" enough that Patterson could
reasonably have anticipated being haled into an Ohio court. Indeed, Patterson's relationship with
CompuServe as a software provider and marketer was a crucial fact in this case. Specifically,
"although all of this happened with the distinct paucity of tangible, physical evidence, there can
be no doubt that Patterson purposely transacted business in Ohio." Id. at 1264. Other events
showed that CompuServe and Patterson intended the relationship to be ongoing.. And, Patterson
deliberately set in motion an ongoing marketing relationship with CompuServe that he could
have reasonably foreseen would have consequences in Ohio. Finally, Patterson entered into a
contract expressly stating that it would be governed by and construed in the light of Ohio law.
The 6th Circuit found that there was a substantial enough connection between Patterson
and Ohio to make it reasonable for an Ohio court to assert personal jurisdiction over him.
Someone like Patterson who employed a computer network service like CompuServe to market a
product can reasonably expect disputes with that service to yield law suits in the service's home
state finding Patterson had sufficient contact with Ohio to support the exercise of personal
jurisdiction over him, the 6th Circuit reversed the District Court's dismissal and remanded the
case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.
Another seminal case Zippo Manufacturing Company v. ZippoDot Com, Inc., 952
F.Supp. 1119 (W.D. PA. 1997), is significant because the court offered a framework to analyze
personal jurisdiction in cyberspace, one of the few courts to do so. Zippo Manufacturing Co.
("Manufacturing Co.") sued Zippo Dot Com, Inc. ("Dot Com") for the several alleged violations
of Federal and state trademark protection laws by use of the domain names "zippo.com,"
"zippo.net," and "zipponews.com." Dot Com was incorporated and based in California.
Manufacturing was incorporated and based in Pennsylvania. Almost all of Dot Com's contacts
with Pennsylvania occurred over the Internet. After reviewing cases and holdings cited in
Jurisdictional Fundamentals, supra, the Zippo court stated:
Enter the Internet, a global 'super-network' over 15,000 computer
networks used by over 30 million individuals, corporations, organizations and
educational institutions worldwide. [Citations omitted.] In recent years,
businesses have begun to use the Internet to provide information and products to
consumers and other businesses. [Citation omitted.] The Internet makes it
possible to conduct business throughout the world entirely from a desktop. With
this global revolution looming on the horizon, the development of the law
concerning the permissible scope of personal jurisdiction based on the Internet
use is in its infant stages. The cases are scant. Nevertheless, our review of the
available cases and materials reveals that the likelihood of personal jurisdiction
can be constitutionally exercised is directly proportionate to the nature and quality
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of commercial activity that an entity conducts over the Internet. This sliding scale
is consistent with well-developed personal jurisdiction principals. At one end of
the spectrum are situations where a defendant clearly does business over the
Internet. If a defendant enters into contracts with residents of a foreign
jurisdiction that involve the knowing and repeated transmission of computer files
over the Internet, personal jurisdiction is proper. E.g. Compu
Serve, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 Fed.3d 1257 (6th Circuit, 1996). And at the opposite
end are situations where a defendant has simply posted information on an Internet
web site which is accessible to users in foreign jurisdictions. A passive Web site
that does little more than make information available to those who are interested
in it is not grounds for the exercise of personal jurisdiction. E.g. Bensusan
Restaurant Com. v. King, 397 F. Supp. 295 (S.D. NY. 1996). The middle ground
is occupied by interactive Web sites where a user can exchange information with
the host computer. In these cases, the exercise of jurisdiction is determined by
examining the level of interactivity and commercial nature of the exchange of
information that occurs on the web site. E.g. Maritz, Inc. v. CyberGold, Inc. 397
F.Supp. 1328 (B.D. Mo. 1996). Zippo, supra, at 1123-1124. The Zippo court went
on to say that "... when an entity intentionally reaches beyond its boUndaries to
conduct business with foreign residents, the exercise of specific jurisdiction is
proper. [Citation omitted.] Different results should not be reached simply because
business is conducted over the Internet. Id. at 1124. (Italics supplied)
The Zippo court found Dot Com's claim that its web site was not "purposeful availment"
of Pennsylvania law "wholly unpersuasive". In essence, the court found that by receiving and
processing subscription applications from Pennsylvania and then assigning passwords to
applicants, Dot Com deliberately and systematically availed itself of the privileges and benefits
of doing business in Pennsylvania. The court found irrelevant the fact that only 2% of Dot
Com's accounts came from Pennsylvania. It is the nature and quality of forum contacts that are
of primary relevance, not their quantity. Dot Com made a conscious choice to conduct business
with the residents of Pennsylvania and was therefore on notice that it could be subject to suit
there. Notably, here, as in Patterson, the court was aware that the virtual contacts were
buttressed by contracts and other physical, real space contacts.
The court found nothing unreasonable about the exercise of jurisdiction over Dot Com
here. Dot Com consciously chose to conduct business in Pennsylvania, pursuing profits from
actions that are in question. "The Due Process clause in not a "territorial shield to inter-state
obligations that have been voluntarily assumed. [Citation omitted.]"
Of the cases on the Case List, approximately sixty find no jurisdiction while
approximately forty find jurisdiction. In those finding jurisdiction, Patterson and Zippo have
provided the analytical framework that a number of later cases have followed. A discussion of
some or many of the cases on the Case List, Cases Finding Personal Jurisdiction might provide
additional information, but little additional wisdom. However, at least one of the decisions
provide interesting examples of the court accepting the jurisdictional challenge and finding
jurisdiction, apparently because it wants the defendant before it.
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In Archdiocese of St. Louis v. Internet Entertainment Group, Inc. 34 F. Supp.2d 1145
(E.D. Mo. Jan. 20, 1999), the owners of the common law trademarks and trade name
commemorating the Pope's 1999 visit to St. Louis sought a preliminary injunction prohibiting
the defendant from using its Internet domain names or colorful variations on the holder's
common law trademarks and/or trade names. Finding that the owners demonstrated a probability
of success in proving defendant had been diluting the distinctiveness of the owner's family of
marks, the court granted the motion. In a rather terse Preliminary Injunction, the court found that
the defendant has been diluting the distinctiveness of the plaintiffs' family of marks by using the
name "Papal visit 1999" and derivatives therefrom to identify a sexually explicit Internet site and
by using the name string "Papal visit 1999.com" "Papal visit.com" as Internet domain names
which provided Internet users throughout Missouri and elsewhere with access to those sites. The
court found the defendant's use tarnished the plaintiffs family of marks by associating them
with adult entertainment venues that are inconsistent with the positive and spiritual uplifting
image plaintiff is striving to create and maintain in connection with the Pope's upcoming visit to
St. Louis." Id. at 1146. One has the feeling that the court was eager to have the defendants
before it to put an end to their tarnishing.
Although the cases finding personal jurisdiction resists easy categorization, in each case
the court found the fundamentals necessary for personal jurisdiction, usually specific
jurisdiction, but occasionally general jurisdiction. If you find yourself adrift and desire a quick
survey of the cases to date, consult Cendali and Weinstein's article, Personal Jurisdiction And
the Internet, 520 PLI/Pat 975, (June, 1998). There, the authors review twenty-three of the cases
finding personal jurisdiction, describing each of them briefly. Then, the authors review
seventeen cases finding no personal jurisdiction, again summarizing the salient facts of the
holdings. This resort should be sufficient for you to pick and choose among these cases for ones
that support or oppose your particular situation and allow you to collect the authorities you need
to make your own argument. ' .
CYBERSPACE JURISDICTIONAL FUNDAMENTALS
As the preceding discussion shows, courts are applying traditional jurisdictional rules to
determine the existence of personal jurisdiction over Internet transactions. From these cases, I
submit the following jurisdictional fundamentals will be true more often than not:
1. General Jurisdiction based on Internet presence alone is extremely unlikely.
Rather, a significant amount of forum contact in both cyberspace and physical space is likely to
be required.
2. In considering the role of the Internet in establishing contacts for personal
jurisdiction, the courts have analogized Internet contacts to more traditional communication
media. However, for all their explanatory usefulness, analogies can be quite misleading. Even
so, the courts have applied a number of them, analogizing:
a. telephone calls and mail sent to the forum to e-mail;
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3. Specific jurisdiction is unlikely to arise from a mostly or even predominantly
passive web site.
4. Provision of goods and services or transactions of business through a web site
may well lead to specific jurisdiction. Pure Internet advertising cases are unlikely to give rise to a
personal jurisdiction. But, in cases where the defendant actively solicits or transacts business
through the web site, personal jurisdiction often occurs.
5. In many of the cases where the court found a specific jurisdiction, the court
considered the defendant's non-Internet contacts such as contracts with residents, toll-free
advertisements in forum publications, mailings into the forum and toll-free telephone numbers as
important factors.
6. In any case where a defendant has purposefully directed his activity to the forum
state in a substantial way, the courts have been generous in finding specific jurisdiction, even
more so when there exists non-Internet contacts.
7. Last, the incidental activity that typically arises in these specific jurisdiction cases
usually takes the form of either commercial activity or effects directed toward the forum state,
i.e., a "targeting" the forum state or one of its residents.
Finally, in conducting your analysis, be mindful of some of Andrew Costa's well-
founded distinctions in his seminal article Minimum Contacts in Cyberspace: A Taxonomy ofthe
Case Law. For example, Costa points out that some courts have had difficulty separating the
defendant's conduct from the medium in which it takes place. Costa believes an important
distinction exists between the Internet itself, as the purposefully availing contact, and the
Internet, as the vehicle for the purposefully availing conduct.
Costa's distinction between the Internet itself and the conduct which takes place on it
illustrates the fallacy in Maritz. Inc. v. Cybergold, supra, where the court characterized
Cybergold's web site as evidence of intent to reach all Internet users regardless of geographical
location. Similarly, in Inset Systems. Inc. v. Instruction Set. Inc., the court viewed the
defendant's Internet advertising and toll free numbers as indicating it intended to avail itself of
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the privilege of doing business in all states. Costa correctly observes that these cases would
subject those with an Internet presence to suit any of the fifty states. Costa also accurately
observes that where the Internet by itself is viewed as a pervasive medium that demonstrates an
intent to avail oneself of all forum states, the result cannot be harmonized with the Jurisdictional
Fundamentals stated earlier.
Similar cautions are useful to insure that the court making a minimum contacts analysis
does not mistake technological possibility with foreseeabilty. The fact that a party can
reasonably foresee citizens of each of the fifty states accessing his web site is not the same thing
as that same party reasonably anticipating that his Internet presence, without more, would render
him amenable to suit in any jurisdiction in the United States. After all, a web site is not
automatically projected to a user's computer. Rather, the user must take affirmative action to
access the web site.
SAFEGUARDS AGAINST ASSERTION OF JURISDICTION
1. Operate a passive, information only, web site with little or no consumer interaction. Do
not solicit or fill orders through the web site. Have the order solicitation and 'acceptance occur
through more conventional means.
2. Restrict access to the web site to persons from "friendly" jurisdictions, and decline
business from jurisdictions where you do not wish to be subject to jurisdiction.
3. Remember to limit the degree of consumer/customer interaction on the web site.
4. Put contractual terms on the web site, call them to the attention of web site users and
require web site users to accept them before undertaking significant activities on the web site.
5. The contractual terms may include, among other things,
a. Contractual choice of forum and choice of law clauses;
b. Jurisdictional disclaimers;
c. Non-judicial remedies in advance of, but in the event of, a dispute including
arbitration or mediation clauses, credit card charge off agreements and escrow agreements.
CONCLUSION
Although the Internet is new and exciting, and its proponents claim great things for it, be
mindful that not all courts share that enthusiasm. In St. Clair v. Johnny's Oyster and Shrimp,
Inc., 76, F. Supp., 2d 773 (S.D. Tex, December 17, 1999), an action for personal injuries seamen
sustained aboard a vessel, the defendant moved to dismiss contending that it did not, at the time
of the suit or at the time of the alleged incident, own or operate the vessel CAPT. LE'BRADO.
Plaintiff responded that he had discovered evidence taken off the World Wide Web on December
1, 1999, revealing that the defendant did "in fact" own the vessel. Here is the court's rejoinder:
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"Plaintiff's electronic 'evidence' is totally insufficient to withstand
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. While some look to the Internet as an innovative
vehicle for communication, the court continges to weerily and wearily view it as
largely one large catalyst for rumor, innuendo and misinformation. So as not to
mince words, the court reiterates that this so called web provides no way of
verifying the authenticity of the alleged contentions the plaintiff wishes to rely
upon in his response in the defendant's motion to dismiss. There is no way
plaintiff can overcome the presumption that the information he discovered on the
Internet is inherently untrustworthy. Anyone can put anything on the Internet.
No web-site is monitored for accuracy and nothing contained therein is under oath
or even subject to independent verification absent underlying documentation.
Moreover, the court holds no illusions that hackers can adulterate the content on
any web-site from any location at any time. For these reasons, any evidence
procured off of the Internet is adequate for almost nothing, even under the most
liberal interpretations and hearsay exception rules found that Fed. R.Civ. P 807.".
Instead of relying on the voodoo information taken from the Internet,
plaintiff must hunt for hard copy backup documentation in admissible form from
the United States Coast Guard or determine alternative information verifying what
plaintiff alleges. . . If plaintiff cannot provide the court with credible and
legitimate information supporting its position by February 1, 2000, the Court will
be inclined to grant Defendant dispositive relief."
Mr. Kenneth J. 'Tuggle
Brown, Todd & Heyburn PLLC
400 W. Market Street, 32nd Floor
Louisville, Kentucky 40202-3363
(502)568-0269
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CYBERSPACE JURISDICTION
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A. REMEMBER: THE BASICS APPLY - EVEN IN THE BOLD NEW WORLD OF
THE INTERNET!
r
r
r
r
r
r
r,
r)
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
1. THE PURPOSE OF TRADEMARK LAW.
Trademark law exists both to protect the public and to protect the trademark owner:
The purpose underlying any trademark statute is two-fold.
One is to protect the public so that it may be confident that, in
purchasing a product bearing a particular trademark which it
favorably knows, it will get the product which it asks for and wants
to get. Secondly, where the owner of a trademark has spent energy,
time, and money in presenting to the public the product, he is
protected in his investment from its misappropriation by pirates and
cheats. This is the well established rule of law protecting both the
public and the trade-mark owner. [Citation omitted.]
Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 112 S.Ct. 2753, 120 L.Ed.2d 615, 23 USPQ.2d
1081 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring) at n. 15. Similarly, in Gilson's noted treatise on trademark law
the policy is outlined as follows:
A trademark functions and is accorded legal protection because it:
(a) designates the source of origin of a particular product or
service, even though the source is to the consumer anonymous;
(b) denotes a particular standard of quality which IS
embodied in the product or service;
(c) identifies a product or service and distinguishes it from
the products or services ofothers;
(d) symbolizes the good will of its owner and motivates
consumers to purchase the trademarked product or service;
(e) represents a substantial advertising investment and IS
treated as a species ofproperty; or
(f) protects the public from confusion and deception, insures
that consumers are able to purchase the products and services they
want, and enables the courts to fashion a standard of acceptable
business conduct.
J - 1
1 Gilson, Trademark, Protection and Practice, §1.03. See also 1 McCarthy on Trademarks and
Unfair Competition, 3d Ed. §2.10-§2.14.
2. WHAT CONSTITUTES A TRADEMARK, SERVICE MARK OR TRADE NAME.
Trademarks. In the United States, trademarks were originally protected by the individual
states, first by common law and subsequently by statute. The most recent version of the Model
State Trademark Act, a major portion ofwhich was enacted into law in Kentucky effective July 15,
1994 as KRS 365.561 et seq" defines a trademark as follows:
"Trademark" means any:
[1] word, name, symbol or device including, but not limited to, a
distinctive package or container of any kind, or any combination" of
these
[2] used by a person
[3] to identify and distinguish the goods of that person, including a
unique product, from those manufactured or
sold by others, and to indicate the source of the goods, even if that
source is unknown.
KRS 365.563(1) (emphasis and numbering added for analytical clarity.
Federal trademark law is set forth in the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §1051 et seq' Somewhat
similar to the Model State Trademark Act, the Lanham Act defines a ''trademark'' as follows:
The term ''trademark'' includes any word, name, symbol or device, or
any combination thereof-
[1] used by a person, or
[2] which a person has a bona fide intention to use in commerce
and applies to register on the principal register established by this
Act,
[3] to identify and distinguish his or her goods including a unique
product, from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate
the source of the goods, even if that source is unknown.
J-2
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i associated only with tangible "goods".
r Service Marks. Marks used in association with "services" are protectible as "service marks"
which the Model State Trademark Act defines as follows:
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"Service mark" means:
[1] any word, name, symbol or device or any combination ofthese,
[2] used by a person
[3] to identify and distinguish the services of one (1) person,
including a unique service, from the services of others, and to
indicate the source of the services, even if that source is unknown..
[4] Titles, character names used by a person, and other distinctive
features of radio or television programs may be registered as service
marks notwithstanding that they, or the programs, advertise the
goods of the sponsor.
KRS 365.563(2) (emphasis and numbering added); see also 15 U.S.C. §1127.
Trade Names. Kentucky statute defines "trade name" as any name used by a person to
identify his business or vocation. KRS 365.563[4]. The most common example of a "trade name"
is the name of a corporation ora companys fictitious business name. Generally speaking, trade
names may be protected in the same ways as trademarks.
Whether a name ofa corporation is a trademark, a trade name or both
is not entirely clear under the decisions. To some extent the two
terms overlap, but there is a difference more or less definitely
recognized, which is that generally speaking, the former is applicable
to the vendible commodity to which it is affixed, the latter to a
business and its good will. . .. A corporate name seems to fall more
appropriately into the latter class. But the precise difference is not
often material, since the law affords protection against its
appropriation in either view upon the same fundamental principles.
J-3
American Steel Foundries v. Robinson, 269 U.S. 372, 70 L.Ed. 317,46 S.Ct. 160 (1926). No
person or general or limited partnership, business trust or corporation may do business in Kentucky
under an assumed name or any name or style other than his real name (as defined in KRS
365.105(1)) unless one has properly obtained and recorded a certificate of assumed name. KRS
365.015[3]. The standard for obtaining such a certificate is low: the name selected must only be
"distinguishable on the record" and there is no check for state or federal trademark registrations or
other certificates of assumed names for confusingly similar names. One must merely be distin-
guishable on the record and pay the required fees.
Failure to properly obtain a certificate of assumed name can expose one to fines ranging
between $25 to $100 and imprisonment of ten to 30 days, or both -- with each day of continuing
violation constituting a separate offense! KRS 365.990[1].
B. TRADEMARK ISSUES IN THE BATTLE FOR "EYEBALLS".
Businesses using the internet are generally trying to make a buck. To be successful, they
must have two things: content and customers. Getting both can be a challenge.
Content is the substance of a website. It is the information businesses hope internet users
are searching for. Or, ifusers are not actually searching for a particular business's content, the
business at least hopes users will be interested in its content if they find it. Which leads to the
problem of attracting "eyeballs" or users. Businesses must find ways to attract internet users to
the businesses' websites. Given that there are over 4.3 million sites on the internet now (and that
number is growing at the rate of about 250,000 per month), this is no easy task.
Enormous amounts of time, effort and money are being spent on attracting users to
businesses' websites and providing content for the sites. But the easiest way to get content and
J-4
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website visitors is to rip them off from somebody else. Which leads to trademark issues on the
internet.
Like the Wild West, the internet is a kind oflawless frontier. For some reason, techies
with green hair and multiple body piercings and tattoos tend to ignore old economy conventions.
As a result, any number ofnefarious schemes have been hatched to get content or website
visitors using other peoples' trademarks.
What follows is a quick tour of some rip-off techniques, some of which are apparently
legal (at least in the U.S. - you take your chances with the rest of the world on the internet), but
most ofwhich aren't or shouldn't be.
(1) DOMAIN NAMES
There are several ways for internet surfers to find content. Using domain name
addresses is one way. However, this requires the surfer to have knowledge of the actual domain
name of the business they are looking for and is generally a very narrow search. However, as
discussed below, it has been a powerful way for cybersquatters to use another's trademark to
their advantage.
(2) META TAGS AND IMAGE NAMES
Another, broader way of searching the internet is to use an internet search engine such as
Netscape Navigator, Altavista, Lycos or the like. The user enters a keyword and the search
engine processes it through an index ofwebsites to produce a list of sites corresponding to the
keyword.
Search engines look for keywords in domain names, actual text ofweb pages, and in
meta tags and image names. Meta tags are HTML code used to describe the websites and are
meant to facilitate searches. Image names and descriptions are HTML code used to describe a
1-5
particular image used on a page. The search engines look for match-ups between the search
keyword and meta tag keywords and image names and descriptions. The search engines use the
information contained in the meta tags and image names and descriptions as a reference for what
the website is about and in prioritizing search results (the more times the keyword appears in the
meta tags, the higher the priority ofthe search result). Meta tags are not visible to the viewer of
a website. (Sometimes it is possible to see a site's meta tags by using web browser functions,
such as "view source" in Netscape Navigator.)
A practice has developed of using competitors' trademarks as meta tags. As a result, a
search engine conducting a search using the competitors' marks as keywords may also find sites
where the marks are meta tags, even though the sites may have no connection to the trademark
owner. As a result, internet users who enter a particular business's marks for a search may be
directed to competitors' websites. Not surprisingly, the trademark owners are generally not
overjoyed by this result.
Several court cases have dealt with this meta" tag issue. In Brookfield Communications,
Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corp., 174 F3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999), Brookfield, an
entertainment industry information supplier, found its trademark "MovieBuff' was being used as
a domain name and in website meta tags by West Coast, the operator of a chain ofvideo rental
stores. Brookfield sued to stop West Coast from continuing to use Brookfield's mark.
The Ninth Circuit Court ofAppeals reasoned that the use of Brookfield's trademark by
West Coast as a meta tag would result in "initial interest confusion" among consumers and was
impermissible. The Court stated:
Web surfers looking for Brookfield's "MovieBuff' products who
are taken by a search engine to ''westcoastvideo.com'' will find a
data base similar enough to "MovieBuff' such that a sizeable
number of consumers who were originally looking for Brookfield's
J-6
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product will simply decide to utilize West Coast's offering instead.
Although there is no source confusion in the sense that consumers
know they are patronizing West Coast rather than Brookfield, there
is nevertheless initial interest confusion in the sense that ... West
Coast improperly benefits from the goodwill that Brookfield
developed in its mark.
174 F.3d at 1062 (emphasis added).
Niton Corp. v. Radiation Monitoring Devices, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 2d 102 (D. Mass. 1998)
involved a more blatant rip-off There, Niton discovered that its competitor RMD had virtually
copied Niton's meta tag descriptions of its website. In fact, RMD's meta tags described its site
as "The Home Page of Niton Corporation." Because the obvious intent was to divert users
looking for Niton's website to RMD's site, the court enjoined RMD from using"Niton's marks in
RMD's meta tags. 27 F. Supp. 2d at 105.
In Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Welles, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (S.D. Cal. 1998), Playboy sued
Terri Welles for using its trademarks "Playboy" and "Playmate" on her website, including in the
meta tags. Ms. Welles was Playboy's 1981 Playmate of the Year and her website "includes
photographs ofherself and others (both nude and clothed), a fan club posting board, an
autobiography section, and a listing of current events and personal appearances." 7 F. Supp. 2d
at 1100.
The court concluded that the use of"Playboy" and "Playmate" as meta tags was not
trademark infringement, but rather fair use ofPlayboy's marks. The court staten:
With respect to the meta tags, the court finds there to be no
trademark infringement where defendant has used plaintiff's
trademarks in good faith to index the content ofher website. The
meta tags are not visible to the web surfer although some search
engines rely on these tags to help web surfers find certain websites.
rd. At 1104. Equally important was the fact that Ms. Welles was not competing with Playboy,
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and was simply using the title previously bestowed by Playboy itself for self-promotion, a
practice encouraged by Playboy in other contexts. Id. At 1102.
These cases demonstrate that the use of competitors' trademarks in meta tags is an
infringing use where it is intended to divert visitors from the competitors' sites to the infringer's
site for commercial gain. On the other hand, as the Playboy v. Welles case shows, the use of
others' trademarks as meta tags may be permissible ifit constitutes "fair use." Fair use may exist
where the site owner using someone else's trademarks as meta tags is using the trademarks
"otherwise than as a mark" or the mark is used in good faith to describe the goods or services of
a party or its geographic origin. 15 U.S.c. § 1115(b)(4); e.g., New Kids on the Block v. News
America Publishing, Inc., 971 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1992); Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp. v.
Faber, 29 S. Supp. 2d 1161 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (Defendant's "BALLY SUCKS" website was a
consumer criticism site, was not likely to be confused with plaintiffs Bally site, and was fair
use).
(3) TYPO PIRACY
Another tactic for trying to steal visitors to another website is typo piracy. Typo piracy
involves registering a domain name which differs only slightly from someone else's domain
name. The difference is meant to be so minor that a web surfer who mistypes the intended
domain name will instead get the pirate's site.
Typo piracy was at issue in Paine Webber Inc. v. WWWPAINEWEBBER.COM, 1999
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6552 (E.D. Va. 1999). There, Mr. Rafael Fortuny registered
"wwwpainewebber.com" as a domain name. This domain name differed from the domain name
of the stock brokerage Paine Webber by only the omission of a period after the "www." Mr.
Fortuny's site automatically linked to another site offering pornography.
1-8
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The court concluded that "Paine Webber" is a famous trademark which will be diluted by
being linked to pornography. Id. Consequently, Mr. Fortuny was enjoined from using the
offending domain name. Id.
Significantly, the court addressed only the possibility of dilution. Federal trademark
protection from dilution applies only to famous trademarks. The court did not address the
possibility of confusion between the trademark owner's site and the pirate site. A confusion
claim would seem to be the only avenue open to the owner of a non-famous mark to attack typo
pIracy.
Even so, typo piracy is likely to remain a problem for some domain name registrants. For
example, some domain names are generic and not trademark protected (e.g., "loans.com," just
purchased by Bank ofAmerica for $3.3 million). Moreover, another registrant may make "fair
use" of a very similar domain name (e.g., not a competitive use). In these cases, typo piracy may
continue to be a problem. For now, some companies are registering multiple variations of their
domain names to ward off typo piracy.
(4) KEYWORD PORTAL REGISTRATION
Keyword portal registration is another way some companies have tried to divert internet
traffic intended for competitors' websites. Portals are websites used by consumers as home
pages. The portals serve as internet directories and allow the consumers to conduct internet
searches from the website. Portals allow other websites to register keywords for their sites to
facilitate searches for the sites. The keywords, although registered with the portal, are not visible
to consumers.
Some enterprising companies have registered competitors' trademarks as keywords with
portals. For example, in Nettis Environmental, Ltd. v. IWI, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d 722 (N.D. Ohio
J-9
1999), IWI registered Nettis' name with 380 search engines and websites as a keyword for IWI's
site. IWI and Nettis are competitors in the same industry. The District Court for the Northern
District of Ohio enjoined IWI from continuing its registration ofNettis' trademark as a keyword
because it infringed Nettis' trademarks. Id.
A similar case is pending before the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York. The case is Estee Lauder, Inc. v. The Fragrance Counter, Inc., No. 99 Cir. 0382
(RWS)(see 189 F.R.D. 269; 1999 U.S. Dist. Lexis 14825 (S.D. N.Y. 1999) for a ruling on a
motion to dismiss an affirmative defense of defendant Excite, Inc.). In that case, Estee Lauder,
owner of the "Clinique" trademark, has sued The Fragrance Counter and Excite for registering
"Clinique" as a keyword for The Fragrance Counter's website. The case is still pending.
These cases raise serious questions about the advisability of registering competitors'
trademarks as keywords for other sites. So far the results, in court at least, have not been
encouragmg.
(5) KEYWORD TRIGGERED BANNER ADVERTISING
The marvels of technology allow portals to display pre-selected banner advertisements
whenever a user enters certain keywords for a search. For example, General Motors pays to have
its banner advertisements displayed whenever someone enters "Chevrolet" as a keyword search
on Excite. G. Miller & D. Maharaj, "Banner Ads on the Web Spark a Trademark Battle," Los
Angeles Times, Feb. II, 1999, Part A, Page 1. The practice is so effective that portals charge a
substantial premium for keyword triggered banner advertisements. Naturally, some companies
are willing to pay to have their banner advertisements appear when someone else's trademark is
the keyword. The trademark owners are usually not thrilled.
Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp. and Excite, Inc., 55 F.
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Supp. 2d 1070 (c.n. Cal. 1999), involved this kind ofbanner advertising tactic. There, Netscape
and Excite sold banner advertisements to various adult entertainment websites. The advertisers
could pay extra to have their ads pre-selected for display whenever anyone of a number of
keywords were entered, including the keywords "Playboy" or "Playmate." Playboy, as the
owner of the trademarks "Playboy" and "Playmate," sued to prevent Netscape and Excite from
displaying others' ads in response to Playboy's marks.
Playboy lost. The court did not believe that confusion would result from the banner
advertisement arrangement. Central to the court's analysis was the fact that the words "playboy"
and "playmate" are common English words, even if they also happen to be trademarks. The
court stated that a trademark owner "may not remove a word from the English language merely
by acquiring trademark rights in it." 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1074.
The court also concluded that Playboy's marks were not diluted by blurring or
tarnishment as a result of the ads. There was no evidence that any of the advertisers actually
used Playboy's marks, so no blurring occurred. As for tarnishment, Playboy argued that its
marks were being tarnished by association with more sexually explicit material. The court
rejected this argument because Playboy's marks "are associated with other purveyors of adult
entertainment in other marketing channels." Id. at 1076.
This same banner advertising type of claim is also at issue in the Estee Lauder case
discussed above. However, the practice ofkeyword triggered banner advertisements using
others' marks is likely to continue. The Playboy court allowed it, and the practice is not a blatant
hijacking of internet users trying to find something else. Instead, a web surfer must still
affirmatively click on the banner ad to go to the advertiser's website. This requirement of
consumer choice may save the keyword triggered banner advertising practice from the internet's
J - 11
trash bin.
(6) DEEP VS. SHALLOW LINKING
The practices discussed so far involve attempts to attract internet users to websites,
mostly by diverting users trying to find someone else's site. The other part of the equation to
internet success is content. Some website owners find it easier to use someone else's content
rather than creating their own.
One way internet companies can use someone else's content is to link to the other's
website. Hyperlinks allow a visitor to one site to quickly connect with another site on the web.
A hyperlink is created by inserting a URL into HTML code. When a user clicks on the icon or
highlighted text, he or she automatically links to and accesses the other site.
Often, there are logical and good reasons to link to another website, and linking is a
widely accepted practice. The problem is that website owners want to attract and keep visitors.
Visitors who link to another site may not come back. Most websites consist ofmany pages and
require a fair amount ofclicking to get where you want to be. Once there, getting back to where
you started can be a daunting task. And much of the required clicking involves navigating pages
full of trademarks, advertisements and other attention grabbers meant to keep you there.
Accordingly, linking to the home page of a another website ("shallow linking") is often
unsatisfactory for the "linkor" site.
To combat this problem, some intrepid website owners use "deep linking." In deep
linking, a site may link to another site, but the link is to a specific page or area, generally deep
within the site. Usually, many or all of the other website's trademarks and advertisements are
bypassed. In fact, the user may not even realize he or she has gone to someone else's website.
Upon leaving the deep link, the user may return automatically to the first site, rather than
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remaining in the linked site.
As a consequence, the linkor's visitors access the linkee's content, but perhaps without
ever knowing it and certainly without being subjected to most of the linkee's trademarks,
advertisem.ents and attention grabbers. Naturally, deep linkees are usually not fond of this
practice. At least one lawsuit was filed to stop deep linking.
In Ticketmaster Corp. v. Microsoft Cerp., Case No. 97-3055 DDP (C.D. Cal., complaint
filed Apr. 28, 1997), Ticketmaster sued to stop, among other things, deep links from Microsoft's
Seattle Sidewalk website to locations on Ticketmaster's site. The parties settled in 1999, and
Microsoft agreed not to continue deep links to Ticketmaster's site.
The Ticketmaster case is probably a good indication that deep linking without permission
is a bad idea. Deep linking is likely to create consumer confusion about the origin of the site. It
may also be unfair or deceptive. Shallow links are less likely to raise the same concerns.
(7) FRAMING
Framing is another scheme for getting someone else's content on a website. Frames are
boxes on a website where content from another website can be displayed or viewed, without
leaving the first site. Frames make it difficult to distinguish between content original to the
framing site from framed content. In fact, the framing site's URL remains displayed, even while
the framed site is on screen.
Problems arise because the framed content may contain trademarked or copyrighted
material from the framed site. Or, the framed content may be surrounded by the trademarks of
the framing site, making it look as though those marks go with the framed content.
The likelihood of consumer confusion with framing is high. Cases dealing with framing
so far have been resolved on terms favorable to the framed site owner. E.g., The Washington
J -13
Post Co. v. Total News, Inc., Case No. 97 Civ. 1190 (PKL) (S.D. N.Y., complaint filed Feb. 20,
1997) (settled with the framing stopping in favor of agreed-upon linking); Hard Rock Cafe Int'l
Inc. v. Morton, 1999 U.S. Dist. Lexis 8340 (S.D. N.Y. 1999) (framing a website is likely to
cause consumer confusion).
C. A NEW "STICK" FOR TRADEMARK OWNERS: THE ANTICYBER-
SQUATTING CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 1999.
Congress recently added a new "stick" to the trademark owner's arsenal that may be used
to protect one's marks: the Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act of 1999 (the
"ACPA"). The ACPA is effective as of29 November 1999 and is, with a few exceptions,
retroactive in effect.
The act creates a new section 43 (D.) of the Lanham Act and provides remedies against a
defendant who, with a "bad faith intent", registers or uses a domain name that (1) is identical or
confusingly similar to a distinctive mark; (2) is identical or confusingly similar to, or Duluth say
famous mark; or (5) 3 infringes the trademarks owned by the United States Olympic Committee.
Indicia of Bad Faith. The statute lists the following nonexclusive factors as meriting
consideration as to when a domain name registrant has a "bad faith intent" in registering a
particular name:
(1) the trademark or other intellectual property rights of the defendant, if any, in the
domain name;
(2) the extent to which the domain name consists ofthe legal name of the defendant or a
name that is otherwise commonly used to identify the defendant;
(3) the defendant's prior use, if any, of the domain name in connection with the bona fide
offering of any goods or services;
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(4) the defendant's bona fide noncommercial or fair use of the mark in a site accessible
under the domain name;
(5) the defendant's intent to divert consumers from the mark owner's online location to a
site accessible under the domain name that could harm the goodwill represented by the marks,
either for commercial gain or with the intent to tarnish or despair edge to mark, by creating a
likelihood of confusion as to the source, sponsor said, affiliation or endorsement of the site;
(6) the defendant's offer to transfer, sell or otherwise assign the domain name to the mark
owner or any third party for financial gain without having used, or having an intent to use, the
domain name in the bona fide offering of any goods or services, or the defendant's prior conduct
indicating a pattern of such conduct;
(7) the defendant's provision ofmaterial and misleading false contact information when
applying for the registration of the domain name, the defendants intentional failure to maintain
accurate contact information, or the defendant's prior conduct indicating a pattern of such
conduct;
(8) the defendant's registration or acquisition ofmultiple domain names which the
defendant knows are identical or confusingly similar to marks of others that are distinctive at the
time ofthe registration of such domain names, or dilutive of famous marks ofothers that are
famous at the time ofregistration of such domain names, without regard to the goods or services
of the parties; and
(9) the extent to which the mark incorporated in the defendant's domain name
registration is or is not distinctive and famous within the meaning of subsection (c)( I) of 15
u.S.C. §1l25(c).
J - 15
In addition, domain name registrars may also face liability "under the ACPA if it acts in
bad faith or reckless disregard of the trademark owner's rights.
Lastly, the ACPA also prohibits the registration of a domain name in bad faith that is
identical or confusingly similar to the name of another living person without that person's
permission. Here, bad faith means with the intent to profit from the registration by selling the
domain name to a third party.
In Rem Action. In addition to providing a new cause of action for trademark owners, the
ACPA provides that a trademark owner may proceed in rem against the domain name - if the
owner's identity is unknown. Of course, to proceed in rem, the plaintiff must show that it
exercised due diligence in trying to locate the domain name owner or that personal jurisdiction is
otherwise unavailable. In addition, remedies are limited to the forfeiture or transfer of the
domain name - no damages are recoverable in such an action.
Remedies. The ACPA expands the relief available to trademark owners. Statutory
damages are now available to trademark holders, rariging between $1,000 to $100,000, per
domain name. Like in the copyright remedy context, the ACPA statutory damages are in lieu of
actual damages and are awarded at the discretion of the trial court within the range set by statute.
However, statutory damages are available only for domain names registered after the effective
date of the ACPA.
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APPENDIX A
UNIFORM DOMAIN NAME DISPUTE RESOLUTION POLICY
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Note: This policy is now in effect. See www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-schedule.htm for the
implementation schedule.
b. our receipt of an order from a court or arbitral tribunal, in each case of
competent jurisdiction, requiring such action; and/or
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c. our receipt of a decision of an Administrative Panel requiring such action in
any administrative proceeding to which you were a party and which was
conducted under this Policy or a later version of this Policy adopted by ICANN.
(See Paragraph 4(i) and [Is} below.)
3. Cancellations, Transfers, and Changes. We will cancel, transfer or otherwise make
changes to domain name registrations under the following circumstances:
a. subject to the provisions of Paragraph 8, our receipt of written or appropriate
electronic instructions from you or your authorized agent to take such action;
1. Purpose. This Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Policy") has been
adopted by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers ("ICANN"), is
incorporated by reference into your Registration Agreement, and sets forth the terms and
conditions in connection with a dispute between you and any party other than us (the
registrar) over the registration and use of an Internet domain name registered by you.
Proceedings under Paragraph 4 of this Policy will be conducted according to the Rules for
Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Rules of Procedure"), which are
available at www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-rules-240ct99.htm. and the selected administrative-
dispute-resolution service provider's supplemental rules.
2. Your Representations. By applying to register a domain name, or by asking us to
maintain or renew a domain name registration, you hereby represent and warrant to us that
(a) the statements that you made in your Registration Agreement are complete and
accurate; (b) to your knowledge, the registration of the domain name will not infringe upon
or otherwise violate the rights of any third party; (c) you are not registering the domain
name for an unlawful purpose; and (d) you will not knowingly use the domain name in
violation of any applicable laws or regulations. It is your responsibility to determine whether
your domain name registration infringes or violates someone else's rights.
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We may also cancel, transfer or otherwise make changes to a domain name registration in
accordance with the terms of your Registration Agreement or other legal requirements.
4. Mandatory Administrative Proceeding.
This Paragraph sets forth the type of disputes for which you are required to submit to a
mandatory administrative proceeding. These proceedings will be conducted before one of
the administrative-dispute-resolution service providers listed at
www.icann.org/udrp/approved-providers.htm (each, a "Provider").
a. Applicable Disputes. You are required to submit to a mandatory
administrative proceeding in the event that a third party (a "complainant")
asserts to the applicable Provider, in compliance with the Rules of Procedure,
that
(i) your domain name is identical or confusingly similar to a
trademark or service mark in which the complainant has rights; and
(ii) you have no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain
name; and .
(iii) your domain name has been registered and is being used in bad
faith.
In the administrative proceeding, the complainant must prove that each of these
three elements are present.
b. Evidence of Registration and Use in Bad Faith. For the purposes of
Paragraph 4(a)(iji), the following circumstances, in particular but without
limitation, if found by the Panel to be present, shall be evidence of the
registration and use of a domain name in bad faith:
(i) circumstances indicating that you have registered or you have
acquired the domain name primarily for the purpose of selling,
renting, or otherwise transferring the domain name registration to the
complainant who is the owner of the trademark or service mark or to
a competitor of that complainant, for valuable consideration in
excess of your documented out-of-pocket costs directly related to the
domain name; or
(ii) you have registered the domain name in order to prevent the
owner of the trademark or service mark from reflecting the mark in a
corresponding domain name, provided that you have engaged in a
pattern of such conduct; or
(iii) you have registered the domain name primarily for the purpose of
disrupting the business of a competitor; or
(iv) by using the domain name, you have intentionally attempted to
attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to your web site or other
on-line location, by creating a likelihood of confusion with the
complainant's mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or
endorsement of your web site or location or of a product or service
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on your web site or location.
c. How to Demonstrate Your Rights to and Legitimate Interests in the
Domain Name in Responding to a Complaint. When you receive a complaint,
you should refer to Paragraph 5 of the Rules of Procedure in determining how
your response should be prepared. Any of the following circumstances, in
particular but without limitation, if found by the Panel to be proved based on its
evaluation of all evidence presented, shall demonstrate your rights or legitimate
interests to the domain name for purposes of Paragraph 4(a)(ii):
(i) before any notice to you of the dispute, your use of, or
demonstrable preparations to use, the domain name or a name
corresponding to the domain name in connection with a bona fide
offering of goods or services; or
(ii) you (as an individual, business, or other organization) have been
commonly known by the domain name, even if you have acquired no
trademark or service mark rights; or
(iii) you are making a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the
domain name, without intent for commercial gain to misleadingly
divert consumers or to tarnish the trademark or service mark at
issue.
d. Selection of Provider. The complainant shall select the Provider from among
those approved by ICANN by submitting the complaint to that Provider. The
selected Provider will administer the proceeding, except in cases of
consolidation as described in Paragraph 4(f).
e. Initiation of Proceeding and Process and Appointment of Administrative
Panel. The Rules of Procedure state the process for initiating and conducting a
proceeding and for appointing the panel that will decide the dispute (the
"Administrative Panel").
f. Consolidation. In the event of multiple disputes between you and a
complainant, either you or the complainant may petition to consolidate the
disputes before a single Administrative Panel. This petition shall be made to the
first Administrative Panel appointed to hear a pending dispute between the
parties. This Administrative Panel may consolidate before it any or all such
disputes in its sole discretion, provided that the disputes being consolidated are
governed by this Policy or a later version of this Policy adopted by ICANN.
g. Fees. All fees charged by a Provider in connection with any dispute before an
Administrative Panel pursuant to this Policy shall be paid by the complainant,
except in cases where you elect to expand the Administrative Panel from one to
three panelists as provided in Paragraph 5(b)(iv) of the Rules of Procedure, in
which case all fees will be split evenly by you and the complainant.
h. Our Involvement in Administrative Proceedings. We do not, and will not.
participate in the administration or conduct of any proceeding before an
Administrative Panel. In addition, we will not be liable as a result of any
decisions rendered by the Administrative Panel.
i. Remedies. The remedies available to a complainant pursuant to any
proceeding before an Administrative Panel shall be limited to requiring the
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cancellation of your domain name or the transfer of your domain name
registration to the complainant.
j. Notification and Publication. The Provider shall notify us of any decision
made by an Administrative Panel with respect to a domain name you have
registered with us. All decisions under this Policy will be published in full over
the Internet, except when an Administrative Panel determines in an exceptional
case to redact portions of its decision.
k. Availability of Court Proceedings. The mandatory administrative
proceeding requirements set forth in Paragraph 4 shall not prevent either you or
the complainant from submitting the dispute to a court of competent jurisdiction
for independent resolution before such mandatory administrative proceeding is
commenced or after such proceeding is concluded. If an Administrative Panel
decides that your domain name registration should be canceled or transferred,
we will wait ten (10) business days (as observed in the location of our principal
office) after we are informed by the applicable Provider of the Administrative
Panel's decision before implementing that decision. We will then implement the
decision unless we have received from you during that ten (10) business day
period official documentation (such as a copy of a complaint, file-stamped by the
clerk of the court) that you have commenced a lawsuit against the complainant
in a jurisdiction to which the complainant has submitted under Paragraph 3(b)
(xiii) of the Rules of Procedure. (In general, that jurisdiction is either the location
of our principal office or of your address as shown in our Whois database. See
Paragraphs 1 and 3(b)(xiii) of the Rules of Procedure for details.) If we receive
such documentation within the ten (10) business day period, we will not
implement the Administrative Panel's decision, and we will take no further
action, until we receive (i) evidence satisfactory to us of a resolution between
the parties; (ii) evidence satisfactory to us that your lawsuit has been dismissed
or withdrawn; or (iii) a copy of an order from such court dismissing your lawsuit
or ordering that you do not have the right to continue to use your domain name.
5. All Other Disputes and Litigation. All other disputes between you and any party other
than us regarding your domain name registration that are not brought pursuant to the
mandatory administrative proceeding provisions of Paragraph 4 shall be resolved between
you and such other party through any court, arbitration or other proceeding that may be
available.
6. Qur Involvement in Disputes. We will not participate in any way in any dispute between
you and any party other than us regarding the registration and use of your domain name.
You shall not name us as a party or otherwise include us in any such proceeding. In the
event that we are named as a party in any such proceeding, we reserve the right to raise
any and all defenses deemed appropriate, and to take any other action necessary to
defend ourselves.
7. Maintaining the Status Quo. We will not cancel, transfer, activate, deactivate, or
otherwise change the status of any domain name registration under this Policy except as
provided in Paragraph 3 above.
8. Transfers During a Dispute.
a. Transfers of a Domain Name to a New Holder. You may not transfer your
domain name registration to another holder (i) during a pending administrative
proceeding brought pursuant to Paragraph 4 or for a period of fifteen (15)
business days (as observed in the location of our principal place of business)
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after such proceeding is concluded; or (ii) during a pending court proceeding or
arbitration commenced regarding your domain name unless the party to whom
the domain name registration is being transferred agrees, in writing, to be bound
by the decision of the court or arbitrator. We reserve the right to cancel any
transfer of a domain name registration to another holder that is made in violation
of this subparagraph.
b. Changing Registrars. You may not transfer your domain name registration
to another registrar during a pending administrative proceeding brought
pursuant to Paragraph 4 or for a period of fifteen (15) business days (as
observed in the location of our principal place of business) after such
proceeding is concluded. You may transfer administration of your domain name
registration to another registrar during a pending court action or arbitration,
provided that the domain name you have registered with us shall continue to be
subject to the proceedings commenced against you in accordance with the
terms of this Policy. In the event that you transfer a domain name registration to
us during the pendency of a court action or arbitration, such dispute shall remain
subject to the domain name dispute policy of the registrar from which the
domain name registration was transferred.
9. Policy Modifications. We reserve the right to modify this Policy at any ,time with the
permission of ICANN. We will post our revised Policy at <URL> at least thirty (30) calendar
days before it becomes effective. Unless this Policy has already been invoked by the
submission of a complaint to a Provider, in which event the version of the Policy in effect at
the time it was invoked will apply to you until the dispute is over, all such changes will be
binding upon you with respect to any domain name registration dispute, whether the
dispute arose before, on or after the effective date of our change. In the event that you
object to a change in this Policy, your sole remedy is to cancel your domain name
registration with us, provided that you will not be entitled to a refund of any fees you paid to
us. The revised Policy will apply to you until you cancel your domain name registration.
Comments concerning the layout, construction and functionality of this site
should be sent to webmaster@icann.org.
Page Updated 03-January-OO
(c) 2000 The IntemetCorporation for Assigned Names and Numbers. All rights reserved.
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APPENDIXB
DOMAIN NAME DISPUTE COMPLAINT FORM
J - 27
J - 28
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
r$
DOMAIN NAME DISPUTE COMPLAINT FORM
(All references to "Rule" are to ICANN's "Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy. "
Utilizing this Complaintform is not a substitute for reading and understanding the ICANN rules)
r
r
r
COMPLAINANT
Name, full address & contact information: Rule 3(b)(ii) COMPLAINT
r
r
Telephone:
E-Mail Address:
Fax: _
File Number:
Filing Date:
( Assigned by The Forum)
r
RESPONDENT
Name, full address & contact information: Rule 3 (b)(v)
( Assigned by The Forum)
Contact person's preferred method for receiving electronic and hard-copy material (e-mail required): Rule 3(b)(iii)
Name and contact information of person or representative authorized to act for the Complainant in the proceeding if
different from above: Rule (b)(ii)
The above named Complainant requests that this Complaint be submitted for decision in accordance with ICANN's
Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy and Rules. Rule 3(b)(i) .
The Complainant is seeking a panel of 0 One 0 Three arbitrator(s). Note: IfComplainant seeks only one
arbitrator, no arbitrator candidate names are required below.
Fax: _
Fax: _
Name of Arbitrator candidate(s) - IfAvailable: Rule 3 (b)(iv)
Telephone:
E-Mail Address: _
o Fax to:
o E-mail Address:
o US Postal Service at:
Name:
Address:
City, State, Zip:
Telephone:
E-Mail Address: _
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
Candidate(s) Name Address Telephone Number
r
r
J - 29
Specify the domain name(s) that is/are the subject of the complaint: Rule 3(b)(vi)
Identify with whom the domain name(s) is/are registered (e.g. Network Solutions): Rule 3(b)(vii)
Specify the trademark(s) or service mark(s) upon which the complaint is based: Rule 3(b)(viii)
THIS COMPLAINT NOT TO EXCEED 10 PAGES - Supp. Rules 4(a)
Please print or type on this form or on a separate document ifmore space is needed.
Describe the grounds on which the complaint is made. Rule 3(b)(ix). In particular, the complaint must describe:
1. The manner in which the domain name(s) are identical or confusing
2. Why the Respondent should be considered as having no rights or legitimate interest in the domain name(s)
3. Why the domain name(s) should be considered as having been registered in bad faith
The description should, for elements (2) and (3), discuss any aspects of Paragraphs 4(b) and 4(c) of the ICANN
Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy that are applicable.
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r
r
r,
r
Specify the remedies sought: Rule 3(b)(x), Policy Paragraph 4(i)
Identify any other legal proceedings that have been commenced or terminated in connection with or relating to any
of the domain names that are the subject of this complaint. Rule 3(b)(xi)
1. A copy of this Complaint together with the "Complaint Transmittal Sheet" has been sent or transmitted to the
Respondent in accordance with Rule 2(b), Rule 3(b)(xii).
2. Complainant will submit to the jurisdiction of the courts in at least one specified jurisdiction if any challenge is made
to a decision in the arbitration proceeding. Rule 3(b)(xiii)
,.
J
r
r
I
IfWe
(Print or Type Complainant(s) Name)
assert the following under penalty of perjury;
r
r
[
r
3. Complainant agrees that its claims and remedies concerning the registration of the domain name, the dispute, or the
dispute resolution shall be solely against the domain-name holder and waives all such claims and remedies against;
• The dispute-resolution provider and panelists, except in the case of deliberate wrongdoing
• The registrar
• The registry administrator
• The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, as well as their directors, officers, employees and
agents.
4. Complainant certifies that the information contained in the Complaint is to the best of the Complainant's knowledge
complete and accurate and that this Complaint is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass.
5. That the assertions in this Complaint are warranted under these Rules and under applicable law, as it now exists or as
it may be extended by a good faith and reasonable argument:
Enclose the appropriate Filing Fee with Complaint Submission.
o Check or Money Order Enclosed
o Charge to Credit Card Account 0 Visa 0 MasterCard 0 Discover 0 American Express
Send the Complaint, along with any documents or other evidence applicable to the domain name(s) in dispute and
any trademark or service mark registration upon which the complaint relies, together with a table of contents of the
evidence, Rule 3(b)(xv), a copy of ICANN's Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, and the Complaint
Transmittal Sheet to The National Arbitration Forum by by email (info®arb-forum.com) and also by mail
(P.O. Box 50191, Minneapolis, Minnesota 55405), Supp. Rule4.d.
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
Signature of Complainant or
Representative:
Account Number:
Signature:
Expiration Date:
National Arbitration Forum
P.O. Box 50191, Minneapolis, Minnesota 55405
Telephone: 651-631-1105 or 800-474-2371
www.arb-forum.com
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Date:
3
J - 32
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
-I
I
I
I
I
I
I·
I
I
I
I
I
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r}
r,
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
APPENDIXC
LIST OF PROCEEDINGS UNDER
UNIFORM DOMAIN NAME DISPUTE
RESOLUTION POLICY
J - 33
J - 34
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
r
r
r
r
~:
r
r
List of Proceedings Under Uniform
Domain Name
Dispute Resolution Policy
leAN N
UDRP Proceedings--Arranged by Commencement
Date
Pending
Pending
Pending
II Pending
II PendingI
Il Pending
II Pending
I Pending
II Pending
I .Pending
Pending
II Domain Name(s) II Status I
II worldwrestlingfederation.c0rTill Name transferI
I musicweb.com II Name transferl
americanvintage.com II Name transferl
buyerschoice.com II Pending I
icqsms.com Name transferl
telstra.org Name transferI
facetime.com Name transferI
omniloan.com Name transferI
Date Proceeding
Commenced Number
9 Dec 1999 WIPO 099-0001
10 Jan 2000 WIPO 000-0001
10 Jan 2000 WIPO 000-0004
11 Jan 2000 NAF FA0092015
11 Jan 2000 II NAF FA0092016
12 Jan 2000 II WIPO 000-0003
14 Jan 2000 II NAF FA0092048
18 Jan 2000 II NAF FA0092049
Icunardcruises.com vvn:narawn19 Jan 2000 NAF FA0092052 without
prejudice
19 Jan 2000 II NAF FA0092053 II cunardcrUlse.com
20 Jan 2000 /I NAF FA0092054 II fibershield.net
21 Jan 2000 II DeC AF-0076 a powrachute.com
21 Jan 2000 II DeC AF-0076 b powrachute.net
21 Jan 2000 II DeC AF-0076 c powrachutes.com
21 Jan 2000 II DeC AF-0076 d powrachutes.net
21 Jan 2000 II WIPO 000-0005 I telaxls.com
.======I:t:el:a:xl:s.:ne:t::::::::::::;::::====~
1
:=2=1=J=a=n=2=00=0= WIPO 02000-00081 slx.net
. =s:;:lx==n=et:;::::.c::::::o::::;:m;======~
============ ::::::~~::r;:~:::::=:=::=::::r:::=::~~===9:=====
1
24 Jan 2000 NAF FA0092524 desflnatlonpuertonco.comdesflnaflonpuertonco.net
124 Jan 2000 NAF FA0092525 fossilwatch.com
1
24 Jan 2000 NAF FA0092526 puertoaventuras.com
. puertoaventuras.net
r
r
I
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
http://www.icann.org/udrp/proceedings-Iist.htm J - 35 3/7/00
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I
I
I
I
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I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
Pending
Pending
Pending
Pending
Pending
Pending
Pending
Pending
Pending
Pending
Pending I
t;ase settlea;
name
transferred
botox.net
planetrxx.com
paytrust.net
philipsindia.com
narcoticsanonymous.orgOeCAF-0060
NAF FA0092529
NAF FA0092530
NAF FA0092973
NAF FA0092974
27 Jan 2000
24 Jan 2000 IWIPe 02000-00071 alcoholicsanonymous.net
25 Jan 2000 IlwlPe 02000-000611 militec.com
=::::::::=====:=======26 Jan 2000 II NAF FA0092531 craftwork.com
==:======:=======26 Jan 2000 II NAF FA0092532 golferswarehouse.com
phonespel.com
phonespel.org
27 Jan 2000 NAF FA0092975 phonespell.com Pending
phonespell.net
phonesspell.com
24 Jan 2000 NAF FA0092527 heelqUlk.com:::;h::::::e:::::e~lqi::::u::;;:lk=.o::::::r=g===-===
~==== ;:::::=====::::::; ;======
24 Jan 2000 NAF FA0092528 cosmebcdocshop.com
plasbcdocshop.com
tvazteca.com
26 Jan 2000 NAF FA0092533 tvazteca.net Pending
tvazteca.org
127 Jan 2000
127 Jan 2000
127 Jan 2000
127 Jan 2000
126 Jan 2000 wiPe 02000-0009 talk-clty.com
:============:F~=====::::::::=iiar:=:
I27 Jan 2000 II NAF FA0092976 fishtech.com Pending
I II I homemtenors.net28 Jan 2000 WIpe 02000-0010 1=hi=o=m=e=rl=int;=e=;::no=r=sa==n=d:;::g=;:;lft:r=s=.c=o=m= Pending
128 Jan 2000 IlwlPe 02000-0012 stelladoro.com Name transfer
I II westernhay.com31 Jan 2000 NAF FA0093466 westernhay.net Pending
131 Jan 2000 wiPe 02000-0011 ronson.com Pending
1 Feb 2000 DeC AF-0092 ::::::b~e=v=e=ra=g=e=sa=n=d:=m=o=re=.=co=m== r====P:=e=nd~i=ng==
1 Feb 2000 DeC AF-0095 iphones.com Pending
3 Feb 2000 DeC AF-0090 theartofshaving.com Pending
3 Feb 2000 DeC AF-0098 follicare.com Pending
3 Feb 2000 DeC AF-01 00 benihanaoftokyo.com Pending
3 Feb 2000 DeC AF-01 03 iphone.com Pending
3 Feb 2000 NAF FA0093547 concierge.com Pending
3 Feb 2000 NAF FA0093548 zaploan.com Pending
3 Feb 2000 NAF FA0093550 sixflag.com Pending
J - 37
IName transfer
I
Il====:;;::::==:;::=======l
cybergauge.com II Pending
Fg==i::::=lb=a=rc=o=e===cl:::=iP=s=e.=c=om====11 Pending
8 Feb 2000 II NAF FA0093559
8 Feb 2000 II NAF FA0093560
14 Feb 2000 I Ingersoll-rand.netWIPO 02000-0021 Ingersoll-rand.org Pending
Ingersollrand.org I
chnsflandlorcosmeflcs.com I
4 Feb 2000 WIPO 02000-0022 chnsflandlortashlons.com I Pendingdlorcosmeflcs.com I
dlortashlons.com I
3 Feb 2000 II NAF FA0093551 jerryorbach.com Pending
I 3 Feb 2000 II NAF FA0093552 fieldcrest.com Pending
I II
=:u=:=:s:::::o~u:::::rc::::;e::::.c::::;o::;:m======;
3 Feb 2000 NAF FA0093553 =:::u:=:=:s===o:=:=:u==rc===e==.n===eTt======i Pending
I 3 Feb 2000 /I NAF FA0093554 bigdog.com ==Pe=n~d:=:=in=g=
3 Feb 2000 I NAF FA0093555 euroconsult.com Pending
3 Feb 2000 I NAF FA0093556 steamist.com Pending
3 Feb 2000 IIWIPO 02000-003~Ii=s=:=t=ei:=n:;='a=g=er=.c=o=m===== Pending
1==::::::;:=:::::;::===4 Feb 2000 IIW1PO 02000-0013jl sizesunlimited.com Pending
I 4 Feb 2000 IIWIPO 02000-001411 theeconomictimes.com Pending
I 4 Feb 2000 IIWIPO 02000-001511 thetimesofindia.com Pending
I 4 Feb 2000 IIW'PO 02000-0020 saint-gobain.net Pending
I 7 Feb 2000 IWIPO D2000-0031 Ithelirnited.orgI bettercheddars.com
I harvestcnsps.com
7 Feb 2000 WIPO 02000-0032 milk-bone.com
wheatsworth.com
wheatthlns.com
I 4 Feb 2000 IIWIPO 02000-0023 11 dlor.org II Pending
~:::::;=========I 6 Feb 2000 WIPO 02000-0026 4tel.com I Pending
7 Feb 2000 OeC AF-0096 tourplan.com Pending
7 Feb 2000 OeC AF-01 02 biofield.com Pending
7 Feb 2000 OeC AF-01 04 thyme.com Pending
7 Feb 2000 NAF FA0093557 vybar.com Pending
7 Feb 2000 NAF FA0093628 " celestialseasonings.net Pending
7 Feb 2000 IWIPO 02000-001611 allocation.com Pending
7 Feb 2000 IIW1PO 02000-001911 goodfoodguide.net Pending
7 Feb 2000 Ilw'PO 02000-002911 credltconnecflon.net PendingI credltconnecflon.org
t>enlement;
complaint
withdrawn
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r
r
r
r
r
r
r
I
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
I
8 Feb 2000 NAF FA0093561 den.com II Pending I
8 Feb 2000 NAF FA0093562 hewlittpackard.com IIRecommenced!
8 Feb 2000 NAF FA0093563 icqguide.com II Pending I I8 Feb 2000 NAF FA0093564 hewlettpackard.com Recommencedl
8 Feb 2000 NAF FA0093629 janusfund.com Ismlsse onjoint motion I8 Feb 2000 NAF FA0093630 almanauta.com Pending
8 Feb 2000 NAF FA0093631 soundchoice.net Pending I8 Feb 2000 NAF FA0093632 adventurecity.com Pending
8 Feb 2000 I NAF FA0093633.1 buypc.com Pending I8 Feb 2000 IIWIPO 02000-0017 11 drawtite.com Pending
8 Feb 2000 IIWIPO 02000-0024 11 easyjet.net Pending I8 Feb 2000 WIPO 02000-0028 cellularonechina.com Pending
9 Feb 2000 NAF FA0093634 cnnheadlinenews.com Pending
9 Feb 2000 1 NAF FA0093635 glgantor.com Recommencedl Iglgantor.net
9 Feb 2000 IIWIPO 02000-00181 banesto.net Pending I II banesto.org
9 Feb 2000 IIWIPO 02000-00251' sgs.net Pending I II sgsgroup.net9 Feb 2000 IIWIPO 02000-0035 11 jpmorgan.org Pending I
9 Feb 2000 IIWIPO 02000-0037 zwacku.nicum.com Pending I I9 Feb 2000 WIPO 02000-0041 rollasign.com Pending I
10 Feb 2000 NAF FA0093546 thetotalpackage.com I Pending I I10 Feb 2000 NAF FA0093637 marriott-hotels.com IIRecommencedl
10 Feb 2000 NAF FA0093666 faithnet.org II Pending I I10 Feb 2000 II NAF FA0093667 fanuc.com II Pending I
10 Feb 2000 NAF FA0093668I olcq.com II Pending I Iolcq.net I
10 Feb 2000 NAF FA0093669 youaskedforit.com Recommenced
10 Feb 2000 NAF FA0093670 marriott-hotel.com Pending I
110 Feb 2000 1 NAF FA0093671
loanmart.net Pendingloanmart.org I10 Feb 2000 I NAF FA0093672 halegroves.com Pending
10 Feb 2000 NAF FA0093673 southernbank.com Pending
10 Feb 2000 NAF FA0093674 aeroturbine.com Pending I
10 Feb 2000 NAF FA0093675 1 aeroturbine.net Pending
10 Feb 2000 IIWIPO 02000-002711 gamma.com Pending I
J - 38 I
r
r 10 Feb 2000 WIPO 02000-0038 euro-tunnel.com Pending11 Feb 2000 DeC AF-0107a kittenger.com Pending
r 11 Feb 2000 DeC AF-01 07b kittengerfurniture.com Pending11 Feb 2000 DeC AF-0108a kittinger.com Pending
r
11 Feb 2000 DeC AF-0108b kittingercollector.com Pending
11 Feb 2000 NAF FA0093676 Indlanamulch.net PendingIndymulch.com
r 11 Feb 2000 NAF FA00936771 mckennaandcuneo.com Pending
f
111 Feb 2000
amencanonhne.com ]NAF FA0093679 Pendingr amencaonhne.net111 Feb 2000 NAF FA0093680 namethattune.com Pending I
111 Feb 2000 NAF FA0093681 dogs.com Pending Ir 111 Feb 2000 NAF FA0093682 cartoys.net Pending I
111 Feb 2000 NAF FA0093708 websterhall.com Pending Ir 111 Feb 2000 NAF FA0093709 firefoam.com . Pending I
efg-pnvate-bank.com
r 11 Feb 2000 WIPO 02000-0036 efgpb.com Pendingefgpnvate.com
efgpnvatebank.com
r 111 Feb 2000 IIWIPO 02000-00431 safmarine.com Pending
111 Feb 2000 IIWIPO 02000-004411 toefl.com Pending
r 113 Feb 2000 IIWIPO 02000-003311 moorepushpin.com Pending
113 Feb 2000 IIWIPO 02000-0039 budgetsaver.com Pending
r pantyexpress.com14 Feb 2000 NAF FA0093459 pantyexpress.net Pending
r
pantYexpress.org
114 Feb 2000 II NAF FA0093710 breederscrown.com Pendinghambletoman.com
r 114 Feb 2000 IIWIPO 02000-00401 phonenphone.com Pending114 Feb 2000 IIWIPO 02000-004611 avnet.net Pending
r 114 Feb 2000 IIWIPO 02000-004811 praline.com Pending
\ 114 Feb 2000 IIWIPO 02000-005311 microsoft.org Pending
r 1 15 Feb 2000 IIWIPO 02000_004211Infopaq.com PendingI smartpaq.com
115 Feb 2000 WIPO 02000-0045 hipercor.com Pending
r 116 Feb 2000 DeC AF-0106 computerfutures.com Pending
116 Feb 2000 NAF FA0093635
glgantor.com Pending
r (restart) glgantor.net116 Feb 2000 NAF FA0093757 netgrocer.com Pending
r J - 39
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foxclasslcs.com
foxdownload.com
foXfashlon.com
foXfashlon.net
foXfhcks.com
foXfortun.com I
foxhomeadultvldeo.com
foxhomemovles.com
foxhomenet.com
foxhomevldeo.com
16 Feb 2000 NAF FA0093761 foxhomevldeo.net Pending
foxhomevldeo.org
foxmp3.com
foxnetworknews.com
foxnewsnetwork.com
foxplctures.com
foxreleases.com
foxvldeodownload.com
foxvldeos.com
tcfhv.com
116 Feb 2000 IIWIPO 02000-005411 crew.com Pending
=::=:::;:::::;::::=======116 Feb 2000 IIWIPO 02000-005511 guerlain.net Pending
:::::§:::~::::::E'??::iE=~::====~
1
16 Feb 2000 IIWIPO 02000-005711 acrobatreader.com Pending
.?::.=:::=====:::.===::====::::::::=::::::::::=:.1 adobeacrobat.com1~1:::;:6==F==::eb=2::=:'::0===00::==;IIWIPO 02000-005811 forrent.com Pending
=:=====7====~116 Feb 2000 IIWIPO 02000-005911 barneysnewyork.com Pending
116 Feb 2000 IIWIPO 02000-0060 dodialfayed.com Pending
116 Feb 2000 WIPO 02000-0061 inforspace.com Pending
117 Feb 2000 OeC AF-0126 mikimoto.com Pending
=========~117 Feb 2000 NAF FA0093763 esquire.com Pending
~==:===:==::======~117 Feb 2000 NAF FA0093764 I borderpatrol.com Pending
I clanns.com17 Feb 2000 NAF FA0093765 i=c:;;:la:;::r~ln~s::::::.c~o~m;======= Pending~========= =::::::;====117 Feb 2000 NAF FA0093766 go2aol.com Pending
?=:=:=========117 Feb 2000 NAF FA0093767 obagLcom Pending
i===:=====:======117 Feb 2000 NAF FA0093768 netgrocer.net Pending
~::==:===:======~117 Feb 2000 I NAF FA0093769 I thinkquest.com Pending
117 Feb 2000 IIWIPO 02000-004711 officespecialists.com Pending
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
Pending
Pending116 Feb 2000 II NAF FA0093758 II attLnet
116 Feb 2000 II NAF FA0093759 I=s=e=ve=n=ty=s;:::ix=.co=m=====
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Pending
Pending
Pending
I Pending
II Pending
Pending
Pending
Pending
Pending
II Pending
bbcdelondres.com
17 Feb 2000 WIPO 02000-0051 bbcenespanol.com Pendingbbcenespanol.net
bbcenespanol.org
2002worldcup.net I
2002worldcup.org I
200Bworldcup.org I
wc02.com
wc2002.com
worldcup02.net
worldcup02.org
18 Feb 2000 WIPO 02000-0034 worldcup10.com Pending
worldcup2002.com
worldcup2002.net
worldcup2002.org
worldcup200B.org
worldcup2010.com
worldcup2010.net
~_._-
I worldcup2010.org
118 Feb 2000 II NAF FA0093884 stalnmaster.com
I hollywood-casino.com I
21 Feb 2000 NAF FA0091407 I hollywood-casino.net I PendingI hollywoodgoldcaslno.com II hollywoodgoldcaslno.net I
117 Feb 2000 IIWIPO 02000-005011 eautolamps.com
118 Feb 2000 1!WiP0 02000-005611 bellevuesquare.com
1
18 Feb 2000 IIWIPO 02000-006211 potomacmllls.net
. I potomacmllls.org
~::;:::::::;::=::;;::;:::;:::::::::;::::;::::::::::::;::;;
118 Feb 2000 IIWIPO 02000-006511 surfdog:com
1==::===;:========
118 Feb 2000 IIWIPO 02000-006711 miguard.com
1===:::=:::=:==r::;r::::r:::=s:=::=:::===::=::::::====
1
18 Feb 2000 IIWIPO 0200.0-007211 grass-telefactor.com
i=.:::====::::==:=~:;::::;::;.~====::;;::;:::;:::::::::;::::;~=::i.1grasstelefactor.com
118 Feb 2000 IIWIPO 02000-007411 microinfospace.com
119 Feb 2000 IIWIPO 02000-006411 1800rockport.com
120 Feb 2000 IIWIPO 02000-006911 wwwinfospaces.com
121 Feb 2000 II NAF FA0093770 II sololnsurance.com PendIng
121 Feb 2000 II NAF FA0094108 II hydraroll.com Pending
==========
121 Feb 2000 WIPO 02000-0066 ;::c=o=s=co=.=co=m======= ==P=e=nd=i=ng=~
1
22 F b 2000 NAF FA00935B2 hewlittpackard.com Pending
. e (restart)
122 Feb 2000 I NAF FA0094110 cordstrap.com Pending
122 Feb 2000 IIWIPO 02000-0063111.-~_am_.co_m ,---P_e_n_din_g_
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
I
122 Feb 2000JIWIPO 02000-007911 talkabout.com II Pending I122 Feb 2000 IjWfPO 02000-0080 11 alaskaairlines.org II Pending
123 Feb 2000 OeC AF00123 I paradigm.com
"
Pending
I23 Feb 2000 NAF FAOO93564 hewlettpackard.com Pending(restart)
23 Feb 2000 NAF FA0094183 aopa.com Pending I23 Feb 2000 NAF FA0094184 kingsofcomedy.com Pending
23 Feb 2000 IWIPO 02000-00491 tata.org Pending I23 Feb 2000 IIWIPO 02000-005211 franpin.com Pending
23 Feb 2000 IIWIPO 02000-007011 wwwinfospace.com Pending I23 Feb 2000 IIWIPO 02000-007111 csa-canada.com PendingI csa-Internatlonal.net
23 Feb 2000 IIWIPO 02000-007311 hamburgerhamlet.com Pending I23 Feb 2000 IIWIPO 02000-007511 info-space.com Pending
23 Feb 2000 IIWIPO 02000-008211 aerotrader.com Pending II boaftrader.com
23 Feb 2000 IIWIPO 02000-008811 unipart.com Pending
I24 Feb 2000 II NAF FA0093637 II marriott-hotels com Pending(restart) .
124 Feb 2000 IIWIPO 02000-007811 m-power.net Pending I24 Feb 2000 IIWIPO 02000-008311 i-mln.com Pending
24 Feb 2000 I~!PO 02000-0084 muji.com Pending I25 Feb 2000 [ OeC AF-0109 anneofgreengables.com Pending
25 Feb 2000 OeC AF-0121 launchpad.com Pending
I25 Feb 2000 OeC AF-0122 shopzone.com Pending
25 Feb 2000 OeC AF-0131 fido.com Pending
125 Feb 2000 NAF FAOO93669 youaskedforit.com Pending I(restart)
25 Feb 2000 NAF FA0094187 jamesdean.net Pending I25 Feb 2000 I NAF FA0094188 networksystems.com Pending
25 Feb 2000 II NAF FA0094190 latinohealthcare.com Pending I25 Feb 2000 JIWIPO 02000-007611 indiainfospace.com Pending
I truevlnyl.com
I25 Feb 2000 WIPO 02000-0085 I truevlnylthefllm.com PendingI truevlnylthemovle.com
125 Feb 2000 IIWIPO 02000-008711 toeic.net Pending I125 Feb 2000 IIWIPO 02000-008911 pacificplace.com Pending
I
J - 42 I
rPending
Pending
Pending
Pending
Pending
Pending
II Pending
II Pending
II Pending
II . Pending
II Pending
I Pending
Pending
Pending
Pending
Pending
Pending
Pending
Pending
Pending
Pending
. Pending
Pending
Pending
Pending
Pending
Pending
Pending
Pending
Pending
Pending
1 Mar 2000
1 Mar 2000
1 Mar 2000
1 Mar 2000
1 Mar 2000
1 Mar 2000
28 Feb 2000 NAF FA0094197 dralnstatlon.com
northwestplumblng.com
2 Mar 2000 NAF FA0094234 venusswimwear.net
2 Mar 2000 IlwlPe 02000-009211~t~on:=:e==rj::=et=.c=::o=m=====
2 Mar 2000 IIWIPO 02000-009911 fiddlehead.com
2 Mar 2000 IlwlPe 02000-010311 e-automotive.com
2 Mar 2000 IIwlPe 02000-010511 petwarehouse.com
2 Mar 2000 IlwlPe 02000-010611 gatewaypccountry.com
2 Mar 2000 wiPe 02000-0109 gate-way.com
3 Mar 2000 NAF FA0094235 bodyandsoul.com
3 Mar 2000 NAF FA0094236 whypaymore.com
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Negotiation of Web Development,
Software Development, and Web Design Agreements:
Who Owns the Code?
by Stephen E. Gillen I
Introduction
Web site development agreements can run the gamut from:
• the simple -- e.g., a relatively static promotional site with information about the
company and its products and services, perhaps based on the developer's pre-existing
design template, and with little interactivity beyond the ability to email comments to
the webmaster;
• to the complex -- e.g., the development from the ground up of a dynamic, content-
rich, interactive site (still focused on information delivery, but perhaps supporting
data mining functions);
• to the devilishly complex -- e.g., the creation of a site that is both content- and media-
rich, where the publicly accessible portions of the site may include executable
programs, databases, text, images, sound, video, animation (some ofwhich may be
supplied by the customer, some of which may be developed specifically for this work
by the developer, some of which may come from the developer's library of existing
r
r
r
,.
!
works, and some ofwhich may be in tum licensed from third parties) and where the
site is designed to support the execution of transactions (including the execution of
I Steve Gillen is a partner in the Intellectual Property Department at Frost & Jacobs LLP in
Cincinnati and Co-Chair of the finn's Technology Law Practice Group. His practice is concentrated
in traditional and electronic publishing, licensing, computer law and technology issues, copyrights and
trademarks. He has published and spoken widely on this and other technology topics.
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auctions and reverse auctions), the delivery of digital products, the collection and
evaluation of sensitive customer data, the generation of leads and referrals, and the sale
of advertising space.
There is no one-size-fits-all form of development agreement that can accommodate the entire
range of possible circumstances ... and no 50-minute presentation that can do complete justice
to the range of issues that should be addressed or the contract and negotiating options for
resolving those issues. There is, however, a core group of issues common to most such deals
which, given the circumstance of any particular deal, take on more or less significance, and more
or fewer levels of complexity.
For convenience sake, let's talk about the fmal product as the "Work," though in actuality
it may be comprised of a number of different components and deliverables in various stages of
development -- preliminary, intermediate, and final. We'll also have to talk about "Services" apart
from the development activities, which may include preliminary design consulting, training,
launch assistance, hosting, maintenance, and support. The range of core issues, then, includes 1) a
description of the Work to be developed and the Services to be rendered; 2) ownership of the
Work and its specially commissioned components; 3) a license to use certain pre-existing
components incorporated in the Work; 4) a mechanism for determining acceptability of the Work
and for dealing with the inevitable modifications to the original specifications; 5) covenants
dealing with the quality and timeliness of the Services to be rendered; 6) a schedule; 7)
compensation; 8) warranties and indemnification; 9) confidentiality; 10) non-compete provisions;
11) remedies for breach; and 12) the usual menu of miscellaneous contract provisions (some of
which take on a special significance in deals involving intellectual property).
K-2
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n. Description of the Work and the Services
From the perspective of the customer (commissioning party) in a web site development
deal, it's undoubtedly correct to say that if you don't get this right, nothing else will matter. But
it's also important from the·perspective of the developer to be certain that both parties to the
deal have the same expectations with respect to the scope of the development being undertaken
as well as the nature of associated services t6 be rendered. As a practical matter, it is unlikely that
you as a lawyer will be able to provide the details. Much of this will take the form of schedules
and exhibits to the agreement (requirements document, RFP and response, proposal, high level
design document, detailed interface and functional specification, storyboards, demos or
prototypes, etc.). Your task is to ask the right questions of the right people to be certain that
both parties have a common understanding and that the details have been adequately
memorialized in the agreement. If the project is complex and carries a big ticket and if the client
does not have ready access internally to IS staff familiar with high level web design, you may
need to convince your client of the need to bring in an independent consultant experienced in
high-level web design to assist in the technical review of the preliminary design documents and in
acceptance testing.
As noted above, the Work may include a number of different deliverables. Let's take them
one at a time:
A. Preliminary Documents
In a complex web site development project where the developer is starting from ground
zero, a lot of work is done before the first line of code is ever written. The first deliverable may
be a requirements definition -- a statement, based upon interviews with the client and perhaps
with focus groups or prospective site visitors, of the requirements which the new site must
fulfill.
K-3
In a transaction of this type, it is a good idea to commit the parties in stages. If, in the
course of the requirements definition process, it becomes apparent that client and developer are
not well matched, the client should have the option of paying for and owning the requirements
document or high level design document so that the investment in that process can be used to
create a request for proposal and used to select another vendor. Providing for an opt out at this
point in the development process also serves as a disincentive to over specing the project.
Perhaps more likely, again depending upon the scope and complexity of the project, the
first document your client will see will be a high level design document, progressing through a
series of intermediate steps to a detailed set of specifications. Ultimately, the client should get a
design document or specification which sets forth the functions, features, interface specifications,
browser compatibilities, security features, internal audit and report-generating capabilities,
performance characteristics, bandwidth requirements, operating environment requirements, and
so on for the final Work. It is this specification against which acceptability and performance will
ultimately be measured.
B. Software
At the outset of the relationship between developer and client, it will likely be anticipated
that the developer will proceed to host and maintain the web site after its completion.
Consequently, clients are frequently unconcerned about getting delivery of the completed site in a
form that would permit them to operate it or outsource operation to a different vendor. If,
however, your client is not willing to be held hostage to a developer whose service declines or
whose hosting and maintenance fees skyrocket, then it is important to pay close attention to
ensuring that all of the deliverables necessary to an efficient transition of hosting are precisely
defined. In defining or describing any software deliverable, be careful that you select the correct
terminology and that you understand the terms you choose to use. Consider, for example, the
K-4
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potential differences between the terms "computer program" and "software". 17 USC §101
defines a computer program as "[a] set of statements or instructions to be used directly or
indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result." Software, on the other hand, is a
broader term which can incorporate computer programs, libraries, databases, and utilities.
If the project involves incorporation of existing software, be certain to identify the
software as specifically as possible, including the version number and release. Include all
modules, if appropriate, or a list of only those modules licensed. Where the software being
incorporated is the developer's proprietary software, consider making the definition of software
broad enough to cover subsequent releases from the developer. Consider also whether the
developer will be incorporating third-party software (server systems, utilities, tools, run-time
versions, credit card processing or electronic cash or debiting software) necessary for the
operation of the site. In such event, you will want to define that third-party software separately
(as it will probably be treated differently for a number ofpurposes later in the agreement).
Lastly, consider whether the software is to be delivered in executable form only or
whether it is also to be provided as source code (likely it will be some of both: source code for
custom applets and content; executable for third party applications).
c. Documentation
Avoid including documentation as part of the definition of software: Give it its own
definition -- there will probably be separate limitations on its use. Consider also the following
concerns in constructing your description:
1. What type of documentation is included?
(a) Site administrator or webmaster manuals.
(b) Development documentation (necessary for maintenance and modification).
K-5
2. Define documentation in as much detail as possible.
(a) Site administrator or webmaster manuals might be defined as any written manuals
and any other materials, drawings, or writings, whatever the media, electronic,
paper, or otherwise, provided by the developer and relating to use or maintenance
of the site.
(b) Development Documentation might be defined as all documentation, on paper and
magnetic media, related to the development of the site, flow charts, data
description and requirements, functional specifications, design specifications,
results of any testing, and any and all data bases, sufficient in detail and clarity to
enable a computer programmer of ordinary skill to easily understand and modify
the site without undue experimentation or development time.
3. Can the client copy the documentation?
D. Operating Environment
Any description of the Work would be out of context if you did not also describe the
environment in which it is intended to function. In that regard, consider the following points:
1. What are the minimum system/environment requirements? Are the warranties
conditioned on such minimums?
2. With respect to the sufficiency of minimum system/environment (hardware and
software), is the customer being held responsible for assessing sufficiency of existing
equipment/environment or has developer inspected them and made a representation about
their sufficiency?
3. Will the developer be providing hardware or third party software?
(a) Fix the cost. Preview third party purchase, lease, license, and maintenance
agreements. Be certain that payments for hardware are either made directly to the
K-6
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OEM or, in the alternative, that the payment is contemporaneously exchanged for
a bill of sale free and clear of any liens or encumbrances. If the deal is being
financed by a third party financing company or capital leasing agent, be sure that
your client retains the ability to direct or withhold payments to the developer
sufficient to get the developer's undivided attention in the event a deliverable is
late or fails to function as intended.
(b) Provide for pass through warranties for hardware and third party software.
Developer should assign and pass through to the client the third parties'
warranties such that client's rights under such third parties' warranties will be the
same as if the client had purchased the third party hardware or licensed the third
party software directly from the third party. Developer should commit to assist
the client in the enforcement of such warranties.
E. Deliverables
It is important to describe what physical materials the client will be receiving (or may be
entitled to demand, in the event of a transition in hosting and maintenance):
1. Copies of the software.
(a) How many copies, what type and size of media, what format, for what.
(b) If the client changes platforms to another platform supported by.the developer, is
there a right to delivery of the software in formats for such other platforms? Are
additional/replacement copies available? Charges?
2. Copies of Documentation.
(a) What documentation and in what form?
(b) How many copies? Is there a charge for additional copies? Can the client make
additional copies?
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3. Source code.
(a) Don't list source code as a deliverable unless its delivery is consistent with the
scope of the license. If the client has a right to modify the software, source code
must be listed as a deliverable.
(b) Specify in what form, written or electronic (machine readable).
(c) If source code is provided, make sure the licensor has an obligation to deliver
source code with each new version or update delivered.
(d) From the developer's side, you should include a covenant not to compete if the
client has access to the source code for the developer's proprietary routines and
applications.
(e) Also from the developer's side, you should prohibit client from developing,
marketing, distributing, etc. similar software during and for a period after access to
or possession of source code.
(f) Special confidentiality provisions may be advisable, limiting who will have access.
4. The client will also have some delivery obligations for the content it provides (originally
and with respect to updates). In order to avoid any misunderstanding, the agreement
should provide for the form, manner, and timing of the delivery of this content.
F. Services
In addition to the deliverables, it will be important to specify the services that the
developer will provide:
1. Types.
(a) Pre-development assessment or assistance with the requirements definition.
(b) Implementation.
(c) Training.
K-8
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3.
(d) Support (telephone, remote access, on-site).
(e) Maintenance -- provide separately for maintenance of content and for maintenance
of any licensed software.
(f) Installation.
(g) Hosting -- it is important to spell out the scope of those service -- what sort of
server equipment and software will be used, what size connection or pipeline is
guaranteed, how much disk space will be allocated, how soon will the developer
respond to service interruptions, when will routine maintenance be performed, and
so on. Be sure that the contract requires the developer to maintain the facilities so
that they will be operating and available 24 hours per day, 7 days per week, and
that the developer has capable technical support personneL If the client is going to
process transactions electronically via its site, make sure that the developer will
take appropriate steps to ensure the security and integrity of these transactions.
(h) Report generation and data mining.
(i) Roll out/launch assistance.
Training.
(a) What type of training? System administrator, Developer (for source code
modification).
(b) Is there a minimum/maximum class size? How effective will the training be if
classes are large?
(c) Where will the classes be held?
Support.
(a) How is support defined by the parties?
(b) Identify to whom the support will be given.
K-9
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6.
(c) How long will support be available? For what versions?
(d) Hours of telephone support (specify time zone) and whether it's toll free.
(e) On site support?
Maintenance.
(a) By separate agreement?
(b) Error correction. Example:
The developer will correct any errors in the software or documentation as
delivered by the developer, which is attributable to the developer and which
significantly affects use or operation of the web site, provided that (i) the client
notifies developer in writing of the error(s) during the term ofmaintenance; (ii) the
client can reasonably identify the error, so as to permit its duplication.
(c) Error correction typically excludes correction of errors not caused by the software
itself.
Charges.
(a) Watch for "estimate only" per hour charges.
(b) Training can be specified in terms of number of classes, number of students,
number of instructors/class.
(c) Support -- flat periodic fee, by the call, by the hour? How does either side keep
track? Who pays for telephone charges? Frequently it is the developer.
(d) The client wants fixed fees, the developer wants to change the charges at will, or at
least periodically.
How long will the services be available?
(a) Perpetual?
(b) Is there a scheduled time or a minimum time period.
K- 10
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7. What constitutes acceptance of services.
(a) What standards are they to be measured against? How do you measure/guarantee
adequacy of services? Tied to warranties? Other ways?
8. "Additional Services" Not Covered (e.g., custom programming, porting, installation,
training, database or file conversion).
(a) Require the developer to provide written notice before performing any such
service for which there will be an additional charge. Require the client's written
approval prior to delivery of any such additional services.
9. Employee Raiding.
(a) Limit party's ability to offer or employ employees of the other for a limited time,
such as a year, following termination of the employee's work done for the other
party.
Ill. Ownership
Most web sites will be comprised of a number of different types of components, from a
number of different sources, subject to a variety of types of intellectual property claims. Your
challenge will be in identifying the various components and in memorializing who owns what.
The best (albeit most difficult) approach is to schedule in the agreement the various components
that will be provided, who will provide them, and who will own the associated intellectual
property rights. This may prove unworkable at the agreement stage, however, and a more
practical alternative may be to develop a mechanism for identifying exactly what is being
transferred to the client in contrast to what the developer retains -- perhaps through a notice and
amendment process or perhaps by obliging the developer to tag (in the code) those components
which it claims are proprietary.
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A. Content (text, images, video and audio files, and databases)
1. There will likely be pre-existing content provided by the client for inclusion in the site.
Some of this client-provided content may be owned by the client, and some of it may
have been previously provided to the client by contractors subject to some sort of limited
license.
2. There may be new content created by the developer specifically for the client and only
useful for the client's site.
3. In some cases there may be content procured, by the developer or by the client, from
third parties.
B. Design (the layout or architecture of the site, the interrelationship between and among
the various pages, and aesthetic aspects of the user interface)
1. The design may be a custom work prepared by the developer specifically and solely for
the client.
2. The design may be based on a template that the developer uses across multiple sites for
multiple clients.
C. Software (executable applications or applets which provide the functionality)
1. The developer will probably have incorporated in the Work various applications and
subroutines from the developer's inventory of existing work -- components that are more
or less standard and used frequently by the developer in other projects.
2. The developer may also have incorporated third party applications from other vendors
(particularly in connection with any transaction processing features of the site)
3. Occasionally, the developer will build an application specifically for the client's site.
D. Forms of Intellectual Property
1. Copyrights -- the content, design, and software are all subject to copyright claims. As
K- 12
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noted above, much of the content for a site may already exist, in the form of catalogs,
sales literature, maintenance manuals, and so on. The key question here is ensuring that
the client does indeed hold the necessary rights, particularly when creation of that
material has been outsourced rather than completed in house by company employees.
Default ownership rules under copyright law favor the human creator or his/her employer
over the one who simply pays the bill (the commissioning party).
(a) The problem in outsourcing development of creative expression arises from the
statutory prejudice in favor of vesting copyright ownership in the human creators.
Copyright in a work protected under this title vests initially in the author or
authors o/the work. ... 17 USC §201(a)
Note that the term "author" in the statute subsumes all those who create
copyrightable works -- including the writer, artist, photographer, programmer, and
so on. Thus, a copyrightable work developed at the instance of (and paid for by) a
company belongs not to the company.but to the human creator unless 1) that
human is also an employee acting within the scope ofhis/her duties or 2) there is a
written transfer of rights. This comes as a surprise to many managers, a problem
that is best dealt with on the front end by adopting reasonable, written ownership
policies and by establishing procedures and documents for routinely implementing
those policies (and for making informed exceptions when the circumstances
warrant). A company that elects to use its PO system for outsourcing creative
work should take care to adapt its PO forms to address the intellectual property
issues. Without a written agreement that expressly addresses who owns what
rights, the best the business owner will get is an implied, non-exclusive license to
use the work. How long and for what purposes that business will get to use the
K-13
(b)
work are questions that are ripe for dispute.
Work-Made-for-Hire. Work that is done in house by employees, within the scope
of their duties, is considered to be work-made-for-hire. Work-made-for-hire is the
exception to the rule that rights in a copyrightable work vest automatically in the
human creator. In the case of such works, the employer or commissioning party is
considered to be the "author" for copyright purposes and becomes the owner of
all the rights comprised in the copyright -- the transfer of rights is comprehensive
and permanent. The rationale for distinguishing works-made-for-hire was first
recognized in 1903 in the Supreme Court case ofBleistein vs. Donaldson
Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, and traces its roots to the precept that
ownership of a work created to the specification and at the risk of an employer
should belong to the employer, with the employee (retained for the purpose of
creating the work) taking his or her compensation in the form of a salary, benefits,
and the other associated emblements of employment. Since its inception, the for-
hire doctrine has evolved through case law and legislation to encompass two
circumstances:
• the true employer/employee relation, or
• by written agreement of the parties under certain, statutorily enumerated
circumstances.
In the first scenario, the creative is treated as an employee (full-time or part-time)
in terms of the control exercised by the employer and in terms of access to
benefits, tax withholding, social security contributions and so on. For copyright
purposes, however, this determination is driven by the federal common law of
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•
a translation
•
a supplementary work
•
a compilation
•
an instructional text
•
a test
•
answer material for a test
• an atlas
agency, not by state law principles or decisions.
The second scenario ignores the true nature of the relationship and focuses on the
intentions of the parties. Its reach is limited to nine classes of works:
and requires that the work be specially commissioned and that the parties agree in
advance of creation of the work that the work will be considered to have been
made-for-hire. Note that computer programs, data files, and advertising materials -
- all examples of copyrightable works that are frequently outsourced -- do not fall
neatly into any of these nine categories (though in some cases they may fit as an
audiovisual work or a contribution to a collective work). Ifyou are attempting to
create a work-for-hire on the margins of the statutory authorization, you would be
well advised to take a "belt and suspenders" approach and couple your work-for-
hire acknowledgements with an assignment of all rights. If you intend that a work
be done on a for-hire basis you should endeavor to memorialize the terms ofyour
deal before that work is created and you should be certain to use the term of art
"work-made-for-hire" or to be clear that the assignment of all rights includes not
a contribution to a collective work (e.g., periodical article)
a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work
•
•
r
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(c)
only the physical article but also the intellectual property rights in the expression.
Ifyou are documenting a sloppy transaction after the fact, you should include in
the statement to be signed an acknowledgment that the document confirms a deal
struck prior to creation of the work.
All Rights and other more limited transfers. If the client's existing content was not
created by an employee and doesn't fall into one of the nine categories ofworks
that can be deemed "for-hire" by written agreement, then the next best alternative
is to get an assignment of "all rights." The second most comprehensive transfer of
rights possible, a grant of all rights means almost what it says. It is a complete
transfer of all right, title, and interest in and to the subject work. A grant of all
rights, without further modification, would be construed to include not only print
rights but also what have come to be known as electronic (or display) rights as
welL Notwithstanding the comprehen$ive and permanent sound of the term,
however, such a transfer is subject to a statutory right of termination during a five-
year window 35 to 40 years after the grant was made. In plain English, the
creative or the creative's heirs can take back the rights to a work (free of charge) 35
years after they were first signed away. There are a few other rights terms that
you might encounter in evaluating whether or not a client holds the requisite rights
to existing content destined for inclusion on a web site, particularly when dealing
with commercial photographers (a group that has historically been very shrewd in
selling limited use privileges rather than ownership to their work product). "One-
time rights" represent a grant of the right to publish a work in one issue of a
periodical or one sales piece. If the photographer's invoice says "single-use" or
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"one-time rights," then the client has paid for the right to use the photo in one ad
insertion or one sales piece. Running the ad a second time or using it on a web site
would be outside the scope of the client's license and would require the payment
of an additional fee. "Electronic rights" is an amorphous term that does not have
one settled definition across industry lines. Sometimes it is treated as a synonym
for "display rights," generally understood to encompass the right to include text or
images on a CD-ROM for recall and display on a PC screen. In contrast, are
"interactive" (or multimedia) rights which encompass the right to combine text
with sound and video incorporating some level of interactivity. The entertainment
industry views these interactive rights as a subset of pay television rights and, as a
consequence, negotiation over interactive rights can be vigorous where the licensed
work has any potential pay TV applications. General contract law resolves any
questions about the nature of a transfer in favor of the creative in two ways: first,
by providing that rights not expressly granted are interpreted to be retained by the
creative; and second, by providing that any ambiguity in a transfer document will
be resolved against the party who drafted the document (this will almost always
be the business or commissioning party). Thus, if there is no signed writing
evidencing an appropriate transfer of rights (or an exchange ofwritings that
collectively accomplish the same thing), then the client should not assume that it
has the right to make the works available electronically.
Patents -- certain aspects of the software and the processes it enables have, in the wake of
State Street Bank, been recognized as the proper subject of aggressive patent claims. Until
the dust settles on this volatile area of intellectual property law, the cautious attorney
will assume that the web site software may well incorporate patentable or patented
K- 17
3.
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5.
technology and will provide for ownership and/or appropriate licenses for same.
Trade secrets -- whether or not patentable, the software is certainly subject to trade secret
claims to the extent that the source code has been adequately secured. Accordingly,
ownership and licensing of this aspect of the work should be handled with the same
degree of care employed in apportioning rights to the copyrights and patents.
Appropriate confidentiality provisions should be included in the agreement -- with
respect to both the proprietary components and with respect to the scope of the project
itself, pre-launch (the client will, in all likelihood, not want its competitors to know what
it is up to until it is too late for them to respond).
Trademarks -- the site will likely carry trademarks belonging to the client. While there is
not likely to be an issue over ownership of these marks simply by virtue of the
developer's hosting of the site, conservative practice suggests that the agreement include
an acknowledgement of exclusive ownership in the client and a disclaimer of any interest
or license in the developer. Of more concern is the ownership of any trademark or service
mark rights in the domain name selected for the site.
Factors in negotiating ownership/licensing -- If the client has specially commissioned the
development of components that have no significant commercialization prospects, it is
likely that the client will want to own all rights in those components and that the
developer will agree to such an arrangement. If, on the other hand, the project involves
customization of existing components or the development of components that have
significant commercialization prospects beyond what the client is positioned to
effectively exploit, it may make more sense to leave ownership with the developer (in
return for a concession on cost) and to take only a license for the uses the client intends.
As noted above, where the objective is to vest the broadest possible rights in the client,
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getting agreement to characterize the various components as "work-made-for-hire" is the
preferred solution. It is not possible in every instance, however, and the requirements for
effecting this feat are technical and offer many opportunities for miscue. The next best
option is a transfer of all rights, title, and interest (including, without limitation, all patent
rights, trade secret rights, copyrights, and other property rights throughout the world) in
and to the specified components. With respect to those components which will continue
to be owned by the developer, the client will need a license to use them in connection
with its use of the Work.
IV. License
A. Scope
The license for developer-owned components can take many forms, depending on the
following factors:
1. What activities are being licensed
(a) To use?
(b) To modify?
(c) Is it portable, i.e., can the client carry the license to another host?
2. Exclusive or non-exclusive?
3. Is it transferable (to an affiliate or to a purchaser of substantially all of the relevant
assets?
4. Are there territorial limits.
5. Is the license limited to the original platform and environment.
B. License Term, Fees and Termination
There are other issues you will want to specifically address with respect to any license:
K- 19
1. Clearly state the term of the license.
(a) Perpetual.
(b) Limited duration.
2. License Fees.
(a) Probably tied to the license term.
(b) One time, paid in full license fee -- especially for perpetual license.
(c) Periodic payment -- limited duration or perpetual (as long as payments are made)
3. Timing of payments.
4. Early Termination.
(a) By the client.
(b) By the developer.
v. Acceptance Testing and Performance Criteria
Success cannot be assumed when it comes to web site development. The much sought
after (and infrequently achieved) triad in this industry is 1) on spec, 2) on time, and 3) within
budget. While it is important to set targets, it is equally important to anticipate adjustment of
those targets and to provide a mechanism for notification ofdeviations, agreement that they are
deviations and that they are necessary, notice of the impact on price and schedule, and
memorialization of the client's acceptance of those impacts.
A. Defining the Target
1. What is acceptance?
2. Acceptance Criteria vs. Performance Specifications.
(a) Acceptance Criteria must be met before the software is accepted.
(b) Frequently can be spelled out in terms of specific tests, runs with data, response
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4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
times, etc.
(C) Acceptance Criteria may be in more detail, but less breadth than Performance
Specifications.
(d) Should it be different?
Performance Specifications.
(a) To the extent possible, fmalize'before signing the agreement or making any
significant payments (unless the deal is designed to be done in phases).
Capabilities beyond Performance Specifications.
Automatic Acceptance.
(a) The developer wants automatic acceptance, preferably on delivery, perhaps on
successful installation, more reasonably on implementation or "go live."
(b) The client wants actual notice of acceptance to be required, preferably after a
sufficient shake down period.
Initial Test Period, Cure Period, Subsequent Test Period.
(a) When does the Test Period start? Upon delivery of software? of all hardware?
Upon installation? Upon end of training?
(b) When does the Cure Period start?
(c) Make the periods consecutive, with each starting at the conclusion of the
preceding one.
(d) Reinstallation/setup following cure period.
(e) Additional hardware requirements following correction during cure period.
(f) Is an iterative process beneficial? How many cycles must the client permit?
Importance of acceptance.
Remedy during acceptance testing vs after acceptance.
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9. Will development and testing be done on a secure server?
B. Modifications
1. What sort of notice is required?
2. What is the response time, and the impact of a failure to object or reject in the time and
manner specified?
VL Compensation
Payments to the developer can take a wide variety of forms depending upon the nature of
the deal. The ends of the spectrum, however, are marked by flat fee deals on the one hand and
(although infrequent in most commercial deals outside of web-based publishing) royalty or
commission arrangements on the other.
A. Fee Transactions
Most web site development deals are structured around payment of a fee, fixed or
variable. The client naturally has an interest in capping its costs -- preferably as low as possible.
Where the project involves a high degree of certainty and predictability, the developer is likely to
be accommodating. Where, on the other hand, the project is complex or less predictable, the
developer is likely to press for some alternative, and more flexible arrangement -- time and
materials, or cost plus. In between, you may get the developer to agree to a fixed fee, a firm
estimate, or a not-to-exceed cap (based on reasonable, good faith projections taking into account
articulated assumptions). This assumption, by the developer, of some or all of the price risk will
not come without cost, however, and it is likely that any limits to which the developer agrees will
include a cushion for that risk.
B. Royalty/Commission Deals
Where the deal involves web-based publishing, it is more likely that the compensation
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vn. Warranties, Remedies, and Indemnification
It is an unfortunate fact (perhaps more pervasive in the software industry than elsewhere)
Gross sales (specify the business model and revenue streams and anticipate the
possibility of adjustment or refinement in same).
Net Sales.
Gross receipts.
Net receipts (or net cash received).
Defining the exclusions from "net" amounts.
Responsibility for bad debts or uncollectibles.
Reporting and payment cycles.
Audit rights.
Best efforts to promote; advances (refundable and non-refundable); minimum guarantees;
and other assurances of performance.
Associated non-competes.
Hosting and maintenance fees.
If the developer will also be hosting the site, what are the charges for disk space and
volume of traffic? Is there a credit for service interruptions? Is there a maximum on the
volume of change in content in any period? If so, how is this measured or determined?
Will the client get advance notice of maintenance for which there will be additional
charges?
arrangement will involve royalties (or a share of the proceeds from that commercial exploitation).
In cases such as these, it is important to specify the revenue stream on which royalties will be
paid.
1.
10.
c.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
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that things do not always go as planned. Against this possibility, the client will want some
assurances about the Work -- broadly grouped into performance warranties and warranties of
non-infringement -- and some comfort that they will have adequate recourse if these assurances
are not borne out. The developer, conversely, will want to limit its promises as well as its
exposure.
A. Warranties
1. When does the Warranty Period start?
2. How long will it be?
3. What happens during the Warranty Period?
(a) Performance warranties in effect.
(b) Error Correction.
(c) Updates, enhancements or other new releases.
(d) Support.
(e) Overlap with maintenance.
4. Warranties for the client.
(a) Site performs in accordance with Performance Specifications.
(b) Sufficiency of documentation.
(c) Sufficiency of training.
(d) Sufficiency of specified environmentJhardware/third party software. For example
The developer warrants that when the software is operated on and with the third
party products, without additional hardware or software, (i) the software will be
fully compatible and functional; (ii) the software will have all of the functionality
set forth in the performance specifications; and (iii) the client's license to use
developer-owned or third party components is sufficient for the client to exercise
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B.
1.
2.
C.
1.
all of its rights under this agreement.
(e) Warranties of ownership, sufficient rights to enter the agreement and grant the
license, and ofnon-infringement.
(t) Additional reps and warranties re security, compliance with relevant e-commerce
standards or protocols; compliance with card issuer and sponsoring bank
requirements.
Exclusions and Disclaimers From Warranty (or Liability) By Developer.
(a) Modifications made by the licensee.
(b) Implied warranties of merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose, and of
non-infringement.
(c) Uninterrupted or error free operation.
(d) Loss of Data.
(e) Cost to the client for changes to other the components, training, etc. necessitated
by error correction, updates, or enhancements.
Requisites For Warranty Service (such as error correction).
(a) In order to correct a problem, the developer must be able to reproduce it.
Developer's reluctance to guarantee or warrant error free performance of software
(substitute a covenant to repair defects or deficiencies).
Remedies for Performance Deficiencies
Correct any errores) in the components as delivered by the developer which significantly
affect use or operation of the web site.
Refund and conditions therefor; credit for service interruptions.
Infringement (these are likely to be bi-Iateral as a result of client-provided content)
Type of third party rights usually addressed.
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Patents.
Copyrights.
Trade secrets.
Trademarks.
(b)
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e) Other intellectual or proprietary rights.
Duty to defend/indemnification.
(a) Should be based on the event of a claim of infringement or misappropriation, not
arising out of actual infringement.
Should the indemnitor have sole authority to control defense of the claim and
settlement?
Conditions to indemnification or obligation to defend.
The difference between a breach ofan affirmative covenant and a breach of
warranty.
The remedies.
(a) Frequently a four part remedy for functional components, usually at the
developer's option.
(1) modify the software so that it is rendered non-infringing;
(2) procure for the licensee the right to continue use of the software;
(3) substitute software having equivalent capabilities; or
(4) refund the unused portion of the license fee based on straight line 3 year
amortization.
(b) The trigger event for these remedies might be when a claim is made or, in the
developer's opinion, is likely to be made, or upon preliminary or[mal judgement,
or upon settlement of a claim.
(c)
(d)
2.
3.
vm.
A.
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4. Exclusions.
(a) Claims which arise out of modifications made by the client.
(b) Claims which arise out of the developer's compliance with the client's instructions
or requests.
5. Indemnification/Duty to defend shouldn't be limited by any limitations on liability.
D. Escrow of Source Code (for proprietary software components)
1. Does source code really need to be escrowed? Will the client be able to use it?
2. Separate escrow agreement with escrow agent, setting forth the details of the escrow.
3. Who will be the escrow agent?
4. Exclude access/withdrawal by the developer.
5. How many versions will be maintained on deposit?
6. Verification that deposited source code is correct code.
7. What will be the trigger event for release of the source code to the client?
8. Make sure that the client is licensed to make modifications, etc. upon release of escrow.
9. What will be the deposited media?
10. What documentation will be deposited?
Two Important Miscellaneous Provisions
Assignability
In contrast to the general contract rule favoring assignability in the absence of an express
restriction, non-exclusive licenses of technology are not assignable by the licensee unless the
license agreement expressly provides that they may be assigned. Moreover, some agreements
(together with the accompanying maintenance agreements and source code escrows) contain
express restrictions against assignment by the client in combination with termination rights
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triggered by a change in control.
Developers include these provisions for a number of reasons:
• in order to avoid displacing subsequent sales -- the acquirer who gets access to a site
by assignment will not have to build a new one;
• because fees are sometimes based on the size of the client -- the developer's exposure
under the warranty and indemnification provisions may increase for a larger client;
• because the developer may be concerned about the possibility of proprietary
components falling into the hands of a potential competitor;
• because the credit worthiness of the acquirer may be inferior; and,
• because the continuing obligations of the developer may be materially affected by the
size and nature of the acquirer.
Accordingly, it will be important to provide for any restrictions on transfer. Look not
only for provisions that expressly preclude assignment and for provisions that render the
agreements terminable at the election of the developer in the event of a change in ownership or
control, but look also for qualifications in the grant or license language that might have the same
impact -- e.g., "Developer hereby grants to client apersonal, non-exclusive right and license ";
or "Developer hereby grants to client a non-exclusive, non-transferable right and license "
B. ADR
Another "miscellaneous" provision too often included without due consideration for the
practical implications is a commitment to utilize some form of Alternative Dispute Resolution
mechanism before resorting to litigation. While there may be very good reasons for adopting this
approach in a web site development transaction (not least among them the speed with which the
process can be effected as well as the ability to select a neutral decision maker more familiar with
the sometimes highly technical nature of the dispute), there are at least an equal number of
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reasons to be cautious.
1. Availability of injunctive relief.
2. Limited discovery (who is likely to have the relevant records?)
3. Is it important to establish binding precedents?
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DIGITAL ETHICS
In the binary world of digital electronics, everything is either black or white. But ethics are
always gray, shaded by reason, morality, and opinion. The rapid acceptance of computers by
lawyers has bucked the profession's historical resistance to technological advances. In the past
five years, lawyers have flocked to the Internet and cyberspace at an unprecedented rate. The
burgeoning use and embracement of electronic communications has radically transformed the
practice of law. The purpose of this paper is to discuss the top five hot topics where legal ethics
intersect with information technology, creating all new attorney-client issues for the Digital Age.
The following topics are covered (in no particular order):
1. Use of unencrypted e-mail
2. Attorney web site advertising
3. Creating the lawyer-client relationship online
4. Giving legal advice or "information" online
5. Internet legal referral services
1. Use of unencrypted e-mail
The three common types of electronic mail (e-mail) are: (1) point-to-point; (2) private network;
and (3) public network. It is fairly well established that the use of all forms of unencrypted e-
mail is an acceptable means of communicating with clients. See KBA E-403 (July 1993)
(www.uky.edu/Law/kyethics/kba403.htm) (see appendix) which poses the question:
Question 1: Maya lawyer use electronic mail services including the Internet to
communicate with clients without encryption?
Answer: Yes, unless unusual circumstances require enhanced security measures.
The Kentucky Bar Association adopted the above ethics opinion from the Illinois State Bar
Association Opinion No. 96-10 (May 16, 1997), which provides in part:
The duty to maintain the confidentiality of client information implies the duty to
use methods of communication with clients that provide reasonable assurance that
messages will be and remain confidential. * * * Courts and ethics committees
have unifonruy held that persons using ordinary telephones for confidential
communications have a reasonable expectation of privacy. The three common
types of electronic mail messages appear no less secure.
The Illinois Bar opinion drew an analogy to permissibility of cordless and cellular telephones,
but made a distinction that the illegality of the unauthorized access of information somehow
fives rise to an expectation of privacy.
The third type of electronic mail, that carried on the Internet, typically travels in
another fashion. Rather than moving directly from the sender's host computer to
the recipient's host computer, Internet messages are usually broken into separate
L-l
"packets" of data that are transmitted individually and then re-assembled into a
complete message at the recipient's host computer. Along the way, the packets
travel through, and may be stored temporarily in, one or more other computers
(called "routers") operated by third parties (usually called an "internet service
provider" or "ISP") that help distribute electronic mail over the Internet. * * *
Unlike a cordless cellular telephone message, for example, an Internet e-mail is
not broadcast over the open air waves, but through ordinary telephone lines and
the intermediate computers. When an Internet message is transmitted over an
ordinary telephone line, it is subject to the same protections and difficulties of
interception as an ordinary telephone call. To intercept an Internet communication
while it is in transit over telephone lines requires an illegal wiretap. * * * The
unauthorized interception of an Internet message is a violation of the ECPA
[Electronic Communications Privacy Act], which was amended in 1986 to extend
the criminal wiretapping laws to cover Internet transmissions. 18 USCA §251O et
seq.
The Illinois opinion, as adopted in KBA E-403, concludes as follows:
In summary, the Committee concludes that because (1) the expectation of privacy
for electronic mail is no less reasonable than the expectation of privacy for
ordinary telephone calls, and (2) the unauthorized interception of an electronic
message subject to the ECPA is illegal, a lawyer does not violate Rule 1.6 by
communicating with a client using electronic mail services, including the Internet,
without encryption. Nor is it necessary, as some commentators have suggested, to
seek specific client consent to the use of unencrypted e-mail. The Committee
recognizes that there may be unusual circumstances involving an extraordinarily
sensitive matter that might require enhanced security measures like encryption.
These situations would, however, be of the nature that ordinary telephones and
other normal means of communication would also be deemed inadequate.
More recently, on March 10, 1999 the American Bar Association's Standing Committee on
Ethics and Professional Responsibility released its Formal Opinion No. 99-413 on "Protecting
the Confidentiality of Unencrypted E-mail" (www.abanet.org/cpr/f099-413.htmn (See appendix)
which reinforces the Kentucky and Illinois opinions that e-mail communications, including those
send unencrypted over the Internet, pose no greater risk of interception or disclosure than other
modes of communication commonly relied upon as having a reasonable expectation of privacy.
A lawyer may transmit information relating to the representation ofa client by
unencrypted e-mail sent over the Internet without violating the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct (1998) because the mode of transmission affords a
reasonable expectation ofprivacy from a technological and legal standpoint. The
same privacy accorded U.S. and commercial mail, land-line telephonic
transmissions, andfacsimiles applies to Internet e-mail. A lawyer should consult
with the client andfollow her instructions, however, as to the mode of
transmitting highly sensitive information relating to the client's representation.
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The ABA opinion recognizes the risk of unauthorized interception and inadvertent disclosure
exists in every medium of communication, including e-mail, but concludes that an expectation of
privacy in this electronic medium is reasonable:
Lawyers have a reasonable expectation of privacy in communications made by all
forms of e-mail, including unencrypted e-mail sent on the Internet, despite some
risk of interception and disclosure. It therefore follows that its use is consistent
with the duty under Rule 1.6 to use reasonable means to maintain the
confidentiality of information relating to a client's representation
Problems for discussion:
1. Frequency of misdirected e-mail
Improper addressing
Bounce backs
Default mailboxes
2. Ease of erroneous transmissions
Reply All - Inadvertent mailings
Errors in Reply-Addresses perpetuated
Reasonable expectation of delivery (probable expectation)
3. Reliability of deliverability - "Mailbox Rule" v. "Sent Folder Rule"?
ISP or mail servers down
Backbones or lines down
Problems with PC, user gone
4. Hackers and viruses
Intentional attacks on ISP, asp, etc.
Viruses - Melissa (word macro)
Liability if you infect client
Summary:
Risk of misdirection much higher, reliability of delivery much lower.
Reasonable versus probable expectation of delivery.
2. Attorney web site advertisin2
It is likewise fairly well established that lawyers may advertise on the web under similar
constraints as for traditional publications and advertising. See KBA E-403 (July 1993)
(www.uky.edulLaw/kyethics/kba403.htm) (see appendix) which addresses the question:
Question 2: Is the creation and use by a lawyer ofan Internet "web site"
containing information about the lawyer and the lawyer's services that may be
accessed by Internet users, including prospective clients, a communication falling
within KRPCs 7.09 [Prohibited Solicitation] or 7.30 [Direct Contact With
Prospective Client]?
Answer: Qualified No. Unless the lawyer uses the Internet or other
electronic mail service to direct messages to a specific recipient [in which case
the rules governing solicitation would apply] only the general rules governing
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communications regarding a lawyer's services and advertising [KRPCs 7.10,
7.20, and the so-called advertising rules setforth at KRPCs 7.01-7.08] should
apply to a lawyer's "web-site" on the Internet.
The KBA Ethics Opinion No. E-403 again incorporated the reasoning expressed in Illinois State
Bar Association Opinion No. 96-10, which analogizes web site advertising to passive forms of
publication such as Yellow Pages or firm brochures:
With respect to the second general issue, the extent to which a lawyer may use an
Internet web site to communicate with clients and prospective clients, the
Committee believes that the existing Rules of Professional Conduct governing
advertising, solicitation and comrimnication concerning a lawyer's services
provide adequate and appropriate guidance to a lawyer using the Internet. For
example, the Committee views an Internet home page as the electronic equivalent
of a telephone directory "yellow pages" entry and other material included in the
web site to be the functional equivalent of the firm brochures and similar
materials that lawyers commonly prepare for clients and prospective clients. An
Internet user who has gained access to a lawyer's home page, like a yellow pages
user, has chosen to view the lawyer's message from all the messages available in
that medium. Under these circumstances, such materials are not a
"communication directed to a specific recipient" that would implicate Rule 7.3
and its provisions governing direct contact with prospective clients. Thus, with
respect to a web site, Rule 7.1, prohibiting false or misleading statements
concerning a lawyer's services, and Rule 7.2, regulating advertising in the public
media, are sufficient to guide lawyers and to protect the public.
However, attorney participation in two-way communications and exchanges of information with
individuals crosses the line from passive push technology to proactive pull techniques, and
therefore are held to higher scrutiny with respect to solicitation. The test is usually whether the
lawyer's communication is general information or specific advice to the individual:
On the other hand, lawyer participation in an electronic bulletin board, chat group,
or similar service, may implicate Rule 7.3, which governs solicitation, the direct
contact with prospective clients. The Committee does not believe that merely
posting general comments on a bulletin board or chat group should be considered
solicitation. However, of a lawyer seeks to initiate an unrequested contact with a
specific person or group as a result of participation in a bulletin board or chat
group, then the lawyer would be subject to the requirements of Rule 7.3. For
example, if the lawyer sends unrequested electronic messages (including
messages in response to inquiries posted in chat groups) to a targeted person 0 r
group, the messages should be plainly identified as advertising material. * * *
The Committee believes that [Illinois] lawyers may appropriately make use of the
Internet in serving and communicating with clients and prospective clients subject
to the existing rules governing confidentiality; advertising and solicitation.
More recently, the State Bar of California's Committee on Professional Responsibility and
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Conduct released a proposed formal ethics opinion (no. 96-0014) on attorney web sites (see:
www.calbar.org/2bar/3com/3cp9903a.htm) The opinion concludes that web sites are
"advertisements" within the meaning of the rules but are not automatically deemed
"solicitations" by virtue of the inclusion of e-mail contact capabilities. One attorney's web site
containing information for the public regarding her availability for professional employment was
both a "communication" and an "advertisement," and as such was subject to the applicable
prohibitions on false, misleading, and deceptive messages for all words, sounds and images on
the site. However, under the facts presented the web site was not a "solicitation" even if it
included e-mail facilities allowing direct communication to and from the attorney. The attorney
was warned that her web site may be subject to regulation by other jurisdictions or that it might
be considered the unauthorized practice of law in other jurisdictions.
3. Creatin(: the lawyer-client relationship online
There are a number of ways to communicate on the Internet. The most common use of e-mail
from sender to a known receiver is but one method, albeit the most obvious, but a growing
number of lawyers have begun to use cyberspace to give specific legal advice to laypeople who
request it. One way to seek legal advice on the Internet is through newsgroups, such as
alt.lawyers.sue.sue.sue, which are online discussion forums categorized by subject, where people
post and read messages from other people, say, who have been injured in accident, fired from
jobs, going through a divorce, buying a house, probating a will, etc. There is also a mailing list
program, or listserv, where messages are sent to a central e-mail address and then redistributed to
the list's subscribers, where some listservs are dedicated for requests for legal advice. A more
interactive version of these discussion groups is the "chat room," in which two or more
individuals can communicate in real time, receiving responses on the screen as soon as they are
typed in. Lawyers may join chat rooms and participate in largely unregulated speech and usually
without either party having any reliable verification of the identity of the person with whom they
are chatting. A variation of the chat room is the netmeeting, in which the individuals may have
audio or video capabilities to talk or see the other. Further, specific web sites have been
established to facilitate requests for legal advice, such as FreeAdvice (www.freeadvice.com) and
LawGuru.(www.lawguru.com). which encourage laypeople to post legal questions, identifying
their state of residence, and suggest that lawyers who are licensed to practice in those states post
responses. Another way for laypeople to seek legal advice online is to go to the web sites of
individual attorneys or law firms and to send questions directly to the attorneys bye-mail. These
sites differ from the preceding web sites in that neither the questions nor the answers are visible
to the public. Some lawyers have begun charging a fee to answer such questions, such as
www.legaIQuestions.com. which provides the following terms:
You, the Questioner/Client will ask a short legal question of 200 words or less
and our firm will provide a written e-mail response for a fee of $25 which will be
billed to your credit card via our secure server. Each question will be responded to
within a reasonable time and although both parties understand that an
Attorney/Client relationship may be created hereby, it is understood and agreed to
that such relationship will terminate upon the sending of our e-mail response to
your e-mail address and no further legal services or advice will be required. It is
L-5
further agreed to by you that the submission of your question shall not place upon
Attorneys the duty to protect any statute of limitations or any other rights on your
behalf or cause Attorneys to have a duty to take any action in any court of law,
unless we agree in writing
While the fee-based legal sites tend to acknowledge the possibility of an attorney client
relationship, they often try to limit the scope of engagement with the use of disclaimers. A
Villanova law professor has summarized the "parade of horribles" of online advice:
The specter of lawyers casually typing out off-the-cuff responses to questions
posed by strangers and posting them online for all the world to see must be the
stuff of a bar regulator's nightmares. Online advice-giving raises a host of ethical
issues. Public exchanges of often-sensitive personal information and specific legal
advice present questions of confidentiality. Lawyers answering legal questions
about which they have little or no expertise may violate the duty of competency.
The possibility that a lawyer might inadvertently create a conflict of interest by
answering legal questions from someone with an interest adverse to a current or
former client is particularly troubling in the sometimes-anonymous world of
cyberspace. Lawyers answering questions about the law in jurisdictions in which
they are not licensed to practice may violate restrictions against the unauthorized
practice of law. Most notably, the likelihood that some disgruntled recipient of
negligent online legal advice will sue for malpractice lurks over all.
Lanctot, Catherine J., Attorney-Client Relationships in Cyberspace: The Peril and the Promise,
49 Duke L.J. 147, 156 (1999) (www.law.duke.edu/shell/cite.pl?49+Duke+L.+J.+147).
Because giving legal advice on the Internet raises ethical questions that are likely to be
confronted by every state bar disciplinary authority iOn the next several years, the issue warrants
close examination now. The key seems to be that giving specific legal advice to online
questioners ordinarily will create an attorney-client relationship.
The organized bar has attempted since the 1930s to regulate the giving of specific
legal advice in a variety of other contexts, such as radio and television call-in
shows, newspaper advice columns, books, seminars, and 900-number telephone
lines. In each instance, the bar has attempted to distinguish between the
transmission of general legal knowledge, which it has viewed as permissible, and
the presentation of spe,cific legal advice tailored to an individual's particular
problem, which it has treated as impermissible. Lanctot, at 163.
According to the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, approved by the American
Law Institute in early 1998, Section 26 of the Restatement outlines the principles governing the
formation of the attorney-client relationship as follows:
A relationship ofclient and lawyer arises when:
(1) a person manifests to a lawyer the person's intent that the lawyer provide
legal services for the person; and either
(a) the lawyer manifests to the person consent to do so; or
L-6
jJ
•
it
it
II
I
'1-'
....,., .
Ii:
t
I
I
I
-I
•
I
I
j
'I
I
I
J
I
'I:}i.A(,
rr
,.
!
..
f
r
r
I
r
r
,.
!
r
r
r
,..
t
r
,.
t
r
(b) the lawyer fails to manifest lack ofconsent to do so, and the lawyer
knows or reasonably should know that the person reasonably relies on the lawyer
to provide the services.
Thus, the Restatement contemplates that the attorney-client relationship arises either by consent
of both parties, or under an estoppel theory, where the putative client reasonably has relied on the
lawyer to perform legal services. There are at least three situations where the attorney-client
relationship may be formed on the Internet:
1. The client manifests an intent to receive legal services.
2. The lawyer manifests consent to provide legal services
3. The lawyer fails to manifest lack of consent, and the lawyer knows or reasonably
should know that the person reasonably relies on the lawyer to provide the services.
Again, the linchpin to the analysis is the point at which specific legal information is given to a
specific person in response to a particular set of facts. There is no bright line test between
general information and specific legal advice.
In In re Raynard, 171 B.R. 699 (Bankr. N.D.Ga.1994), an attorney-client relationship was found
in a "free telephone consultation" where the attorney gave the caller advice on filing an answer
in a collection matter. In Togstad v. Velely, Otto, Miller & Keefe, 291 N.W. 2d 686 (Minn.
1990), the lawyer subjected himself to malpractice liability because he gave specific legal advice
to someone who had requested it, even though he did not charge any fee.
4. Internet Referral Service
There is yet another emerging means by which means lawyers may receive business from the
Internet. There are a number of websites that field questions from laypersons and attempt to
match that question up with an attorney in a particular geographic area and area of practice.
Some of these referral web sites charge a fee for services.
Under the facts of on Arizona case, a web site claiming to be a clearing-house service for clients
with legal questions, offered lawyers to "deliver potential clients directly to you." There was a
one-time fee to join and a fixed amount for each question from a potential client that is routed to
that member. Alternatively, the lawyer could pay the service a percentatge of any fee unlimately
received, somewhere in the range of one to five percent. .
The Arizona Bar Association released an opinion 99-06 in June 1999 l which states that Arizona
lawyers may not ethically participate in an Internet service that sends legal questions from
individuals to attorneys based upon the subject matter of the question.
(www.azbar.org/EthicsOpinionslData/99-06.pdO. The opinion also notes that lawyers can not
pay a fee for such referrals or give the service a portion of the legal fees earned from the referral.
Another Illinois case found that for-fee telephone referrals was improper. Illinois State Bar
Opinion No. 94-11 (Nov. 1994). A Nebraska Opinion #95-3 also found that lawyers may not
participate in a "for-profit" Internet lawyer referral program.
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• Kentucky Bar Association Ethics Opinion: KBA E-403
• ABA Standing Committee On Ethics And Professional Responsibility:
Fonnal Opinion 99-413
• www.legalethics.com: Announcements & Ethics Opinions
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KENTUCKY BAR ASSOCIATION
ETHICS OPINION
KBA E-403 (July 1993) (http://www.uky.edulLaw/kyethics/kba403.htm)
Question 1: Maya lawyer use electronic mail services including the Internet to communicate with clients
without encryption?
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Answer: Yes, unless unusual circumstances require enhanced security measures.
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Question 2: Is the creation and use by a lawyer of an Internet "web site" containing information about the
lawyer and the lawyer's services that may be accessed by Internet users, including prospective clients, a
communication falling within KRPCs 7.09 [Prohibited Solicitation] or 7.30 [Direct Contact With Prospective
Client]?
Answer: Qualified No. Unless the lawyer uses the Internet or other electronic mail service to direct
messages to a specific recipient [in which case the rules governing solicitation would apply] only the general rules
governing communications regarding a lawyer's services and advertising [KRPCs 7.10, 7.20, and the so-called
advertising rules set forth at KRPCs 7.01-7.08] should apply to a lawyer's "web-site" on the Internet.
References: Illinois Op. 96- 10 (1997); Kurt Metzmeier & ShaUll Esposito, How to Avoid Losing Your
License on the Information Superhighway: Ethical Issues Raised by the Use of the Internet in The Practice of Law
(Kentucky Bench & Bar, Spring 1998).
OPINION
Despite widespread use of the Internet, the Committee has received few inquiries regarding its use. Still, the
Committee is of the view that this opinion should be issued to provide some guidance and some comfort. The
subject is addressed in a recent article cited in the references, which is available from the UK Law Library, and
which has been submitted for publication in the Bench & Bar.
The Committee finds persuasive the comprehensive and thoughtful opinion of the Illinois State Bar Association,
ISBA Advisory Opinion No. 96-10, excerpts of which we attach as an Appendix.
APPENDIX
ILLINOIS STATE BAR ASSOCIAnON
ISBA Advisory Opinion on Professional Conduct
Opinion No. 96-10 (May 16, 1997)
Topic: Electronic communications; confidentiality of client information; advertising and solicitation.
Digest: Lawyers may use electronic mail services, including the Internet, without encryption to communicate with
clients unless unusual circumstances require enhanced security measures. The creation and use by a lawyer of an
Internet "web site" containing information about the lawyer and the lawyer's services that may be accessed by
Internet users, including prospective clients, is not "communication directed to a specific recipient" within the
meaning of the rules, and therefore only the general rules governing communications concerning a lawyer's services
and advertising should apply to a lawyer "web site" on the Internet. If a lawyer uses the Internet or other electronic
mail service to direct messages to specific recipients, then the rules regarding solicitation would apply.
Ref.: Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct, Rules 1.6,7.1,7.2,7.3 and 7.4
ISBA Opinion Nos. 90-07 and 94-11
Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 USC §251O, et seq.
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QUESTIONS
The Committee has received various inquiries regarding ethical issues raised by use of electronic means of
communication, including electronic mail and the "Internet," by lawyers. These inquiries usually involve two
general areas of concern. The first is whether electronic mail may be used to communicate with clients regarding
client matters in view of a lawyer's duty under the ethics rules to maintain the confidentiality ofclient information.
The second is whether the creation and use of a "web site" and other forms of contract with prospective clients may
be conducted by lawyers on the Internet, and if so, whether the rules regarding "in person" solicitation should apply
to such contact.
Because of the technical nature of the discussion, the Committee will use the following commonly accepted
definitions in this opinion. The Internet is a super network of computers that links together individual computers and
computer networks located at academic, commercial, government and military sites worldwide, generally by
ordinary local telephone lines and long-distance transmission facilities. Communications between computers or
individual networks on the Internet are achieved throughout he use of standard, nonproprietary protocols.
Electronic mail, commonly known as e-mail, is an electronic message that is sent from one computer to another,
usually through a host computer on a network. E-mail messages can be sent through a private or local area network
(within a single firm or organization), through an electronic mail service (such as America Online, CompuServ or
MCI Mail), over the Internet, or through any combination of these methods.
A bulletin board service (sometimes called a "BBS") is an electronic bulletin board on a network where electronic
messages may be posted and browsed by users or delivered to e-mail boxes. A "newsgroup" is a type of bulletin
board service in which users can exchange information on a particular subject. A "chat" group is a simultaneous or
"real time" bulletin board or newsgroup among users who send their questions or comments over the Internet.
The World Wide Web is that part of the Internet consisting of computer files written in a particular format (the
"HTML" format) that includes "hyperlinks" (text or symbols that the user may click on to switch immediately to the
item identified) as well as graphics and sound, to enable the creation of complex messages. A "home page" is a
computer file containing text and graphics in the HTML format usually continuing information about its owner,
which can be obtained over the Internet and viewed by transmitting it from the owner's computer to the user's
terminal. A "web site" is a set of computer files containing text and graphics in the HTML format and organized
around a central home page.
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 USC §251O, et seq. (the "ECPA"), is the federal codification of the
intrusion arm of the common law tort of invasion of privacy applied to electronic communication and provides
criminal and civil penalties for its violation. The ECPA is actually the 1986 revision of the federal wiretap statute
originally enacted in 1968, but the term ECPA is now commonly used to refer to the entire statute, as amended.
OPINION
The first issue, whether a lawyer may use electronic mail services including the Internet to communicate with
clients, arises out of a lawyer's duty to protect confidential client information. Rule 1.6(a) of the Illinois Rules of
Professional Conduct provides that" ...a lawyer shall not, during or after termination of the professional relationship
with the client, use or reveal a confidence or secret of the client known to the lawyer unless the client consents after
disclosure." AS the Terminology provisions of the Rules state, the information a lawyer must protect includes
information covered by the lawyer-client privilege (a "confidence") as well as information that the client wishes to
be held inviolate or the revelation of which would be embarrassing or detrimental to the client (a "secret").
The duty to maintain the confidentiality of client information implies the duty to use methods of communication
with clients that provide reasonable assurance that messages will be and remain confidential. For that reason, the
Committee concluded in Opinion No. 90-07 (November 1990) that a lawyer should not use cordless or other mobile
telephones that were easily susceptible to interception when discussing confidential client matters. The Committee
also opined that a lawyer conversing with a client over a cordless or mobile telephone should advise the client of the
risk of the loss of confidentiality.
With the increased use of electronic mail, particularly electronic mail transmitted over the Internet, have come
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suggestions that electronic messages are not sufficiently secure to be used by lawyers communicating with clients.
At least two state ethics opinions have concluded that because it is possible for Internet or other electronic mail
service providers to intercept electronic mail service providers to intercept electronic mail messages, lawyers should
not use electronic mail for "sensitive" client communications unless the messages were encrypted or the client
expressly consented to "non-secure" communication. South Carolina Bar Advisory Opinion 94-27 (January 1995);
Iowa Supreme Court Board of Professional Ethics and Conduct Opinion 96-1 (August 29,1996). After reviewing
much of the available literature on this issue, the Committee disagrees with these opinions.
Among the numerous recent articles regarding a lawyer's use of electronic mail, the Committee found three to be
particularly useful and informative. These are: Joan C. Rogers, "Malpractice Concerns Cloud E-Mail, On-Line
Advice," ABNBNA Lawyers' Manual on Professional Conduct (March 6,1996); Peter R. Jarvis & Bradley F.
Tellam, "High-Tech Ethics and Malpractice Issues," 1996 Symposium Issue of the Professional Lawyer, p. 51
(1996); David Hricik, "Confidentiality and Privilege in High-Tech Communications," 8 Professional Lawyer, p. 1
(February 1997). From these and other authorities; there is a clear consensus on two critical points. First, although
interception of electronic messages is possible, it is certainly no less difficult than intercepting an ordinary telephone
call. Second, intercepting an electronic mail message is illegal under the ECPA.
Courts and ethics committees have uniformly held that persons using ordinary telephones for confidential
communications have a reasonable expectation of privacy. The three common types of electronic mail messages
appear no less secure. For example, electronic messages that are carried on a local area or private network may only
be accessed from within the organization owning the network. Such messages would therefore clearly appear subject
to a reasonable expectation of privacy.
Other electronic messages are carried by commercial electronic mail services or networks such as America Online,
CompuServ or MCI Mail. Typically, these services transmit e-mail messages from one subscriber's computer to another
computer "mailbox" over a proprietary telephone network. Typically, the computer mailboxes involved are password-
protected. Because it is possible for dishonest or careless personnel ofthe mail service provider to intercept or misdirect a
message, this form ofelectronic mail is arguably less secure than messages sent over a private network. AS a practical
matter, however, any ordinary telephone call may also be intercepted or misdirected by dishonest or careless employees of
the telephone service provider. Again, this possibility has not compromised the reasonable expectation ofprivacy of
ordinary telephone users. The result should be the same for electronic mail service subscribers.
The third type of electronic mail, that carried on the Internet, typically travels in another fashion. Rather than
moving directly from the sender's host computer to the recipient's host computer, Internet messages are usually
broken into separate "packets" of data that are transmitted individually and then re-assembled into a complete
message at the recipient's host computer. Along the way, the packets travel through, and may be stored temporarily
in, one or more other computers (called "routers") operated by third parties (usually called an "internet service
provider" or "ISP") that help distribute electronic mail over the Internet.
Unlike a cordless cellular telephone message, for example, an Internet e-mail is not broadcast over the open air
waves, but through ordinary telephone lines and the intermediate computers. When an Internet message is
transmitted over an ordinary telephone line, it is subject to the same protections and difficulties of interception as an
ordinary telephone call. To intercept an Internet communication while it is in transit over telephone lines requires an
illegal wiretap.
Consequently, the real distinction between an Internet electronic message and an ordinary telephone call is that
Internet messages may be temporarily stored in, and so can be accessed through, a router maintained by an ISP. It is
possible that an employee of an ISP (as part of the maintenance of the router) could lawfully monitor the router and
thereby read part or all of a confidential message. As in the case of telephone and proprietary electronic mail
providers, it is also possible for dishonest employees of an ISP to intercept messages unlawfully. The Committee
does not believe that the opportunity for illegal interception by personnel of an ISP makes it unreasonable to expect
privacy of the message.
As noted above, it is also clear that unauthorized interception of an Internet message is a violation of the ECPA,
which was amended in 1986 to extend the criminal wiretapping laws to cover Internet transmissions. As part of the
1986 amendments, Congress also treated the issue of privilege in 18 USCA §2517(4), as follows:
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No otherwise privileged wire, oral, or electronic communication intercepted in accordance with, or in
violation of, the provisions of this chapter shall lose its privileged character.
This provision demonstrates that Congress intended that Internet messages should be considered privileged
communications just as ordinary telephone calls.
In summary, the Committee concludes that because (1) the expectation of privacy for electronic mail is no less
reasonable than the expectation of privacy for ordinary telephone calls, and (2) the unauthorized interception of an
electronic message subject to the ECPA is illegal, a lawyer does not violate Rule 1.6 by communicating with a client
using electronic mail services, including the Internet, without encryption. Nor is it necessary, as some commentators
have suggested, to seek specific client consent to the use of unencrypted e-mail. The Committee recognizes that
there may be unusual circumstances involving an extraordinarily sensitive matter that might require enhanced
security measures like encryption. These situations would, however, be of the nature that ordinary telephones and
other normal means of communication would also be deemed inadequate.
With respect to the second general issue, the extent to which a lawyer may use Internet web site to communicate
with clients and prospective clients, the Committee believes that the existing Rules of Professional Conduct
governing advertising, solicitation and communication concerning a lawyer's services provide adequate and
appropriate guidance to a lawyer using the Internet. For example, the Committee views an Internet home page as the
electronic equivalent of a telephone directory "yellow pages" entry and other material included in the web site to be
the functional equivalent ofthe firm brochures and similar materials that lawyers commonly prepare for clients and
prospective clients. An Internet user who has gained access to a lawyer's home page, like a yellow pages user, has
chosen to view the lawyer's message from all the messages available in that medium. Under these circumstances,
such materials are not a "communication directed to a specific recipient" that would implicate Rule 7.3 and its
provisions governing direct contact with prospective clients. Thus, with respect to a web site, Rule 7.1, prohibiting
false or misleading statements concerning a lawyer's services, and Rule 7.2, regulating advertising in the public
media, are sufficient to guide lawyers and to protect the public.
On the other hand, lawyer participation in an electronic bulletin board, chat group, or similar service, may implicate
Rule 7.3, which governs solicitation, the direct contact with prospective clients. The Committee does not believe
that merely posting general comments on a bulletin board or chat group should be considered solicitation. However,
of a lawyer seeks to initiate an unrequested contact with a specific person or group as a result of participation in a
bulletin board or chat group, then the lawyer would be subject to the requirements of Rule 7.3. For example, if the
lawyer sends unrequested electronic messages (including messages in response to inquiries posted in chat groups) to
a targeted person or group, the messages should be plainly identified as advertising material.
Finally, lawyers participating in chat groups or other on-line services that could involve offering personalized legal
advice to anyone who happens to be connected to the service should be mindful that the recipients of such advise are
the lawyer's clients, with the benefits and burdens of that relationship. In Opinion No. 94-11 (November 1994), the
Committee addressed an analogous situation arising out of a "call_in" legal advice service as follows:
The committee believes that callers to the legal advice service are clients of the law firm who are entitled to the
protection of clients afforded by the Rules of Professional Conduct. However, it does not appear that either the law
firm or the cellular telephone service makes any effort to determine the identity of the callers and check for potential
conflicts of interest prior to the time that the callers' questions are asked and the legal·advice is given. (Presumably
the callers' identities are revealed after the advice is rendered through the billing process. If the cellular telephone
company handles the billing for the law firm, this procedure may also violate client confidences. See ISBA Opinion
No. 93-04) Under these circumstances, it would be possible for the law firm to give legal advice to callers whose
interest are directly adverse to other firm clients, including other callers, in violation of Rule 1.7(a), or whose
interests are materially adverse to the firm's former clients, including other callers, concerning the same or a
substantially related matter, in violation of Rule 1.9
For these reasons, the Committee believes that Illinois lawyers may appropriately make use of the Internet in serving
and communicating with clients and prospective clients subject to the existing rules governing confidentiality,
advertising and solicitation. • ••••
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AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
STANDING COMMITTEE ON ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY
Fonnal Opinion No. 99-413
March 10, 1999
Protecting the Confidentiality of Unencrypted E-Mail
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/fo99-413.html
A lawyer may transmit infonnation relating to the representation of a client by unencrypted e-mail sent over the
Internet without violating the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (1998) because the mode of transmission affords
a reasonable expectation ofprivacy from a technological and legal standpoint. The same privacy accorded U.S. and
commercial mail, land-line telephonic transmissions, and facsimiles applies to Internet e-mail. A lawyer should
consult with the client and follow her instructions, however, as to the mode of transmitting highly sensitive
infonnation relating to the client's representation.
The Committee addresses in this opinion the obligations of lawyers under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
(1998) when using unencrypted electronic mail to communicate with clients or others about client matters. The
Committee (1) analyzes the general standards that lawyers must follow under the Model Rules in' protecting
"confidential client infonnation"l from inadvertent disclosure; (2) compares the risk of interception of unencrypted
e-mail with the risk of interception of other fonns of communication; and (3) reviews the various fonns of e-mail
transmission, the associated risks of unauthorized disclosure, and the laws affecting unauthorized interception and
disclosure of electronic communications.
The Committee believes that e-mail communications, including those sent unencrypted over the Internet, pose no
greater risk of interception or disclosure than other modes ofcommunication commonly relied upon as having a
reasonable expectation ofprivacy. The level oflegal protection accorded e-mail transmissions, like that accorded
other modes ofelectronic communication, also supports the reasonableness of an expectation of privacy for
unencrypted e-mail transmissions. The risk ofunauthorized interception and disclosure exists in every medium of
communication, including e-mail. It is not, however, reasonable to require that a mode of communicating
infonnation must be avoided simply because interception is technologically possible, especially when unauthorized
interception or dissemination of the infonnation is a violation oflaw.2
The Committee concludes, based upon current technology and law as we are infonned of it, that a lawyer sending
confidential client infonnation by unencrypted e-mail does not violate Model Rule 1.6(a) in choosing that mode to
communicate. This is principally because there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in its use.
The conclusions reached in this opinion do not, however, diminish a lawyer's obligation to consider with her client
the sensitivity of the communication, the costs of its disclosure, and the relative security of the contemplated
medium of communication. Particularly strong protective measures are warranted to guard against the disclosure of
highly sensitive matters. Those measures might include the avoidance ofe-mail,,J, just as they would warrant the
avoidance of the telephone, fax, and mail. See Model Rule 1.1 and l.4(b). The lawyer must, of course, abide by the
client's wishes regarding the means of transmitting client infonnation. See Model Rule 1.2(a).
A. Lawyers' Duties Under Model Rule 1.6
The prohibition in Model Rule 1.6(a) against revealing confidential client infonnation absent client consent after
consultation imposes a duty on a lawyer to take reasonable steps in the circumstances to protect such infonnation
against unauthorized use or disclosure.,4 Reasonable steps include choosing a means of communication in which the
lawyer has a reasonable expectation ofprivacy.~ In order to comply with the duty of confidentiality under Model
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Rule 1.6, a lawyer's expectation ofprivacy in a communication medium need not be absolute; it must merely be
reasonable.
It uniformly is accepted that a lawyer's reliance on land-line telephone, fax machine, and mail to communicate with
clients does not violate the duty of confidentiality because in the use of each medium, the lawyer is presumed to
have a reasonable expectation ofprivacY.fi The Committee now considers whether a lawyer's expectation of privacy
is any less reasonable when she communicates bye-mail.
B. Communications Alternatives To E-Mail
In order to understand what level of risk may exist without destroying the reasonable expectation of privacy, this
Section evaluates the risks inherent in the use of alternative means of communication in which lawyers nonetheless
are presumed to have such an expectation. These include ordinary u.S. mail; land-line, cordless, and cellular
telephones; and facsimile transmissions.
1. U.S. and Commercial Mail
It uniformly is agreed that lawyers have a reasonable expectation of privacy in communications made by mail (both
U.S. Postal Service and commercial). This is despite risks that letters may be lost, stolen or misplaced at several
points between sender and recipient. Further, like telephone companies, Internet service providers (ISPs), and on-
line service providers (OSPs), mail services often reserve the right to inspect the contents of any letters or packages
handled by the service. Like e-mail, U.S. and commercial mail can be intercepted and disseminated illegally. But,
unlike unencrypted e-mail, letters are sealed and therefore arguably more secure than e-mail.l
2. Land-Line Telephones
It is undisputed that a lawyer has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the use of a telephone..8.
For this reason, the protection against unreasonable search and seizure guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment applies
to telephone conversations.2 It also is recognized widely that the attorney-client privilege applies to conversations
over the telephone as long as the other elements of the privilege are present. 10 However, this expectation of privacy
in communications by telephone must be considered in light of the substantial risk of interception and disclosure
inherent in its use. Tapping a telephone line does not require great technical sophistication or equipment, nor is the
know-how difficult to obtain.ll
Multiple extensions provide opportunities for eavesdropping without the knowledge of the speakers. Technical
errors by the phone company may result in third parties listening to private conversations. Lastly, phone companies
are permitted by law to monitor phone calls under limited conditions.
Despite this lack of absolute security in the medium, using a telephone is considered to be consistent with the duty to
take reasonable precautions to maintain confidentiality. 12
3. Cordless and Cellular Phones
Authority is divided as to whether users have a reasonable expectation of privacy in conversations made over
cordless and cellular phones.U Some court decisions reached the conclusion that there is no reasonable expectation
of privacy in cordless phones in part because of the absence, at the time, of federal law equivalent to that which
protects traditional telephone communications. 14 After the 1994 amendment to the Wiretap Statute, which extended
the same legal protections afforded regular telephone communications to cordless phone conversations,15 at least
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one ethics opinion addressed the advisability of using cordless phones to communicate with clients and concluded
that their use does not violate the duty of confidentiality. 16
The nature of cordless and cellular phone technology exposes it to certain risks that are absent from e-mail
communication. E-mail messages are not "broadcast" over public airwaves. 17 Cordless phones, by contrast, rely on
FM and AM radio waves to broadcast signals to the phone's base unit, which feeds the signals into land-based phone
lines. Therefore, in addition to the risks inherent in the use of a regular telephone, cordless phones also are subject to
risks of interception due to their broadcast on radio signals that may be picked up by mass-marketed devices such as
radios, baby monitors, and other cordless phones within range..lli Further, the intercepted signals of cordless and
analog cellular telephones are in an instantly comprehensible form (oral speech), unlike the digital format of e-mail
communications.
Similarly, cellular phones transmit radio signals to a local base station that feeds the signals into land-based phone
lines. The broadcast area from the phone to the station is larger than that of a cordless phone, and receivers and
scanners within range may intercept and overhear the conversation. Although the Committee does not here express
an opinion regarding the use of cellular or cordless telephone, it notes that the concerns about the expectation of
privacy in the use of cordless and cellular telephones do not apply to e-mail transmitted over land-based phone
lines. 19
4. Facsimile
Authority specifically stating that the use of fax machines is consistent with the duty of confidentiality is absent,
perhaps because, according to some commentators, courts assume the conclusion to be self-evident.20 Nonetheless,
there are significant risks of interception and disclosure in the use of fax machines. Misdirection may result merely
by entering one often digits incorrectly. Further, unlike e-mail, faxes often are in the hands of one or more
intermediaries before reaching their intended recipient, including, for example, secretaries, runners, and mailroom
employees. In light of these risks, prudent lawyers faxing highly sensitive information should take heightened
measures to preserve the communication's confidentiality.
C. Characteristics OfE-Mail Systems
The reasonableness of a lawyer's use of any medium to communicate with or about clients depends both on the
objective level of security it affords and the existence oflaws intended to protect the privacy of the information
communicated. We here examine the four most common types of e-mail and compare the risks inherent in their use
with those of alternative means of communication, including the telephone (regular, cordless and cellular), fax, and
mail.
Like many earlier technologies, "e-mail" has become a generic term that presently encompasses a variety of systems
allowing communication among computer users. Because the security of these e-mail systems is not uniform, the
Committee here evaluates separately the degree of privacy afforded by each. As set forth below, we conclude that a
lawyer has a reasonable expectation of privacy in such use.
1. "Direct" E-Mail21
Lawyers may e-mail their clients directly (and vice versa) by programming their computer's modem to dial their
client's. The modem simply converts the content of the e-mail into digital information that is carried on land-based
phone lines to the recipient's modem, where it is reassembled back into the message. This is virtually
indistinguishable from the process of sending a fax: a fax machine dials the number of the recipient fax machine and
digitally transmits information to it through land-based phone lines. Because the information travels in digital form,
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tapping a telephone line to intercept an e-mail message would require more effort and technical sophistication than
would eavesdropping on a telephone conversation by telephone tap.
Based on the difficulty of intercepting direct e-mail, several state bar ethics opinions and many commentators
recognize a reasonable expectation 0 privacy in this form ofe-mail.22 Further, in two recent federal court decisions,
the attorney-client and work-product privileges were considered applicable to e-mail communications.23 The
Committee agrees that there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in this mode of communication.
2. "Private System" E-Mail
A "private system" includes typical internal corporate e-mail systems and so-called "extranet" networks in which
one internal system directly dials another private system. The only relevant distinction between "private system" and
"direct" e-mail is the greater risk of misdirected e-mails in a private system. Messages mistakenly may be sent
throughout a law firm or to unintended recipients within the client's organization. However, all members of a firm
owe a duty ofconfidentiality to each of the firm's clients.24 Further, unintended disclosures to individuals within a
client's private e-mail network are unlikely to be harmful to the client.
The reliance of "private system" e-mail on land-based phone lines and its non-use ofany publicly accessible
network renders this system as secure as direct e-mail, regular phone calls, and faxes. As a result; there is a
widespread consensus that confidentiality is not threatened by its use,25 and the Committee concurs.
3. On-line Service Providers
E-mail also may be provided by third-party on-line service providers or "oSPs."26 Users typically are provided a
password-protected mailbox from which they may send and retrieve e-mail.
There are two features of this system that distinguish it from direct and private-system e-mail. First, user mailboxes,
although private, exist in a public forum consisting of other fee-paying users. The added risk caused by the existence
ofother public users on the same network is that misdirected e-mails may be sent to unknown users. Unlike users of
private system e-mail networks who, as agents oftheir employers, owe a duty of confidentiality to them and, in the
case of a law firm, to all firm clients, the inadvertent user owes no similar duties.27 The risk of misdirection is,
however, no different from that which exists when sending a fax. Further, the misdirection of an e-mail to another
OSP can be avoided with reasonable care.28
The second distinctive feature of e-mail administered by an OSP is that the relative security and confidentiality of
user e-mail largely depends on the adequacy of the particular OSP's security measures meant to limit external access
and its formal policy regarding the confidentiality of user e-mail. Together, they will determine whether a user has a
reasonable expectation ofprivacy in this type ofe-mail.
The denial of external access ordinarily is ensured by the use ofpassword-protected mailboxes or encryption29. The
threat to confidentiality caused by the potential inspection of users' e-mail by OSP system administrators who must
access the e-mail for administrative and compliance purposes is overcome by the adoption of a formal policy that
narrowly restricts the bases on which system administrators30 and OSP agentsll 32 are permitted to examine user
e-mail.
Moreover, federal law imposes limits on the ability ofOSP administrators to inspect user e-mail, irrespective of the
OSP's formal policy. Inspection is limited by the ECPA to purposes "necessary to the rendition of services" or to the
protection of "rights or property."33 Further, even if an OSP administrator lawfully inspects user e-mail within the
narrow limits defined by the ECPA, the disclosure of those communications for purposes other than those provided
by the statute is prohibited.34
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Accordingly, the Committee concludes that lawyers have a reasonable expectation of privacy when communicating
bye-mail maintained by an aSP, a conclusion that also has been reached by at least one case as well as state bar
ethics committees and cornmentators.35
4. Internet E-Mail
E-mail may be sent over the Internet between service users without interposition ofaSPs. Internet e-mail typically
uses land-based phone lines and a number of intermediate computers randomly selected to travel from sender to
recipient. The intermediate computers consist of various Internet service providers or "routers" that maintain
software designed to help the message reach its final destination.
Because Internet e-mail typically travels through land-based phone lines, the only points ofunique vulnerability
consist of the third party-owned Internet services providers or "ISPs," each capable of copying messages passing
through its network. Confidentiality may be compromised by (1) the ISP's legal, though qualified, right to monitor e-
mail passing through or temporarily stored in its network, and (2) the illegal interception of e-mail by ISPs or
"hackers."36
The ISPs' qualified inspection rights are identical to those of oSPs.37 The same limits described above therefore
apply to ISPs. In addition, the provider ofan electronic communications service may by law conduct random
monitoring only for mechanical or service quality control checks.38
The second threat to confidentiality is the illegal interception of e-mail, either by ISPs exceeding their qualified
monitoring rights or making unauthorized disclosures, or by third party hackers who use ISPs as a means of
intercepting e-mail. Although it is difficult to quantify precisely the frequency of either practice, the interception or
disclosure of e-mail in transit or in storage (whether passing through an ISP or in any other medium) is a crime and
also may result in civilliability.39
In addition to criminalization, practical constraints on the ability of third parties and ISPs to capture and read
Internet e-mail lead to the conclusion that the user ofInternet e-mail has a reasonable expectation of privacy. An
enormous volume of data travelling at an extremely high rate passes through ISPs every hour. Further, during the
passage ofInternet e-mail between sender and recipient, the message ordinarily is split into fragments or "packets"
of information. Therefore, only parts of individual messages customarily pass through ISPs, limiting the extent of
any potential disclosure. Because the specific route taken by each e-mail message through the labyrinth of phone
lines and ISPs is random, it would be very difficult consistently to intercept more than a segment ofa message by
the same author.
Together, these characteristics ofInternet e-mail further support the Committee's conclusion that an expectation of
privacy in this medium of communication is reasonable. The fact that ISP administrators or hackers are capable of
intercepting Internet e-mail - albeit with great difficulty and in violation of federal law - should not render the
expectation of privacy in this medium any the less reasonable, just as the risk of illegal telephone taps does not erode
the reasonable expectation of privacy in a telephone callAO
CONCLUSION
Lawyers have a reasonable expectation ofprivacy in communications made by all forms of e-mail, including
unencrypted e-mail sent on the Internet, despite some risk of interception and disclosure. It therefore follows that its
use is consistent with the duty under Rule 1.6 to use reasonable means to maintain the confidentiality of information
relating to a client's representation.
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Although earlier state bar ethics opinions on the use of Internet e-mail tended to find a violation of the state
analogues ofRule 1.6 because of the susceptibility to interception by unauthorized persons and, therefore, required
express client consent to the use of e-mail, more recent opinions reflecting lawyers' greater understanding of the
technology involved approve the use ofunencrypted Internet e-mail without express client consent.
Even so, when the lawyer reasonably believes that confidential client information being transmitted is so highly
sensitive that extraordinary measures to protectthe transmission are warranted, the lawyer should consult the client
as to whether another mode of transmission, such as special messenger delivery, is warranted. The lawyer then must
follow the client's instructions as to the mode of transmission. See Model Rule 1.2(a).
ENDNOTES
1 As used in this opinion, "confidential client information" denotes "information relating to the representation of a
client" under Model Rule 1.6(a), which states:
(a) a lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client unless a client consents after
consultation, except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation.
2 The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986), amended the
Federal Wiretap Statute of 1968 by extending its scope to include "electronic communications." 18 U.S.C.A. (2510,
et seq. (1998) (the "ECPA"). The ECPA now commonly refers to the amended statute in its entirety. The ECPA
provides criminal and civil penalties for the unauthorized interception or disclosure of any wire, oral, or electronic
communication. 18 U.S.C.A. (2511.
3 Options other than abandoning e-mail include using encryption or seeking client consent after apprising the client
of the risks and consequences of disclosure.
4 See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS ( 112 cmt. d (Proposed Official
Draft 1998), which provides that confidential client information must be "acquired, stored, retrieved, and transmitted
under systems and controls that are reasonably designed and managed to maintain confidentiality."
5 Whether a lawyer or a client has a reasonable expectation ofprivacy also governs whether a communication is "in
confidence" for purposes of the attorney-client privilege. As a result, analysis under the attorney-client privilege is
often relevant to this opinion's discussion of e-mail and the duty of confidentiality. The relevance of privilege is not
exhaustive, however, because of its more restrictive application in prohibiting the introduction of privileged
communications between a lawyer and client in any official proceeding. In contrast to the requirement imposed by
the duty of confidentiality to avoid disclosing any information "relating to the representation" of the client, see
Model Rule 1.6(a), supra n.l, the attorney-client privilege applies only to actual "communications" made "in
confidence" by the client to the lawyer. See JOHN H. WIGMORE, 8 EVIDENCE § 2295 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
6 See infra Section B. It should be noted that a lawyer's negligent use of any medium - including the telephone, mail
and fax - may breach the duty of confidentiality. The relevant issue here, however, is whether, despite otherwise
reasonable efforts to ensure confidentiality, breach occurs solely by virtue of the lawyer's use of e-mail.
7 A.C.L.U. v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 834 (E.D. Pa. 1996), affd 521 U.S. 844 (1997) ("Unlike postal mail, simple
e-mail is not 'sealed' or secure, and can be accessed or viewed on intermediate computers between the sender and
recipient (unless the message is encrypted.").
8 Frequently, what we understand to be regular or land-line telephone conversations are transmitted in part by
microwave. For example, many corporate telephone networks are hard-wired within a building and transmitted by
microwave among buildings within a corporate campus to a central switch connected by land-line or microwave to a
local or interstate carrier.
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9 It should be noted that the ECPA preserves the privileged character of any unlawfuIIy intercepted "wire, oral, or
electronic communication." 18 U.S.C.A. ( 2517(4). The inclusion ofe-mail in this provision is important for two
reasons. First, implicit in this provision is the assumption that electronic communications are capable of transmitting
privileged material. To argue that the use of e-mail never is "in confidence" or constitutes an automatic waiver of
otherwise privileged communications therefore appears to be inconsistent with an assumption of this provision of
federal law. Second, the identical federal treatment ofe-mail with other means of communication long assumed
consistent with the maintenance ofprivilege likewise is inconsistent with the assertion that the use of e-mail poses
unique threats to privileged communications.
10 See Peter R. Jarvis & Bradley F. TeIIam, High-Tech Ethics and Malpractice Issues 7 (1996) (paper delivered at
the 22nd National Conference on Professional Responsibility, May 30, 1996, in Chicago, Illinois) (on file with its
author), reported in 1996 SYMPOSIUM ISSUE OF THE PROFESSIONAL LAWYER, 51, 55 (1996) (hereafter
"Jarvis & Bradley"); David Hricik, E-mail and Client Confidentiality: Lawyers Worry Too Much about Transmitting
Client Confidences by Internet E-mail, 11 GEO. J.LEGAL ETHICS 459, 479 (1999) (hereafter "Hricik").
11 See Jarvis & Tellam supra n.lO, at 57; Hricik supra n.lO, at 480.
12 See Hricik supra n.lO, at 481.
13 See, e.g., Jarvis & TeIIam supra n.lO, at 59-61; Hricik supra n.lO, at 481-85. Compare Mass. Ethics Opinion 94-5
(1994) (if risk ofdisclosure to third party is "nontrivial," lawyer should not use cellular phone); N.C. Ethics Op. 215
(1995) (advising lawyers to use the mode of communication that best will maintain confidential information); State
Bar of Arizona Advisory Op. 95-11 (1995) (lawyers should exercise caution before using ceIIular phones to
communicate client confidences) with United States v. Smith, 978 F.2d 171, 180 (5th Cir. 1992) (finding that there
may be reasonable expectation ofprivacy in cordless phone communications for Fourth Amendment purposes).
14 McKamey v. Roach, 55 F.3d 1236, 1238-9 (6th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 576 U.S. 944 (1995); Askin v. United
States, 47 F.3d 100, 103-04 (4th Cir. 1995).
15 By 1986, the protection under federal law for ceIIular phone communications was equal to traditional land-line
telephone communications. The Communications Assistance fOf Law Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-414,
202(a), 108 Stat. 4279 (1994), deleted previous exceptions under the Federal Wiretap Act that limited the legal
protections afforded cordless phone communications under 18 U.S.C.A. «2510(1), 2510(12) (A). Existing law
criminalizes the intentional and unauthorized interception ofboth cordless and cellular phone communications, 18
U.S.C.A. (2511; the privileged status of the communication preserves in the event of intentional interception, 18
U.S.c.A. (2517(4); and bars the introduction of the unlawful interception as evidence at trial even if it is not
privileged, 18 U.S.C.A. (2515.
16 State Bar of Arizona Advisory Op. 95-11 (1995). Some commentators have argued that in light of the 1994
amendment and the recent improvements in the security of both media (including the introduction of digital ceIIular
phones), the expectation ofprivacy in communications by cordless and cellular telephones should not be considered
unreasonable. Jarvis & Tellam supra n.lO, at 60-61. See also Hricik supra n.10, at 483, 485 (arguing that despite the
fact that their privileged status would not be lost if cellular and cordless phone conversations were intercepted,
lawyers should consider whether the cost of potential disclosure is outweighed by the. benefit derived from the use of
cordless or ceII phones). Further, 18 U.S.C.A. ( 2512 prohibits the manufacture and possession of scanners capable
of receiving cellular frequencies, and cordless and cellular phone communications have been afforded greater legal
protection under several recent state court decisions. See, e.g., State v. Faford, 128 Wash.2d 476, 485-86,910 P.2d
447, 451-52 (1996) (reversing trial court's admission of defendants' cordless phone conversations violated state
privacy act because defendants had reasonable expectation ofprivacy in such communication); State v. McVeigh,
224 Conn. 593, 622, 620 A.2d 133, 147 (1995) (reversing trial court's admission of defendants' cordless telephone
conversations because such communications were within scope of state law forbidding the intentional interception
of wire communications).
17 Hricik supra n.lO, at 497.
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18 See United States v. Maxwell 42 MJ. 568, 576,43 Fed. R. Evid. Servo (Callaghan) 24 (A. F. Ct. Crim. App.
1995) (holding that user of e-mail maintained by OSP was protected against warrantless search of e-mails because
user had reasonable expectation ofprivacy in such communications, unlike cordless phone communication) aft'd in
part and rev'd in part, 45 M.J. 406 (U.S. Anned Forces 1996) (expectation of privacy exists in e-mail transmissions
made through OSP).
19 The risks of interception and disclosure may be lessened by the recent introduction of digital cellular phones,
whose transmissions are considered more difficult to intercept than their analog counterparts. New communications
technology, however, does not always advance privacy concerns. The use of airplane telephones, for example,
exposes users to the interception risks ofcellular telephones as well as a heightened risk of disclosure due to
eavesdropping on the airplane itself. Most recently, a world-wide, satellite-based cellular telephone system called
Iridium has been introduced by Motorola. The principles articulated in this opinion should be considered by a
lawyer when using such systems. .
20 See, e.g., Practice Guide, Electronic Communications, in ABAIBNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 55:403 (1996) ("[C]ourts seem to have taken it for granted that fax machines may be
used [to transmit confidential infonnation]," citing State ex reI. U.S. Fidelity and Guar. Co. v. Canady, 144 W.Va.
431, 443-44, 460 S.E.2d 677, 689-90 (1995) (holding that faxed communication was protected by the attorney-client
privilege)). See also Jarvis & Tellam supra n.lO, at 61 ("[T]here seems to be no question that faxes are subject to the
attorney-client privilege ... no one asserts that the use of a fax machine or the possibility of misdirection destroys
any hope of a claim of privilege," citing ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Fonnal Ops. 94-
382 and 92-368).
21 The names for the varieties ofe-mail described in this section of the opinion are based on those used by Hricik,
supra n.l 0, at 485-92.
22 See, e.g., Alaska Bar Ass'n Op. 98-2 (1998); Ill. State Bar Ass'n Advisory Op. on Professional Conduct No. 96-
10 (1997); S.c. Bar Ethics Advisory Comm. Op. No. 97-08 (1997); Vennont Advisory Ethics Op. No. 97-5 (1997).
See also, Jarvis & Tellam, supra n.l0, at 61; Hricik supra n.l 0, at 502-06.
23 In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 43 F.3d 966, 968 (5th Cir. 1994) (court considered e-mail messages along with
other documents in work-product privilege analysis); United States v. Keystone Sanitation Co. Inc., 903 F. Supp.
803, 808 (M.D. Pa. 1995) (defendants waived privileged nature ofe-mail messages due to inadvertent production).
24 Hricik supra n. 10, at 487.
25 See e.g., Alaska Bar Ass'n Op. 98-2 (1998); Ill. State Bar Ass'n Advisory Op. on Professional Conduct No. 96-10
(1997); S.C. Bar Ethics Advisory Comm. Op. No. 97-08 (1997); Vennont Advisory Ethics Op. 97-5 (1997). See
also, Hricik supra n.l 0, at 486-87.
26 Examples include America Online ("AOL"), CompuServe, and MCI Mail.
27 Hricik supra n.lO, at 487-88.
28 If the inadvertent recipient is a lawyer, then the lawyer must refrain from examining the infonnation any more
than necessary to ascertain that it was not intended for her and must notify the sender, ABA Comm. on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility, Fonnal Op. 92-368 (1992), an obligation that extends to infonnation received bye-mail
or fax, ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Fonnal Op. 94-382 (1994).
29 For a basic explanation of encryption technology, including the use of digital signatures, see Kenneth E. Johnson,
Dealing with Security, Encryption, and Ethics Concerns, in THE LAWYER'S QUICK GUIDE TO E-MAIL 93-105
(ABA Law Practice Management Section 1998) ("Johnson").
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30 For a discussion ofsome additional matters such formal policies might address (deletion and retention of e-mail
messages, remote checking of messages while out of office, etc.), see Johnson, supra n. 29, at 104-05.
31 For example, the terms of AOL's policy forbid access to e-mail except (1) to comply with the law, (2) to protect
its own rights, or (3) to act in the belief that someone's safety is at risk. Hricik supra n. 10, at 489.
3218 U.S.C.A. (2511(2) (a) (i) (It is "not unlawful under this chapter for an operator ofa switchboard, or an officer,
employee, or agent ofa provider ofwire or electronic communication service, whose facilities are used in the
transmission of a wire or electronic communication, to intercept, disclose, or use that communication in the normal
course of his employment while engaged in any activity which is a necessary incident to the rendition of his service
or to the protection of the rights or property of the provider of that service, except that a provider of wire
communication service to the public shall not utilize service observing or random monitoring except for mechanical
or service quality control checks"). The qualified right of interception ofOSPs cannot be argued to create unique
risks to the confidentiality of e-mail communications because phone companies (and other providers of wire or
electronic communication services) are given identical rights under 18 U.S.C.A. (2511(2) (a) (i». Moreover, many
commercial mail services reserve the right to inspect all packages and letters handled, yet no one suggests this
diminishes the user's expectation of privacy. See Hricik supra n.1 0, at 492. It also is noteworthy that in 1998, the
New York Legislature amended the state's rules of evidence to provide that no otherwise privileged communication
"shall lose its privileged character for the sole reason that it is communicated by electronic means or because
persons necessary for the delivery or facilitation of such electronic communication may have access to the content of
the communication." N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. § 4547 (1998).
33 18 U.S.C.A. (2511(3) (a).
34See e.g., supra n.18. See also Alaska Bar Ass'n Op. 98-2 (1998); D.C. Bar Op. 281 (1998); Ill. State Bar Ass'n
Advisory Op. on Professional Conduct No. 96-10 (1997) (users ofe-mail maintained by OSP have reasonable
expectation of privacy despite greater risks than private network e-mail); S.C. Bar Ethics Advisory Comm. Op.No.
97-08 (1997); Vermont Advisory Ethics Op. 97-5 (1997); Jarvis & Tellam supra n.lO, at 61; Hricik supra n.lO, at
492.
35 Confidentiality also may be compromised by computer viruses, some of which have the capability ofcausing the
user's document to be propagated to unintended recipients. However, a virus scanning program containing up-to-
date definition files will detect and clean such viruses. See generally Carnegie Mellon Software Engineering
Institute's CERT(r) Coordination Center Website, http://www.cert.org/index.html, for descriptions of these and other
computer viruses.
36 See supra notes 30 & 31 and accompanying text.
3718 U.S.C.A. (2511(2) (a) (i).
38 See 18 U.S.C.A. «2511, 2701, 2702.
39 See Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967) (Fourth Amendment protection extended to conversation overheard
by listening device attached to outside of public telephone booth).
40 See, e.g., Alaska Bar Ass'n Op. 98-2 (1998) (lawyers may communicate with clients via unencrypted e-mail;
client consent is unnecessary because the expectation of privacy in e-mail is no less reasonable than that in the
telephone or fax); D.C. Bar Op. 281 (1998) (lawyers' use of unencrypted e-mail is not a violation of duty to protect
client confidences under District of Columbia Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6); Ky. Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm.
Advisory Op. E-403 (1998) (absent "unusual circumstances" lawyers may use e-mail, including unencrypted
Internet e-mail, to communicate with clients); New York State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics Op. 709
(1998) (lawyers may use unencrypted Internet e-mail to transmit confidential information without breaching the
duty of confidentiality under state analogue to ABA Model Rule 1.6); Ill. State Bar Ass'n Advisory Op. on
Professional Conduct No. 96-10 (1997) (lawyers may use unencrypted e-mail, including e-mail sent over the
Internet, to communicate with clients without violating Rule 1.6 of the IlIinois Rules of Professional Conduct; client
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consent is not required absent "extraordinarily sensitive" matter; expectation of privacy in e-mail is no less
reasonable than that in ordinary telephone calls); N.D. St. B. Ass'n Ethics Comm. Op. 97-09 (1997) (attorneys may
communicate with clients using unencrypted e-mail unless unusual circumstances warrant heightened security
measures); S.C. Bar Ethics Advisory Comm. Op. No. 97-08 (1997) (finding reasonable expectation of privacy when
sending confidential information bye-mail, including that sent through a private network, commercial service, and
the Internet; use of e-mail to communicate client confidences does not violate South Carolina Rule of Professional
Conduct 1.6); Vermont Advisory Ethics Op. 97-5 (1997) (lawyers may use unencrypted Internet e-mail to transmit
confidential information without breaching the duty of confidentiality under state analogue to ABA Model Rule
1.6). Two opinions similarly endorsed e-mail as a means of communicating client confidences, but advised lawyers
to seek client consent or consider the use of encryption prior to its use, unlike the present opinion: Pa. Bar Ass'n
Comm. on Legal Ethics Op. 97-130 (1997) (lawyers should not use unencrypted e-mail to communicate with or
about a client absent client consent); State Bar of Arizona Advisory Op. 97-04 (1996) (lawyers should caution client
or consider the use of encryption before transmitting sensitive information bye-mail). Two other opinions advised
lawyers to avoid the use of e-mail to communicate with or about clients: Iowa Bar Ass'n Op. 1997-1 (1997)
(sensitive material should not be transmitted by e-mail- whether through the Internet, a non-secure intranet, or other
types ofproprietary networks - without client consent, encryption, or equivalent security system); N.C. State Bar
Opinion 215 (1995) (advising lawyers to use the mode of communication that will best maintain confidential
information, and cautioning attorneys against the use of e-mail). Commentary supportive of the conclusions reached
in this opinion, in addition to Hricik supra n.10 and Jarvis & Tellam supra n.10, include William Freivogel,
Communicating With or About Clients on the Internet: Legal, Ethical, and Liability Concerns, ALAS LOSS
PREVENTION JOURNAL 17 (1996) (concluding that it is not ethically or legally necessary to encrypt Internet e-
mail but cautioning them in light of the absence of controlling legal authority). For a list of Web pages containing
articles on e-mail andconfidentiality.seeJohnson.supran.29.atl03.
© 1999 by the American Bar Association. All rights reserved
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Site Index.
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copyright notice.
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A top research site for
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LegalOnline Best of
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+ 1998, Featured Site
of the Week at the
Ethics Connection,
Legalonline 5-Star Site,
Features Site of MN
Online, NOBC Pick of
the Month.
Announcements:
0(2/24/00) Added Minnesota Opinion #19 to the opinions listing. The
Minnesota opinion notes that a lawyer may use technological means such as
unencrypted electronic mail (e-mail) and cordless and cellular telephones to
communicate confidential client information without violating Rule 1.6 under
specified conditions.
o (2/22/00) The Committee on Professional Ethics of the Massachusetts Bar
issued an opinion (#OO-On in January 2000 on the use ofunencrypted Internet
e-mail. Like the ABA and other opinions on the issue, the opinion states that it is
not an ethical violation to exchange unencryped e-mail with a client.
0(1119/00) Catherine Lanctot, professor oflaw at Villanova University Law
School, recently published Attorney-Client Relationships in Cyberspace: The
Peril and the Promise, 49 Duke LJ. 147 (1999), analyzing the nature and scope
of online legal advice. It is available online.
0(1/12/00) State Bar ofCalifornia's Committee on Professional Responsibility
and Conduct released proposed formal ethics opinion on attorney web sites
(proposed formal opinion interim no. 96-0014). The comment period expires at 5
p.m., Wednesday, March 22, 2000. Contact information and the
text of the opinion are available on the Bar's Web Site. Not surprisingly, the
opinion states that Web Sites are "advertisements" within the meaning of the
rules but are not automatically deemed "solicitations" by virtue of the inclusion
of e-mail contact capabilities. The digest of the proposed formal opinion states
that an attorney's internet web site, which contains information for the public
regarding her availability for professional employment, is a "communication"
under rule 1-400(A) of the California Rules ofProfessional Conduct and an
"advertisement" under Business and Professions Code sections 6157-6158. As
such, it is subject to the applicable prohibitions on false, misleading, and
deceptive messages. All words sounds and images that make up the presentation
on the web site must conform to the requirements of the rules. Under the facts
presented, the web site is not a "solicitation" under rule 1-400(B) even if it
includes e-mail facilities allowing direct communication to and from the attorney.
The attorney also must be aware that her web site may be subject to regulation by
other jurisdictions or that it might be considered the unauthorized practice of law
in other jurisdictions.
0(1118/99) We offer reprints of two recent presentations by Peter Krakaur at the
Glasser LegalWorks seminars in New York and Los Angeles:
"Secure Surfing -- How to Cover Your Digital Tracks" and
DisplayText cannot span more than one line!
o (9/8/99) Added links to the searchable
Missouri Informal AdvisorY Opinions.
0(8/24/99) Arizona released opinion 99-06 [pdf]in June 1999, which states that
Arizona lawyers may not ethically participate in an Internet service that sends
legal questions from individuals to attorneys based upon the subject matter of the
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question. The opinion also notes that lawyers can not pay a fee for such referrals
or give the service a portion of the legal fees earned from the referral.
0(7/19/99) Tennessee released formal ethics opinion 99-F-144 on June 14, 1999,
noting that lawyers listing areas of practice on the Internet, including listings on
law directories, should comply with certification of specialization requirements
under applicable state rule 2-101(C).
0(7/15/99) The Report of the Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice to the
ABA House of Delegates is available on line at
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdpfinalreport.html.
0(7/12/99) The North Carolina State Bar disciplined an attorney for posting
"misleading" information on his law firm web site (Action #99 DHC-3). More
details about the disciplinary action and censure decision are available in the
article Internet Advertising Now 'On the Radar Screen' ofState Bars, by Michael
Bowden published in the In Practice Section ofLawyers Weekly USA on July 12,
1999 (1999 LWUSA 643-44).
o (6/15/99) The Ethics 2000 Commission is now circulating for public comment
drafts of several of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
0(5/20/99) Missouri released opinion 990007 dealing with the scope ofa client
consent form relating to the use ofe-mail between the lawyer and client. The
opinion notes that it would be difficult to create a comprehensive form to cover
all concerns raised bye-mail. Lawyers are encouraged to discuss with their
clients the risks associated with e-mail communication and storage.
0(5/6/99) The ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility published the full text of ABA 99-413 which states that there is a
reasonable expectation of privacy in e-mail. Although the opinion states that
there is no automatic duty to encrypt Internet e-mail, lawyers should still consider
the dangers associated with the transmission of client confidences via any
medium and reach an understanding with their clients regarding appropriate
means to transmit sensitive client information.
o (4/17/99) The ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility formal opinion was renamed to ABA Formal Opinion 99-413
(previously designated #1999-01).
0(4/15/99) The ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility approved formal opinion (#1999-01) addressing the need to
protect the confidentiality ofunencrypted e-mail (March 10, 1999). The essence
of the opinion is that a lawyer may transmit information relating to the
representation of a client by unencrypted e-mail sent over the Internet without
violating the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. The rationale supporting this
is that the mode of transmission affords a reasonable expectation of privacy from
both a technological and legal standpoint. The opinion noted that the same
privacy accorded U.S. and commercial mail, land-line telephonic transmissions
and facsimiles also applies to Internet e-mail. In addition, like other ethics
opinions issued on the subject to date, the opinion states that a lawyer should
consult with the client and follow the client's instructions as to the mode of
transmitting highly sensitive information relating to the client's representation.
0(3110/99) The Association of the Bar of the City of New York Committee on
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Professional and Judicial Ethics released opinion 1998-2 on December 21, 1998.
The opinion deals with Web Site advertising, referral services, and encryption.
For further information, check out the opinions listing.
o (3/9/99) LegalEthics.com voted as a top research site for legal professionals in
1999 by Law Office Computing Magazine. Check the April/May for the entire
list of winners. We have picked up a number of awards over the years and
thank everyone for the continued interest and support.
0(2/16/99) Arizona now offers ethics opinions on line.
0(2/1199) South Dakota now offers ethics opinions on line. South Dakota also
issued Opinion #98-10 (1/12/99) finding that a South Dakota lawyer may
not participate in an Internet Referral Service taking an advertising fee and a
share oflegal fees to refer cases to a South Dakota lawyer but providing no legal
services.
0(1116/99) Added a reference in the opinions list to Connecticut Informal
Opinion (#97 - 29) dealing with the applicability of advertising solicitation rules
to Connecticut and out-of-state lawyer web sites.
0(1115/99) Added a reference in the opinions list to Tennessee Advisory
Opinion (#98-A-650(a» dealing with the question of encryption and e-mail. This
opinion amends opinion 98-A-750 to permit the use of e-mail via the Internet to
transmit client confidences and secrets.
0(114/99) Added a link in the opinions list to DC Bar's Legal Ethics
Committee Opinion (No. 281) entitled "Transmission of Confidential Information
by Electronic Mail."
0(12/6/98) We publish an article
DisplayText cannot span more than one line! by Drew L. Kershen,
Earl Sneed Centennial Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma, analyzing the
ethical issues that professional legal organizations, in contrast to individual
lawyers or law firms, must consider when they create a website.
0(11122/98) Added a copy of Pennsylvania Inquiry 98-85 which deals with
jurisdictional issues associated with lawyer web site publishing.
0(11101/98) The ABA Center for Professional Responsibility now offers
headnote summaries of recent ABA ethics opinions.
0(10/23/98) Added New York 709 to the opinions list. Opinion 709 addressed
the questions whether an attorney may operate and advertise a trademark practice
over the Internet. The opinions addressed a number of ethical issues as noted in
the summary in the opinions list. Following the vast majority of other opinions
addressing the associated confidentiality issue, the NYSBA Committee on
Professional Ethics stated, "In considering the ethical issue, we believe that the
criminalization of unauthorized interception of e-mail certainly enhances the
reasonableness of an expectation that e-mails will be as private as other forms of
telecommunication. That prohibition, together with the developing experience
from the increasingly widespread use of Internet e-mail, persuades us that
concerns over lack of privacy in the use of Internet e-mail are not currently well
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Ethics Opinions
Updated February I, 1999
The following ethics opinions relate to Internet or electronic communications.
1. ABA (#99-413 3/10/99): There is no automatic duty to
encrypt Internet e-mail to protect client confidences and secrets.
Although there is a "reasonable expectation of privacy" in Internet e-
mail, lawyers should still consider the dangers associated with the
transmission of client confidences via any medium and reach an
understanding with their clients regarding appropriate means to
transmit sensitive client information. The summary of the opinion
states, "A lawyer may transmit information relating to the
representation of a client by unencrypted e-mail sent over the
Internet without violating the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
[] because the mode of transmission affords a reasonable expectation
of privacy from a technological and legal standpoint. The same
privacy accorded U.S. and commercial mail, land-line telephonic
transmissions, and facsimiles applies to Internet e-mail. A lawyer
should consult with the client and follow her instructions, however,
as to the mode of transmitting highly sensitive information relating
to the client's representation."
II. Alabama (#RO-96-07, 10/23/96): Information made available to
the public, regardless ofmeans used, must comply with Rules of
Professional Conduct.
III. Alaska Bar Association (98-2. 1/16/98), E-mail
communications need not be automatically encrypted to protect
client confidences;attorneys should discuss the issue with their
clients.
IV. Arizona (99-06. 6/99) [pdfl: Arizona lawyers may not
ethically participate in an Internet service that sends legal questions
from individuals to attorneys based upon the subject matter of the
question. The opinion also notes that lawyers can not pay a fee for
such referrals or give the service a portion of the legal fees earned
from the referral.
V. Arizona (#97-04. 4/7/97) [pdfl: Discusses advertising
"housekeeping" requirements, such as need to include the cities
where the lawyer has offices and/or will actually perform work
(citing ER 7.1); client consent needed before providing a list of
existing clients; and explanations regarding whether or not firms are
affiliated if site provides links to other firms. (ER 7.1(p». Direct e-
mail to a prospective client may be a solicitation if the lawyer
initiates the contact and the client has a known legal need for a
particular matter. If it is solicitation, then specific disclosure must be
made and copy must be sent to Clerk of Supreme Court. Lawyers
probably may not join an on-line referral service. Generally, lawyers
need not submit copy of Web site to State Bar and Supreme Court.
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Lawyers must retain copy of Web site in some retrievable format"
AND record of when and where the web site was used.
VI. Colorado: (#90, 11/14/92): Lawyer must exercise reasonable
care to protect client confidences from inadvertent disclosure when
using electronic communications devices such as telephones, cellular
phones, and facsimile machines. The opinion does NOT specifically
address e-mail but is included to show prior treatment of inadvertent
disclosure rules.
VII. Connecticut: (#97 - 29, 10/22/97): Advertising Rules apply to
web site advertising, but Rule 7.3's solicitation rules does not as a
general matter. The applicability ofConnecticut's rule to out-of-state
advertisements by lawyers is a question of law and beyond the ethics
committee's jurisdiction.
VIII. District of Columbia: (#281, 2/18/98): In most
circumstances, transmission ofconfidential information by
unencrypted electronic mail does not per se violate the
confidentiality rules of the legal profession. However, individual
circumstances may require greater means of security.
IX. Illinois (#96-10. 5/6/96): Web site equivalent to telephone
directory yellow pages. Participation in bulletin board, chat group, or
similar service may implicate solicitation rules. If lawyer seeks to
initiate an unrequested contact with a specific person as a result of
participation in a chat,room or bulletin board, then lawyer subject to
solicitation rules and messages must be labeled as advertising
materials.
X. Illinois (#94-11. 11/94): Confidentiality of cellular
telephone use and participation in legal advice service. Included in
materials for treatment of referral services.
XI. Iowa: (#97-11. 9/18/97): Discussed lawyer referral service
issues.
XII. Iowa: (#97-01. 9/18/97): Amending opinion 96-01 and
Iowa's e-mail encryption requirement; now client consent needed,
not necessarily encryption.
XIII. Iowa: (#96-33.6/5/97): Describing meaning ofsensitive
material" as the term relates to e-mail encryption requirements.
XIV. Iowa: (#96-14. 8129196): Advertisements by out-of-state
firm with offices in Iowa must comply with Iowa's ethics rules. Can
have two separate, unconnected web sites.
XV. Iowa: (#96-02, 8/29/96): addressing some issues associated with
Web Site language (e.g., specialization, disclosures).
XVI. Iowa: (#96-02. 8/26/96): Web Site disclaimer language on
association web site.
XVII. Iowa: (#96-01. 8129/96): E-mail encryption (see 97-01 for
amended version) and Web site disclosure requirements.
XVIII. Iowa: (#95-30.5/16/96): OUt of state home page and
confidentiality.
XIX. Iowa: (#95-21. 2122/96): Addressing Bulletin
Board/Internet lawyer referral services.
XX. Kentucky E-403 (July 1998): This official advisory opinion
authorizes unencrypted email communications and a
characterizes web pages as advertising, rather than solicitation.
XXI. Massachusetts 00-01 (1/2000): Deals with th ethics of
unencrypted e-mail. Like the ABA and other opinions on the issue,
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the opinion states that it is not ail ethical violation to exchange
unencryped e-mail with a client.
XXII. Mass 1998-2 (5/29/98): Applicability of advertising and
lawyer referral rules where bar association intends to establish an
Internet site that contain membership directory and links to member
home pages.
XXIII. Massachusetts: (#1997-130.9/18/97): Addresses issues
associated with publication of Web directory of lawyers and lawyer
referral services (see 1998-2 for formal opinion).
XXIV. Massachusetts: 94-5 (3/22/94) : Lawyers should disclose
dangers regarding disclosing confidences when speaking with client
on cellular telephone.
XXV. Michigan (#RI-276. 7/11/96): Web sites regulated by Rule
7.1 and copies retained pursuant to Rule 7.2 E-mail to one or more
e-mail addresses must follow rules relating to general and direct mail
solicitation (Rule 7.3). A chat room" interactive communication is
like a direct solicitation and outside the activity permitted by Rule
7.3. Layers may not solicit legal business unless follow Rule 7.3.
XXVI. Minnesota (#19. 1/22/99): A lawyer may use technological
means such as unencrypted electronic mail (e-mail) and cordless and
cellular telephones to communicate confidential client information
without violating Rule 1.6 under specified conditions.
XXVII. Missouri (990007) deals with the scope of a client consent form
relating to the use of e-mail between the lawyer and client. The
opinion notes that it would be difficult to create a comprehensive
form to cover all concerns raised bye-mail. Lawyers are encouraged
to discuss with their clients the risks associated with e-mail
communication and storage.
XXVIII. Missouri (#97-10): A lawyer who sets up a website referring to
a specific area of practice, invites people to send the attorney E-mail
on that area, and lists the website address and the E-mail address on
letterhead should include in the website a statement that E-mail is
not necessarily confidential.
XXIX. Nebraska (#95-3): Lawyers may not participate in a "for-profit"
Internet lawyer referral program.
XXX. DisplayText cannot span more than one line! : The
Association of the Bar of the City of New York Committee on
Professional and Judicial Ethics opinion says that a law firm should
maintain a copy of its website for at least one year, but need not file
a copy with the Departmental Disciplinary Committee. A law firm
that establishes a discussion area on its website should exercise
caution and vigilance to avoid the establishment of an attorney-client
relationship and impermissible advertising or solicitation. A law
firm may not pay a fee to an Internet service provider calculated by
reference to fees earned by the law firm from the provision of on-
line services. A law firm may not post a form for a new customer to
request a trademark or copyright search, but may do so for existing
clients. A law firm need not encrypt all e-mail communications
containing confidential client information, but should advise its
clients and prospective clients communicating with the firm by e-
mail that security of communications over the Internet is not as
secure as other forms ofcommunications.
XXXI. Nassau County (N.Y.) Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics,
Gp. 99-3 (9/29/99): Lawyers may pay to be listed as "sponsor" in
banner advertisements on Internet sites that provide viewers with
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infonnation about particular fields oflaw, provided that certain
disclaimers are used.
XXXII. DisplayText cannot span more than one line! :
Lawyer may advertise in Internet Web site sponsored by another
organization, though use of title "Attorney Referral Board" is
potentially misleading.
XXXIII. New York 709 addressed the question whether an attorney
may operate and advertise a trademark practice over the Internet.
The NYSBA Committee on Professional Ethics held that using the
Internet to take orders for trademark searches, conduct trademark
searches, render legal opinions and file trademark applications is
analogous to conducting a law practice by telephone or facsimile
machine and is pennissible, subject to the same restrictions
applicable to communication by those means.
XXXIV. North Carolina Opinion (#RPC 215 (4/13/95): Lawyers
must minimize the risk ofdisclosing confidential infonnation when
using cellular phones or e-mail. If the lawyer is aware that the
communication can be intercepted, the lawyer must notifY the parties
to the conversation.
XXXV. North Carolina (#RPC 239. 7/25/96): Must indicate the
jurisdictions in which the lawyer is licensed to practice and the
geographic location of the layer's principal office. Listing may
indicate areas of concentration or interest. Lawyer must retain copy
of advertisement and a record of when and where it was used..
Compliance with this requirement by print hard copy ofall screens
of site and any material changes in fonnat or content.
XXXVI. North Carolina (#RPC 241. 10/16/96): Lawyer may
participate in Internet directory of lawyers, but listing must indicate
the jurisdictions in which the lawyer is licensed to practice and the
geographic location of the layer's principal office. Listing may
indicate areas of concentration or interest.
XXXVIINorth Dakota: (#99-03, 6/21/99): Lawyers may use online data
backup service if the lawyer ensures that data transmission is secure
and that the infonnation storage system adequately safeguards
sensitive records.
XXXVIIINorth Dakota: (#97-09,9/4/97): Lawyers need not use
encryption to send routine e-mail to clients.
XXXIX. Ohio (#99-2, 4/9/99): Ohio lawyers may communicate with
clients via unencrypted e-mail.
XL. Ohio (#99-3, 6/4/99): Ohio lawyers may be included in
professional association's online membership directory, with a link
from lawyer's listing to lawyer's e-mail address.lawfinnWebsite.ir
Web site of related professional association.
XLI. Ohio (#99-4, 6/4/99): Ohio lawyer need not use finn's name as
part of "domain name" for finn's Web site, but name that is used
must not be false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, self-laudatory,
or unfair and may not imply special competence or experience.
XLII. Ohio (#99-9, 12/2/99): Ohio ethics rules pennit rendering of
online legal advice for a fee, subject to same constraints that govern
other methods of deIlvering legal services. The board offered a list
of suggestions for avoiding ethical problems in the course of
providing online legal representation through e-mail answers to e-
mail questions from nonlawyers.
XLIII. Oregon (#1994-137,8/94): Lawyers may participate in online,
self-help legal infonnation system providing infonnation on
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substantive, procedural, and jurisdictional matters
XLIV. Pennsylvania 98-85 (7/24/98): Discussesjurisdictional
issues associated with lawyer web site publication.
XLV. Pennsylvania 97-130 (9/26/97): Analyzing ethical
obligations relating to e-mail and confidentiality.
XLVI. Pennsylvania (#96-17,5/3/96): Addressing Web Site advertising
requirements. Retain copy of ad along with record of when and
where it was used. (Rule 7.2(b)). Also disclose the geographic
location ofoffice in which the lawyer who will actually perform the
services principally practice law.
XLVII. Philadelphia Bar Association 98-6 (3/98) Ethical issues
associated with lawyer participation in Internet discussion groups
and chats.
XLVIII. South Carolina (#99-09): Deals with a lawyer whose client
unilaterally created a web site advertising for additional plaintiffs in
a pending litigation. The lawyer has a duty to verify that the web site
complies with applicable advertising rules. If the lawyer determines
that the Web Site does not comply with ethical advertising rules and
the client refuses to make changes, the lawyer can withdraw.
XLIX. South Carolina (#97-08) Discussing -mail confidentiality
issues. Finds a reasonable expectation of privacy when sending
confidential information through electronic mail (whether direct
link, commercial service, or Internet). The Opinion also states that
the use of electronic mail will not affect the confidentiality of client
communications under South Carolina Rule of Professional Conduct
1.6. This opinion revisited the e-mail confidentiality issue as
originally addressed in Opinion 94-27 addressing on line legal
advice.
L. South Carolina (#94-27): Addressing advertising and e-
mail issues. Must identify the geographic limitations of the lawyer's
practice, so that "it is clear that he may not practice law except in .
those states in which he is admitted to practice." (citing Rule 7.2(a)).
NOTE: see opinion 97-08 for updated requirements regarding e-
mail.
LI. South Dakota (#98-10, 1/12/99) finds that a South Dakota
lawyer may not participate in an Internet Referral Service taking an
advertising fee and a share of legal fees to refer cases to South
Dakota lawyer but providing no legal services.
LII. Tennessee (#98-A-650(a), 11/19/98): Amends Advisory
opinion 98-A-650 to allow the use of e-mail to transmit client
confidences and secrets via the Internet. Notes that "[t]he reasoning
in these new opinions [SC 97-08 and DC 281] is that the technology
involved in e-mail is now better understood and the use of e-mail is
more widespread. The technology has also improved. It is generally
accepted that the security of e-mail is probably no more problematic
than the security of a non-cordless telephone line."
LIII. Tennessee (Formal Op. 99-F-144, 6/14/99): Lawyers who list
practice areas on the Internetmust comply with disclosure
requirements regarding specialization. This includes listing in law
directories or other Web Sites available to the public.
LIV. Tennessee (#95-A-576, 7/6/95): Advertising/publicity rules
generally inapplicable when an lawyer responds through private
electronic mail to an individual inquiry on a legal matter posted to
the Internet.
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LV. Tennessee (#95-A-570, 5/17/95): Newsgroup postings are a
form of improper solicitation similar to unsolicited phone contacts.
Web sites must contain certification disclaimer if an area ofpractice
is listed (DR 2-101(C» and it must contain statement "This Is An
Advertisement" (2-10 I(N). The lawyer must furnish a copy to the
Board of Professional Responsibility 3 days before it is placed on
the Web (2-1OI(F».
LVI. Canter Disciplinary Judgment (#95-831) Posting on
bulletin board is violation ofTennessee DR 1-102(A)(I), (5),(6), and
DR 2-103. Must include "This Is An Advertisement" disclaimer.
Description as "Immigration Attorneys" presented the attorneys as
specialists without the requisite disclaimer. Additional violation for
failure to sent a copy to Board 3 days prior to publication.
LVII.· Utah 97-10 (10124/97) Addressing lawyer Web site, e-mail,
newsgroup, and chat use for advertising purposes.
LVIII. Vermont (#97-5): General advertising rules apply to Web
sites, but the opinion may change with push technology where
lawyers can direct information to subscribers. This could raise
solicitation and direct mail issues.Internet "home page" is not
"directed to a specific recipient" and is similar to a phone book's
"yellow pages." Importantly, the Vermont Conuilittee stated
specifically that it did NOT address the use of push technology, chat
rooms, news groups, discussion groups, or other "potentially
interactive means ofcommunicating."
LIX. Virginia A-OlIO (04/14/98): The Virginia State Bar's
Standing Committee on Lawyer Advertising and Solicitation issued
this advisory opinion dealing with Internet lawyer advertising. It
states states that Web Sites are covered by the existing advertising
rules, but that additional rules may need to be drafted. In addition,
lawyers who communicate on the Internet in "real time" chat rooms
must abide by the restrictions on solicitation. Moreover, a lawyer
who solicits employment in a "real time" chat room may not solicit
employment in personal injury or wrongful death cases by
communicating with the victim or their immediate family.
LX. Virginia 1702 (11/24/97): Addressing duty ofzealous
representation and inadvertent receipt of information transmitted via
e-mail and facsimile.
ILS Webmaster © 1996-1998 Internet Legal Services Disclaimers (Reprinted courtesy of ILS)
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1. The transmission of information from Legalethics.com or The Practicing
Attorney's Home Page to you is not intended to create nor does it create an
attorney-client relationship between Internet Legal Services and you.
2. The resources that can be accessed with hypertext links from Legalethics.com
are not maintained by Internet Legal Services. Internet Legal Services is not
responsible for the contents of any such resources.
3. Internet Legal Services does not (a) make any warranty, express or implied,
with respect to the use of the links provided; or (b) guarantee the accuracy,
completeness, usefulness or adequacy of any resources, information, apparatus,
product, or process available at or from Legalethics.com.
4. The rules, regulations, and statutory references to ethical requirements at
Legalethics.com are subject to revision and interpretation. Unless otherwise
noted, we make no representation, warranty or claim that the information
available here is current or accurate. You should contact your state or local bar
for guidance on their current requirements. Internet Legal Services is not
responsible for any errors or omissions in the resources or information available
at or from Legalethics.com.
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5. Reference at Legalethics.com to any specific commercial product, process, or
service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not
necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement or recommendation by Internet
Legal Services.
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